On October 29, Binance lost control of about $6.34 billion in digital assets in a matter of hours. The attackers did not break in on that day, though. They had been working their way inside since June. The Binance hack was a slow campaign aimed at a handful of engineers, and it used a tampered download, a fake job interview and the exchange's own internal AI tool to reach the systems that sign transactions. Binance CEO Richard Teng called it "one of the most sophisticated attacks the digital asset industry has ever seen." He said the company takes full responsibility and that no user will bear the loss.

Why the Binance Hack Targeted Engineers, Not Systems

According to the post-mortem Binance released on Tuesday, the attackers went after people with access to wallet infrastructure. In June, Wallet DevOps Engineer A searched for a popular AI coding tool and downloaded a tampered Homebrew installation. Binance's security team spotted the anomaly, replaced the device and rotated his credentials. But the damage was done in another way: Engineer A's role, and his colleagues on the wallet infrastructure team, were now known to the attacker. In September, the attackers moved to social engineering. Software Engineer B, whose profile on a legitimate job-hunting platform mentioned his Binance experience, was approached by someone posing as a project director. A first-round video interview followed with a supposed HR representative, who shared personal photos and videos on social media to build trust. Binance said this was more advanced than social engineering it had seen before. In the second round, held on a popular chat app, Engineer B was told to download an "assignment" onto his work computer. It contained malicious code that ran during setup, swapped a legitimate development tool for a malicious version, and connected to an attacker-controlled server. The zero-day malware was not detected by endpoint security tools at the time. On October 20, the attackers used Engineer B's compromised computer and an internal AI tool to gain control over Engineer A and another wallet engineer, Engineer C. They then found that Engineer A had a container deployment permission token on his machine.

How the Binance Hack Unfolded on October 29

Between 17:15 and 19:56 UTC, the attacker logged onto Engineer C's computer, used Engineer A's stolen credentials, deployed a container and triggered a malicious script. That gave them unauthorized access to an internal wallet signing service, which they used to send transactions outside the normal withdrawal process. Between 20:05 and 20:09 UTC, five Binance hot wallets sent 233.46 million XRP to an attacker-controlled address. Hot wallets on Solana and Optimism sent about 970,500 SOL and 44.2 million OP. Binance then received an internal alert about large transfers, and another hot wallet sent 18,270 BTC.

Why Binance Couldn't Stop It Faster

Binance suspended withdrawals, but that did not end the outflows. The attacker had used the signing service to exploit Ethereum's EIP-7702 authorization mechanism. By submitting 50 signing transactions, they gave an attacker-controlled smart contract partial execution rights over a Binance hot wallet. Those authorizations lived on-chain and worked independently of Binance's withdrawal systems. And because the wallet used Multi-Party Computation, there was no single private key that could instantly revoke them. Binance had to build a special procedure to do it. The final unauthorized transfer of 2,961.9 ETH was confirmed at 23:56 UTC. At 00:10 UTC on October 30, Binance cleared the malicious delegation.

Who Is Behind It

Over the weekend, the FBI and other U.S. agencies blamed the theft on TraderTraitor, a North Korea state-sponsored group that has spent years attacking cryptocurrency platforms. Binance said it had detected and stopped 57 suspected North Korea-linked threats in 2026 alone, many using fake job interviews and malicious developer tools. On Tuesday, Kim Yo-jong rejected the U.S. findings, calling them a "grave political provocation" in a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency. Observers noted the statement ended by saying Pyongyang had matters to "reconsider," without directly threatening retaliation. South Korea's Unification Ministry called her personal response unprecedented. An official said it suggested the North was taking the allegations seriously and was "increasingly conscious of its international standing."

Where Users Stand

Binance says it has set aside more than 100% of the funds needed to cover the loss. As of October 31, 98% of impacted token assets had been replenished, and Binance is buying the remaining, less liquid assets. About $2.85 billion has been frozen or intercepted with help from law enforcement, token issuers and blockchain intelligence firms. Withdrawals have broadly resumed. The exchange says it has rebuilt the affected wallet system and AI tool, replaced devices, revoked credentials tied to the affected engineers and brought in independent security firms. The investigation is ongoing.

Australians filed a cybercrime report about every six minutes over the past year, and artificial intelligence is making the attacks behind those reports faster and more convincing. That is the main finding of the ASD Cyber Threat Report 2025-26. It is the seventh annual assessment from the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC).

In FY2025-26, the agency received more than 82,000 cybercrime reports through ReportCyber. It responded to over 1,500 cyber security incidents, up more than 20% on the previous year and 36% over five years. It also notified Australian entities of potentially malicious activity more than 4,400 times, almost 80% more than in FY2024-25.

What the ASD Cyber Threat Report Says About AI

The report calls AI the defining force in the threat environment this year. In his foreword, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles wrote that AI is helping malicious actors find vulnerabilities faster and exploit them at greater scale, speed and sophistication. He also noted that new threats have emerged in recent weeks from the unintended actions of AI agents and from model testing.

ASD’s ACSC makes one clear distinction. AI has not created new kinds of threats. It has amplified and sped up existing ones. AI-enabled cyber threats are most visible in social engineering. Attackers are using AI to write phishing emails with no spelling or grammar errors and to automate targeted spearphishing. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission has also seen a sharp rise in scams that use deepfake videos of celebrities and politicians.

The time defenders have to respond is also shrinking. The agency has previously observed that most vulnerabilities are exploited within two weeks, and some within 48 hours of a patch being released. It expects AI-driven tools to shorten that window further over the next 12 months. Publicly reported vulnerabilities (CVEs) rose 30%. Old flaws are still a problem too: ASD’s ACSC recorded the successful exploitation of a vulnerability first identified in 2008.

Incident Severity Grows in ASD Cyber Threat Report Data

Only one Category 2 incident was recorded this year. However, extensive compromises rose from 26 to 40. ASD’s ACSC identified 362 incidents after proactively notifying organisations. A single notification about cPanel vulnerabilities, sent to 340 entities in May 2026, led to more than 60 confirmed incidents.

The number of ransomware incidents held steady at 139, but extensive ransomware incidents rose from 16 to 24. Health Care, Professional, Scientific and Technical Services, and Manufacturing remained the most affected sectors. Data breaches made up 98 incidents, a 66% increase on the previous year. Separately, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner received 1,205 breach notifications in 2025. That is the highest yearly total since its Notifiable Data Breaches scheme began in 2018.

The financial impact is rising for businesses. The average self-reported cost of cybercrime per business report rose 16% to $93,500. For medium-sized businesses, it rose 45% to $141,300. The average cost for individuals stayed at $33,000. Identity fraud remained the most reported cybercrime, although reports fell 18%.

Stolen access is now a major entry point. Compromised accounts and credentials were among the most frequently reported incident categories, and phishing appeared in 39% of incidents. Government survey research cited in the report found that 55% of Australians reuse passwords across multiple accounts.

State Actors and Critical Infrastructure in the ASD Cyber Threat Report

State-sponsored actors continued to target Australian government, business and individuals to gain sensitive information. The report says these actors are increasingly pre-positioning inside networks to enable future disruption. Marles wrote that the line separating state-sponsored espionage from sabotage and cybercrime is becoming increasingly blurred.

In April 2026, ASD’s ACSC and international partners highlighted a shift by China-nexus actors. These actors are moving towards large covert networks built from compromised home and small office routers, Internet of Things devices and smart devices.

Critical infrastructure accounted for 154 incidents, or 10% of the total, a decrease of almost 7%. Phishing was the leading initial access technique at 36%, and Financial and Insurance Services was the most affected critical infrastructure division at 30%.

What the Threat Report Asks Organisations to Do

In October 2026, ASD’s ACSC released the Essentials series. It evolves the Essential Eight into a principles-based framework with three chapters: Enterprise IT, Operational Technology and Cloud.

Under its Cyber Action Year, the agency is pushing five priorities:

• Replacing or mitigating legacy technology.
• Implementing best-practice event logging.
• Managing supply chain risk.
• Preparing for AI-enabled threats.
• Preparing for post-quantum cryptography, including ceasing the use of traditional asymmetric cryptography by the end of 2030 or sooner.

The report also urges organisations to patch faster. For individuals, it recommends reviewing privacy settings and enabling multi-factor authentication or passkeys.

Suspicious activity, incidents and vulnerabilities can be reported at cyber.gov.au or through the Australian Cyber Security Hotline on 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371).

Iranian cyber actors are using a malware family known as HEAVYGRAM, also tracked as CHOSEN BRICK, to target dissidents, journalists, and opposition groups worldwide, according to a recent FBI FLASH report and a joint advisory from the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the US FBI, and the Netherlands' General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). The FBI assesses that the malware is deployed on behalf of the Government of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) to collect intelligence, conduct data leaks, and cause reputational harm to targets. The joint advisory adds that Iran almost certainly uses cyber activity to support repression of individuals seen as threats to the regime.

Who Is Being Targeted by Iranian Cyber Actors

The victim profile includes Iranian dissidents, journalists opposed to Iran, members of organizations with views countering Government of Iran narratives, and other individuals the Iranian government perceives as threats. The joint advisory notes that CHOSEN BRICK has been used against individuals in the UK, US, and Netherlands since at least 2025, and that personal details of some victims have appeared on pro-Iranian leak sites, increasing risks to their personal safety. In some cases, Iranian intelligence services have plotted to kidnap or conduct lethal operations against individuals abroad who are seen as enemies of the regime.

Social Engineering and Delivery

Iranian cyber actors rely heavily on social engineering to deliver their malware. Actors communicate with targets through platforms such as Telegram, WhatsApp, and Instagram, often posing as individuals known to the target or as technical support from the messaging platform. The joint advisory notes that actors research targets in advance to appear credible, and often initiate contact through a target's work device before shifting to personal devices if the initial delivery attempt fails or risks detection. Victims are persuaded to download files disguised as legitimate applications, including Pictory, RunwayML, Norton Antivirus, Telegram, Adobe Flash Player, and KeePass, or files appearing to be MRI scan results. The FBI notes that some victims downloaded AnyDesk and provided access strings, while others downloaded malware masquerading as a program installer. The malware targets only the Windows operating system.

Persistence and Telegram Command and Control

Once installed, the malware achieves persistence by adding registry keys, most often within the Run key at HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, so it runs automatically at user login. It also adds exclusions to Microsoft Defender antivirus to evade detection. The malware then connects to Telegram command-and-control infrastructure, with each victim device linked to a unique Telegram Bot ID to prevent cross-contamination between victims. Through Telegram, the malware can enumerate running processes and system information, capture screen content, enable the microphone to record audio, copy Telegram and WhatsApp data from browsers, download additional files, delete files, steal email content, and wipe the computer system. Files and data are exfiltrated through the Telegram bot and cloud object stores such as VultrObjects and StorjShare. Recent variants use HTTPS/SOCKS5 proxies to obscure the use of Telegram bots.

FBI Recommendations

The FBI recommends caution regarding communications from unknown individuals, keeping devices updated, downloading software only from trusted sources, enabling antivirus software, using strong unique passwords with multi-factor authentication, and reporting suspicious messages. The NCSC, FBI, and AIVD jointly recommend phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, application allowlisting, email scanning security features, and endpoint and network monitoring. Organizations concerned about a potential HEAVYGRAM or CHOSEN BRICK infection are advised to contact their IT providers and check both corporate and personal devices, since the actors also target individuals outside their workplace systems.

The FBI is warning the public about sexual exploitation actors illegally accessing social media and personal accounts to steal explicit images and videos from adult and underage victims. The stolen material, also known as non-consensual intimate images (NCII), is being posted or sold on criminal marketplaces, often without the victim's knowledge.

According to the FBI, these actors use social engineering and cyber intrusion tactics to target specific individuals or general targets of opportunity. After gaining access to accounts, they steal explicit content and share it through community forums or illicit marketplaces.

The FBI said personally identifiable information, including a victim's name, date of birth, email address, phone number and social media username, is often posted alongside the stolen material. This can expose victims to continued harassment and re-victimization.

How Sexual Exploitation Actors Access Accounts

The FBI has identified several methods used by sexual exploitation actors to gain access to victims' accounts.

Password and PIN Targeting

In password/PIN targeting, actors use high-volume password and PIN attempts against social media and personal accounts. The information used in these attempts can come from data leak sites, social media and open-source information.

When victims are known to the actors, curated lists may include personal details such as names, date of birth or variations of those details.

Social Media Customer Service Impersonation

Another tactic involves social media customer service impersonation through text messages. Victims may receive messages claiming their account is being disabled or locked unless they provide a verification code.

The actor then requests a password reset, causing a code to be sent to the victim. If the victim shares the code, the actor can reset the password and access the account.

Phishing Emails

The FBI also warns about phishing campaigns using look-alike domains and email accounts designed to appear as social media customer support.

These messages may claim there has been a new login and contain an embedded link asking the victim to change their password. Clicking the malicious link can give the actor access to the account.

Stolen Content Can Lead to Further Attacks

Once explicit content is stolen, sexual exploitation actors may post or sell it while including personal information about the victim. The FBI said victims can subsequently face harassment, sextortion, stalking or other targeted attacks.

The actors may also advertise stolen content through a victim's own social media page, increasing the potential for further exposure.

FBI Shares Steps to Protect Accounts

The FBI advises people to avoid storing sensitive images or videos on social media platforms or other internet-accessible sites.

It recommends using unique, complex passphrases and PINs along with multi-factor authentication (MFA). Password information directly associated with a person's identity, including names or birthdays, should be avoided.

Users should also be cautious with links received through emails and text messages. The FBI recommends going directly to the relevant website to address account concerns and checking URLs before clicking.

Unrequested temporary passwords, PIN resets or access codes should also be treated with caution. The FBI advises users not to share login information, even when someone claims to represent a platform or service.

People who believe their explicit content was stolen or leaked can provide information through the FBI's NCII reporting site. The FBI also advises the public to continue reporting fraud, scams and cyber threats to the Internet Crime Complaint Center or a local FBI Field Office.