This week, we are joined by Matt Poto, Associate Triage Analyst at Huntress, discussing their work on "Grand Theft Auto VI Hype Leads to Malware." Threat actors are exploiting the hype surrounding the upcoming release of Grand Theft Auto VI (GTA6) by distributing fake leaked game downloads designed to infect unsuspecting gamers. Huntress identified malicious ISOs promoted through search engine poisoning, gaming forums, torrent sites, and social media that contain multiple types of malware, including remote access trojans (RATs), an infostealer, and ransomware. The malware can steal credentials and personal information, give attackers control of compromised systems, and encrypt or destroy files, with evidence suggesting the campaign may be targeting Russian-speaking gamers.

Today we are joined by ⁠⁠Subhajeet Singha⁠⁠, Senior Security Researcher at ⁠⁠Acronis⁠⁠ Threat Research Unit, discussing their work on "Red Heron exploits Gitea n-day flaw in multinational campaign, exposing new Linux rootkit." A Chinese-speaking threat actor tracked as Red Heron exploited a critical Gitea remote code execution vulnerability, CVE-2026-60004, within days of its public disclosure, compromising organizations across five countries and stealing source code, credentials, and sensitive infrastructure data. The campaign involved deploying persistent backdoors and a newly identified Linux implant called JITTERLY, which contains an undocumented rootkit, SIXZUT, capable of hiding files, processes, and network connections while protecting the malware from removal. Acronis assesses with moderate confidence that Red Heron operates within a PRC-linked context, highlighting how quickly attackers can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities and turn exposed development platforms into gateways for broader network compromise.

Today we have ⁠Damon Rouse⁠, Threat Intelligence from ⁠Lumen⁠'s Black Lotus Labs, discussing their work on "The infrastructure quartermaster: inside a China-nexus state enablement model." Black Lotus Labs identified a China-nexus cyber infrastructure provider, dubbed a “quartermaster,” that supplies reconnaissance, proxy routing, and obfuscation services to Chinese cyber espionage actors. Its interconnected systems, including QScan and Fast Labyrinth, help identify high-value targets, conceal malicious traffic, and support potential exploitation of government, military, research, and critical infrastructure networks. Researchers warn that this shared infrastructure makes traditional IP-based defenses less effective and recommend following CISA and NCSC guidance, reducing external attack surfaces, and keeping routers, firewalls, and IoT devices updated.

Dan Lisichkin⁠, AI Security Researcher from ⁠Pillar Security⁠, discussing their work on "A WIF Of Fresh Access, How a GitHub Issue on Gemini-CLI Led to GCP Project Compromise." Researchers at Pillar Security uncovered a vulnerability in Google’s Gemini CLI workflows that could allow an attacker to turn a malicious GitHub issue into remote code execution and gain elevated access to a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) project. The exploit chain combined a misconfigured tool allowlist that allowed unrestricted command execution with exposed Workload Identity Federation credentials and overly broad service account permissions, potentially enabling attackers to impersonate privileged accounts. Google promptly addressed the issues by tightening tool restrictions, blocking the agent’s access to credential files, and limiting service account impersonation permissions, highlighting the risks of connecting AI agents to untrusted input and sensitive infrastructure.

⁠Adam Meyers⁠, Head of Counter Adversary Operations at ⁠CrowdStrike⁠, is discussing their work on "PhantomRaven, An LLM-Generated Information Stealer Developed for Bug Bounty Hunting." PhantomRaven, a JavaScript-based information stealer distributed through malicious npm packages by a financially motivated threat actor posing as a bug bounty hunter. The malware targets system information and continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) environment variables, likely seeking credentials, with analysis suggesting its code was generated using a large language model. The report explores how AI-generated tools may lower the barrier to cybercrime and outlines steps organizations can take to mitigate risks, including restricting package installation scripts, using private npm registries, and monitoring dependencies.

Today we are joined by Jean-Pierre Mouton, Senior Threat Intelligence Consultant at GuidePoint Security, discussing their work on "How Play Achieves Encryption." Play ransomware, also known as PlayCrypt, continues to target organizations across multiple sectors using a consistent double-extortion playbook that combines data theft with widespread encryption. A recent investigation details how the group gained access through a SonicWall VPN, moved laterally using tools such as Mimikatz and PsExec, exfiltrated sensitive data, and used the victim’s own SentinelOne uninstallation utility to disable endpoint protection. The findings highlight several behavioral indicators defenders can monitor, including tool staging through SYSVOL and SystemBC for command and control, event log clearing, and suspicious WinSCP activity.

Today we are joined by ⁠Ensar Seker⁠, VP of Research and CISO at ⁠SOCRadar⁠, discussing their work on "Exposing AnonyMousKIT: AI-Powered PhaaS Supply Chain." An investigation into AnonyMousKIT reveals an AI-powered Phishing-as-a-Service platform designed to steal Apple credentials and disable Activation Lock on stolen devices. The platform uses email, SMS, WhatsApp, and AI-driven voice calls to impersonate Apple Support, with researchers uncovering a broader ecosystem spanning 506 domains, 168 storefront brands, and 30 backend installations. Despite its sophisticated social-engineering capabilities, basic coding flaws exposed extensive operational logs and revealed the shared infrastructure, developer activity, and reseller network behind the criminal operation.

Today we are joined by ⁠Dr. Renée Burton⁠, VP of Threat Intelligence at ⁠Infoblox⁠, discussing their work on Lurking Lizard, "Fake Installers, Fake Reviews, Fake Services – Real Proxies, Real." The research uncovers Lurking Lizard, a threat actor that has operated since at least 2022 by using fake software installers, VPNs, and lookalike domains to secretly turn victims’ devices into residential proxy nodes. Researchers identified more than 230 related domains and connected seemingly separate campaigns—including fake 7-Zip, downloader tools, and WireVPN—through shared infrastructure, tracking URLs, deployment patterns, and APIs. The investigation suggests the actor runs an end-to-end proxy operation, recruiting compromised devices and then monetizing their bandwidth through proxy services and fake review sites, with WireVPN appearing to be the latest evolution of the campaign.

Today we are joined by ⁠Brigid O Gorman⁠, Senior Intelligence Analyst on ⁠Symantec⁠ Threat Hunter team, discussing their work on “GodDamn Ransomware: Latest Beast Rebrand Uses Malicious Driver to Disable Defenses." GodDamn ransomware, the latest rebrand from the Hyadina group behind Monster and Beast, is using increasingly sophisticated techniques to evade defenses. In a recent attack, the threat actors used AnyDesk for remote access, a broad credential-harvesting toolkit, and the PoisonX malicious kernel driver to disable endpoint security before deploying the ransomware. The activity highlights Hyadina’s continued development of its ransomware operations and an escalation in its defense-evasion capabilities.

⁠Ismael Valenzuela⁠, Vice President of Labs, Threat Research and Intelligence at ⁠Arctic Wolf⁠, sits down with Dave to discuss their work tracking Anubis. Arctic Wolf Labs details a series of 2026 Anubis ransomware intrusions, revealing affiliates using stolen VPN credentials and exploiting CitrixBleed 2 to gain initial access. Attackers then blended into legitimate IT activity by deploying RMM tools, using RDP and PsExec for lateral movement, stealing credentials, and establishing tunnels and proxies for persistence and exfiltration. The research highlights a repeatable attack chain defenders can disrupt before encryption, from suspicious remote access and unauthorized RMM deployment to credential theft, security-tool tampering, and ransomware execution.

Today we are joined by ⁠Crystal Morin⁠, Senior Cybersecurity Strategist, and ⁠Michael Clark⁠, Senior Director of Threat Research, at ⁠Sysdig⁠, sharing their work on "LLMjacking evolved: Attackers are using stolen AI compute to build offensive agentic tools." The Sysdig Threat Research Team observed an attacker abusing an exposed, unauthenticated Ollama server as the “brain” for an automated offensive security tool. The AI-powered framework can fingerprint services, identify vulnerabilities, craft exploits, extract credentials, and orchestrate attacks toward command execution, with researchers capturing the tool while it was still under active development. The activity highlights how LLMjacking is evolving from simply stealing AI compute for profit into using stolen model capacity to build increasingly autonomous offensive capabilities.