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  • The ‘Lost’ Villages of Myanmar’s Rakhine Pooja Chaudhuri
    A “river of blood” was how one survivor described the scene in western Myanmar. “I saw shooting. I saw mass killing.” Another told the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHRC) how 20 relatives, including three children, had been killed in the 2024 attack on Htan Shauk Khan village. Human Rights Watch (HRW) said earlier this month that the Arakan Army (AA) “may have killed at least 170 Rohingya men, women, and children” in Hoyyar Siri (known as Htan Shauk Khan in Burmese) in Buthidaung To
     

The ‘Lost’ Villages of Myanmar’s Rakhine

27 de Maio de 2026, 06:41

A “river of blood” was how one survivor described the scene in western Myanmar. “I saw shooting. I saw mass killing.” Another told the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHRC) how 20 relatives, including three children, had been killed in the 2024 attack on Htan Shauk Khan village.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) said earlier this month that the Arakan Army (AA) “may have killed at least 170 Rohingya men, women, and children” in Hoyyar Siri (known as Htan Shauk Khan in Burmese) in Buthidaung Township. It described the May 2, 2024, attack as a “massacre”.

Buthidaung is one of the two townships in Rakhine State that is home to the majority of the Rohingya, a mainly Muslim ethnic minority in the predominantly Buddhist Myanmar.

At least 40 villages in Buthindaung were burned down in April and May 2024 amid clashes between the AA, an ethnic armed group fighting Myanmar’s military junta for control of Rakhine, and junta forces battling to retain their hold of the township.

Both sides committed abuses against civilians during the clashes, according to HRW. The military junta’s forced conscription of Rohingya to fight on its behalf has also intensified violence against them. 

The military and Rohingya armed groups began arson attacks in Buthidaung township in April 2024. By mid-May the AA had captured all junta bases, according to the think tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The destruction of Buthidaung has previously been documented by Bellingcat. 

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The AA has denied accusations that it massacred civilians in Buthidaung, claiming that those killed were junta soldiers and Rohingya militants.

Bellingcat emailed the United League of Arakan, AA’s political wing, about the alleged attack on civilians but did not receive a response at the time of publication. The United League of Arakan’s humanitarian office responded to Bellingcat after publication disputing the Human Rights Watch report and the allegation that Arakan Army personnel massacred Muslim civilians. Instead describing that the village became part of an intense military confrontation involving several armed groups, rather than a one-sided assault. Myanmar’s Ministry of Defence also did not respond to our questions. 

Evidence of civilian harm in Myanmar is slow to emerge and difficult to obtain due to the military’s strict control of the region and the tight grip of armed groups such as the AA in areas they control. 

“The mass killing could only be confirmed more than a year later,” the recent HRW report said, “when survivors eventually crossed into Bangladesh and found their way to the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar.” 

Aerial imagery shows that Htan Shauk Khan was almost entirely destroyed in May 2024.

False-colour infrared map from Copernicus on Planet Insights Browser shows exposed ground in grey or tan, indicative of possible damage, in the village.

Erasing Homes

A new investigation by Bellingcat has identified 115 villages in Rakhine State, similar to Htan Shauk Khan, as partially or completely destroyed since the February 2021 military coup that overthrew Myanmar’s democratically elected government.

The data points to a pattern of violence that leaves civilian areas uninhabitable and in some cases, erases them completely.

MapLibre | Protomaps | Planet Labs © OpenStreetMap contributors

Several buildings were set on fire when the junta allegedly dropped a bomb on the Muslim village of Zu La on Nov. 3, 2024. The fire was captured nearby on NASA FIRMS.

Satellite imagery indicates that it was attacked again on Dec. 9, 2024. Visible smoke can be seen rising from the village.

Zu La is located in Maungdaw Township. Along with neighbouring Buthidaung, Maungdaw is home to the majority of Myanmar’s persecuted Rohingya.

Zu La, and the neighbouring village of Gone Nar, previously faced violence during the 2017 Rohingya genocide.

Satellite imagery from that year shows them completely burned to the ground.

They show signs of reconstruction after 2017.

But repeated attacks in 2024 destroyed the villages again.

Neither of the villages appears on the latest maps from 2024. These are produced by the United Nations mapping unit, based on Myanmar government maps.

Steve Ross, Senior Fellow at the US nonprofit Stimson Center who is leading the ‘Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ project, told Bellingcat this is part of the military’s broader campaign to deny the existence of the Rohingya and erase identity in Rakhine.

Bellingcat contacted the Myanmar government but had received no response by the time of publication.

Villages in Mungdaw are inured to cycles of violence. Ywar Haung, a village south of Zu La, has stood barren since 2017.

So has Kan Kya, where the military built the Border Guard Police Battalion No. 5 (BGP5).

All four villages are among the growing number of Rakhine’s lost settlements.

Six of the 10 villages we found partially or totally destroyed in Maungdaw in 2024 aren’t marked on the UN’s township map.

Removing more villages from the map remains a possibility, Ross said. However, following this April’s elections, which critics dismissed as a sham, the military is eager to restore international credibility and avoid actions that might be seen as provocative, the expert told Bellingcat.

The AA announced the capture of Maungdaw when it seized BGP5 on Dec. 8, 2024.

And with that the armed group gained full control of Myanmar’s entire border with Bangladesh.

Shortly afterwards, the AA took control of the strategically important Ann Township in central Rakhine.

The armed group announced it had captured the headquarters of the Western Regional Military Command on Dec. 18, 2024.

It shared a video of the headquarters and nearby military installations burning.

Local residents in and around the township were trapped, displaced or forced to flee their homes due to the months-long fight for Ann.

According to reports, the military entered Pyaung Chaung village and burned it down on Oct. 31, 2024.

Satellite imagery from Nov. 1, 2024, shows large-scale damage in the village. There were reports that the military warned residents to evacuate the village a week before the attack.

Ross believes that the military’s intention has been to try to make Rakhine as ungovernable as possible if the AA gains full control of the state.

Nearby villages of Yat Thar Ywar Thit

and Pyaung Thay show similar evidence of destruction.

Sittwe city, the capital of Rakhine State, has become a focal area of fighting since late 2025. The city is in Sittwe township, one of the three townships still under junta control.

Su Mon Thant, Asia-Pacific analyst at Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), said capturing Sittwe would be highly symbolic for the AA as no non-state actor has yet taken control of a state capital in the country.

The AA already controls areas along an India-backed transport corridor in Myanmar that includes a port in Sittwe.

Sittwe is surrounded by water on three sides. Capturing it would be challenging, with the military maintaining naval superiority and building defences in and around the city to deter a potential AA offensive, Ross said.

On Dec. 27, 2024, the AA attacked the Kyauk Tan checkpoint near Sittwe on the highway linking the capital to Yangon, the largest city to the south of Rakhine.

There are many villages near the checkpoint.

Like Taw Kan

where, according to local reports, junta forces carried out an arson attack that destroyed 80 houses on Jan. 15, 2024.

Bellingcat found at least 13 villages near the checkpoint that had been destroyed, with only a few remaining structures. All but one of them were attacked in 2024-2025.

Less than 4km from the checkpoint is Yar Tan

which appears intact in a March 2024 Google Earth image

but several buildings look destroyed in high-resolution satellite image on Google Earth from March 2025.

Trenches and military outposts began appearing near the village around Nov-Dec 2024.

They grew as the months passed. However, due to a lack of updated high-resolution satellite images, we cannot tell whether these are currently in use or to what extent.

There are also villages that appear to have been replaced with defensive structures. For example, Kan Pyin Ywar Haung, for which the latest available high-resolution satellite image shows trenches on both sides.

Although such structures are clearly visible in high-resolution satellite imagery, lower-quality images can also help indicate whether a village was replaced with fortifications.

Kan Pyin Ywar Thit, located just south of Kan Pyin Ywar Haung, appears to have been completely destroyed; however, the same criss-crossing lines are not visible across the village.

Similar fortifications appear in other villages.

Defence infrastructure has replaced villages on the outskirts of Sittwe, making it more difficult for AA to advance towards the city, said Ross.

Bellingcat also found at least 10 villages partially or totally destroyed in Kyaukpyu Township since fighting intensified in February 2025.

Kyaukpyu, which has abundant oil, natural gas and marine resources, is also home to a junta naval base

As well as Chinese infrastructure projects that the AA fully or partially controls.

Nearly all the villages we found to be destroyed or damaged are within a 10km radius of the naval base.

In early March this year, clashes took place between the AA and the military near Say Maw village, located less than 5km from the base.

NASA FIRMS detected fire in the village and the surrounding areas on March 23, 2026.

The latest high resolution satellite image on Planet from April 2026 shows flattened buildings in the village.

A month earlier Saing Chon Dwein village, also less than 5km from the base, was reportedly burned down by the military.

The fire was caught on a Feb. 9, 2026 lower resolution satellite image

with burnt areas distinguishable the next day.

Like Sittwe, Kyaukpyu is surrounded by water, making it difficult for the Arakan Army, which lacks naval capabilities, to seize control. “AA has some advanced drones reportedly, but these areas also have jamming technology,” said Thant.

Methodology

The data was compiled using news reports, including social media channels, ACLED, satellite imagery and NASA FIRMS. The names of the villages were corroborated using the UN’s Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), news reports and Planet Labs. 

We only included areas where the destruction was clearly visible in high-resolution satellite imagery or significant enough to be detected in mid-resolution images. Our data is not exhaustive and the true number of affected villages is likely to be higher.

While it is difficult to ascertain whether the villages we found damaged or destroyed showed signs of reconstruction, at least five of them appear to show some buildings rebuilt in latest available satellite imagery.

Military Control Is Slipping

Last month, in the first election since Myanmar’s 2021 coup, the pro-military parliament chose junta chief Min Aung Hlaing to be the next president.  

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According to research group Data for Myanmar, at least 65 townships were excluded from voting, including the 14 in the AA’s control. In Rakhine’s 17 townships, voting was held in only three still under junta control – Kyaukpyu, Sittwe and Manaung.

The AA resumed attacks against the junta in Rakhine in November 2023, ending a year-long ceasefire.

Data published by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and analysed by Bellingcat reveals a sharp increase in the military’s air and drone strikes in Rakhine. After the AA resumed its offensive, strikes rose from 30 in 2023 to 461 in 2024. By the end of 2024, the AA had captured all but three townships in the state.

Bellingcat found that strikes were then concentrated in the townships where the junta is fighting to maintain control. They decreased in 13 townships captured by the AA and remained unchanged in one during 2025. By contrast, attacks increased in Kyaukpyu and Sittwe, yet to be captured by the AA. Data for Manaung is unavailable.

ACLED’s data comes from multiple sources, including news reports and social media. While the data is not exhaustive, a broad trend can be identified. You can read further details and caveats about the data here.

Su Mon Thant, Asia-Pacific analyst at ACLED,explained that the military conducts clearance operations to prevent the AA from using villages as buffers or shelters – a tactic employed across the country. “At the same time, it’s a warning sign for other villages,” she said, adding that when one village is set ablaze, it sends a signal to other villages not to “accept, shelter or harbor” armed groups. Thant also noted that people are displaced when their village is destroyed, eroding support for armed groups as locals suffer the consequences of the fighting. 

The AA has vowed to take control of all of Rakhine by 2027 and success may bring a geopolitical shift in the region. The armed group’s control over Kyaukpyu and Sittwe will give it significant leverage, with both India and China having infrastructure projects in the townships, Steve Ross of the Stimson Center told Bellingcat.

But neither side can control the state without further alleviation of civilian suffering, Ross said. According to UNHRC data, there are almost half a million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Rakhine as of March 30, 2026.

Estimated total IDPs in March-April of each year. Data prior to 2022 is unavailable. Source: United Nations Human Rights Council. Chart: Created on Datawrapper, edited on Adobe Illustrator by Pooja Chaudhuri/Bellingcat

In Sittwe township alone, about 120,000 Rohingya have been displaced by communal conflict since 2012. 

“People displaced from other parts of Rakhine State during the war are in Sittwe, hundreds of thousands of civilians,” said Thant, adding that neither side can control the capital without significant loss of life.

There are also 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The futures of both the refugees and IDPs remain uncertain. 

“Nobody can go home yet at this stage,” said Thant.


Editor’s note: This article was updated on July 6, 2026 to include response from representatives of the United League of Arakan.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.

The post The ‘Lost’ Villages of Myanmar’s Rakhine appeared first on bellingcat.

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  • How India’s Ruling Party is Using AI to Boost Hate Speech in States Near Bangladesh Pooja Chaudhuri
    The video posted by a state branch of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) showed Assam chief minister Himanta Biswa Sarma shooting an image of two men in Muslim skull caps. “Foreigner-free Assam”, read one caption across the video. “Why did you not go to Pakistan?” said another.  Screenshots of the now-deleted video shared by BJP on Feb. 7 showing Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma shooting an AI-generated version of INC leader Gaurav Gogoi (in a white skull cap) and another uni
     

How India’s Ruling Party is Using AI to Boost Hate Speech in States Near Bangladesh

31 de Março de 2026, 10:00

The video posted by a state branch of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) showed Assam chief minister Himanta Biswa Sarma shooting an image of two men in Muslim skull caps. “Foreigner-free Assam”, read one caption across the video. “Why did you not go to Pakistan?” said another. 

Screenshots of the now-deleted video shared by BJP on Feb. 7 showing Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma shooting an AI-generated version of INC leader Gaurav Gogoi (in a white skull cap) and another unidentified, bearded man. Source: BJP4Assam/X

One of the men in the photo that Sarma was portrayed as shooting was Gaurav Gogoi, a leader of the Indian National Congress (INC), the BJP’s main competitor in Assam for the state’s upcoming legislative elections next month

Gogoi has stated that he is Hindu but enjoys visiting different religious sites and observing their norms. He has been photographed wearing traditional Muslim attire during religious occasions such as Eid

But the image of him in the video shared by BJP Assam, wearing a casual singlet with a skull cap, was not one of those occasions. 

Bellingcat has seen several dozen videos posted by the BJP that use generative artificial intelligence (AI) alongside anti-Muslim and anti-Bangladeshi messaging in the border states of Assam and West Bengal in December last year, ahead of legislative elections scheduled in both states for April.

Left: Original photo shared by Gogoi on Jun. 17, 2025. Right: An image shared by BJP Assam that was edited with AI to show Gogoi with a skull cap, beard and Quran. Source: gauravgogoiasm/Facebook, BJP4Bengal/Facebook

Bellingcat analysed 499 social media posts containing photos and videos shared on Facebook, Instagram and X by the BJP’s official accounts in the two states for this time period, finding 194 posts that appeared to meet the United Nations’ definition of hate speech: discriminating against persons or communities based on inherent characteristics such as religion and national origin. Of these, 31 (about one in six of the hateful posts) contained the obvious use of AI-generated imagery. 

visualization

Chart: Galen Reich

These appear to be part of a larger pattern of politicians and parties globally using generative AI to amplify hateful or divisive content, particularly ahead of major political events such as elections. 

Ahead of the New York City mayoral race last year, Andrew Cuomo’s official X account shared, then deleted, an AI-generated video depicting Mamdani eating rice with his hands and a Black man in a keffiyeh shoplifting. In Italy, several opposition parties complained to a communications watchdog after deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini’s League party published a series of AI-generated images depicting men of colour attacking women or police officers. And in the UK, videos by an AI-generated rapper funded by the far-right Advance UK party, with lyrics targeting Muslims, were viewed millions of times. 

A Campaign of Hate

Both Assam and West Bengal share a border with Bangladesh. BJP, the world’s largest political party, is currently in power in Assam, where legislative elections are scheduled on Apr. 9. West Bengal, which goes to the polls on Apr. 23, is governed by the Trinamool Congress (TMC).

Map: Pooja Chaudhuri. Source: Goran tek-en, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons 

Tensions between India and Bangladesh worsened after former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who enjoys close ties with Delhi, was ousted in 2024 and fled to India

US-based international affairs expert Mohammed Zeeshan told Bellingcat that the “dehumanising and debasing” terminology used in India to refer to alleged illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, including by senior ministers, has caused resentment towards India in Bangladesh. 

“The situation, in fact, was so bad that Hasina herself had subtly warned the Modi government in public statements that Indian domestic rhetoric was endangering Bangladeshi Hindus, who bore the brunt of that resentment,” Zeeshan said. 

Zobaida Nasreen, a professor of anthropology at Dhaka University, said that anti-Muslim rhetoric intensified by BJP leaders reinforces the belief in Bangladesh that Muslims and Bengalis are being collectively targeted in India.

“Viral videos containing this message tend to spread quickly across Bangladeshi media and social platforms especially on Facebook, enhancing perceptions of hostility and triggering anti-India sentiment or nationalist backlash,” she added.

In December, the month our dataset was collected, Dipu Das, a Hindu garment worker, was beaten to death at an anti-India protest in Bangladesh over allegations that he had made derogatory remarks about Islam. 

And while the administration led by Bangladesh’s newly elected leader Tarique Rahman has sought to reset strained ties, most of the hateful social media posts we saw posted by the BJP in December attacked Bangladeshi Muslims and/or Bengali-origin Muslims in India, showing how tensions between the two countries continue to influence political messaging in India’s border states.

Bellingcat’s analysis included a total of 202 posts by BJP Assam and 297 by BJP’s West Bengal branch on their official accounts. We also looked at posts shared by BJP’s main opponent parties – 194 from INC in Assam and 357 from the TMC in West Bengal – during the same time period in December. 

This included all visual social media posts (containing photos or videos) by each party in December, except those that did not appear to contain any overt political messaging, such as those simply commemorating public holidays. We only counted each photo or video once, regardless of how many platforms it was shared across. 

Although all of the major parties contesting in the Assam and West Bengal state elections appeared to use AI-generated imagery in some of their posts, there appeared to be a particularly high concentration of hateful messaging in the ones posted by the BJP’s accounts. 

In Assam, we identified 28 posts by BJP using apparently AI-generated imagery, of which 24 carried hateful messaging. Of the 194 INC posts we looked at from December, 41 appeared to feature AI-generated imagery, but none of these appeared to carry hateful messaging. 

In West Bengal, we found 14 BJP posts that contained clear indicators of AI-generated imagery, seven of which were hateful. We also identified 15 posts by the incumbent TMC that appeared to feature AI imagery, but none of these appeared to meet the definition of hate speech. 

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When contacted for comment, BJP Assam spokesperson Rupam Goswami did not directly respond to questions on the party’s general use of AI but said they did not post any AI-generated photos of Gogoi. “BJP does not stoop so low,” he told Bellingcat.

As for the “point blank” shooting video, Goswami initially said the person responsible had been punished and removed from the party. However, when asked about Sarma saying that he would re-post the video with those he was depicted shooting labelled as “Bangladeshis”, Goswami said, “[Bangladeshis] need to be completely suppressed.”

BJP West Bengal did not respond to multiple requests for comment by Bellingcat via phone and email.

It is important to note that as generative AI technology improves, it can be increasingly difficult to detect AI-generated imagery. Our manual count of AI-generated imagery only included posts that had obvious signs of generative AI such as unnaturally smooth textures and multiple people with the same faces. It is therefore possible that there were other images in our dataset where generative AI was used more subtly. 

However, Joyojeet Pal, Professor of Information at the University of Michigan, told Bellingcat that the quality of these visuals, or whether they looked real, was not the priority. 

“What politicians in India have understood is that the sociocultural drivers of misinformation are most important for elections, so they harp on about things to the extent that they have started to not care about form over substance. It looks bad? It doesn’t matter,” he said.

More important to voters, according to Pal, was whether they already believed in the narrative contained in the videos, which generative AI could help create more quickly: “AI is helping cement polarised opinions by giving you the kind of content you have already decided you want to engage with.” 

When asked about INC’s use of AI, party spokesperson Aman Wadud said that it was obvious that some of the videos they posted were made with AI and that there was no intention to mislead. 

“AI can be both destructive and creative. We are using it in a creative manner, we are not using it in a destructive manner. We don’t violate people’s dignity, we don’t falsely accuse people,” he said.

TMC did not respond to Bellingcat’s multiple requests for comment via phone and email by publication time.

Portraying Bengali Muslims as ‘Foreigners’

The largest category of hateful messaging Bellingcat observed in the BJP’s posts targeted Bangladeshi or Bengali-origin Muslims, referring to them as “infiltrators” or “foreigners”. We counted 66 such posts by the BJP’s Assam and West Bengal branches from December, of which eight appeared to contain obvious AI-generated imagery. 

Bengali-origin Muslims are often stereotyped as “illegal immigrants” in the state, although members of the community have lived in India since the late 1800s

Last year, the BJP deported thousands of alleged undocumented migrants – reportedly including Indian Muslim citizens – to Bangladesh. Human rights groups have called the deportations unlawful and discriminatory, as well as lacking in due process

One video referencing this theme shows AI-generated visuals of protests against “illegal infiltration” in Assam, with the caption urging people to “wake up” or the country would “turn into Bangladesh”. 

A different one uses real footage from past violence in Assam mixed in with images of Muslim men. A song playing in the background accuses them of taking over “Assamese land” and shows AI images of “Assamese” people, i.e. those not in stereotypical Muslim clothing, crying.

An AI-generated image of a crying man in non-Muslim clothing and a traditional Assamese scarf on his shoulders. Source: BJP4Assam/X

Both videos use religious markers to draw a distinction between “infiltrators” – men in skull caps or lungis associated with Bengal-origin Muslims – and “citizens” in non-Muslim attire. 

Clothing is often used by the Hindu far-right as a visual shorthand for identity and a deepening religious divide. In 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said of protests against a controversial citizenship law that those responsible for violence could be “identified by their clothes”

In the hateful posts seen by Bellingcat, both real and AI-generated images of opposition figures – particularly Gogoi – were shown alongside messaging that suggested that they supported “foreigners” or “infiltrators”. 

The Center for the Study of Organized Hate (CSOH) also noted, in a 2025 report on AI-generated imagery and Islomophobia in India, that Hindu far-right politicians and media outlets have invoked and reinforced the trope of Muslims as “infiltrators” for years. 

“AI-generated images on these themes reinforce associations between Muslim identity and illegality, reinforcing xenophobic and Islamophobic stereotypes. In doing so, they play a powerful role in justifying exclusionary policies and normalising discrimination against Muslims,” the report said. 

‘Save Hindus’

Zenith Khan, a data analyst who worked on the CSOH report, noted that AI-generated propaganda was often tightly knit with current political moments, and its impact depended on “timing it right” especially when “people are emotionally charged”. 

The violence against the minority Hindu community in Bangladesh has been used by the BJP to raise concerns over the safety of Hindus in India. 

Days after Das’ lynching, the Assam state branch of BJP posted a video with an image of his face – except that it was manipulated with AI to show tears streaming from his eyes. “Save Hindus”, said the text accompanying the video. 

Posts by BJP’s West Bengal unit also seemed to frame Muslims as criminals or threats. A video, styled after the TV show “Stranger Things”, raised alarms over an “upside down” version of the state under the current government. 

A man is depicted being chased by men in skull caps. Arrows label them as “Ralib,” “Galib,” and “Chalib” – a play on Muslim names ending in “-lib” – in case the skull caps left any ambiguity about their Muslim portrayal. 

“Stranger Things” themed post that depicts Hindus under threat from Muslims in West Bengal. Source: BJP4Bengal/X

INC filed a police complaint in September last year against the BJP for sharing AI videos targeting Gogoi and the Muslim community, as well as another complaint in relation to the video of Sarma portrayed as shooting two men “point blank” in February. 

INC Assam spokesperson Wadud said that no action had been taken on the party’s police complaints as far as he knew. 

Disinformation researcher Bharat Nayak told Bellingcat that it has always been tech platforms’ responsibility to control new types of content. 

“The goal post can’t shift. This has always been a tech problem,” he said. 

When this responsibility is shrugged off, Nayak added, the result is a lack of accountability. “If you’re using old videos from other countries as new, you will have people countering you. But AI-generated videos can be shared without context just to spread hate – like showing people in skull caps – and the ‘when, where, how’ questions vanish.”

Both Meta – which owns Facebook and Instagram – and X have policies against hateful conduct. 

Meta also announced in 2024 that it would start adding “AI info” labels to more content detected as AI-generated, while some X users spotted a similar feature introduced on the platform last month. Only five of INC’s AI visuals that we identified – and none of those by TMC or the BJP – had a disclaimer that said “AI-generated”. 

Bellingcat reached out to Meta and X for comment on whether the posts we identified breached their terms of use regarding hateful conduct or labelling AI-generated posts. A Meta spokesperson said they were reviewing the flagged content and “will take appropriate action on any violations of our policies”. As of publication, X had not responded.


Kalim Ahmed from Bellingcat’s Discord Community contributed research to this piece.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.

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