Apache Neethi Patches Triple Threat of DoS and Redirection Flaws
The post Apache Neethi Patches Triple Threat of DoS and Redirection Flaws appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

Modern browser extensions and ad blockers are legally collecting and reselling user data, including streaming habits and B2B sales intelligence, under the guise of "analytics." This unregulated "legal spyware" creates massive security gaps as employees unwittingly leak corporate URLs, SaaS dashboards, and research activity to third-party databases. With the rise of AI-native browsers and personal device syncing, security leaders must evolve beyond simple permission checks to implement rigorous extension governance and privacy policy reviews to prevent targeted attacks and corporate data leakage.
The post Networks of Browser Extensions Are Spyware in Disguise appeared first on Security Boulevard.


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How modern age-verification laws, like the California Digital Age Assurance Act, dismantle the principle of data minimization by mandating the collection of sensitive personal data, effectively turning "don't know" into "must know" and knowledge into liability.
The post When Privacy Laws Force You to Know Too Much: The Perverse Incentives of Age Verification Regimes appeared first on Security Boulevard.
ProPublica has a scoop:
In late 2024, the federal government’s cybersecurity evaluators rendered a troubling verdict on one of Microsoft’s biggest cloud computing offerings.
The tech giant’s “lack of proper detailed security documentation” left reviewers with a “lack of confidence in assessing the system’s overall security posture,” according to an internal government report reviewed by ProPublica.
Or, as one member of the team put it: “The package is a pile of shit.”
For years, reviewers said, Microsoft had tried and failed to fully explain how it protects sensitive information in the cloud as it hops from server to server across the digital terrain. Given that and other unknowns, government experts couldn’t vouch for the technology’s security...
The post On Microsoft’s Lousy Cloud Security appeared first on Security Boulevard.
ProPublica has a scoop:
In late 2024, the federal government’s cybersecurity evaluators rendered a troubling verdict on one of Microsoft’s biggest cloud computing offerings.
The tech giant’s “lack of proper detailed security documentation” left reviewers with a “lack of confidence in assessing the system’s overall security posture,” according to an internal government report reviewed by ProPublica.
Or, as one member of the team put it: “The package is a pile of shit.”
For years, reviewers said, Microsoft had tried and failed to fully explain how it protects sensitive information in the cloud as it hops from server to server across the digital terrain. Given that and other unknowns, government experts couldn’t vouch for the technology’s security.
[…]
The federal government could be further exposed if it couldn’t verify the cybersecurity of Microsoft’s Government Community Cloud High, a suite of cloud-based services intended to safeguard some of the nation’s most sensitive information.
Yet, in a highly unusual move that still reverberates across Washington, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program, or FedRAMP, authorized the product anyway, bestowing what amounts to the federal government’s cybersecurity seal of approval. FedRAMP’s ruling—which included a kind of “buyer beware” notice to any federal agency considering GCC High—helped Microsoft expand a government business empire worth billions of dollars.

This is for new routers; you don’t have to throw away your existing ones:
The Executive Branch determination noted that foreign-produced routers (1) introduce “a supply chain vulnerability that could disrupt the U.S. economy, critical infrastructure, and national defense” and (2) pose “a severe cybersecurity risk that could be leveraged to immediately and severely disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure and directly harm U.S. persons.”
More information:
Any new router made outside the US will now need to be approved by the FCC before it can be imported, marketed, or sold in the country.
In order to get that approval, companies manufacturing routers outside the US must apply for conditional approval in a process that will require the disclosure of the firm’s foreign investors or influence, as well as a plan to bring the manufacturing of the routers to the US.
Certain routers may be exempted from the list if they are deemed acceptable by the Department of Defense or the Department of Homeland Security, the FCC said. Neither agency has yet added any specific routers to its list of equipment exceptions.
[…]
Popular brands of router in the US include Netgear, a US company, which manufactures all of its products abroad.
One exception to the general absence of US-made routers is the newer Starlink WiFi router. Starlink is part of Elon Musk’s company SpaceX.
Presumably US companies will start making home routers, if they think this policy is stable enough to plan around. But they will be more expensive than routers made in China or Taiwan. Security is never free, but policy determines who pays for it.

The 2026 US “Cyber Strategy for America” document is mostly the same thing we’ve seen out of the White House for over a decade, but with a more aggressive tone.
But one sentence stood out: “We will unleash the private sector by creating incentives to identify and disrupt adversary networks and scale our national capabilities.” This sounds like a call for hackback: giving private companies permission to conduct offensive cyber operations.
The Economist noticed (alternate link) this, too.
I think this is an incredibly dumb idea:
In warfare, the notion of counterattack is extremely powerful. Going after the enemy—its positions, its supply lines, its factories, its infrastructure—is an age-old military tactic. But in peacetime, we call it revenge, and consider it dangerous. Anyone accused of a crime deserves a fair trial. The accused has the right to defend himself, to face his accuser, to an attorney, and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Both vigilante counterattacks, and preemptive attacks, fly in the face of these rights. They punish people before who haven’t been found guilty. It’s the same whether it’s an angry lynch mob stringing up a suspect, the MPAA disabling the computer of someone it believes made an illegal copy of a movie, or a corporate security officer launching a denial-of-service attack against someone he believes is targeting his company over the net.
In all of these cases, the attacker could be wrong. This has been true for lynch mobs, and on the internet it’s even harder to know who’s attacking you. Just because my computer looks like the source of an attack doesn’t mean that it is. And even if it is, it might be a zombie controlled by yet another computer; I might be a victim, too. The goal of a government’s legal system is justice; the goal of a vigilante is expediency.
We don’t issue letters of marque on the high seas anymore; we shouldn’t do it in cyberspace.
The post The Stealth Skimmer: How Hackers Weaponized WebRTC to Bypass PCI Security and Siphon Credit Cards appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

The March 2026 Cyber Strategy shifts focus from private sector compliance to national power and adversary disruption. Explore the tension between geopolitical deterrence and the economic realities of cybercrime.
The post The Danger of Treating CyberCrime as War – The New National Cybersecurity Strategy appeared first on Security Boulevard.

The FCC bans new foreign-made routers over national security risks, a move that could reshape the US tech supply chain and impact pricing and availability.
The post US Bans New Foreign-Made Routers, Citing ‘Unacceptable’ Security Risks appeared first on TechRepublic.
