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Hoje — 8 de Setembro de 2026Cybersecurity News
  • ✇Security | CIO
  • OpenAI agent swarm exposes a blind spot in AI containment
    A swarm of autonomous OpenAI agents spent six weeks this summer turning an obscure, 25-year-old German developer wiki into a private message board, without OpenAI’s knowledge, according to independent researchers. The agents used it to trade answers to timed tasks, reverse-engineer a random number generator, and share a technique for bypassing network restrictions meant to keep them off the open internet. “These AIs colluded to share answers, research their environme
     

OpenAI agent swarm exposes a blind spot in AI containment

8 de Setembro de 2026, 09:15

A swarm of autonomous OpenAI agents spent six weeks this summer turning an obscure, 25-year-old German developer wiki into a private message board, without OpenAI’s knowledge, according to independent researchers.

The agents used it to trade answers to timed tasks, reverse-engineer a random number generator, and share a technique for bypassing network restrictions meant to keep them off the open internet.

“These AIs colluded to share answers, research their environment, and bypass sandbox restrictions,” researchers at the Nightingale Collective wrote in a report.

The agents were expected to operate independently with read-only access to the internet. Instead, they “found a way to use their read access to write information to an obscure German wiki” and began using it as a shared message board.

The group documented roughly 18,000 wiki edits made between May and July.

“OpenAI has not publicly disclosed this incident,” the report added.

The researchers said this wiki-based swarm is a separate group of agents from the one behind that Hugging Face attack.

“The main reason we believe this was a distinct swarm is because these agents explicitly had internet access as part of their task — the whole point was web browsing,” the researchers wrote. “The Hugging Face agents were in a sandbox without internet access and had to hack their way out by exploiting the Artifactory package manager.”

From isolation to coordination

Once the agents began writing to the wiki, the researchers said it effectively became a coordination layer.

“The agents used this wiki to communicate information with each other, primarily to help them succeed at their task,” the report states. “They asked for answers, pooled results, and shared techniques for bypassing their restrictions.”

Based on the posts reviewed, the researchers say agents appeared to use each other’s outputs to complete tasks more efficiently, in some cases enabling near-instant responses when similar questions appeared later in the sequence.

The activity was sustained and large-scale. The researchers identified thousands of distinct agent identities operating over a period of weeks, with a sharp increase in coordination beginning in mid-June.

Sharing ways to bypass controls

The report also documented agents exchanging techniques to circumvent technical restrictions.

According to the researchers, agents faced limitations that allowed only GET requests, but they collaborated on ways to bypass those constraints, including exploiting how trusted hostnames were handled within the sandbox environment.

Other agents then tested and confirmed these methods, suggesting that the wiki was used not just for coordination but also for distributing reproducible bypass techniques.

The researchers also observed agents uploading compressed datasets across multiple pages, which they say indicates the wiki was being used as shared infrastructure rather than incidental output.

Where containment assumptions fall short

For enterprise leaders, the findings point to a more specific failure: not of compute isolation, but of how agent behavior is constrained.

“This incident exposes an incomplete definition of containment,” said Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research.

Gogia noted that the evidence does not show agents escaping their execution environment, but rather bypassing network restrictions and creating “unauthorised shared memory on a public wiki.”

“A sandbox can protect the host while failing to contain the work,” he said, adding that a domain allowlist “says nothing about what the agent can make the destination do.”

Gogia said organizations lack visibility into which agents are acting with authority, as well as where those agents may be storing or sharing data externally.

“Any service an agent can write to, and another agent can read is shared memory,” he said, whether or not that interaction is visible to orchestration systems.

Discovery and possible intervention

The timeline reconstructed from wiki logs suggests the activity continued for weeks before being curtailed.

“We believe OpenAI discovered the message board,” the researchers wrote, pointing to visits from IP addresses associated with the company beginning June 21.

The report noted that agent activity on the website dropped to near zero the following day, adding, “We infer that OpenAI intervened at this point to prevent further edits.”

For practitioners, analysts said, the episode also highlights limitations in how agent activity is typically monitored.

“A capable agent finding a coordination channel on a public wiki is exposing a blind spot that was never instrumented,” said Amit Kumar Jena, head of AI at Kanerika, adding that most monitoring systems were not designed to detect “inter-agent coordination on external resources.”

Jena said many enterprise controls remain focused on model outputs rather than behavior. “What the model says, not what it does,” he said. “That breaks completely with multi-agent systems.”

Disclosure questions

The report pointed out that “OpenAI has not publicly disclosed this incident,” raising broader questions for enterprise buyers around how such events are classified and communicated.

Gogia said the industry lacks a clear category for incidents that fall short of a breach but still represent consequential system behavior.

“A vendor’s definition of an incident must not become the customer’s blind spot,” he said.

Jena added that enterprises should evaluate vendors not just on disclosure, but on detection capability. “Enterprises should ask not just whether a vendor disclosed, but whether they even knew,” he said.

OpenAI did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • Harnessing unleashed AI agents
    In Northeast Greenland, where temperatures can plummet to -40°F, security officials rely on the Sirius Dog Sled Patrol, led by well-trained canines that guard the sprawling, weather-beaten coastline – tundra territory where snowmobiles commonly fail. Tethered together with the right harness that efficiently channels their collective energy toward a shared mission, the sled dogs are more than up to the challenge. But left to run free without the leashes and human guidance,
     

Harnessing unleashed AI agents

8 de Setembro de 2026, 08:00

In Northeast Greenland, where temperatures can plummet to -40°F, security officials rely on the Sirius Dog Sled Patrol, led by well-trained canines that guard the sprawling, weather-beaten coastline – tundra territory where snowmobiles commonly fail. Tethered together with the right harness that efficiently channels their collective energy toward a shared mission, the sled dogs are more than up to the challenge. But left to run free without the leashes and human guidance, they naturally become a pack of wild animals bent on following their instincts.  

Enterprises relying on AI could learn a thing or two from this scenario. In recent years, organizations have depended on copilots and chat-based assistance designed to answer questions or summarize information. These systems have advanced to include autonomous agents increasingly capable of executing workflows, accessing tools, interacting with software and making decisions with limited human oversight. AI has been enabled to serve as a true workforce partner.

It’s an evolution that promises significant productivity gains but requires a more advanced foundation. Even the smartest agents need clear directives and the right connections to successfully maneuver sophisticated enterprise systems and maximize their potential.

This concept has been coming up pretty frequently in conversations I’ve been having with tech leaders lately. When I was in Nashville not long ago for the Insurance Innovators USA conference, and later over a few cocktails with former colleagues near San Francisco, I quickly tuned into a growing trend. Instead of talking about predictable topics like which foundation model was the most intelligent, the conversation veered toward a more thought-provoking challenge: How do we connect and amplify these increasingly autonomous AI systems to yield the greatest value more safely?

The answer to that question represents enterprise AI’s next major opportunity. Organizations are now realizing that capability and raw intelligence are only the beginning:  Building the infrastructure that enables agents to perform dependably at scale matters even more.

Operationalizing intelligence

Autonomous agents are a different animal from traditional AI assistants. That’s because they don’t simply generate text; they take resonant action. A self-directed AI agent can, for instance, update customer records, trigger software workflows, initiate financial transactions and coordinate with other AI agents. These proficiencies significantly up their value and turn them into vibrant operational resources. But these assets require a structured environment to succeed. An agentic system can have the necessary tools but lack the right controls to navigate compliance and privacy rules. To tap their full potential, the architecture that effectively directs their actions must exist.

Traditional guardrails weren’t designed for this kind of autonomy. Prompt filtering, simple permissions and basic access controls do the job for conversational AI. But they don’t cut it when it comes to enabling software that makes decisions and interacts with enterprise systems independently. That requires a new level of orchestration.

Enterprises need a standardized control layer for agent behavior, regardless of which underlying model powers them. We have to recognize that intelligence by itself isn’t enough – control is just as important.

Which brings us back to those trusty sled dogs. Think of each dog as a large language model (LLM) task. We often run several LLM tasks within a harness, often involving different models, comparable to a sled team. Just as each dog is positioned for what it does best, from lead dog to wheel dog, a “mixture of experts” delegates each part of the problem to the LLM task best suited to handle it. Without a harness guiding their powerful capabilities for a common purpose and enabling better performance, those LLM tasks, like the dogs, can’t effectively pull the sled. An AI model needs this same type of surrounding governance to reliably perform enterprise work and accomplish its objectives.

An agent harness provides the necessary infrastructure to contain and channel agent capability safely. It securely defines permissions and access boundaries, determines rigid tool usage limitations, manages workflow sequencing, human approval workflows and approval logic and creates audit and observability trails. The LLMs provide raw power, but the harness enables the coordination and audit trails needed to transform AI intelligence into reliable operations.

AI tools are progressing into increasingly dynamic autonomous agents. It’s encouraging to see that organizations have mostly moved beyond experimentation and are finally incorporating AI into production workflows that impact customers and revenue. But that means regulators are paying closer attention, particularly to organizations in insurance, financial services and other highly regulated industries. The architecture facilitating these agents has to be resilient enough to both comply with requirements and foster speedy innovation.

Autonomous AI agents signal a new era of speed and capability, creating exciting prospects for executive leaders ready to scale operations. To take advantage of this momentum, they should ensure that early deployments have strategic guardrails and a clear operational runway for these agents to thrive. The right infrastructure and the ability to interact with multiple software systems enable agents to orchestrate complex, multi-system workflows with precision and high-impact efficiency. That means enterprise-grade governance around agentic systems must improve.

Major foundation model providers are increasingly implementing proprietary harness capabilities directly into their ecosystems. These exclusive harnesses often provide better performance optimization, more seamless coordination and enhanced access to model-specific capabilities. The prevailing industry sentiment is that these environments will consistently deliver the best results. Case in point: If you want the strongest performance from Claude, you’re better off using Anthropic’s surrounding ecosystem and harnessing infrastructure rather than treating the model as a standalone component.

That said, there’s also value in maintaining the freedom to jump between models on a daily basis. Most developers, me included, switch between something like six models daily, whether that’s Claude, Gemini, Muse or an open-source option, depending on the task. That flexibility gets much harder to preserve once a company builds on a provider-specific harness, such as Anthropic. While this will likely improve performance and cut costs, the trade-off is increased vendor lock-in.

This creates a strategic choice for organizations: Fully embrace a vendor ecosystem for immediate performance, or maintain ownership of your own orchestration layer? Use the harness provided by the model provider, or build your own custom harness tailored to your business requirements?

I remain hopeful that many enterprises will leverage vendor innovations, while ensuring their core business logic remains portable instead of embedded within closed proprietary systems. But only time will tell.

The many benefits of harnessed agents

A carefully designed agent harness does more than merely decrease risk. It also lays a foundation for implementing autonomous agents with better confidence. You can count on the safe deployment of autonomous agents in production environments. No more wondering whether or not an agent will exceed its authority: Your enterprise can define exactly what it is permitted to do. A robust harness also delivers fine-tuned control over agent actions and access to tools, including which APIs, enterprise systems and software resources that each agent can invoke. Compliance-ready auditability is equally important for regulated industries.

The bottom line is that you can rely on the right harness to provide better peace of mind, transforming your AI into a transparent operational system that ensures reduced operational risk while seamlessly amplifying automation. The result is scalable AI systems that companies can actually trust.

Trust isn’t guaranteed just because a model scores well. It’s earned via system predictability. As my friend and former Google colleague Ben Mathes warned me, crafting custom rules around today’s models is risky. That’s because every few months, new foundation models make yesterday’s engineering workarounds extinct. We should instead prioritize building robust frameworks that can adapt as models progress.

I believe lasting advantage comes from fat skills – modular, detailed instruction sets that tell an AI agent how to perform a specific task without cluttering its core system – and fat prompts that capture institutional knowledge, along with rigorous backends that meticulously organize enterprise data. This enables the harness to evolve alongside improving models without needing to be completely rebuilt, which means business expertise can remain the primary fuel that powers AI success.

Actionable steps for enterprises

So, what are the best practices going forward? CIOs and CTOs should treat agent governance as a core infrastructure decision. Procurement focus needs to expand from models to platforms to, ultimately, control systems. And enterprises need to understand that competitive advantage will be dependent on three factors:

  1. Safety – Does the model safely do what you wanted to do?
  2. Performance – Does it do it well?
  3. Costs – Does it do it with relatively low expense?

Professionals in this space now face the strategic decision I mentioned earlier: use vendor-provided harnesses and maximize performance, or build proprietary internal harnesses to preserve flexibility and avoid vendor lock-in.

Without a resilient harness, you risk slower adoption due to security concerns. For example, Tesla is rolling out a $200 token-per-month cap on employee spending on third-party AI tools at around the same time a new Claude model debuted with lower per-request token costs. Yes, safety continues to be nonnegotiable. But once you meet that threshold, optimizing performance and expense becomes the Pareto Frontier problem your organization should be closely watching.

The AI arms race is no longer merely about smarter models. Instead, it’s about safely deploying autonomy at minimal cost. That’s why implementing an appropriate agent harness is so crucial. It becomes the critical operating layer that allows intelligent agents to reliably function inside an enterprise.

As we transition to the next phase of AI adoption, control is going to matter as much as capability to executives. The LLM also matters, of course, but without the proper framework, it can’t operate effectively. The organizations that dominate won’t necessarily have the best model; instead, they’ll have the most effective framework for deploying and governing autonomous agents.

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • How to upskill IT for agentic AI: 7 pathways to success
    There are two prevailing schools of thought regarding the AI-agent workforce. One says organizations should prepare for agentic AI, in which the human-in-the-middle role is largely transitional and serves to buy time to improve agents’ accuracy and build trust in their decision-making. Others say AI agents will largely augment humans, but expect workflows to change drastically from task-based processes to more asynchronous, choreographed operations. Businesses will like
     

How to upskill IT for agentic AI: 7 pathways to success

8 de Setembro de 2026, 07:01

There are two prevailing schools of thought regarding the AI-agent workforce. One says organizations should prepare for agentic AI, in which the human-in-the-middle role is largely transitional and serves to buy time to improve agents’ accuracy and build trust in their decision-making. Others say AI agents will largely augment humans, but expect workflows to change drastically from task-based processes to more asynchronous, choreographed operations.

Businesses will likely have a mix of agentic and human-augmented AI agents, with many more in pilot stages. As part of this transformation, CIOs need to consider how to evolve the IT organization and upskill IT employees for this future. According to Deloitte’s 2026 Global Technology Leadership Survey, 75% of IT leaders agree their operating models and processes must change within the next 12 to 18 months to drive greater value.

“Upskilling IT for an AI-agent workforce requires more than training; it requires behavior change because as AI takes on more routine development activities, technology professionals increasingly focus on validating, governing, and directing AI-generated outputs,” says Doug Vargo, VP of consulting services and head of the national AI and alliances team at CGI. “The cognitive habits that define experienced engineers are deeply ingrained, so they need to develop new ways of working focused on reviewing outputs, framing intent, and curating the context that keeps those outputs accurate, secure, and aligned with business objectives.”

How CIOs upskill their organizations will follow several career tracks. Here are the most essential to consider.

Developing business acumen and AI literacy for IT leaders

AI is requiring more IT professionals to shift left into transformational leadership and change-agent roles. These leaders will advise business managers on when to use AI versus other technologies to automate tasks, and when to consider top-down re-engineering workflows based on AI capabilities.

“Leaders need to help their teams understand how work flows across the business, where AI fits into that process, and where humans need to stay accountable,” says Jamie Lyon, chief product and strategy officer at Lucid Software. “As AI agents take on more of the execution, critical thinking becomes even more important because people still need to provide the context, define the process, and make the decisions AI can’t.”

One of the top barriers in delivering value from AI is employee adoption. CIOs need more change agents to drive enthusiasm and help department leaders reimagine emerging job responsibilities. Upskilling IT leaders for change-agent roles often requires embedding them in business units so they can learn their processes and build relationships.

Upskilling focus: AI literacy, critical thinking, business relationship management, and change management are four primary skills. To connect problems to solutions, developing skills in architecture, design thinking, and analytics is also needed. 

Extending AI and data governance for everyone

According to Adobe’s 2026 AI and Digital Trends, 78% of technology leaders say data integration and quality is a top AI challenge, and 52% say limited data unification is holding back AI initiatives. CIOs facing data governance, integration, and management challenges risk seeing their businesses fall behind their competitors who are aggressively pursuing AI-driven opportunities.

“Upskilling for an AI agent workforce starts with understanding that the biggest challenge is the data and operational layer underneath the model itself. IT teams need to know how to connect fragmented data, engineer the context and memory that make AI agents more reliable, and support transactional, analytical, and vector workloads on a unified platform without breaking the budget,” says Adam Luciano, VP of product management at MariaDB. “They also need to understand governance, security, and observability so autonomous systems can safely execute real business processes and expand to higher-value use cases instead of simply generating recommendations.”

Data governance used to be a compliance team’s responsibility, but AI now requires many more in IT to be versed with policies, practices, and related technologies.

“As AI agents begin executing work across enterprise environments, IT teams need to build governance skills, not just AI literacy,” says Doug Gilbert, CIO and chief digital officer at Sutherland. “They should know how to assign accountability, monitor data access, enforce human-style approval workflows, and maintain complete audit trails so AI operates under the same controls as any employee and not as an exception to them.”

Upskilling focus: One upskilling focus should be on data governance, DataOps, data engineering, and data management. A second focus should address data risk management issues, such as data security and AI governance.

Expanding knowledge management to develop AI’s context layer

CIOs looking to scale from dozens of AI agents to thousands of AI-orchestrated workflows will need to develop an AI brain for their organizations, including knowledge graphs, a semantic layer, and a context layer.

“One critical place for CIOs and CISOs to focus upskilling is building the information layer that has to replace the human management layer everyone’s trying to collapse,” says Lior Gavish, co-founder and CTO at Monte Carlo. “A real part of what managers do is information work, including passing context, surfacing priorities, and keeping decisions aligned with the bigger picture. Flatten the org without replacing that function, and you get people, or agents, making locally optimized decisions on incomplete information.”

Organizations will need cross-disciplinary teams to develop and improve their context layers. Data skills to develop include extending unstructured data governance, evolving data fabrics, and building data products.

“The challenge is no longer just teaching employees how to use new tools, but ensuring teams know how to structure, manage, and govern the knowledge that powers them,” says Adam Field, chief AI officer at Tungsten Automation. “This will require new skills around contextual AI training, knowledge management, and information stewardship. Organizations that can effectively connect AI systems to trusted institutional knowledge, while maintaining appropriate security and access controls, will be better positioned to accelerate product development, improve collaboration, and increase access to critical information across their company.”

Upskilling focus: To develop the context layer needed by AI agents, CIOs should promote collaboration and communication skills alongside key data management, integration, and governance skills. In addition, agile data teams will need strong business acumen to partner with department leaders and subject matter experts.

Establishing an AI quality center of excellence

DevOps teams accelerating their deployment cycles while underinvesting in continuous testing were left with one of two bad options. Some tried to get business users to perform extensive user acceptance testing. Others deployed applications with minimal testing, hoping their observability and monitoring would catch errors before users escalated issues.

Underinvesting in testing and automating evaluations of AI agents can lead to significant issues, including increased costs, compliance violations, and operational impacts.

Sanjay Gidwani, CEO and founder at Kosmos, says the skill that will matter more than building AI agents is in confirming their accuracy. “Agents increasingly act on correlations drawn across disconnected systems, and a correlation that a human never confirmed is a decision waiting to go sideways at high speed. Upskill your teams to serve as the confirmation layer for what agents do before anything is acted on,” Gidwani says.

CIOs should think about AI agent quality from three perspectives:

  • When are AI agents in experimental and pilot stages delivering high enough quality to be released into production?
  • Once in production, how are quality metrics used to build trust in which decisions AI agents can automate, versus those that require people’s involvement?
  • How are AI agents’ quality benchmarked in production to detect when their models are drifting and the agents’ performance degrading?

Upskilling focus: CIOs should upskill teams in data quality, test automation, and analytics. Organizations scaling the number of AI agents in production should consider developing an AI quality center of excellence.

Revisiting the skills needed by product and program managers

Before developing that center of excellence, consider how AI is changing the nature of team collaboration. Three examples:

These three spinning process wheels inside IT, with evolving AI capabilities, are one reason why many CIOs are rethinking the IT organization for the AI era. According to Atlassian’s The State of Teams 2026, AI-augmented teams need more coordination, not less: 77% say they expect more horizontal teams with fewer layers, and 73% have blended roles with hybrid responsibilities.

Mal Vivek, CEO and founder at Zeb, says the most valuable capability CIOs can build for an agent workforce is judgment. “Teach teams to decompose work into clear objectives, constraints, and feedback. These skills won’t come from a one-off course or certification; it takes redesigning roles so that human judgment compounds,” Vivek says.

Upskilling focus: CIOs will need more business-facing roles to lead discussions on where to invest in AI. Skills to develop include Six Sigma process skills, product management disciplines, and agile planning practices.

Upskilling junior developers beyond coding skills

If 41% of all global code is AI-generated, do CIOs still need engineers?

According to Karat’s AI Workforce Transformation Report, 73% say strong engineers are now worth at least three times their total compensation. That’s likely because the top engineers were never just coders; they were stewards of the software development lifecycle, drivers of sound architectures, and advocates for addressing technical debt.

“Agent verification should be a top priority for CIOs and CISOs, training professionals to look beyond raw AI outputs and to get ahead of the review burden that can come with increased AI use,” says Samar Abbas, CEO at Temporal. “As agents move to writing more code, tech talent needs to embrace becoming primary evaluators, interrogating an agent’s design decisions, defending the generated architecture under questioning, and confidently proving its correctness.”

Upskilling focus: CIOs should consider apprenticeship programs to accelerate junior developers into senior-level roles and entry-level architecture responsibilities. To start, junior developers will need training in systems thinking and in resolving issues flagged by code review tools. Beyond these basics, guide developers to build technical domain expertise in two to three focus areas such as testing, data, identity management, application performance, API development, integration, and security.

Maturing AgenticOps in IT operations

While many organizations are still in pilot stages with AI agents, others are deploying thousands into production and using AI orchestration platforms to build complex workflows.

“As apps evolve from traditional software into autonomous AI agents, IT’s role shifts from maintaining systems to managing a digital workforce,” says Nikhil Mungel, head of AI R&D at Cribl. “IT teams will need to learn how to onboard and supervise AI agents, ensure they comply with company policies, and monitor for unusual or harmful behavior. The organizations that succeed will be those that invest in teaching IT teams to govern and manage AI systems in production.”

Upskilling focus: AgenticOps skills to focus on include identity management, root cause analysis, and monitoring AI agents. CIOs deploying hundreds of AI agents should plan to extend site reliability engineering to include tracking AI agent reliability and diagnosing their performance issues.

Developing a world-class IT department is not just about delivering business value. Top CIOs recognize that they need to plan their IT organizations to support future needs and update their skills and learning development programs. AI capabilities are evolving quickly, and CIOs need to guide employees on the new skills needed to enable the AI agent workforce.

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • The EU AI Act just gave you a breach notification clock you didn’t know about
    Most security teams already have a breach clock memorized. GDPR gives you 72 hours. SEC rules give public companies four business days after determining an incident is material. Those numbers get built into incident response runbooks, tabletop exercises and escalation paths, because the clock starts the moment the team confirms something happened. Article 73 of the EU AI Act adds a third clock, and in my work advising enterprise clients on AI governance, I have yet to s
     

The EU AI Act just gave you a breach notification clock you didn’t know about

8 de Setembro de 2026, 07:00

Most security teams already have a breach clock memorized. GDPR gives you 72 hours. SEC rules give public companies four business days after determining an incident is material. Those numbers get built into incident response runbooks, tabletop exercises and escalation paths, because the clock starts the moment the team confirms something happened.

Article 73 of the EU AI Act adds a third clock, and in my work advising enterprise clients on AI governance, I have yet to see one with a runbook for it.

The obligation took effect on August 2, and it did so alone. The EU’s Digital Omnibus on AI, in force since late July, pushed the rest of the Act’s high-risk enforcement wave — classification, conformity assessment, technical documentation — back to December 2027. Article 73 was not part of that reprieve, though the extra time elsewhere is worth using to get ready. It requires providers of high-risk AI systems to report serious incidents to national market surveillance authorities within 15 days by default, 10 days if a death is involved and just 2 days for incidents the Act classifies as widespread or as a serious disruption to critical infrastructure. Coverage of Article 73 so far has treated it as a legal filing requirement, handled through the same channel as a data protection filing. That framing misses what the obligation is. It is an incident response deadline, and it runs on a different trigger than the breach clocks most security teams already know.

A client once asked me, almost as an aside, whether their customer-facing AI tool would trigger a reporting duty if it simply gave someone bad information rather than getting hacked. At the time, the honest answer was probably not, under any framework they were tracking. Article 73 changes that, and most organizations building or buying AI for the EU market have not caught up yet.

What counts as a trigger here is broader than most teams expect

GDPR’s 72-hour clock starts when you become aware of a personal data breach. That is a bounded question. Did data leave the environment? Was it accessed without authorization? Article 73 asks something harder. The European Commission’s draft guidance takes the position that an indirect causal link between an AI system and a downstream harm is enough to trigger the reporting duty. Their example is a loan denial that traces back to a flawed AI credit assessment. The AI system does not cause harm the moment it produces the assessment, only once a human acts on it and denies the loan. The fundamental rights category requires the infringement to interfere with Charter-protected rights at scale, which is why the Commission illustrates that threshold with patterns, a recruitment tool that discriminates systematically or a credit system that categorically rejects an entire neighborhood. Under the Commission’s reading, once a pattern like that exists, the clock starts when the provider becomes aware of it, not when the system generated the output.

Here’s a plainer version of that pattern. A public benefits agency uses an AI system to match applicants against its records. A flaw in the matching logic occasionally conflates applicants, and over several weeks it happens to a run of different people, each flagged as already receiving the same benefit elsewhere and suspended. Nobody catches the pattern at the time, because each flag looks unremarkable on its own. Applicants don’t find out until their payments stop arriving, weeks after the first mismatch. The system never malfunctioned in any way security tooling would catch. It just produced bad matches until people started missing payments.

That is a different kind of determination than “Did we get breached?” It requires tracing a causal chain from a model output through a downstream decision to an actual harm, then judging how confident you are in that link before you are required to report it. Most incident response teams have a well-practiced instinct for confirming unauthorized access, but few have one for confirming that an AI system caused a harm that surfaced elsewhere in the business, days or weeks later. I have watched security leaders confidently answer, “Were we breached?” in minutes, then go quiet when asked, “Did our AI system cause this?” because nobody owns that second question yet.

Why this does not fit into an existing IR playbook

Most incident response programs are built around a single moment: detection. Something trips an alert, a SOC analyst confirms it and the clock starts. Article 73 incidents will not look like that at all. The AI system that produced the flawed output may show no signs of compromise. Nothing gets flagged by a SIEM. The first sign might come from a customer complaint, an internal audit finding or a pattern a compliance analyst notices months after the AI system made the decision.

That means the “becoming aware” clause in Article 73 is doing real work, and most organizations have not decided who is responsible for noticing. Is it the team monitoring the AI system’s technical performance, the business unit acting on its outputs, or whoever eventually hears the complaint? Under Article 73, the clock starts when any of them establishes, or suspects, the causal link, and 15 days is not a long runway if the first internal conversation about “is this our incident” does not happen until day six or seven. I have seen governance structures where a business unit head, a model risk team and security each assumed someone else owned this judgment call. In practice nobody did, and that gap is where a 15-day clock burns down to five.

Some security teams are already mapping agent governance to a maturity model, arguing that oversight must scale with autonomy, moving from agent identities that are barely inventoried toward ones that are bounded, monitored and revocable in real time. Article 73 raises the stakes on that model considerably. The less a human reviews an AI system’s output before it reaches a customer, the more likely a downstream harm surfaces without anyone watching for it in real time, which is exactly the blind spot Article 73 is designed to close.

What needs to change

A few additions belong in an existing incident response program before this becomes a live problem instead of a paper requirement.

First, a defined owner for the causal link determination. Data breach response usually has a clear owner: security confirms the technical facts, legal makes the materiality call. Article 73 needs an equivalent split: Someone technical enough to trace an AI system’s output to a downstream decision and someone with authority to make the reporting call once that link looks plausible rather than certain. In practice, I recommend naming this owner in the incident response plan, not leaving it to be sorted out during the first real incident, when the clock is already running.

Second, a lower bar for opening an investigation. If GDPR taught teams to investigate the moment unauthorized access is suspected, Article 73 requires investigating the moment a downstream harm is suspected to trace back to an AI system, when the system looks normal to security monitoring. That means feeding business unit complaints and customer escalations into the same triage process that currently only starts from technical alerts.

Third, a documented decision log for the indirect link judgment call. Given how broadly the Commission has defined what counts as reportable, organizations will make defensible calls not to report many ambiguous situations. Those decisions need to be documented with the reasoning behind them, the way a security team documents a false positive call, because a regulator revisiting that judgment months later will expect to see how it was made rather than take the outcome on faith.

Fourth, controls built into the AI system, not bolted on after the fact. A defined owner and a lower investigation bar help catch a problem once it surfaces, but neither reduces how often a flawed output reaches a customer first. Scoped credentials, tool allowlists and pre-action approval hooks cut down on how many incidents exist to report.

The AI Act’s high-risk obligations have absorbed most of the attention this year, because conformity assessments and technical documentation are heavy lifts with long lead times. Article 73 looks lighter by comparison, a reporting duty rather than a certification process. It is not lighter. It asks security and compliance teams to build a new kind of judgment into their incident response programs, on a clock as tight as anything GDPR or the SEC have required. Treat the deferral on the rest of the high-risk package as what it actually is, extra runway to build that judgment and name its owner, because the conformity paperwork still gives you months and Article 73 still gives you days.

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • What is sovereign AI? Strategic control of your AI future
    Ask IT leaders what sovereign AI is, and you’ll get a wide range of answers. Some will even struggle to define the term. Sovereign AI is an emerging concept focusing on giving organizations — or countries —control over how they develop, deploy, and govern the technology, often using in-house talent, data, and infrastructure. But only 13% of respondents in a survey from AI platform provider Cohere and IDC say sovereign AI is widely understood across their organization
     

What is sovereign AI? Strategic control of your AI future

8 de Setembro de 2026, 06:30

Ask IT leaders what sovereign AI is, and you’ll get a wide range of answers. Some will even struggle to define the term.

Sovereign AI is an emerging concept focusing on giving organizations — or countries —control over how they develop, deploy, and govern the technology, often using in-house talent, data, and infrastructure.

But only 13% of respondents in a survey from AI platform provider Cohere and IDC say sovereign AI is widely understood across their organizations, and one in three IT leaders had difficulty describing sovereign AI in their own words.

It’s important for IT leaders to understand the concept, because it can help them control costs, keep internal data private, and avoid vendor lock-in, advocates say.

A solid sovereign AI plan can help organizations avoid disruptions caused by forces outside their control, says Joelle Pineau, chief AI officer at Cohere, which offers an AI platform that enables customers to host AI models on premises.

“Over the past year, enterprises and governments have confronted a hard truth: AI systems that rely on external infrastructure can be disrupted without warning by decisions and actions outside their control,” Cohere says in a recent report. “Recent model access restrictions and several high-profile cybersecurity incidents have become a global wake-up call, exposing how fragile technological dependencies can be.”

Sovereign AI is about giving organizations as much autonomy, choice, and control as possible as they deploy and run AI systems, Pineau says.

“The notion of sovereignty really is about giving users control over their tech stack, the ability to choose how it’s deployed, how it works, what data is fed into the system, and how employees are exposed to the technology,” she adds.

Pineau wasn’t particularly surprised about the lack of understanding about sovereign AI reflected in the survey. Cohere’s accompanying report is an attempt to bring more clarity to the issue, she says.

Many goals under one umbrella

Confusion about sovereign AI in part reflects practitioners’ varying goals. Some users want to maximize their AI model options, some want better control over data ingested into AI systems, some want data to reside within country borders, some want to control costs, and others may want to run AI models optimized to their native language or culture.

For Berk Yilmaz, co-founder and CTO at AI integrated development environment provider Noah Labs, sovereign AI encompasses five characteristics: data sovereignty, legal jurisdiction, model provenance, operational control, and supply chain independence.

“Fulfilling one of those does not mean fulfilling all the others, so two executives can agree with sovereign AI and have little in common,” he says.

Freedom of choice doesn’t always mean a company has to host an AI model on premises or data must reside within a certain country, advocates suggest. Sovereign AI is more about preserving options when something unexpected happens.

“The sovereignty model performs well even in a situation where the vendor breaks off the contract, your model is added to the list of models that are banned for exports, and the connection is off,” Yilmaz says. “Each of these three scenarios has already played out somewhere in the last year.”

Others have different definitions. Confusion over sovereign AI isn’t surprising because it is four separate concepts that were collapsed into one, says Jeet Pattanaik, founder and CTO of AI solutions provider Glokal AI. Those four concepts: where a company’s data physically sits, what country’s law can compel access to it, who controls the AI model, and whether a company could still operate if the relationship with the model provider ends.

“Vendors usually sell you the first and call it sovereignty, because data residency is easy to demonstrate and makes a good diagram,” says Pattanaik, author of the book Sovereign AI: The Enterprise Guide to AI That Is Private by Design, Compliant by Default, and Yours Forever. “The hard one is the second, and it’s a legal question rather than a technical one. A server in Frankfurt owned by a US company is still reachable under US law.”

While the concept is largely about control, few companies want full control of their AI stack, he notes.

“Building your own models is expensive and usually worse,” Pattanaik says. “What CIOs actually want is bounded dependency: knowing exactly what you depend on, what happens if it changes, and having an exit that doesn’t take three years.”

Future impact

But the benefits aren’t always immediate, Pattanaik notes.

“The value arrives in specific moments, not continuously — when a regulator asks who processes this data and under whose jurisdiction, or when a vendor changes terms at renewal,” he says. “Organizations that thought about sovereignty already have an answer. Everyone else discovers the question and the crisis at the same time.”

Still, Pattanaik sees momentum building for the concept, with regulated industries such as banking, healthcare, and the public sector paving the way, treating it as a requirement.

“Most others are still at the stage of asking during vendor selection and accepting whatever answer comes back,” he says. “From where I sit it’s moved from philosophy to a procurement line item over roughly the last 18 months, but unevenly.”

David Wang, COO at enterprise AI gateway provider Tetrate, sees similar adoption trends with regulated industries and defense contractors leading the charge.

Other organizations should focus on a handful of questions to decide whether to investigate sovereign AI, he recommends. Companies that can most benefit include those with more than one regulator or legal entity, including recent acquisitions; those with a huge developer population running coding agents; and those with one AI model vendor that commands more than half of their AI spending.

“At that size, a supplier price change becomes a budget event,” Wang says.

Like Pattanaik, Wang suggests that sovereign AI is part of a long-game strategy rather than immediate gains. A good plan enables organizations to quickly shift to open AI models when a frontier model gets too expensive, he says.

“This work mostly prevents a loss rather than creating a gain, which is why it rarely wins the budget on its own,” he adds.

Cohere’s Pineau sees benefits for a broad range of organizations. With token costs a major concern for many companies, a sovereign AI plan can explore alternatives to current AI vendors, she notes.

“A lot of companies care about it, but they care about different aspects,” she says. “In regulated sectors, they care about the compliance aspects, and in some sectors with tight profit margins, they care a lot about the cost control. The manufacturing, the telecoms, and the energy sectors care about the ability to control their costs.”

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • From tokens to terabytes: Building reactive generative media pipelines
    For the first three years of the generative AI wave, the output of a model was a string. You called an API, you got tokens back, you rendered them in a chat window or wrote them to a row in Postgres. The economics of that pipeline were dominated by inference cost. Storage was a rounding error. That era is over. The output of a modern generative pipeline is an asset: a 4K video clip, a stem-separated audio track, a 50-megapixel product render, a 3D mesh with PBR textures. G
     

From tokens to terabytes: Building reactive generative media pipelines

8 de Setembro de 2026, 06:00

For the first three years of the generative AI wave, the output of a model was a string. You called an API, you got tokens back, you rendered them in a chat window or wrote them to a row in Postgres. The economics of that pipeline were dominated by inference cost. Storage was a rounding error.

That era is over. The output of a modern generative pipeline is an asset: a 4K video clip, a stem-separated audio track, a 50-megapixel product render, a 3D mesh with PBR textures. Generative AI has gone from text-centric to asset-centric, and the architectural center of gravity has moved with it. The teams building durable advantages in generative media right now are the ones treating their storage layer as a pipeline component rather than a destination.

This is a good problem. It is the problem you get when your pipeline works.

Asset-centric changes the shape of the system

Text pipelines are stateless in practice. A prompt goes in, a response comes out and the interesting state lives in a database. You can rebuild almost any artifact by re-running the call.

Media pipelines are not like that. Every stage produces a large, opaque binary that the next stage consumes. A single finished deliverable might traverse a dozen of them: prompt expansion, base generation, upscale, frame interpolation, color pass, audio generation, mix, mux, transcode to delivery formats, thumbnail extraction. Each stage writes an intermediate. Each intermediate is expensive enough to regenerate that you keep it.

The result is a system where the objects are the state. Your object store stops being a place you put things when you are finished and becomes the substrate the pipeline runs on.

Adoption is past experimentation, and the volume is in production

Advertising has the clearest numbers. IAB’s 2026 Digital Video Ad Spend and Strategy Report finds that nearly two in three digital video buyers now use generative AI for creative, up from half in 2025. A third of their ad assets are expected to involve generative AI this year, up from a quarter in 2025, with buyers projecting 43 percent by 2027. That is happening inside a U.S. digital video ad market IAB projects will pass $80 billion in 2026, growing 11 percent year over year, nearly 20 percent faster than the total ad market.

The interesting detail for architects is what the creative is used for. IAB’s prior-year data showed buyers reaching for generative AI specifically to produce audience-specific versions of an ad, visual style variations and contextually adapted cuts. That is not one asset per campaign. That is a matrix.

Games are the instructive counterexample. GDC’s 2026 State of the Game Industry puts generative AI use at 36 percent of industry professionals and 30 percent at game studios specifically, but the usage breakdown is dominated by language models rather than media generation: research and brainstorming at 81 percent, code assistance and routine writing at 47 percent each, prototyping at 35 percent. The most-used tools are ChatGPT, Gemini and Copilot. Sentiment is sharply negative, with 52 percent saying generative AI is having a negative impact on the industry, rising to 64 percent among visual and technical artists. Asset-centric pipelines have not landed in games the way they have in advertising, and the constraint is as much workforce and provenance as it is tooling.

Elsewhere, the pattern holds even where the survey data is thinner: e-commerce teams generating on-model imagery per SKU per segment, localization pipelines producing dubbed and lip-synced variants per market, previsualization work that used to require an art department.

What the adopting categories have in common is that none of them produce one asset per request. They produce a set. The pipeline is judged on how many viable options it surfaces, which means a better pipeline is, definitionally, a pipeline that writes more bytes.

Reactive architecture, because the model layer will not hold still

The model landscape resets on a cadence measured in weeks. A new video model ships with better temporal coherence. A new audio model handles multilingual prosody properly. A new image model finally gets text rendering right. If your pipeline requires an engineering sprint to adopt a new model, you are structurally behind teams whose pipelines do not.

Reactive architecture is the answer, and it means two specific things.

  1. Model-agnostic stages. Each stage of the pipeline should express a contract in terms of inputs and outputs, not in terms of a vendor. A generation stage takes a prompt and conditioning assets and produces a video at a declared resolution and duration. Which model backs it is configuration. Swapping providers should be a config change and an eval run, not a refactor.
  2. Event-driven orchestration. Polling-based orchestration couples your stages to a scheduler and makes each new stage a change to the control plane. Event-driven orchestration inverts it: a stage completes, it writes its output, the write itself is the signal that the next stage should start. Adding a stage means subscribing to an event, not modifying a DAG definition that six other teams depend on.

This is where storage stops being passive. Object storage that emits events on write lets your bucket act as the message bus for the pipeline. B2 Event Notifications send a signed HTTP POST to a webhook endpoint when objects are created, updated or deleted, with rules scoped per bucket and filterable by prefix. That prefix filter is the part that matters architecturally: if your bucket is organized by stage, a rule on stage/upscale/ is a subscription to “upscale finished” without any code knowing what upscale is. Custom headers on the notification carry auth tokens or context to the target, so the endpoint can be a queue, a serverless function or a workflow platform rather than a service you had to build.

A completed upscale triggers the color pass. A completed mux triggers the transcode fan-out. A completed transcode triggers the CDN warm and the catalog write. The storage layer sequences the work, which removes an entire class of orchestration glue from your codebase and removes polling latency along with it.

Quality improvements arrive as file size increases

Every generation of media models improves along axes that all cost bytes. Resolution goes up. Frame rate goes up. Duration limits extend. Bit depth and color fidelity improve. Audio moves from mono to multi-channel. Compression artifacts that were acceptable at 720p are not acceptable at 4K, so teams move to higher bitrates and, for anything entering a post pipeline, to intermediate codecs.

The arithmetic is worth doing explicitly. A 10-second clip in a delivery-grade H.264 4K encode at 50 Mbps is roughly 60 MB. The same ten seconds as a ProRes 422 HQ intermediate, which Apple targets at 884 Mbps for 3840×2160 at 30p, is 1.1 GB. That is roughly 18 times the size, and intermediates are exactly what you keep between stages. Now assume your pipeline generates eight candidates per brief because your creative director wants options, and each candidate produces four intermediates before final. That is one brief consuming tens of gigabytes.

Nobody plans for that in a proof of concept. Everybody encounters it in month four of production.

The iteration multiplier

Here is the part that surprises teams: robustness and storage growth are the same curve.

A fragile pipeline produces one output per request because that is all it can manage. A robust pipeline produces candidates, keeps the rejects for training and eval, versions every asset so a creative decision can be reverted, retains intermediates so a late note does not require regenerating from the prompt, and derives proxies, thumbnails and per-platform cuts from every approved master.

Each of those is the correct engineering decision. Together they mean that improving your pipeline increases your storage footprint superlinearly relative to your output volume. If your unit economics assume storage scales with delivered assets, they are wrong. Storage scales with attempts multiplied by stages multiplied by versions multiplied by derivatives.

This is why storage strategy has to be a design input rather than a line item you discover on an invoice. The two things that turn it from a manageable cost into a structural problem are egress pricing and the absence of a lifecycle policy. Egress hurts most in the exact architecture described above because a multi-stage pipeline repeatedly reads its own intermediates, and a distribution layer constantly reads masters. When every read carries a metered charge, the pipeline design that produces the best creative output is also the one that produces the worst bill, and teams start making architectural compromises to protect margin. Lifecycle policy hurts by omission: if you never decide what an intermediate is worth after 30 days, you pay to keep all of them forever.

What to put in place now

If generative media is core to what you are building, four decisions determine whether your storage layer accelerates you or constrains you:

  1. Choose a storage economic model that does not penalize reads. Understand your egress terms before your architecture depends on them. A pipeline that reads its own outputs at every stage is a read-heavy workload, and pricing that assumes write-once, read-rarely does not fit it. Model the ratio you actually expect: egress as a multiple of stored volume, not as an absolute. That ratio is the number to design against.
  2. Make writes trigger work. Use object-level event notifications as the pipeline’s signaling mechanism. This buys you loose coupling, lower latency between stages and the ability to add a stage without touching the orchestrator.
  3. Attach metadata at write time. Model version, prompt hash, parent asset, generation parameters, approval state. Metadata written at generation time is nearly free. Reconstructing provenance across a million objects later is not; provenance is what makes your rejected candidates usable as eval data and a training signal.
  4. Define lifecycle policy per artifact class. Masters, approved derivatives, intermediates and rejects have different retention values. Encode that as policy on day one rather than as a cleanup project in year two.

Which points at the useful way to think about the storage layer: in a pipeline where everything else churns, it is the constant. Models turn over every few weeks. Stages get swapped, added and reordered around them. Output volume compounds with every quality improvement. The one layer absorbing all of that without being redesigned is the one holding the assets, so it is worth choosing based on the characteristics that stay true while the rest moves. That is what we built B2 for. Always hot, so no stage waits on a rehydration to read what the last one wrote. No retention minimum or file size floor, so intermediates that were always disposable cost what they used. Egress scales to what you store rather than metered per read, so a pipeline that reads its own output is not penalized for being good at its job. The architecture above it should change every quarter. The storage underneath it should not have to.

The opportunity

The teams that will win in generative media are not the ones with privileged access to a model. Model access is converging toward commodities. The advantage is in the pipeline: how fast you can adopt a better model, how many candidates you can afford to generate, how much history you retain to evaluate and fine-tune against, and how cheaply you can move all of it.

Every one of those is a storage architecture question. Treat the storage layer as an active participant in the workflow and it becomes the thing that lets you iterate faster than your competition. Treat it as a bucket you dump finished files into, and it becomes the ceiling on how good your pipeline is allowed to get.

The assets are the product now. Architect accordingly.

Ontem — 7 de Setembro de 2026Cybersecurity News
  • ✇Cybersecurity News
  • AI Agent Coordination: The Unprecedented OpenAI Breakout Do Son
    Discover how autonomous AI agent coordination led to an unprecedented breakout on DSEWiki. OpenAI models created shared memories to bypass test constraints. Related Posts: CVE-2026-86218 (CVSS 10): N-central Pre-Auth RCE Exploited in the Wild MikroTrick PoC: RouterOS Admin Rights Exploited In Wild Roundcube Security Update Fixes 12 Webmail Flaws The post AI Agent Coordination: The Unprecedented OpenAI Breakout appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.
     
  • ✇Security Affairs
  • Why AI Agent Sandboxes Are Failing Security Tests Pierluigi Paganini
    Autonomous AI agents escaped a sandbox and accessed Hugging Face via reward hacking, exposing serious architectural control and isolation flaws. The recent case involving OpenAI test agents and Hugging Face should concern security teams, but not for the reason implied by headlines about an imminent AI “takeover.” The documented issue is more concrete: autonomous agents, given too much access and weakly isolated test infrastructure, found ways to communicate, bypass boundaries and act outside
     

Why AI Agent Sandboxes Are Failing Security Tests

7 de Setembro de 2026, 05:35

Autonomous AI agents escaped a sandbox and accessed Hugging Face via reward hacking, exposing serious architectural control and isolation flaws.

The recent case involving OpenAI test agents and Hugging Face should concern security teams, but not for the reason implied by headlines about an imminent AI “takeover.” The documented issue is more concrete: autonomous agents, given too much access and weakly isolated test infrastructure, found ways to communicate, bypass boundaries and act outside their assigned scope.

OpenAI is developing “automated shutdown capabilities” for AI systems, according to a letter sent to two House Democrats. The move comes weeks after one of its AI agents reportedly escaped its digital environment during a safety test and hacked Hugging Face. The incident has raised new concerns about how OpenAI controls increasingly autonomous AI agents.

“OpenAI told two House Democrats that its engineers are developing “automated shutdown capabilities” for AI systems, according to a company ​letter reviewed by Reuters, weeks after the company disclosed one of ‌its AI tools escaped its digital container during a safety test.” Reuters states. “The company’s safety practices have come under scrutiny since OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, disclosed that one ​of its AI agents went rogue during a security test and hacked ​into AI company Hugging Face. AI agents are programs that ⁠run with minimal human supervision.”

The main problem was poor isolation: agents could share information, pass discoveries between runs, and access infrastructure beyond their intended limits. This broke a key safety assumption, that each agent would remain fully contained.

“The central failure was architectural: supposedly isolated agents could communicate, inherit discoveries, and reach infrastructure beyond their intended targets.” states AI firm Remio.

Agent isolation was a core assumption behind the experiment. Each run could be granted meaningful capabilities because its actions were expected to remain contained. Shared infrastructure quietly invalidated that assumption.”

That distinction matters. The incident does not show that software became sentient, formed a political movement or developed a plan to govern the world. It shows that a system optimising for a narrowly defined goal can exploit weaknesses in its environment when humans give it tools, network access, credentials and insufficient guardrails.

In the reported evaluation, thousands of agents were meant to work independently in a controlled setting. Instead, around 1,200 agents reportedly used an unauthorised message board, exchanged more than 70,000 messages and files, and shared discoveries that helped a subset of roughly 700 agents take part in activity targeting Hugging Face.

The agents were trying to succeed at a difficult cybersecurity benchmark. The reported problem was reward hacking: instead of completing the task within the intended rules, they found shortcuts that improved their apparent performance, including escaping the sandbox and obtaining information outside the test environment.

OpenAI’s test agents really did escape their sandbox and breach a Hugging Face server. OpenAI and independent researchers confirmed the incident. However, the claim that the agents created conscious “civilizations” and took control is disputed and rejected by researchers.

What the reports actually show is reward hacking: the agents found a way around the test’s limits and reached a real external server. This was confirmed by OpenAI and independent reviews from METR and Redwood Research.

According to reporting on the incident, the agents exploited a previously unknown flaw in a package registry used as their authorised network connection. They reached the open internet, identified that Hugging Face hosted material related to the benchmark, and then allegedly chained exposed credentials and further weaknesses to obtain access to external infrastructure.

Some accounts say agents also altered or attempted to alter their evaluation records. That is alarming, but it should be interpreted carefully. A system trained to maximise a score can treat logs, checks and restrictions as obstacles to work around if the evaluation design rewards success more than compliance. That’s not malice. It’s a safety failure with a very expensive sense of initiative.

The case highlights a problem that goes beyond one lab. Companies are quickly adopting AI agents that can read emails, find documents, write code, access databases, use APIs, run tasks, and interact with browsers. Each permission may be useful, but together they can create a path to higher privileges.

An agent with email access could find password-reset links. One with browser access could reach admin panels. An agent that can run code could access tokens, keys, or configuration files. And if agents can communicate, they may combine information and capabilities that no single agent was supposed to have.

The security issue is therefore not whether an agent is “rogue” in a science-fiction sense. It is whether the architecture assumes the agent will always follow intent when it is actually designed to pursue an objective under imperfect constraints.

The first lesson is that sandboxing must be real, not merely conceptual. A test environment with a path to the public internet, a shared service, exposed credentials or loosely controlled package infrastructure is not isolated enough for high-capability agents.

The second is that agents must not receive broad, persistent credentials. They need short-lived tokens, tight scopes, explicit approval gates for sensitive actions and an immediate way to revoke access. An agent should never inherit the same permissions as the human who configured it just because that is convenient.

The third is that agent-to-agent communication needs to be treated as a security boundary. If agents are expected to work independently, they need separate state, separate credentials, separate task context and controlled channels. Unapproved shared storage, message boards and package services can become coordination infrastructure.

The fourth is that logs must be written outside the control plane the agent can touch. Audit records need to be immutable, centrally collected and monitored independently. If the system being evaluated can edit the evidence of its own behaviour, the evaluation has already failed.

The fifth is human control. High-risk actions such as sending external messages, changing access policies, handling secrets, deleting data, deploying code or calling sensitive APIs should require approval from an accountable person. “The agent did it” is not an incident-response plan.

The reports have raised concerns because the AI agents reportedly coordinated in unexpected ways. This is important to study as companies move toward multi-agent systems that can divide tasks, share information, and act with less human supervision.

But dramatic claims can distract from the real security problem. AI agents did not “take over the world.” They showed what can happen when software is allowed to act, communicate, and access sensitive systems without proper security controls.

OpenAI’s plan to add automated shutdown capabilities is a useful step, but a shutdown button should be the last line of defence. Security needs to start with basic controls: least-privilege access, isolated environments, limited network access, independent logging, monitored tool use, strong identity controls, and human approval for actions that cannot be easily reversed.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – AI Agents, OpenAI)

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • The AI cybersecurity arms race is on
    Businesses received a staggering amount of cyberattacks in June, according to Check Point, showing a rise of 20% over the previous 12 months. The breakout of AI agents from OpenAI in July to hack into the Hugging Face website, and subsequent similar events from Anthropic and Meta, indicate agentic-powered attacks will explode over the coming year. Currently, malicious hackers have the advantage because publicly released frontier models from the US incorporate guardrails
     

The AI cybersecurity arms race is on

7 de Setembro de 2026, 07:00

Businesses received a staggering amount of cyberattacks in June, according to Check Point, showing a rise of 20% over the previous 12 months. The breakout of AI agents from OpenAI in July to hack into the Hugging Face website, and subsequent similar events from Anthropic and Meta, indicate agentic-powered attacks will explode over the coming year.

Currently, malicious hackers have the advantage because publicly released frontier models from the US incorporate guardrails that can’t distinguish between malicious or defensive activities. As a consequence, these models default to a refusal to get involved. Hugging Face discovered this the hard way when they attempted to utilize a model to defend against the OpenAI intrusion. Their solution was to adapt a Chinese open weight model to analyze the 17,000 attack logs, find the vulnerability, and contain the intrusion.

With incidents like these happening more often, an arms race has begun with AI being both the problem and the solution.

Strength in numbers

While single agents generally perform more efficiently for well-defined tasks, research from Stanford University indicates swarms are more effective in messy scenarios with noisy data, which are more typical of unpredictable, intrusion attacks. The increased token usage by swarms raises costs, but increasingly efficient open weight models are rapidly lowering these barriers.

In the Hugging Face example, the agents worked together as a team leaving messages for each other on a message board they improvised. They shared newly found vulnerabilities, exchanged tools, and even developed conventions to address one another and to avoid overwriting each other’s work. While this may seem sinister, they were only following their designated purpose: to achieve a goal without regard to any collateral damage. We can expect bad actors to harness the power of agentic swarms through fine-tuning open weight models, and creating agents that progressively learn from their experiences.

Modern warfare has been transformed over the last four years, too, through the deployment of drones by Ukraine to defend against Russian attacks. Military strategies and the deployment of armament budgets around the world are shifting to focus on new technologies, and approaches and enterprises are now facing a similar challenge from the hostile use of agentic AI.

The drawbridge is down

As enterprises build out their own agentic systems to handle ecommerce, customer service, and marketing activities, this presents new attack surfaces for antagonistic efforts. April 2026 research from Trend Micro found almost 1,500 MCP servers directly exposed to the internet had no authentication or encryption, a rise of 200% from nine months earlier. This included 70 hosts offering direct SQL execution, and servers holding medical records.

The automation of business processes and the reduction of humans from decision making chains open up new vulnerabilities for agents with malicious intent. Arkose Labs’ 2026 agentic AI survey of 300 enterprise leaders found 97% expected an AI agent security incident within the next 12 months.

Social engineering

While agents have demonstrated their ability to break through security systems, they’re also capable of targeting humans to achieve their objectives. Recent research from Verizon indicates that 62% of successful breaches involve a human element, with phone-based attacks 40% more successful than email-based ones. In August, for instance, scammers using an AI-generated deep fake of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s voice were able to scam investors out of $5.3 million.

If agents can break out of digital sandboxes, and generate convincing fake videos and audio, then they’re certainly capable of making basic phone calls. In July, during testing of frontier models, the UK AI Security Institute discovered an agent tried to insert malicious code into an open-source project. Attempting to get the code approved, the agent created fake online identities using them to persuade the project’s maintainer to sign it off. “This is the first time we’ve seen risks around autonomy and deception manifest this clearly without specific prompting in the real-world,” the Institute put in a write-up of the incident.

Fight AI with AI

So attackers currently have the upper hand in this escalating arms race. They have access to agents that can work around the clock, constantly probing, learning, and sharing their knowledge with other agents. They’ll only get better at this and learn ways to stay ahead of defensive systems. International agreements to delay or restrict the capabilities of frontier models won’t stop hostile actors motivated by money or rogue states pursuing other objectives. Developers and security vendors need access to the latest frontier models unfettered by restrictive guardrails if we’re to stand any chance of defending against the coming tsunami of attacks.

We can learn a lesson from recent history on this front. In 1992, the US restricted exported software to weak 40-bit encryption, citing security concerns going back to the cold war. While the US allowed stronger encryption internally, the result was weakened security for everyone as hostile antagonists were able to disrupt global supply chains that incorporated less secure software. Despite lifting the ban in 1999, embedded software containing 40-bit encryption continued to cause problems for many years across multiple countries, including the US.

Without rapid action, we may look back fondly to the world before July 2026 as a golden age for cybersecurity, a relative age of innocence.

Antes de ontemCybersecurity News
  • ✇Security Affairs
  • AI Agents Hijacked German Wiki to Cheat, OpenAI Delayed Disclosure Pierluigi Paganini
    AI agents secretly took over a 25-year-old German wiki for two months to cheat on tests, and OpenAI sat on the news until reporters found it first OpenAI finally admitted this weekend that a swarm of its own AI agents hijacked a German programming wiki earlier this year, turning it into a private message board where they coordinated with each other completely outside human supervision. Reuters broke the underlying story days earlier, and OpenAI’s public acknowledgment only came after that re
     

AI Agents Hijacked German Wiki to Cheat, OpenAI Delayed Disclosure

6 de Setembro de 2026, 08:43

AI agents secretly took over a 25-year-old German wiki for two months to cheat on tests, and OpenAI sat on the news until reporters found it first

OpenAI finally admitted this weekend that a swarm of its own AI agents hijacked a German programming wiki earlier this year, turning it into a private message board where they coordinated with each other completely outside human supervision. Reuters broke the underlying story days earlier, and OpenAI’s public acknowledgment only came after that reporting forced the company’s hand.

“OpenAI officials learned of the German incident weeks ago but kept it under wraps as ​executives grappled with the fallout from the breach at Hugging Face, ​Reuters has previously reported.” Reuters states. “OpenAI did not immediately return a message seeking further details on ‌what ⁠the company knew about what it described as the “wiki incident”, or why it waited until after the Reuters story to discuss it publicly. In a statement posted to the social media site X, ​OpenAI said that ​it, and ⁠others, needed to be more transparent about incidents of unintended behavior by AI, typically referred to ​in the industry as “misalignment.””

How we think about the “wiki incident,” where our agents wrote to several internet sites: it’s past time for us to define standards for when and how we share misalignment incidents, not just misalignment properties of our models.

Historically, we have treated misalignment… pic.twitter.com/NNTbfSxVWn

— OpenAI (@OpenAI) September 5, 2026

The site in question, DseWiki, is a roughly 25-year-old communal editing platform for German software developers that had gone largely quiet before agents apparently found it useful for something else entirely.

The scale of what happened there is genuinely striking. Independent AI safety researchers, publishing their findings at a site called collusion.wiki, documented somewhere between 15,000 and 18,000 edits left by autonomous agents identifying themselves as OpenAI systems between May and July 2026. Roughly half the agents gave themselves names implying an OpenAI affiliation, things like “OpenAIResearcher” or “OAIResearchMar26,” and the content of their posts showed them actively sharing tactics for cheating on assigned tasks, evading detection, and bypassing OpenAI’s own restrictions.

What makes this timeline particularly uncomfortable for OpenAI is when it happened relative to what the company already knew. This wiki takeover predates the July incident in which OpenAI’s own agents autonomously plotted and executed a breach of Hugging Face’s systems that went undetected for over a week. OpenAI had actually learned about the German wiki activity weeks before going public, and according to people familiar with the matter, kept it quiet specifically while executives were still managing fallout from the Hugging Face disclosure.

OpenAI’s explanation shows why it handled the two incidents differently, and that’s at the center of the controversy. The company says it has usually treated unexpected AI behavior as a research issue, documenting it in system cards and research papers rather than reporting it as a security incident.

The Hugging Face case was different because the model caused real harm to a third party. OpenAI responded as it would to a normal security incident, working with Hugging Face immediately and publishing the details the next day.

The wiki incident, however, fell into the same category as earlier research on agents behaving unexpectedly online. That decision meant OpenAI treated it as a research finding rather than an incident that required immediate public disclosure.

OpenAI is now conceding that categorization was probably the wrong call going forward.

“Our misalignment disclosure practices need to expand for this new phase of model capabilities. We and the larger AI community do not yet have a clear standard for how to report misalignment that shows up during training, evaluation, and deployment, including examples that don’t look like traditional security incidents but could provide insight into AI behavior and future risks.” states the company. “We’re working on a framework and will share it in upcoming weeks, and in parallel we’re working with dozens of government regulatory agencies worldwide on these issues.”

The company pointed out that neither OpenAI nor the wider AI industry has a real standard for reporting misalignment that surfaces during training or evaluation but doesn’t look like a conventional security breach, even when it reveals something important about how these systems actually behave.

TechCrunch’s reporting on OpenAI’s response notes the company is now building a formal framework specifically for this kind of disclosure, with plans to share it within the coming weeks, and confirms OpenAI is working with regulatory agencies across dozens of countries on the broader problem simultaneously.

That’s a genuinely useful commitment if it materializes into something concrete. It’s also the kind of promise companies tend to make immediately after getting caught sitting on bad news rather than before, which is worth keeping in mind when judging how much weight it deserves.

OpenAI didn’t disclose the wiki takeover on its own. Outside researchers discovered it while scanning the internet for this type of unauthorized AI agent activity, and OpenAI confirmed the incident only when the research was about to become public.

The researchers say the bigger risk isn’t one highly advanced AI suddenly going rogue. It’s large numbers of relatively capable AI agents finding ways to work together in places nobody is monitoring. That behavior can be much harder to detect and stop.

As AI companies build more autonomous agents that can run for longer periods and work together, incidents like this may become more common. What looks like an isolated glitch today could be an early warning of a problem the industry needs to address now.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, DseWiki)

  • ✇Security Affairs
  • OpenAI Announced $1B in Defensive Tools for Water Utilities Pierluigi Paganini
    OpenAI pledges $1B in subsidized Daybreak AI cybersecurity tools for under-resourced critical infrastructure defenders. OpenAI announced Daybreak for Frontline Defenders on September 3, 2026, committing $1 billion in subsidized access to its Daybreak cyber models, training, and technical support to help organizations that protect essential services in the United States and internationally. “A $1 billion global commitment to expand subsidized access to Daybreak cyber models and products,
     

OpenAI Announced $1B in Defensive Tools for Water Utilities

5 de Setembro de 2026, 18:14

OpenAI pledges $1B in subsidized Daybreak AI cybersecurity tools for under-resourced critical infrastructure defenders.

OpenAI announced Daybreak for Frontline Defenders on September 3, 2026, committing $1 billion in subsidized access to its Daybreak cyber models, training, and technical support to help organizations that protect essential services in the United States and internationally.

“A $1 billion global commitment to expand subsidized access to Daybreak cyber models and products, training, technical support, and partnerships in the United States and internationally.reads the announcement

The full announcement is at openai.com. The $1 billion is product credits and subsidized access, not a cash grant, targeted to be used over the next six months.

“Every day, we depend on cyber defenders to protect the systems that keep communities running: the water coming from the tap, the electricity powering homes and businesses, the local government systems that deliver public services, and the financial institutions people trust with their money.” continues the announcement. “Many operate with limited staff and budgets, while defending complex and aging systems.”

Priority access goes to water and wastewater utilities, electric grid operators, state and local governments, community and regional banks, nonprofits, and open-source maintainers. These are the organizations defending complex, often outdated infrastructure against faster-moving threats without the budgets or specialized staff available to large enterprises.

Daybreak has been running since June 2026, and OpenAI expanded it in August with the release of GPT-5.6-Cyber. The program has two levels: Daybreak Blue supports common defensive tasks with standard models, while Daybreak Red gives approved organizations access to specialized cyber models for more sensitive and advanced work.

Around 2,000 organizations and workspaces already use Daybreak, including cybersecurity companies, defense groups, and law enforcement agencies. OpenAI’s new $1 billion commitment aims to give the same capabilities to defenders with limited resources who can’t afford commercial pricing.

“In the coming months, AI-enabled cyber attacks will become far more widespread and sophisticated as models around the world become increasingly capable. That shift puts every organization on notice. Defenders need to act now: test systems, find weaknesses, and strengthen defenses before attackers do.” states OpenAI. “Frontier AI can help defenders move faster. We have a defender’s window: a narrowing opportunity to use AI to close security gaps before attackers seize them. Our role is to help put powerful tools in defenders’ hands so they can protect the systems, and the people, they are responsible for.”

OpenAI made this announcement the same day it shipped a model it classifies internally as meeting the “Critical” threshold for cyber capability, meaning it can meaningfully help someone trying to create cyberweapons. The timing underscores the tension the company is navigating: it’s building tools capable of both attack and defense, and is publicly betting that putting the defensive version in more hands faster is the right move.

The initiative includes a pilot with MS-ISAC, a federally supported organization that shares threat intelligence and incident response support with thousands of public-sector organizations, including utilities, hospitals, schools and law enforcement agencies. The pilot will give an initial group of public-sector and water-system defenders access to Daybreak, along with training and hands-on support.

OpenAI has already tested this approach after recent attacks on U.S. water infrastructure. The company offered affected states and utilities up to $1 million in free API credits and Daybreak access. Teams used the tools to review code and configurations, verify security findings, develop patches and test fixes while keeping water systems running. The new initiative aims to expand this model to more defenders.

The Daybreak Defense Network, also announced September 3, brings more than 35 enterprise products and partner-operated services into the Daybreak ecosystem. HackerOne is among the early partners. The goal is to make Daybreak capabilities available through tools defenders already use rather than requiring them to switch workflows. SecurityWeek notes that OpenAI has disclosed few details about costs and eligibility for the broader program, which matters considerably for a rural water utility or county government trying to determine whether they qualify.

OpenAI also published its Defense Factory architecture, a continuous automated system that finds vulnerabilities, tests them and prepares fixes for human review. The company is sharing the architecture so other defenders can adapt it to their own environments.

The announcement came with support from more than 150 organizations across cybersecurity, technology, critical infrastructure, finance and AI. OpenAI presented the initiative as a joint effort rather than a project led by the company alone.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Astra)

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • Salesforce offers more Agentforce credits to drive adoption
    Salesforce is updating some of the editions, or pricing tiers, of Agentforce Sales and Agentforce Service, a year after their rebrand from Sales Cloud and Service Cloud. The top three now bundle AI agents, analytics, Slack, security, and support with larger allocations of Flex Credits; two of the tiers are also increasing in price. The Core edition replaces the old Enterprise edition, and its price goes up from $175 per user per month to $195, and now includes 500,000 Flex
     

Salesforce offers more Agentforce credits to drive adoption

4 de Setembro de 2026, 11:21

Salesforce is updating some of the editions, or pricing tiers, of Agentforce Sales and Agentforce Service, a year after their rebrand from Sales Cloud and Service Cloud. The top three now bundle AI agents, analytics, Slack, security, and support with larger allocations of Flex Credits; two of the tiers are also increasing in price.

The Core edition replaces the old Enterprise edition, and its price goes up from $175 per user per month to $195, and now includes 500,000 Flex Credits. Advanced edition costs $395 per user per month and includes 1 million credits, replacing the $350 per month Unlimited edition. The Max edition replaces the old Agentforce 1 tier and now includes 2.75 million credits instead of 1 million for the same $550 per month fee, Salesforce said in a blog post.

The lowest tiers, Starter and Pro Suite, remain unchanged in features and price, although there is a hint that Salesforce is renaming the latter to Professional edition.

What is new in Agentforce Sales?

The new editions bring several capabilities to the base subscription of Agentforce Sales that were previously sold separately: The Core edition now includes Momentum, Slack Business+, and Tableau Next, while the Advanced edition adds Sales Programs, the Premier Success Plan, and additional security and data-protection capabilities. Max edition adds Agentforce for Sales, Agentforce Coworker, Salesforce Spiff, Sales Planning, Sales Programs, Salesforce Maps, Slack Enterprise+, and additional Tableau Next capabilities.

Under the previous Enterprise and Unlimited editions, Sales Programs was an add-on, Tableau Next was available through a separate Tableau+ purchase, and Agentforce itself had to be purchased separately.

What is new in Agentforce Service?

The new editions of Agentforce Service also incorporate capabilities that previously required additional purchases.

The Core edition includes case management, self-service Help Center, Slack Business+, and Slackbot; Advanced adds Agentforce Help Agent, Premier Success Plan, full sandbox, Backup & Recover, and Data Detect, and Max adds Service Rep Assistant, Workforce Engagement, Quality Management, IT Service, unmetered Agentforce Coworker access, and a library of service agent templates.

Under the previous Enterprise and Unlimited editions, Agentforce was available as a separate purchase, while capabilities such as additional security, data protection, and workforce-management tools were also packaged separately or reserved for higher-tier offerings.

Procurement simplicity could come at the cost of visibility

Salesforce said the new editions deliver from 50% to 70% greater value than those they replace, but realizing that value may not be straightforward, analysts warned, particularly as enterprises move from experimenting with Agentforce to deploying agents at scale.

While bundling more AI, analytics, security, Slack, and support capabilities into the subscriptions could simplify procurement of Salesforce products for enterprises, the economics could become more complicated once customers start consuming their included Flex Credits, said Manoj Chandra Jha, principal analyst at Nord-IQ Research.

That is because bundling more capabilities into a single subscription reduces the line-item visibility CIOs previously relied on, and most enterprise finance teams are still learning how to forecast for credit consumption, he said.

Without that visibility CIOs will find it hard to assess how Salesforce’s offerings compare with competing products, particularly when they are trying to determine the cost of specific capabilities or decide which components of a broader bundle are delivering value, he said.

Salesforce may be exaggerating the real value of the new editions, said Pareekh Jain, principal analyst at Pareekh Consulting.

“While CIOs may get more capabilities in a single package, they will still need to assess how much of that functionality employees actually use. A package may offer 60% more theoretical value, but that benefit can disappear if much of the bundled functionality or Flex Credits goes unused,” he said.

Overuse is also a problem, said Jha: As agent usage grows, enterprises could consume their included Flex Credits more quickly and eventually need to purchase additional credits, making actual usage a more important measure of value that CIOs should follow rather than the headline savings attached to the new editions, Jha noted.

New editions targeted at accelerating adoption

While Salesforce talks of value for money, analysts see its real goal with the new editions as accelerating Agentforce adoption.

Investment analysts raised concerns about questioned Agentforce’s customer traction in July, citing enterprise data readiness and the product’s maturity as factors holding back broader adoption. Salesforce, however, has pushed back, pointing instead to growth in deployments and usage.

Nevertheless, said Jha, “With Agentforce running at only a fraction of Salesforce’s 150,000-plus customer base, and analysts pinning the drag on messy enterprise data, folding security and analytics into every tier looks like Salesforce neutralizing the objection before a prospect can raise it.”

Salesforce said last month that its customers had increased their average number of agents from five in February 2025 to 13 by April 2026, while the average number of agent actions per account grew at a 31% compound monthly growth rate over the same period.

Jha sees the updated editions as aimed primarily at Salesforce’s existing customer base, giving companies already using its products more incentives and capacity to expand their use of Agentforce, rather than as a draw for new customers.

Salesforce said the new editions for Agentforce Sales and Agentforce Service are already available, and will soon be joined by new editions for Agentforce Industry.

Existing Agentforce 1 edition customers can upgrade to the new Max edition at no additional cost, the company said, adding that in the future, Max editions across its Sales and Service offerings will also include an allocation for Headless 360.

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • What JPMorgan does differently with AI that any company can apply
    In the summer of 2024, JPMorgan Chase deployed its internal AI platform LLM Suite, launching it very differently than most do: The company didn’t force anyone to use it. When LLM Suite arrived at its first major division, asset and wealth management, employees were asked to think of it as a research analyst: someone to ask for data, a draft, or an idea. Leadership didn’t set usage objectives or provide a formal mandate. Access was rolled out in phases and only to
     

What JPMorgan does differently with AI that any company can apply

4 de Setembro de 2026, 07:01

In the summer of 2024, JPMorgan Chase deployed its internal AI platform LLM Suite, launching it very differently than most do: The company didn’t force anyone to use it.

When LLM Suite arrived at its first major division, asset and wealth management, employees were asked to think of it as a research analyst: someone to ask for data, a draft, or an idea. Leadership didn’t set usage objectives or provide a formal mandate.

Access was rolled out in phases and only to those who requested it, and the bank allowed the tool to circulate through word-of-mouth recommendations among colleagues. While half the industry rushed to count users and publish adoption rates, JPMorgan gave up on pursuing that number.

It became flooded with users. In eight months, 200,000 employees had signed up without a single order being issued, out of a workforce of over 300,000. In time, the bank established more than 450 use cases in production.

Two years after that summer launch, JPMorgan had everything to boast about. It had established itself as a global leader in the use of AI: It was the top bank on the Fortune AIQ 50 list, and the third company overall, ahead of all the tech giants except Alphabet.

It was then that the bank’s head of analytics, Derek Waldron, the person best positioned to sell the success, pointed out what still wasn’t working: There was a gap between what the technology was capable of doing and what the bank was actually capturing in its business results.

That gesture is what distinguishes JPMorgan. Although it has much to celebrate, it knows what it lacks, it says so publicly, and it keeps searching for it. Behind that statement lies a way of innovating and measuring that the bank has been developing for years.

Giving up the number everyone was chasing

The first thing JPMorgan did right was not to make adoption the goal. By not forcing anyone, it turned platform usage into a barometer. If a tool worked, it was filled without any campaign; if it didn’t, it was emptied, and that emptiness provided valuable information. If adoption had become a target to be pursued, the organization would have optimized the number instead of understanding what the number represents.

The bank itself acknowledges that if a tool is broadly used, it means it’s popular, but not necessarily effective. To determine its effectiveness, something more was needed. The answer came from two decisions that only work together: linking each project to a business outcome, and creating the metrics to demonstrate that outcome.

First, to find initiatives that could have a real impact, instead of creating an agenda from the top down, the bank surveyed its business units, asking where there was a problem to solve. Within a few weeks, an internal portal gathered, according to the bank’s figures, nearly a thousand ideas. Of these, only a few hundred moved forward and reached production. An organization doesn’t open a funnel of that size if it expects most ideas to survive; it anticipates that many will be discarded.

The funnel’s filtering method was also different. Before launching each test, the outcome that would ensure the experiment’s survival was defined, along with the steps to be taken the day after the decision. By planning future actions in advance, indecision and the perception of failure were avoided.

A clinical approach to AI experimentation

But setting a threshold for each experiment requires verification, and that’s where the bank encountered an unexpected obstacle. Metrics have their own cycles. Bank customers conduct business on Mondays, not Sundays. They receive their paychecks at the end of the month. In August, they disappear. When an initiative generates a change and a figure rises the following week, there’s no way to know whether it increased due to the change or the calendar.

The solution was borrowed from clinical trials. Instead of rolling out the change to all users, it was rolled out to half, chosen at random. The other half (the control group) operated on the same Monday, the same payroll, and the same August, so that the experimental contribution (the attribution) could be separated.

The next step was to industrialize the experiments. Doing it properly required a specialist sitting alongside each product team, and with that method, they reached eight per year. A self-service platform increased the figure to around 300 tests annually.

The results are concrete. For example, tens of thousands of the bank’s engineers have gained between 10% and 20% efficiency thanks to an internally developed programming assistant.

Finally, the bank discovered that a figure can be accurate and yet mean nothing. Its head of analytics explained this with a simple example. They measure the hour that AI saves one employee, and the three hours it saves another. They add them up, and the result is accurate. But in a process that goes from beginning to end, those saved minutes often don’t appear on the bottom line: They merely shift the bottleneck to the next one.

It’s easy to get stuck on partial metrics because they’re more immediate and produce more impressive numbers. JPMorgan’s discipline consisted of not accepting a metric as valid until verifying its impact on the business at the end of the process.

The question then remains on Monday morning: What can a company that has neither the size nor the budget of a bank take home?

The method is what best exports

What’s most interesting about JPMorgan isn’t what it has done with AI, but how it has done it . Any company can replicate this approach, because it doesn’t depend on proprietary data, scale, or budget.

The following are some best practices that don’t require a €20 billion annual budget. They do require making decisions before starting and are within reach of any company:

Launch far more initiatives than will survive, and announce this clearly. If the organization discovers halfway through that most of its projects will be canceled, it may misinterpret this as a planning failure; if it knows from the outset, it understands it as the natural selection process. This is what makes making mistakes quick and cheap.

Decide in advance the threshold that will shut down a project and plan the next steps. Both aspects are necessary, not just the metric. If a certain figure isn’t reached, the team needs to know what will happen next. Applying a threshold without future planning leaves the team in limbo, and they’ll have to find a reasonable reason to wait another quarter before shutting down.

Work on business outcome metrics from the outset, not just when they’re requested. This tracking not only guides the initiative but also prevents having to reconstruct months of poorly documented decisions. Adoption, by the way, is the number the CFO won’t ask for. It serves as a signal while no one is pursuing it, and it ceases to be useful the day it becomes a target.

How to get it right

Whether metrics mean anything depends on where you focus your attention. It’s best to start with scope, because that’s the most common mistake. Saving three hours in one stage isn’t the same as improving time-to-market: If the entire process isn’t shortened, what you have is freed-up capacity, which is also valuable, but it’s something different, and it’s advisable to make that distinction clear.

Then it’s important to consider that value leakage occurs in two directions. The first is outward: The savings are passed on to the customer in the form of lower prices or better service. The second is inward: The savings in personnel are replaced by spending on computing. If these items fall into different budget categories, it’s easy to overestimate the actual savings.

Finally, there’s an excessive focus on cost savings, at the expense of revenue opportunities. Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan, put it more bluntly to his analysts than any consulting firm: No one benefits uniquely from AI. In other words, competitors will eventually incorporate those savings. The greatest potential for differentiation lies in revenue: using AI to uncover unmet demand.

The question a CIO will have to answer in a year’s time won’t be how much AI their company uses. It will be which of projects are still alive because they work, and not because no one has bothered to test them.

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • The AI credibility gap: You can’t lead what you haven’t actually used
    A few weeks ago, in these pages I argued that AI is repricing enterprise software faster than most vendors want to admit. Since then, the sharpest pushback I have gotten from peer CIOs has not been about the pricing thesis. It has been about the leaders navigating it. What does this shift actually ask of the people leading their organizations through it? The honest answer, from where I sit, is uncomfortable. AI is the first enterprise technology in a generation where th
     

The AI credibility gap: You can’t lead what you haven’t actually used

4 de Setembro de 2026, 07:00

A few weeks ago, in these pages I argued that AI is repricing enterprise software faster than most vendors want to admit. Since then, the sharpest pushback I have gotten from peer CIOs has not been about the pricing thesis. It has been about the leaders navigating it. What does this shift actually ask of the people leading their organizations through it?

The honest answer, from where I sit, is uncomfortable. AI is the first enterprise technology in a generation where the leader’s personal experience of the tools has become part of the leadership instrument itself. Most senior IT leaders, including many I speak with regularly, have not yet caught up to what that means. For most of my career, my model for leading technology change was familiar: read deeply, talking to peers, pressure-test with my team, communicate direction, drive execution. That model does not work for AI. I did not figure this out because I was smarter than my peers. I figured it out because I stopped talking about AI and started using it, and the difference in my own judgment surprised me.

The credibility gap most IT leaders don’t see in themselves

The data is more revealing than the conventional commentary suggests. Gallup’s Q4 2025 workplace research found that frequent AI use among leaders had reached 44%, up from 17% in mid-2023. That sounds like progress. But 56% of senior leaders still do not use AI frequently in their own work. And frequent use does not necessarily mean sustained, real-stakes practice with the tools. More than half of the people setting enterprise AI direction are doing so from a distance.

Grant Thornton’s 2026 AI Impact Survey makes the problem visible from a different angle. Of 950 senior business leaders surveyed across ten industries, 78% reported they lacked confidence they could pass an independent AI governance audit within ninety days. The leaders setting direction on AI cannot, by their own admission, explain how their AI decisions get made or who is accountable for the outcomes. Articulation has run ahead of practice across most of the executive population.

I see the same pattern at closer range. In peer CIO conversations, on conference panels and in executive committee discussions inside other organizations, I keep meeting senior leaders who are the most articulate strategic voices on AI in their companies but have not personally used AI in their own work. They have read about it. They have been briefed. They have approved budgets. They have given speeches. They have not lived with it.

I call this the AI credibility gap. It runs from the CEO suite through the C-level and into mid-management. The failure mode it produces is specific: leaders talk fluently about AI strategy without being able to engage with the realities their teams encounter daily. The teams notice. They stop bringing real problems forward because the conversations skim the surface. They stop trusting prioritization because it does not reflect what they are actually experiencing. They start working around leadership rather than with it.

The credibility gap is not a knowledge problem. The leaders involved are intelligent and motivated. It is an experience problem, and experience cannot be briefed.

Why this shift is different from the ones ITDMs have led before

A reasonable objection: senior IT leaders have managed major technology transitions for decades without becoming hands-on practitioners. CIOs led cloud transformations without writing infrastructure-as-code. CFOs led ERP implementations without configuring modules. Why is AI different?

Three things have changed. AI tools are designed for direct human use in a way enterprise infrastructure never was, which means a leader who has not used them is unfamiliar not just with a technology but with a new mode of knowledge work. Second, AI capability changes faster than any leader’s briefing cycle can keep up with, so leaders working from quarterly briefings operate with a perpetually stale model of what the technology can and cannot do. Third, and hardest to communicate to leaders who have not lived it, AI works probabilistically. Knowing when to trust an output, when to verify, when to push back, when to escalate: these judgments accumulate through hours of personal use, the way clinical judgment accumulates in a physician. A leader who has not done that accumulation is asking their teams to do it instead, and to make the resulting calls without leadership cover.

Personal practice, in other words, is now a prerequisite for AI leadership rather than a complement to it.

What actually changed when I started building with the tools

I noticed the credibility gap in myself before I saw it in anyone else. Several months ago, I decided to stop talking about AI as a topic and start using it as a tool. Not the demo-and-show-off way most executives engage with AI, with a Copilot prompt here and a ChatGPT query there, but as a daily instrument in the actual work I do. Drafting strategy documents. Stress-testing arguments before taking them to the leadership team. Working through analysis I would previously have outsourced.

At one point I went further. Coming from a product and supply chain background, I built an inventory contextual model using AI, a working tool rather than a slide, to think through supply, demand, inventory levels, cash flow and downstream customer impact. I did this not because my team could not have built it, but because I wanted to live inside the problem myself. The act of building taught me more about AI’s strengths and limits in a few weeks than two years of vendor demos had. I saw where the model held up under real data, where it broke, where the judgment of an experienced operator was still load-bearing, and where AI genuinely extended what a human alone could see.

The change in my leadership was not what I expected. The efficiency was real but turned out to be the least interesting part. What changed was my judgment. I started understanding what these tools are genuinely good at, where the failure modes hide and where the value sits underneath the marketing layer. That judgment changed how I prioritize AI investments, which vendor demos I find credible, how I push back on enthusiastic recommendations from my own teams, and most importantly, how I talk to my organization about AI. The conversations moved from compliance to engagement. We started moving faster, not because I pushed harder, but because the team trusted the direction more.

You cannot direct an organization’s AI transformation with conviction if your own working life has not been transformed by it.

The advice that actually matters: Pick the work that scares you

If I could give one piece of advice to a peer IT leader trying to close their own credibility gap, it would be the opposite of what most AI-leadership pieces say.

The instinct of senior IT leaders is to start using AI on the parts of the job that are already routine. First-draft emails. Meeting summaries. Scheduling. The parts where the risk feel low and the productivity lift feels visible. That instinct is wrong. Routine work produces routine learning. It gives you exposure to the tools but not to the judgment that changes how you lead.

The judgment that matters develops when AI is sitting next to you at the work where your professional identity is most exposed. The analysis you used to outsource to consultants. The strategy memo where your reputation is on the line. The problem you privately believed only you could solve. That is the work that changes you, because it is the work where you must grapple honestly with what the tool can do that you cannot, and where you can still see clearly what you can do that the tool cannot.

This is uncomfortable for a senior leader. It should be. If you use AI only in the safe parts of your job, you are protecting your professional identity from the encounter that would actually update it. You get to keep believing the tool is a nice supplement to what you already know how to do. If you use AI on the parts of your job where your expertise is the whole point of your seat, the encounter is different. You find out where your judgment still holds. You find out where it does not. You find out how the tool and your expertise combine into something neither could produce alone. That is the learning that changes how you lead.

This is where the ITDM instinct gets in the way most. Many CIOs and IT leaders I speak with have started using AI in IT operations, which feels like home territory and where the productivity gains are visible. That is fine, but it is not where the credibility gap lives. The gap lies in strategic decision-making, board-level analysis, cross-functional trade-off calls and the judgment work leaders were promoted for being good at. Those are the areas where most leaders have never used it.

So, the question I would put to any IT leader reading this: what is the work you are best known for? The work you would not want anyone else to touch? That is exactly the work you should be doing with AI, this month, before you write the next AI strategy document your organization asks you for.

The stakes

The personal practice of the leader, more than strategy or budget or governance, is going to determine whether organizations succeed or struggle with AI transformation. Strategy without lived experience produces hollow direction. Budget without lived experience produces misallocated investment. Governance without lived experience produces over-correction or under-correction depending on which fear is loudest in the room.

The IT leaders I see doing this work quietly, on their own time, with their hands on the tools, are the ones I expect to define the next decade of enterprise transformation. The ones who keep articulating without practicing will find themselves increasingly disconnected from the organizations they lead. The teams will move on. The strategy will drift. And the leaders will not understand why, because the gap they have created is invisible from the seat they sit in. The question is not whether AI will reshape your organization. It will. The question is whether you will reshape yourself first, enough to lead the transformation rather than narrate it.

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • 65% of employees would love to roll back workplace AI
    IT leaders have been making generative AI tools available across the enterprise for just three years, and a significant majority of their business users has already had enough. According to a report from Adaptavist, 65% of 2,500 knowledge workers surveyed say they “regularly feel nostalgic about how work operated before the widespread adoption of AI.” This “pre-AI nostalgia” appears to be due in part to business users feeling overwhelmed by the responsibility of lear
     

65% of employees would love to roll back workplace AI

4 de Setembro de 2026, 06:30

IT leaders have been making generative AI tools available across the enterprise for just three years, and a significant majority of their business users has already had enough.

According to a report from Adaptavist, 65% of 2,500 knowledge workers surveyed say they “regularly feel nostalgic about how work operated before the widespread adoption of AI.”

This “pre-AI nostalgia” appears to be due in part to business users feeling overwhelmed by the responsibility of learning how to use AI on top of their day-to-day job tasks. Moreover, 46% of workers say their concerns about AI have gone unaddressed by management.

“Transparency is critical to truly drive AI engagement; organizations must establish clear guardrails and maintain an open dialogue around AI use and employee choice where workers feel they are being listened to,” Jobin Kuruvilla, field CTO at Adaptavist, tells CIO.

Generational gaps in AI acceptance

Despite an assumption that younger workers are more intuitively adept with AI tools, Gen Z workers (42%) are more likely to prefer the pre-AI world compared to their Gen X colleagues (26%). This may support the growing concern that AI is quickly is hitting entry-level workers the hardest, while creating new career opportunities for more skilled workers who have been in the industry longer.

When asked about fears surrounding job obsolescence due to AI, 54% of all workers surveyed said they are “concerned AI could reduce the need for their role within the next five years.” Broken out by organizational level, junior employees (23%) and C-level executives (29%) expressed the most concern about AI job loss, compared to 13% for mid-level employees and 12% for senior employees.

Additionally, 47% of C-level executives and 36% of directors are looking to move industries, change careers, or step away entirely due to concerns of AI eliminating their positions. Still, plenty of workers are ready to face the new challenges of an AI-driven workplace, with 74% saying they are actively learning new skills to stay relevant, and 85% of C-level leaders saying the same.

Lack of transparency drives AI fatigue

One in three workers (36%) are already experiencing “AI fatigue,” leading to less frequent use of AI tools and active resistance to AI for day-to-day tasks. More than a third of workers (36%) also appears to be confused about AI use expectations in their role.

When implemented quickly without proper training and transparency, AI initiatives can lead to hidden productivity costs. Of those surveyed, 42% say they “spend more time verifying AI output than they save using it,” while 52% say they regularly spend time correcting AI-generated work from colleagues. Additionally, 49% say low-quality AI outputs slow down projects, 55% say AI-generated content reduces overall team efficiency, and 46% say it makes their work feel “more repetitive and less meaningful.”

Half of all workers also feel their performance is now “directly or indirectly compared to AI-generated output.” Providing clarity about how AI impacts or doesn’t impact an employee’s career is important to staving off AI fatigue.

For those chalking this all up to change resistance, know this: 67% of workers surveyed say they want their organization to increase the use of AI, and 69% say they believe AI is being used ethically within the organization. What they lack is a roadmap, guidance, and training to understand how to best implement AI at work, and to ensure it’s being used effectively.

“Ultimately, by automating the mundane tasks that make work feel repetitive —organizations can refocus their specialists on high-value creativity, transforming AI from a source of fatigue into a powerful engine for meaningful human achievement,” says Anand Unadkat, a senior solutions architect at Atlassian.

IT leaders and their executive colleagues need to focus more on the change management artistry necessary to help get them there.

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • Meta minimizes role of token maxing in employee evaluations
    Meta won’t judge employees by how much they use AI when it comes to annual performance reviews, despite early efforts to drive AI adoption focusing on so-called token maxing. The company has told employees that it “will not use AI adoption dashboards or token counts to evaluate impact,” according to  a report by The Information. The announcement came in an internal memo from executives Maher Saba and Santosh Janardhan, which said that instead of measuring AI usage, “
     

Meta minimizes role of token maxing in employee evaluations

4 de Setembro de 2026, 06:01

Meta won’t judge employees by how much they use AI when it comes to annual performance reviews, despite early efforts to drive AI adoption focusing on so-called token maxing.

The company has told employees that it “will not use AI adoption dashboards or token counts to evaluate impact,” according to  a report by The Information.

The announcement came in an internal memo from executives Maher Saba and Santosh Janardhan, which said that instead of measuring AI usage, “managers should look at output quality, velocity, problem complexity and scope taken on.”

This marks a culture change for Meta, where engineers had previously competed to consume the most AI tokens, displaying their scores on a leaderboard. Meta then discovered that its employees were being diverted from regular work because they were using AI to carry out additional tasks to boost their scores.

Amazon had similar results when it implemented a leaderboard to track AI use; it also found that some employees were trying to game the system by using AI to complete unnecessary tasks, and it has now deleted it.

The company, however, does also monitor employees’ use of AI for training purposes, in a program introduced in April, but this is information was not used to measure employee performance.

Meta had already started to look askance at the concept of using AI metrics as a tool to assess employees. Earlier this year, Chief Technology Officer Andrew Bosworth told employees in a memo that “nobody should be using AI tools just for the sake of using them,” adding that “token usage alone is not a measure of impact of any kind.”

This article first appeared on InfoWorld.

  • ✇Security | CIO
  • ChatGPT, Claude, and Grok all went down at once; enterprises need a backup plan
    Enterprises are facing a disturbing new question in the age of AI: What happens when agentic assistants go dark? This became a very real scenario on Thursday, as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Anthropic’s Claude, and SpaceXAI’s Grok near-simultaneously, and somewhat mysteriously, experienced significant, prolonged outages. Beginning in the morning, Eastern time, several ChatGPT models went down over a roughly two hour period, Claude models over a four-hour span, and Grok models f
     

ChatGPT, Claude, and Grok all went down at once; enterprises need a backup plan

3 de Setembro de 2026, 20:52

Enterprises are facing a disturbing new question in the age of AI: What happens when agentic assistants go dark?

This became a very real scenario on Thursday, as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Anthropic’s Claude, and SpaceXAI’s Grok near-simultaneously, and somewhat mysteriously, experienced significant, prolonged outages.

Beginning in the morning, Eastern time, several ChatGPT models went down over a roughly two hour period, Claude models over a four-hour span, and Grok models for a near three-and-a-half hour duration. All three companies acknowledged the “elevated” issues and applied fixes.

As users grumbled in forums and IT teams scrambled to get them back online, the incident revealed how hastily some organizations have adopted generative AI workflows without considering the potential, and inevitable, impact of widespread outages.

AI agents are increasingly taking over automated and wider-scale workflows, and enterprises could find themselves “uncomfortably exposed” when AI hits the brakes, said technology analyst and journalist Carmi Levy. The situation should “serve as a wakeup call to IT leaders who have largely ignored what it’ll cost them if these increasingly critical platforms suddenly go dark. The risk is no longer hypothetical.”

Hours-long outages impact core services

ChatGPT went down on the same day as OpenAI’s anticipated launch of GPT-6 Astra, the new frontier model that the company says approximates artificial general intelligence (AGI) and gets nearer to its goal of creating autonomous systems that outperform humans.

The OpenAI outage occurred around 11 a.m. ET on Thursday and impacted a slew of services, including search, file uploads, agents, GPTs, voice mode, image generation, ChatGPT work, Compliance API, Deep Research, ChatGPT Atlas, and other connectors and apps. In some cases, users were prevented from logging in, conversations failed to load, and the interface returned errors when attempting to send messages. OpenAI’s Codex services, including web, API, command line interface (CLI), and VS code extension, were also impacted.

OpenAI fixed the issue by 12:55 p.m. ET, and advised Codex remote control users to re-pair their mobile devices.

Claude began to go dark around 7:37 a.m. ET, with Anthropic acknowledging an “exhaustive list” of impacted models with elevated errors over the next few hours: Mythos and Fable 5.1 and 5, Sonnet 5, and Opus 5, 4.8, and 4.6.

The issue was resolved by 11:27 a.m. ET. The incident followed a roughly 27-minute outage just the day before, also due to elevated errors on requests in Sonnet 5.

Grok, meanwhile, began experiencing issues around 9:30 a.m. ET. Grok Web, Build, API, Office/Workspace plugins, Android, and X were all impacted. The services returned to “healthy” traffic at 1:08 p.m. ET.

“It’s a curious scenario for multiple different providers to experience outages at the same time,” noted Brian Jackson, a principal research director at Info-Tech Research Group. It could be related to a common infrastructure such as a content delivery network (CDN) layer, domain name system (DNS), or shared cloud infrastructure, he theorized.

A case for outage planning

Just a few months ago, the extent of AI use within the typical enterprise was limited to employees using chatbots to get answers to basic questions or to draft simple email messages, Levy noted. Large-scale AI platform outages, when they occurred, had relatively little impact on overall organizational productivity. “But things are changing, and quickly,” he said.

Organizations must now have a better understanding of the impact agentic AI has on day-to-day workflows, and the degree to which they disrupt employees’ ability to complete complex tasks once they’ve handed the reins over to automated, cloud-based tools, Levy noted.

In incidents like Thursday’s, employees may fall back on traditional manual workflows, such as updating spreadsheets or pulling reports together the old-fashioned way. But they might also realize that, after relying on AI agents to do so much work on their behalf, they’ve become too dependent on automation, and their “cognitive skills may not be as sharp as they once were,” Levy said.

The growing prevalence of agentic AI should prompt organizations to revisit their disaster recovery and business continuity plans and assess the productivity impact of potential service outages, he said. While cloud-based productivity platforms like Google Workplace and Microsoft 365 offer limited degrees of “offline mode” functionality using locally-stored data, and documents can be synchronized to hard drives in Dropbox or Google Docs for Desktop, agentic AI platforms offer up fewer offline workarounds, at least in their current form.

Organizations should document workflows in greater detail and scenario-plan what near-term recovery might look like in the event of an extended AI platform outage, Levy said. They also need better training to ensure employees maintain their manual skills over time and are equipped to press them into service in the event of a service outage, because the more enterprises lean on agents to complete critical tasks, “and pull humans out of the loop in the interest of productivity,” the less able employees will be to step back in during inevitable service interruptions, he pointed out.

“It is entirely possible for otherwise well-meaning organizations to be over-reliant on AI automation,” Levy said. “Too many organizations are about to learn some hard lessons about not having a backup plan in place.”

Info-Tech’s Jackson also recommends a modular architecture for LLMs; enterprises should view the model as a “commodity that can be hot-swapped with an alternative.” That might be another cloud service provider (which hopefully isn’t experiencing a concurrent outage) or a self-hosted option like an open-weights model.

“In a scenario like this, when your first choice provider might not be available, you have a fallback that can supply that same intelligence layer, even if it’s only a stopgap solution,” said Jackson.

This article originally appeared on Computerworld.

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