The UK Electoral Commission is building an AI system to alert candidates to damaging deepfakes within three hours.

The UK’s Electoral Commission is building an AI-powered system to tell candidates about significant deepfakes within three hours of posting. Its chief executive, Vijay Rangarajan, said so at a panel at the Conservative Party’s annual conference last week, as Tech Policy Press points out that it’s a rare public intervention from a man who has run the regulator since 2024 and who mostly speaks to Parliament in evidence sessions.

He began with an example from another country. During Ireland’s 2025 presidential election, a deepfake video falsely showed candidate Catherine Connolly saying the election had been cancelled and that she was withdrawing from the race. The video also urged her supporters not to vote. None of this was true, and Connolly went on to win the election.

Rangarajan said a similar video during a UK election could influence a significant number of votes. However, he stressed that the Electoral Commission has clear limits to its role. It does not settle disputes over political claims made during a campaign. Its focus is on false statements that could disrupt the election process itself.

““If that happens to the British election, that will move a significant amount of votes,” he said, adding that it was not the Electoral Commission’s role to arbitrate rival claims made by candidates during the cut and thrust of a campaign, but rather to focus on statements such as this one that could undermine the administration of the election itself.

“To address that risk, the commission conducted a pilot program during the UK’s local elections in May 2026, Rangarajan said. “We ran a full pilot, analyzed about three million posts through an AI,” he explained. “So, this is a good example of how AI can work: 147 bits of content were flagged. Humans then looked at those — not a terribly pleasant job in some cases — ten were really quite misleading, and we referred to the social media companies or to the police.”” Tech Policy Press reports.

The Commission has tested the idea. During the local elections in May 2026 it ran a full pilot, and an AI analyzed about three million posts. It flagged 147 pieces of content, humans reviewed them (he called that unpleasant in some cases), and ten were really quite misleading, so they went to the social media companies or the police.

Rangarajan said the posts had little impact. However, the trial showed that the Electoral Commission now has a system to help voters, journalists and political parties deal with deepfakes. He expects attempts to use them to disrupt UK elections. The pilot began earlier in 2026 and monitored fake audio and videos designed to mislead voters about the election process or falsely show candidates doing or saying things. The Commission said it would publish the results.

The system has a clear focus. Identifying and prosecuting the people behind deepfakes can take weeks or months, often long after an election. Instead, the Commission aims to act without first identifying who created the content. AI scans social media posts in real time and flags suspicious material for human review. If a post meets the required criteria, the Commission alerts the relevant candidates or parties, ideally within three hours of its first appearance. Rangarajan said this is roughly the time it takes for content to go viral.

That narrow scope has edges. Full Fact, whose AI tools were monitoring more than a thousand candidates in the May elections, found a Glasgow candidate’s campaign videos built with AI. The Commission told Full Fact the clips fell outside its pilot because each was labeled an illustrative AI scene, even though the label sat at the end of the caption.

The legal backdrop is the real problem. Rangarajan said the Commission was set up for money and people, and now it’s all about information, so it has to work out how laws from 1983 or 2000 apply in 2026. Earlier this year the Guardian reported, according to a summary on the Resilient Media for Democracy Observatory, that the Commission was seeking legally enforceable takedown powers from the government.

Then there’s the part with no legal answer at all. Rangarajan said he believes at least one social network showed signs of algorithmic bias at election time, though he didn’t name it. His scenario is a platform that changes its recommendations during an election without warning, suggesting neighbors with one political view and suppressing others, so users think their neighbors have changed their minds.

The Commission believes it has already detected some algorithmic bias in social media campaigns, but Rangarajan said UK law offers no clear solution. Experts and campaigners have also raised concerns about X’s role in UK politics and TikTok’s Chinese ownership.

The Commission faces 30,000 to 40,000 cyberattacks a month, sometimes reaching 10,000 a day, including botnet attacks and phishing. Rangarajan wants stronger, more independent security capabilities and believes major social media monitoring could be handled by another body.

Tech Policy Press sees his comments as a call to update election laws and possibly create new offenses. The next general election must take place by August 2029, but it could be called earlier, and it remains unclear whether lawmakers will act in time.

For now, what the Commission has is a three-hour promise and a pilot that worked at small scale.

Rangarajan describes the threat it’s meant for as “an absolutely certain attempt to use some of these deepfakes against the UK.”

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Deepfakes)

Japan helped extradite a Russian suspect linked to Qilin ransomware to Germany, but the gang continued attacking victims after his arrest.

Germany has arrested a Russian national believed to be a leading figure in the Qilin ransomware group, and Japan’s National Police Agency just put its own role in that arrest on the record. The suspect was detained in Japan back in May, at a hotel in Osaka, while traveling as a tourist.

“In connection with a ransomware incident in Germany, German authorities had obtained an arrest warrant for a Russian national suspected of involvement in the attack. When the suspect arrived in Japan, the Japanese authorities worked with the Ministry of Justice, the Tokyo High Public Prosecutors Office, and German authorities to detain him under a provisional detention warrant, in accordance with Japan’s Act of Extradition.” reads a full NPA statement in Japanese. “The Japanese authorities subsequently handed the suspect over to Germany in accordance with the procedures established by that law. These actions contributed to the case.”

Germany already had an arrest warrant out for the man over a ransomware incident on German soil. When he showed up in Japan, Japanese authorities moved fast. Per the NPA’s own account, Japan’s Ministry of Justice, the Tokyo High Public Prosecutors Office, and German authorities worked together to detain him under Japan’s extradition law, using a provisional detention warrant, before handing him over to Germany through the proper legal process.

The NPA statement does more than confirm the arrest. It specifically recognizes the work of the Kanto Regional Police Bureau’s Cyber Special Investigation Unit and other local police forces. They had been investigating Qilin ransomware attacks in Japan and working with German investigators on the wider case. The agency stressed that international cooperation is essential to investigating cybercrime, including ransomware attacks that affect countries around the world.

Japan has good reason to focus on Qilin. The group has attacked Japanese organizations, including carmaker Nissan and brewing company  Asahi. The attack on Asahi disrupted its operations for an extended period and exposed data belonging to 1.5 million people. Japan has been directly affected by the group, so its role in the investigation and the suspect’s extradition is significant.

Qilin ransomware operation has been active since 2022, it has become one of the most active RaaS groups in 2025, claiming over 40 victims monthly and peaking at 100 in June.

The group enables affiliates to deploy customized ransomware payloads against targeted organizations. Qilin uses double-extortion tactics, encrypting data while threatening to leak it via Tor-based portals. The group has targeted multiple sectors worldwide, including healthcare, manufacturing, and finance, leveraging phishing and known vulnerabilities.

In October 2025, Resecurity’s researchers detailed how the Qilin RaaS group relies on global bulletproof hosting networks to support its extortion operations.

In early October, DragonForce, LockBit, and Qilin formed a ransomware alliance to boost attack effectiveness, marking a major shift in the cyber threat landscape. Ransomware groups DragonForce, LockBit, and Qilin formed a strategic alliance to enhance their attack capabilities, signaling an evolving cyber threat landscape. The alliance aims at sharing tools and infrastructure to enhance attack effectiveness. 

At the end of March, Qilin Ransomware group allegedly breached the chemical manufacturing giant Dow Inc. 

Despite the suspect’s detention in May, the cybercrime group has listed hundreds of new victims on its Tor leak site since June alone.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)

Fortinet details ClingSTUN, a Linux backdoor exploiting unpatched IoT devices and abusing public STUN servers to route traffic past NAT.

FortiGuard Labs researchers spotted a Linux malware family they call ClingSTUN, and the name gives away its trick immediately. Instead of relying on a dedicated command server, the malicious code leans on STUN, the protocol that helps devices behind a router figure out their real public IP address. Video calling apps use it constantly, which means ClingSTUN’s network traffic hides inside something that already looks completely normal.

“ClingSTUN functions as a back-connect proxy backdoor, turning infected systems into remotely controlled proxy nodes. It abuses public STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT) infrastructure to discover externally mapped IP addresses and ports, maintain NAT bindings, and improve connectivity between compromised hosts and remote operators.” reads the report published by Fortinet. “Because many of the STUN servers it contacts are legitimate public services, the resulting traffic easily blends with normal VoIP and WebRTC communications.”

The attack starts with a familiar problem: old, unpatched devices exposed to the internet. Fortinet first spotted the campaign exploiting a known command injection flaw in Hytec Inter routers. As the campaign evolved, the attackers changed their download infrastructure and expanded the list of vulnerabilities they were exploiting.

In the latest wave, they were targeting devices from more than a dozen vendors, including D-Link, TP-Link, Realtek and Linksys, as well as several DVR and IoT cloud platforms. Many of these devices are easy targets because they are rarely updated or closely monitored.

Once the attackers find a vulnerable device, a small downloader script installs the right malware version for its hardware. It supports common architectures such as ARM, MIPS, PowerPC and Intel.

The latest version also checks the device for other malware before installing itself. It scans mounted filesystems and kills suspicious processes running from temporary directories. In other words, ClingSTUN is not just trying to infect the device. It also tries to remove competing malware and take full control.

The persistence mechanism is almost old-fashioned in its simplicity. The malware copies itself into two separate locations, then appends itself to three different boot scripts so it survives a reboot no matter which startup path the device actually uses. It also walks through every running process, checks whether the command line matches what the process claims to be, and kills anything that doesn’t line up, which is both a defense mechanism and a fairly blunt way of eliminating rival malware fighting for the same compromised box.

Two details stand out as genuinely well thought through rather than copy-pasted from some other botnet’s source code. First, it opens the device’s watchdog timer and quietly disables it, so the device never auto-reboots itself out of the infection the way embedded hardware is designed to if something goes wrong. Second, once it’s running as root, it swaps its own process metadata for a copy of PID 1’s, the very first process the kernel starts, which makes a basic process listing show what looks like the init system instead of malware.

“After setting up persistence, ClingSTUN clears its original command-line arguments so that its command line appears empty in tools such as “ps.” It then checks whether it is running as root (UID 0).” reads the report. “If so, it copies selected process information files from “/proc/1/” to “/tmp” and bind-mounts “/tmp” over its own “/proc/” directory, concealing its process information behind metadata copied from PID 1.”

The STUN part is especially interesting because it helps ClingSTUN hide in normal network traffic. The malware sends standard requests to public STUN servers to find out its external IP address and port. These are the same services commonly used by VoIP and WebRTC applications.

Later versions reduced the number of STUN servers and required all connections to work, which suggests the attackers were improving reliability. Because the traffic goes to legitimate third-party services, it can be difficult for defenders to tell the difference between ClingSTUN activity and normal traffic from apps such as Zoom.

Command delivery itself still needs a human on the other end willing to send a 20-byte packet the right way.

“ClingSTUN establishes a UDP socket, binds to a random local port, and sends standard 20-byte STUN binding requests. It sends these to 24 public endpoints and ensures at least half succeed.” Fortinet states. “The third evolution reduced this to 13 endpoints and ensures every endpoint connection succeeds.”

A single control datagram can trigger ClingSTUN to open a fresh outbound TCP connection to an address the operator specifies, pull down a command over that connection, and execute it, which keeps the heavy lifting off the STUN channel and limits what shows up in any one place. The malware also carries hardcoded exploits for seven more vulnerabilities purely for spreading itself further, meaning every infected device doubles as a scanner looking for its next host.

Fortinet stresses that the STUN servers are not compromised or malicious. They are simply working as intended. These third-party services should not automatically be treated as attacker-controlled infrastructure.

“ClingSTUN’s exploitation of known, unpatched vulnerabilities reinforces the importance of consistent cyber hygiene.” concludes the report. “Organizations should inventory Internet-facing devices, track their firmware and support status, and promptly apply available security updates, prioritizing vulnerabilities known to be actively exploited.”

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, ClingSTUN)

Pentagon personnel agency breach exposed data of 3 million people after attackers accessed a file-sharing server for about nine months.

The U.S. Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), which maintains personnel records for the Department of Defense, is notifying people that their personal information was exposed in a data breach. According to the agency, unauthorized users accessed one of its file-sharing servers for roughly nine months.

The breach affects 2.76 million living people and 294,000 deceased individuals, according to a Department of War official. DMDC held at least 60 million records in fiscal year 2024, covering military and civilian personnel, contractors, family members, retirees and veterans.

“The Pentagon has confirmed that the breach affects 2.76 million “living individuals,” a category that potentially includes current and former defense personnel or their dependents, and 294,000 “deceased individuals,” a Defense Department official told CNN on Monday, three days after this story was published.” CNN states.

The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) has notified individuals that a security vulnerability exposed personal information stored on one of its file-sharing systems.

The vulnerability was discovered on July 16, 2026, and the US office quickly patched the system and restored it. An investigation found that a small number of unauthorized users had accessed files between October 2025 and the discovery date. The files contained unencrypted personal information.

“On July 16, 2026, a security vulnerability in a DMDC file sharing system was discovered, which allowed unauthorized users to access files. DMDC immediately updated the file sharing system to patch the vulnerability and the system was restored.” reads a data breach notification letter sent to impacted individuals. “Analysis identified that between October 2025 and the date of discovery, a small number of unauthorized users accessed files on a server containing unencrypted PII. The types of PII involved vary by individual; however, in your case, they include social security number (SSN) and at least one additional identifier such as name, date of birth, contact information, sex, race, and military personnel information (such as occupational specialty).”

The data exposed varies by person, but in this case included Social Security numbers (SSNs) and at least one other identifier, such as name, date of birth, contact details, sex, race or military personnel information, including occupational specialty.

After discovering the vulnerability, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) launched its privacy and cybersecurity incident response process in line with U.S. government policies and guidelines. The agency says it is assessing the affected system and taking steps to improve its security.

DMDC is also offering 12 months of free credit monitoring through IDX, a company specializing in data breach and recovery services. Individuals affected by the breach are encouraged to contact IDX with any questions and enroll in the service. Enrollment is available through the dedicated IDX website using the enrollment code provided in the notification. The deadline to enroll is August 19, 2027. The credit monitoring is intended to help affected individuals identify potential misuse of their personal information following the breach.

At this time, no known cybercrime group claimed responsibilty for the attack.

DMDC says it launched privacy and cybersecurity incident response actions after finding the vulnerability.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, US Defense Manpower Data Center)

Kosovo national Ardit Kutleshi pleaded guilty to running Rydox, a cybercrime marketplace that sold stolen identities and credentials for years.

Ardit Kutleshi, 28 years old and a citizen of Kosovo, pleaded guilty last week to building and running the cybercrime marketplace Rydox.

The Rydox marketplace has been active since February 2016; it facilitated over 7,600 sales of stolen PII, access devices, and cybercrime tools, generating $230,000 since 2016. It offered over 321,000 products to 18,000 users, including names, social security numbers, and hacking tools. Thousands of U.S. victims were affected.

“According to court documents, since at least 2016, Rydox conducted over 7,600 transactions involving stolen personally identifiable information (PII), stolen access devices, means of identification, and cybercrime tools and services, receiving at least $232,000 in revenue.  These transactions involved the sale of PII stolen from victims located in the United States.” reads the DoJ’s press release. “Kutleshi pleaded guiltyin the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to aggravated identity theft and money laundering conspiracy. “

The U.S. authorities seized the Rydox domain in 2025, a coordinated operation by the FBI and Royal Malaysian Police seized servers in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, that hosted the illicit marketplace. The US authorities also seized $225,000 in cryptocurrency.

Kutleshi did not run Rydox alone. His brother, Jetmir, also helped operate the marketplace. He pleaded guilty separately and was sentenced in December 2025 before being deported to Kosovo.

Both brothers have now pleaded guilty in US federal court for their roles in running the same criminal marketplace, bringing the case to a close after an investigation that involved several countries.

The FBI arrested Kutleshi in Kosovo in December 2024, seized the Rydox.cc domain at the same time, and extradited him to the US in 2025. Coordination on this case included Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office and Cybercrime Investigation Directorate, Albania’s anti-corruption body, and Malaysia’s Royal Police and Attorney General’s office, which is a genuinely international lineup for what was, at its core, a website selling other people’s information.

Kutleshi pleaded guilty in the Western District of Pennsylvania to aggravated identity theft and money laundering conspiracy. He faces a mandatory minimum of two years on the identity theft count and up to 20 years on the money laundering charge. Sentencing is scheduled for February 9, 2027.

The FBI’s cyber division assistant director put the harm in plain terms. Rydox, he said, put

“Cybercriminals Ardit Kutleshi and his brother Jetmir — who pleaded guilty and was sentenced in December 2025 prior to his deportation back to Kosovo — operated the Rydox marketplace for their own gain, making hundreds of thousands of dollars from the marketplace where cyber criminals could purchase information and tools to effect and further their online crime,” said U.S. Attorney Troy Rivetti of the Western District of Pennsylvania. “These types of cybercrimes cause not only financial loss, but also ongoing psychological harm to the victims who lose both money as well as trust in institutions and the online market infrastructure. Our office will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to find and prosecute individuals who attempt to profit from the illegal sharing and sale of other people’s personal information and access devices, and related cybercrime.”

That second part is easy to undercount. Identity theft isn’t a one-time event that ends when the fraudulent charge gets reversed. It follows people through credit checks, background checks, and account recovery processes for years, and the damage to how someone trusts systems they have to keep using is harder to quantify than the dollar figure prosecutors cite in press releases.

The Justice Department’s Criminal Division said that, since 2020, its Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section has secured convictions against more than 180 cyber and intellectual property criminals. Courts have also ordered the return of more than $350 million to victims.

Kutleshi’s case adds to those figures. His extradition from Kosovo also shows that operating outside the United States does not necessarily protect cybercriminals from US prosecution.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, cybercrime)

North Korea-linked WaterPlum runs the Contagious Interview campaign, infecting over 30,000 devices using a fake job interview.

On September 18, Japan’s National Police Agency, the FBI, the US Department of Defense’s Cyber Crime Center, and intelligence agencies from Australia and Germany published a joint advisory about a group called WaterPlum, better known as Contagious Interview. The name says it all. The job interview is the infection vector.

The numbers in the advisory are hard to shrug off. At least 30,000 devices infected across more than 100 countries, funds or credentials stolen from over 7,000 cryptocurrency wallets, and a total of 1.7 billion yen, roughly $10.71 million, funneled back to North Korea. The victims are almost always the same type: freelance developers and specialists in blockchain and Web3 work.

Japan’s NPA and the FBI assess that both WaterPlum operators and some North Korean IT workers report to the same place, the 313 General Bureau of the Munitions Industry Department, under the Workers’ Party’s Central Committee. That’s not a loose affiliation. It’s an org chart.

The trap itself is almost embarrassingly simple. WaterPlum actors pose as recruiters or hiring managers, often impersonating real AI, crypto, or NFT companies, and reach out on social media, job boards, and freelance platforms. Candidates get invited to a technical interview, then told to download a file to complete a coding test or fix a supposed bug on the video call.

“WaterPlum actors pose as prospective employers to target software developers and IT professionals worldwide under the pretext of attractive job opportunities. They often impersonate legitimate Artificial Intelligence (AI), cryptocurrency, or Non-Fungible Token (NFT) companies and have also used recruiting services.” reads the joint advisory. “WaterPlum actors have infected at least 30,000 devices in more than 100 countries and exfiltrated funds or account credentials from over 7,000 cryptocurrency wallets. WaterPlum actors have transferred 1.7 billion Japanese yen (JPY) (equivalent to 10.71 million USD) of cryptocurrency assets to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).”

That file is never what it claims to be. The advisory names five malware families riding inside these downloads, BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, OtterCandy, and StoatWaffle, each doing its own piece of the job: one steals browser credentials, another opens a backdoor, another sets up a remote access trojan to move deeper into the machine. Once inside, the goal is straightforward: drain the wallet, then look for whatever else might be worth stealing.

What happens next goes beyond one stolen wallet. The report notes that a successful infection can give WaterPlum a way into the victim’s employer, opening the door to espionage, stolen source code, and further movement inside a company’s systems. Stolen ID photos get reused too, letting North Korean IT workers impersonate the victim to land more paying contracts elsewhere.

That last part connects to a separate but related scheme covered in the same advisory: North Korean IT workers using so-called “laptop farms.” These are physical locations, often just someone’s house, where a local facilitator plugs in company-issued laptops and lets a North Korean worker operate them remotely over VPN. The worker gets a Western-looking identity and a legitimate-sounding job. The facilitator gets a cut.

“Beyond immediate credential theft, successful infections provide WaterPlum actors opportunities to infiltrate organizations employing targeted developers, enabling espionage, intellectual property theft, and additional lateral movement in corporate environments. Stolen ID images can also be used by North Korean IT workers to impersonate victims and generate foreign currency.” continues the report. “Other sensitive data targeted for exfiltration includes:

• Authentication data stored in web browsers (ID, password, etc.);
• Clipboard information, key-logs (recorded keystrokes), screenshots;
• Cryptocurrency-wallet data (private key, seed phrase, etc.); and
• Any files or data of interest to the actors on a PC or in shared folders (ID pictures of driver’s licenses, passports, etc.)”

Here’s a simpler and more natural version, while keeping the same details:

Japan says this is no longer just a theoretical threat. Authorities have already shut down the country’s first known “laptop farm,” run by a local facilitator who had moved several hundred million yen in cryptocurrency out of Japan. In the US, the FBI says it continues to prosecute people who help North Korean IT workers operate this way, across several states and under different charges.

The advisory also describes a case involving a Japanese crypto exchange that spotted one of these applicants in May 2025. His resume listed an unusually wide range of skills across more than a dozen technologies. He claimed to be Malaysian, raised in Finland, and fluent in Malay and Chinese, but struggled with basic English questions that did not fit his claimed background. The company rejected him, avoiding any damage.

Other red flags recruiters have picked up on read like a checklist for a bad Zoom call: the applicant glancing sideways as if reading a script, background voices that shouldn’t be there, video that keeps freezing at convenient moments, a firm preference for getting paid in crypto, sometimes to someone else’s account entirely.

Not every North Korean IT worker sticks to quiet fraud, either. One extorted a client over a payment dispute and leaked the company’s proprietary code online out of spite. Another, hired for basic website maintenance, defaced the site and knocked it offline instead. Petty, but the effect on the client was anything but.

The advisory draws one more thread together: WaterPlum’s cyberattack operators and North Korea’s IT worker network aren’t running in parallel. They’ve been caught using the same IP addresses to access laptop farms, register on freelance platforms, and apply for that same crypto exchange job. Same infrastructure, two revenue streams, one regime cashing the checks.

“The techniques described in this advisory are only examples; actors continuously evolve and refine their methods.” concludes the advisory. “Stay informed by monitoring alerts from domestic and international security agencies and by reviewing reports published by security vendors.”

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – Contagious Interview, WaterPlum)

A 2017 UK assessment warned that police data on Microsoft Azure could face foreign access risks. The risks may still exist.

A Guardian investigation has surfaced a 2017 document signed off by then City of London police commissioner Ian Dyson, who also held the title of senior information risk owner for the entire country. That document reviewed 15 risks tied to moving police data onto Microsoft Azure. The files in question include criminal records, victim statements, internal emails, information from more than 40 UK police forces, and some material exceeding standard “official” classification, meaning it may sit at “secret” or “top secret” level.

The assessment was clear. It said Microsoft software had vulnerabilities that could eventually be exploited by cybercriminals and other attackers. It also pointed to a more specific and worrying risk: “US government insiders.”

“In doing so, officers accepted that “US government insiders” would be able to see the data, and that it could be “transmitted worldwide”, with “the extent of this … unknown”. According to five specialists who reviewed the Guardian’s findings, the risks identified in that document persist today. Almost every UK police force now depends on Microsoft Azure, and the UK government spends at least £1.9bn on Microsoft software each year.”” states The Guardian.

“There is a risk of compromise of sensitive data shared by, or taken from, Microsoft by the US government being released by US government insider attackers.” reads the document.

This wasn’t a general concern. It was a specific threat identified eight years ago by the official responsible for data-handling standards in British policing. Five experts who reviewed the same assessment for The Guardian said the risks are still relevant today.

The proposed protections were fairly simple: use Microsoft’s built-in encryption, keep servers updated and let individual police chiefs decide whether to use the service. But experts interviewed by The Guardian, including Microsoft engineers, said encryption does not prevent Microsoft employees from accessing the data. They also said it would not necessarily prevent the US government from obtaining it.

Which is exactly the geography problem Dave Michels, a researcher at Queen Mary University of London’s Cloud Legal Project, pointed to. Microsoft’s cloud infrastructure spans over 100 countries, and pieces of a single file can end up stored across several of them, Sweden to Ethiopia, for instance. Microsoft has started offering EU customers assurances that data stays within European borders, but Michels called the whole focus on data location somewhat beside the point, since the people who can access the data matter more than the servers holding it.

Legally, the situation becomes more complicated. Under the US CLOUD Act, American authorities can require US-based companies to provide data they control, even when that data is stored outside the United States. In some cases, companies can also be prevented from telling the customer about the request.

Microsoft, Amazon and Google have said they would challenge such requests when possible. But, as international law professor Douwe Korff pointed out:

“The risk is obvious, even though the providers of the cloud and the government both have an interest in talking it down” Douwe Korff, professor of international law told The Guardian.

Which brings us to the part that reads like a contradiction under pressure. Police officials told the Guardian the data stays in the UK and that Microsoft can’t share it without permission. Microsoft, meanwhile, told Police Scotland back in 2023 that data can leave the UK and that it cannot guarantee data sovereignty. Those two statements aren’t compatible, and nobody seems eager to reconcile them out loud.

Every single UK police force has now put its data, wholly or partly, on Microsoft’s cloud, despite all of this being on record since 2017. One former senior policing source summed up the current state of visibility pretty starkly:

“All the security guys I worked with when this policy came in expected a big breach by now, and we know it will take that to change the police’s position.” a source told The Guardian. “The truth is, however, the level of logging and information in the cloud systems would not necessarily tell us if there was a problem. We really don’t know if the data has been breached or not.”

That’s the key point. It’s not saying, “we checked and everything is fine,” or “there has been no incident.” It’s saying that the available logs and monitoring might not detect a breach even if one happened.

For anyone responsible for sensitive data in a large cloud environment, that’s an important warning. In a security assessment, saying “we would probably know if something went wrong” isn’t enough without evidence that the monitoring can actually detect it.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Microsoft Azure)

China rejects Amodei’s AI slowdown proposal, calling it fearmongering and a US attempt to contain China’s technology sector.

The debate over whether the world should slow down the development of advanced AI has quickly turned into something bigger than a technology argument. Dario Amodei, CEO of Anthropic, has called for a slower pace of development, arguing that AI capabilities are advancing faster than our ability to understand and control them. His proposal has now run straight into the geopolitical reality of the US-China competition.

In his essay, “We Must Pace the Frontier“, Amodei argues that the industry needs more time to build effective safeguards around increasingly capable AI systems. He isn’t calling for an end to AI development. His argument is that capability gains should slow enough to give safety research, testing and oversight a chance to catch up.

One of his main concerns is the growing ability of AI agents to act on their own. Amodei warns that a large number of increasingly capable agents could, within six to twelve months, become capable of carrying out complex operations across the internet and potentially cause enormous damage if they aren’t properly controlled. The warning follows recent incidents in which AI systems have already been used to perform cyber operations with a level of autonomy that would have been difficult to imagine only a few years ago.

Amodei’s proposal has three main elements: stronger independent testing of advanced models, greater coordination between leading AI companies, and international cooperation on safety. Anthropic says it is prepared to give independent evaluators permanent, employee-level access to its systems so they can assess safety measures and investigate incidents.

The difficult part starts when China enters the discussion.

Amodei argues that the United States needs to maintain its lead in advanced AI and supports continuing restrictions on China’s access to the most advanced AI chips and chipmaking equipment. He says a Chinese lead in frontier AI could create serious risks for the United States and the wider world.

The Government of Beijing strongly disagrees with that framing. China’s Foreign Ministry accused Amodei of spreading fear and argued that confrontation and competition would damage international efforts to establish rules for AI. China’s state-backed Global Times went further, describing the proposal as a “Cold War playbook” aimed at containing China’s technology sector.

Chinese officials are also warning about AI, but from the opposite direction. Chen Yixin, head of China’s Ministry of State Security, recently warned that advanced AI could be used by hostile actors to discover vulnerabilities at scale, conduct complex hacking operations and steal sensitive information.

“In an essay posted Sunday on social media, Chen Yixin, head of China’s Ministry of State Security, warned that, in the hands of “hostile forces and individuals with ulterior motives,” this technology could pose a direct threat to “our political, institutional, and ideological security.”” The Associated Press reports.

“Citing the capabilities of powerful technologies from U.S. companies like Anthropic and OpenAI, Chen warned that “certain nations and organizations” now have the capabilities to “rapidly discover vulnerabilities at scale … and execute complex hacking tasks.” That, he wrote, poses “serious risks to my country’s critical information infrastructure.””

That contrast is important. Both sides are talking about AI security, but they don’t agree on what the security problem actually is.

Washington is concerned that China could gain access to capabilities that strengthen its military, intelligence and cyber operations. Beijing sees US restrictions on chips and AI technology as an attempt to prevent China from closing the technological gap.

The recent dispute over AI model distillation has made the situation even more complicated. US agencies have accused Chinese AI developers of aggressively extracting capabilities from leading American models, including Claude and GPT. Beijing has rejected those allegations and argued that model distillation is a common technique used across the AI industry.

This creates a problem for any proposal based on international cooperation. How do you persuade two countries to slow down together when each side believes that slowing down alone could leave it at a strategic disadvantage?

President rejected calls to slow AI development, despite warnings from leading tech executives and Democrats about existential risks. Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, OpenAI’s Sam Altman and Elon Musk urged a more cautious approach, but Trump said the US must maintain its global AI leadership while allowing some safeguards.

“Look, we’re leading China in AI . . . and, frankly, I want to keep it that way, because whoever wins AI, wins,” Trump told reporters during a trip to his Doonbeg golf course in Ireland, Financial Times reported.  “We can put guardrails, we can do this and that, but I think you have a lot of negative forces that are bringing it up that shouldn’t be bringing it up and they’re bringing up things that won’t happen,” he added.

That puts Amodei’s proposal in a difficult position. The companies developing the most advanced models are increasingly warning that safety needs more time, while the political leadership in Washington sees AI leadership as a strategic asset that cannot be surrendered. Sam Altman and Elon Musk have backed Amodei’s call for greater caution, and other major AI leaders have also moved toward stronger safety measures.

The timing is particularly interesting because Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to discuss AI governance at their planned September 24 meeting. Any agreement between Washington and Beijing would have to deal with two very different priorities: controlling the risks created by increasingly autonomous AI systems while making sure neither side believes it is giving the other a technological advantage.

For cybersecurity professionals, this is more than a political dispute. The capabilities being discussed are already relevant to vulnerability discovery, exploitation, credential theft, surveillance and large-scale automated operations. The question is no longer simply how powerful AI models can become, but how quickly that power can be turned into real-world action.

That’s where the debate over slowing AI becomes particularly difficult. You can slow the development of a model, but you can’t easily slow a global competition in which governments, companies and attackers all have strong incentives to keep moving.

And that’s probably the uncomfortable part of the discussion: the countries most capable of creating the rules are also the countries with the strongest reasons not to slow down.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, AI)

StyleSmuggler Magento zero-day is under active attack, letting unauthenticated attackers execute code and install backdoors on stores that may already be patched.

A new zero-day flaw, dubbed StyleSmuggler, in Magento and Adobe Commerce is under active attack, giving unauthenticated attackers a path to run code on vulnerable online stores. Sansec researchers say it affects current Magento Open Source releases, including 2.4.7, 2.4.8 and 2.4.9. According to the experts, exploitation began on September 4.

“Sansec discovered StyleSmuggler, an unpatched Magento and Adobe Commerce zero-day that gives unauthenticated attackers remote code execution. All current versions are affected, including 2.4.9.” reads the report published by Sansec. “Attacks started September 4th. Sansec is rolling out emergency mitigation.”

This is not a routine patch-cycle problem. Sansec reproduced the full attack chain on clean installations and observed a first victim running Magento 2.4.6-p15 with July and August 2026 patches already applied and a clean patch-status result. In plain terms, a store could be fully updated according to its normal process and still be exposed.

“StyleSmuggler injects malicious code into Magento’s template system.” states Sansec. “By using the styles properties, it can evade existing safeguards. It works in two stages:

1. Inject (poison) PHP code, for example by generating a failure report.
2. Let Magento execute the poisoned code via a failed payment email“

The attack is especially dangerous because it does not require a victim to open an attachment, click a link or even receive a successful email. Magento can execute the injected code while it renders its standard “Payment Transaction Failed Reminder” notification, and the chain can still work if email delivery itself fails.

That makes unusual spikes in failed-payment reminders a useful detection clue, although not conclusive proof of compromise. Legitimate payment failures happen. A sudden burst of them combined with strange system activity is a different conversation.

StyleSmuggler works by placing PHP code into Magento’s templating path and later causing the platform to evaluate it. The first stage creates or poisons a record, while the second stage turns a routine email-rendering process into remote code execution.

The attack reportedly uses GraphQL-related handling and the styles property to evade safeguards that would normally reject dangerous input. Sansec says moving sessions to Redis or a database does not stop the attack, because operators have already adapted their methods when one delivery route fails.

“Moving sessions to Redis or the database does not stop the attack. One merchant reported an attempt that failed against session storage and, eight seconds later, a second attempt that succeeded by using a file uploaded through Magento’s custom options instead.” continues the report. “Both came from the same operator.”

That detail matters because it shows an active operator, not a static proof-of-concept circulating online. Defenders should assume attackers are testing several paths, watching failures and changing tactics quickly.

Once the exploit succeeds, Sansec observed a lightweight Rust backdoor that connects to attacker-controlled infrastructure and waits for commands. At the time of the report, Sansec had not seen evidence that operators had yet used the implant for follow-on actions, but a backdoor that is installed and waiting is not an idle technical curiosity.

The malware initially hid behind a process name resembling [kworker/u:8:0], then appeared as fc-cache on September 6 and as chronyd on September 7.

These names are designed to blend into Linux environments, where administrators may expect to see kernel workers, font-cache utilities and Network Time Protocol daemons.

The fc-cache variant copies itself into a font-cache directory, writes a PID lock file and uses cron to restart twice an hour. The chronyd version can persist through cron as well, but Sansec also observed a build that relaunched itself without relying on a visible cron entry. An empty crontab is not proof that a host is clean.

The command channel is disguised as time synchronisation traffic. The implant sends 48-byte UDP packets to port 123, the standard NTP port, and uses domains that resemble time servers.

“Command and control is disguised as time sync. Every 60 seconds it resolves ntp.timesync.to and sends 48-byte UDP packets to port 123 that look like NTP server replies.” continues the report.

Only the first four bytes look like a normal NTP message; the remaining data can carry the agent ID, hostname, username, operating-system version, memory and disk use, uptime, root status and implant version.

That is a smart concealment choice. Many networks allow NTP traffic without close inspection because reliable time synchronisation is a normal operational requirement. Calling your malware chronyd and making it speak something that resembles NTP is not subtle genius. It is just clever enough to pass a lazy allowlist.

Sansec also found signs of a second, apparently unrelated attacker operating against stores compromised through StyleSmuggler. This actor deployed a compact PHP dropper that placed a web shell inside the product-image cache, using hash-like directory names to make the extra PHP file less obvious.

The web shell returns a normal-looking 404 response unless a request contains the correct X-Cache-Token header. With the header present, it can execute PHP supplied through a POST parameter. That design helps the attacker keep the shell invisible during casual checks and automated scans.

“Before writing that file, the dropper calls out to 457cfa2fb7p5.daf892t5qau4og8pi4cghbc6fhm1dim3u.oast.site, a subdomain of a public service that developers and testers use to confirm that injected code ran.” states the report. “This actor came in through StyleSmuggler. We recovered the dropper from a Store: request header, and its PHP tags are still JSON-escaped from the record Magento logged it into.”

The lesson is not merely to remove the obvious background process. Stores need a full compromise assessment, including a review of PHP files under pub/media, cron spool files, unexpected processes, altered templates, report records, web-server logs and outbound connections.

Adobe was working on a patch as of September 7, according to Sansec, but no release date had been confirmed. A scheduled Adobe security release was due on September 8, although it was not known whether it would address StyleSmuggler.

Until an official fix is available and applied, merchants should consider temporarily disabling GraphQL if they do not have a compensating control capable of blocking this exploit. This can affect storefront and integration functions, so it should be treated as a risk decision rather than a casual configuration change.

Operators should also hunt for processes named [kworker/u:8:0], fc-cache and chronyd that run from unusual paths such as temporary directories, user cache directories or hidden folders. A legitimate chronyd process does not normally emit nine NTP server-mode packets in rapid succession every minute.

Security teams should inspect outbound traffic to suspicious NTP-like domains and UDP port 123 destinations, particularly 185.157.160.251, which Sansec linked to the observed domains on September 7. They should also search authentication and system logs for repeated crontab command not allowed messages generated by the web-service user, such as www-data.

If compromise indicators appear, treat the system as compromised, not merely vulnerable. Isolate the host, preserve logs and forensic evidence, rotate Magento administrator credentials, API tokens, database credentials, payment-provider secrets and cloud keys, then search for secondary backdoors before restoring normal operations.

The Sansec StyleSmuggler report includes current indicators of compromise, malware hashes, C2 infrastructure, suspicious process names and file paths. Its guidance will likely change as the campaign develops, because the attackers have already changed payload names and persistence methods within days.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, StyleSmuggler)