While more than two-thirds of human-generated TLS traffic to Cloudflare is already protected by post-quantum cryptography, the world of site-to-site networking has been a different story. For years, the IPsec community remained caught between the high bar of Internet-scale interoperability and the niche requirements of specialized hardware. That gap is now closing.
Earlier this month, we announced that Cloudflare has moved its target for full post-quantum security forward to 2029, spurred by several recent advances in quantum computing. To advance that goal, we’ve made post-quantum encryption in Cloudflare IPsec generally available.
Using the new IETF draft for hybrid ML-KEM (FIPS 203), we’ve successfully tested interoperability with branch connectors from Fortinet and Cisco — meaning you can start protecting your wide-area network (WAN) against harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks today using hardware you already have.
This post explains how we implemented the new hybrid IPsec handshake, why it took four years longer to land than its TLS counterpart, and how the industry is finally consolidating around a standard that works at Internet scale.
Cloudflare IPsec is a WAN Network-as-a-Service that replaces legacy network architectures by connecting data centers, branch offices, and cloud VPCs to Cloudflare's global IP Anycast network. Customers get simplified configuration, high availability (if a data center becomes unavailable, traffic is automatically rerouted to the nearest healthy one), and the scale of Cloudflare's global network. This is done through encrypted IPsec tunnels that support both site-to-site WAN, outbound Internet connections, and connectivity to the Cloudflare One SASE platform.
Cloudflare IPsec now uses post-quantum encryption with hybrid ML-KEM (FIPS 203) to stop harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks. These are attacks where an adversary harvests data today and then decrypts later, after Q-Day, when there are powerful quantum computers that can break the classical public key cryptography used across the Internet. Harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks are becoming a concern for more organizations as Q-Day approaches faster than expected.
ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) is a post-quantum cryptography algorithm that is based on mathematical assumptions that are not known to be vulnerable to attacks by quantum computers. It does not require special hardware or a dedicated physical link between sender and receiver. ML-KEM is intentionally designed to be implemented in software across standard processors to provide post-quantum encryption of network traffic.
Draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem specifies post-quantum encryption for IPsec using hybrid ML-KEM, which combines the well-understood security of classical Diffie-Hellman and the post-quantum security of ML-KEM in a single, standards-compliant handshake. Specifically, a classical Diffie-Hellman exchange runs first, its derived key encrypts a second exchange that runs ML-KEM, and the outputs of both are mixed into the session keys that secure IPsec data plane traffic sent using the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol.
Earlier we announced the closed beta of our implementation of draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem in production in our Cloudflare IPsec product and tested it against a reference implementation (strongswan). Now that we have made this implementation generally available, we have also confirmed interoperability with several other vendors, including Cisco and Fortinet, which is a big win for this new standard.
Cisco: Customers using Cisco 8000 Series Secure Routers after version 26.1.1 as their branch connector can also now establish post-quantum Cloudflare IPsec tunnels per draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem.
Fortinet: Customers using Fortinet FortiOS 7.6.6 and later as their branch connector can now establish post-quantum Cloudflare IPsec tunnels to Cloudflare's global network per draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem.
Given that upgrading cryptography is hard and can take years, our 2029 target date for a full update to post-quantum cryptography is going to require concentrated effort. That’s why we hope the IPsec community continues to focus on the development of interoperable standards like draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem.
Let us explain why these standards are vitally important. A full specification for hybrid ML-KEM in IPsec, draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem, became available only in late 2025. That's roughly four years after support for hybrid ML-KEM landed in TLS. (In fact, Cloudflare turned on hybrid post-quantum key agreement with TLS in 2022, even before NIST finalized the standardization of ML-KEM, because the TLS community quickly converged on a single, interoperable approach and pushed it into production. Today more than two-thirds of the human-generated TLS traffic to Cloudflare's network is protected with hybrid ML-KEM.)
The four-year delay is likely due in part to the IPsec community's continued interest in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), as codified in RFC 8784, published in 2020. We've written before about why QKD is not part of our post-quantum strategy: QKD requires specialized hardware and a dedicated physical link between the two parties, which fundamentally means it will not operate at Internet scale. Also, QKD does not provide authentication, so you still need post-quantum cryptography anyway to stop active attackers. It’s difficult to find implementations of QKD that interoperate across vendors.
The U.S. NSA, Germany's BSI, and the UK's NCSC have all warned against solely relying on QKD. Post-quantum cryptography, by contrast, runs on the hardware you already have, authenticates the parties at both ends, and works end-to-end across the Internet.
RFC 9370, published in 2023, opened the door to post-quantum cryptography in IPsec, allowing up to seven key exchanges to be run in parallel with classical Diffie-Hellman. However, RFC 9370 did not specify which ciphersuites should be used in these parallel key exchanges. In the absence of that specification, some vendors shipped early implementations under RFC 9370 before the hybrid ML-KEM draft was available, defining their own ciphersuites including some which are not NIST-standardized. This is exactly the kind of “ciphersuite bloat” NIST SP 800 52r2 warned against. And the risks to interoperability have played out in practice: Cloudflare IPsec does not yet interoperate with Palo Alto Networks' RFC 9370–based implementation, because it was launched before draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem was available.
Fortunately, we now have draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem that fills in the gaps in RFC 9370, specifying hybrid ML-KEM as one of the key exchange mechanisms that can be operated in parallel with classical Diffie-Hellman. We hope to add Palo Alto Networks to the list of interoperable post-quantum branch connectors as the industry continues to consolidate around draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem.
But the journey towards interoperable post-quantum IPsec standards is not over yet. While draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem supports post-quantum encryption, we still need IPsec standards for post-quantum authentication, so that we can stop attacks by quantum adversaries on live systems after Q-Day. Given the shortened timeline for full post-quantum readiness, we hope the IPsec community will continue to focus on interoperable PQC implementations, rather than diverting focus to niche use cases with QKD.
At Cloudflare, we’re helping make a secure and post-quantum Internet accessible to everyone, without specialized hardware and at no extra cost to our customers. Post-quantum Cloudflare IPsec is one more step on our path to full post-quantum security by 2029, and we’re doing it in a way that ensures that the Internet remains open and interoperable for years to come.
Sent by a Spanish diplomat. Apparently people have been working on it since it was rediscovered in 1860.
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Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard have won the 2026 Turing Award for inventing quantum cryptography.
I am incredibly pleased to see them get this recognition. I have always thought the technology to be fantastic, even though I think it’s largely unnecessary. I wrote up my thoughts back in 2008, in an <a href+https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2008/10/quantum_cryptography.html”>essay titled “Quantum Cryptography: As Awesome As It Is Pointless.”
Back then, I wrote:
While I like the science of quantum cryptography—my undergraduate degree was in physics—I don’t see any commercial value in it. I don’t believe it solves any security problem that needs solving. I don’t believe that it’s worth paying for, and I can’t imagine anyone but a few technophiles buying and deploying it. Systems that use it don’t magically become unbreakable, because the quantum part doesn’t address the weak points of the system...
The post Inventors of Quantum Cryptography Win Turing Award appeared first on Security Boulevard.
Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard have won the 2026 Turing Award for inventing quantum cryptography.
I am incredibly pleased to see them get this recognition. I have always thought the technology to be fantastic, even though I think it’s largely unnecessary. I wrote up my thoughts back in 2008, in an essay titled “Quantum Cryptography: As Awesome As It Is Pointless.”
Back then, I wrote:
While I like the science of quantum cryptography—my undergraduate degree was in physics—I don’t see any commercial value in it. I don’t believe it solves any security problem that needs solving. I don’t believe that it’s worth paying for, and I can’t imagine anyone but a few technophiles buying and deploying it. Systems that use it don’t magically become unbreakable, because the quantum part doesn’t address the weak points of the system.
Security is a chain; it’s as strong as the weakest link. Mathematical cryptography, as bad as it sometimes is, is the strongest link in most security chains. Our symmetric and public-key algorithms are pretty good, even though they’re not based on much rigorous mathematical theory. The real problems are elsewhere: computer security, network security, user interface and so on.
Cryptography is the one area of security that we can get right. We already have good encryption algorithms, good authentication algorithms and good key-agreement protocols. Maybe quantum cryptography can make that link stronger, but why would anyone bother? There are far more serious security problems to worry about, and it makes much more sense to spend effort securing those.
As I’ve often said, it’s like defending yourself against an approaching attacker by putting a huge stake in the ground. It’s useless to argue about whether the stake should be 50 feet tall or 100 feet tall, because either way, the attacker is going to go around it. Even quantum cryptography doesn’t “solve” all of cryptography: The keys are exchanged with photons, but a conventional mathematical algorithm takes over for the actual encryption.
What about quantum computation? I’m not worried; the math is ahead of the physics. Reports of progress in that area are overblown. And if there’s a security crisis because of a quantum computation breakthrough, it’s because our systems aren’t crypto-agile.
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