1. Executive summary

Modern software is assembled, not written. A single application routinely draws on hundreds of third-party components, pulled in on demand and updated continuously as part of normal process. That convenience has quietly become a dependable initial-access route that bypasses traditional perimeter and endpoint defenses. Rather than breaching a hardened production perimeter, adversaries increasingly compromise the developer, the maintainer account, the build pipeline, or the package registry — and let trusted automation carry their code the rest of the way.

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Introduction

This blog is part of a cyber threat intelligence (CTI) blog series called Tracking Adversaries that investigates prominent or new threat groups.

The focus of this blog is EvilCorp, a sanctioned Russia-based cybercriminal enterprise known for launching ransomware attacks, and RansomHub, a prominent ransomware as a service (RaaS) operation run by Russian-speaking cybercriminals.

These two threat groups have been linked together through cooperation on intrusions and IOCs and TTPs shared by multiple CTI sources. The implication of this link is critical due to RansomHub being the most active ransomware gang and is working with a well-known sanctioned affiliate.

Who is RansomHub?

Active since February 2024, RansomHub is a RaaS operation formerly known as Cyclops and Knight and is run by Russian-speaking adversaries. It is currently used by more and more cybercriminals that are ex-affiliates of other RaaS operations. This includes the ALPHV/BlackCat RaaS and the LockBit RaaS, which have since shutdown or disappeared. This has made the RansomHub RaaS one of the most widespread ransomware families as of early 2025.

Due to having a high number of affiliates, the tools and TTPs observed before the final RansomHub payload is deployed can vary significantly. Each affiliate may have their own set of tools and TTPs to achieve the final objectives of data exfiltration and ransomware deployment.

Who is EvilCorp?

Evil Corp is an international cybercrime network sanctioned for orchestrating large-scale financial cyberattacks led by Maksim Yakubets. EvilCorp’s operations have evolved over time, expanding from Dridex banking trojan campaigns into developing ransomware like BitPaymer, WastedLocker, Hades, PhoenixLocker, and MacawLocker.

Notably, Aleksandr Ryzhenkov, was identified by the National Crime Agency (NCA) as a high-ranking member of EvilCorp and also LockBit affiliate. Ryzhenkov became a LockBit affiliate around 2022, contributing to over 60 LockBit ransomware builds and attempting to extort more than $100 million from victims. This discovery aligns with Mandiant’s previous reporting on EvilCorp shifting to LockBit as well.

The NCA also found that EvilCorp maintains close ties with Russian intelligence agencies through Yakubets' father-in-law, Eduard Bendersky, a former FSB officer, who is suspected of using his influence to shield the group from prosecution in Russia.

One of the TTPs that makes EvilCorp standout from the rest of the RaaS affiliates is their own affiliation to the SocGholish JavaScript malware (aka FAKEUPDATES). If ransomware deployment takes place following a SocGholish infection, then the attackers responsible for the attack will be affiliated with EvilCorp.

Reported Connections Between EvilCorp and RansomHub

On 15 July 2024, Microsoft shared a post on X stating that RansomHub was observed being deployed in post-compromise activity by Manatee Tempest (which is Microsoft’s name for EvilCorp) following initial access via SocGholish (aka FakeUpdates) infections (which Microsoft tracks as Mustard Tempest).

On 15 January 2025, Guidepoint wrote a blog on a new Python backdoor used by an affiliate of RansomHub. Notably, the new Python backdoor was delivered by SocGholish. Therefore, this Python backdoor is another potential artifact worth monitoring for its connection to known EvilCorp-related malware.

The next day, on 16 January 2025, Google shared a report on EvilCorp (which Google tracks as UNC2165) that disclosed numerous tools and malware families they have been using to deliver RansomHub, including a Python backdoor dubbed VIPERTUNNEL (see the image below). The presence of a Python backdoor following a SocGholish infection is notable TTP that overlaps with the Guidepoint blog on RansomHub.

On 14 March 2025, Trend Micro disclosed further details that also confirmed the SocGholish malware is leading to the deployment of RansomHub ransomware. The operators of SocGholish are tracked as Water Scylla by Trend Micro. The operators distribute SocGholish via the Keitaro Traffic Direction System (TDS), a legitimate service used for marketing campaigns. Trend Micro also observed SocGholish dropping the same custom Python backdoor (aka VIPERTUNNEL) as well.

So What?

EvilCorp has been under US sanctions since 2019, making it illegal for affected organisations to pay ransoms to them without facing potential fines from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Despite these sanctions, EvilCorp has continued its cybercriminal activities by adapting its tactics to include rebranding their ransomware and becoming an affiliate of RaaS operations, such as LockBit and RansomHub. 

The key indicator of EvilCorp's involvement in ransomware attacks continues to be the use of the SocGholish malware, which employs drive-by downloads masquerading as web browser software updates to gain initial access to systems.

EvilCorp’s affiliation with RansomHub raises the possibilities that RansomHub may soon face sanctions similar to those imposed on EvilCorp. Consequently, any victim that pays a ransom to RansomHub could become significantly riskier for cyber insurance organisations, incident responders, and ransomware negotiators, as they may inadvertently violate sanctions and face legal repercussions.

Given EvilCorp's prominence as a target for international law enforcement, its association with RansomHub is likely to draw increased scrutiny. This could result in RansomHub becoming the focus of future law enforcement actions, including potential takedowns and additional sanctions, further complicating the landscape for entities involved in ransomware response and mitigation.

There is also the increased likelihood that RansomHub will now rebrand. As we saw in the BlackBasta Leaks, ransomware groups pay close attention to the news, CTI reports, and even posts on X and even blogs by researchers. This association to EvilCorp and threat of sanctions is an issue for ransomware groups as it impacts their business model and makes earning harder. Therefore, by linking the two entities together CTI analysts can impose cost on these cybercriminals.

References:

1. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-242a
2. https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/ransomhub-hits-powered-by-ex-affiliates-lockbit-blackcat-p-3703
3. https://www.ransomware.live/group/ransomhub#ttps
4. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845
5. https://web.archive.org/web/20200213115628/https:/www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/international-law-enforcement-operation-exposes-the-world-s-most-harmful-cyber-crime-group
6. https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/hades-ransomware-successor-to-indrik-spiders-wastedlocker/
7. https://web.archive.org/web/20241004104429/https:/www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/further-evil-corp-cyber-criminals-exposed-one-unmasked-as-lockbit-affiliate
8. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/#DEV-0206-DEV-0243
9. https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/js.fakeupdates
10. https://x.com/msftsecintel/status/1812932754947911780
11. https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/security/security-insider/manatee-tempest
12. https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/ransomhub-affiliate-leverage-python-based-backdoor/
13. https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/threat_horizons_report_h1_2025.pdf
14. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/c/socgholishs-intrusion-techniques-facilitate-distribution-of-rans.html
15. https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2025/02/blackbasta-leaks-lessons-from-ascension.html

Europe faces a critical juncture. Geopolitical tensions are rising, and cyber threats are growing more sophisticated. This reality has made cybersecurity a vital part of Europe’s defense strategy, along with the defense strategies of the entire world. The European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 initiative, which proposes a €150 billion investment in defense (including a dedicated €3.5 billion cybersecurity fund as noted in President von der Leyen’s 3 March statement), demonstrates that there is unprecedented opportunity for unified action.

Now is the time for European cybersecurity companies to come together, strengthen the industry and protect our shared future. The reason is straightforward: Europe can no longer afford to view cybersecurity separately from traditional defense measures.

The BlackBasta ransomware group’s leaked chat logs have proven to already be another unique and fascinating opportunity for researchers to better understand the internal operations of a Russia-based organised cybercrime enterprise. These leaks followed a major leak of Conti chat logs in 2022, which also proved to be a treasure trove of intelligence on the cybercrime enterprise. The BlackBasta gang consists of former Conti ransomware members and it should come as no surprise that their operations are similar in nature and structure.

Ransomware researchers have several valuable resources to conduct investigations with nowadays. This includes ransomware.live, which contains several resources including ransomch.at, a collection of negotiation chats between ransomware gangs and their victims, as well as the ransomware tool matrix and ransomware vulnerability matrix. These resources allow to deeply understand the capabilities and motivations of these ransomware gangs. However, leaked chat logs are the final missing piece of the puzzle and offer a deeper understanding from the cybercriminal’s very own perspective and organisational structure.

Active since April 2022, BlackBasta is one of the top-tier ransomware gangs and one of the largest cybercrime enterprises in the world. According to the US Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency (CISA), BlackBasta impacted up to 500 different businesses and critical infrastructure in North America, Europe, and Australia as of May 2024.

The importance of the Ascension Health incident

This blog shall dive deep into the Ascension Health attack by BlackBasta. It is a step-by-step extraction of the conversation between the BlackBasta members while they decide how to handle the attack.

The new insights around how BlackBasta and other ransomware gangs perceive being involved with incidents at healthcare sector victim should prove useful for incident responders, law enforcement, and governments that have to resolve these types of attacks on the healthcare sector on an alarmingly regularly basis.

Background

On 9 May 2024, mainstream news organisations in the US reported about a cyberattack and significant disruption of services of Ascension Health, one of the largest healthcare providers in the country. On 11 May 2024, BleepingComputer reported that BlackBasta was to blame for the attack on Ascension Health and that ambulances had been disrupted and patients were being redirected to other hospitals.

How the Incident Began

The BlackBasta attack on Ascension Health began many months before the ransomware was deployed on their network. Reconnaissance of Ascension Health by members of BlackBasta began around 3 November 2023. They shared 14 email addresses of Ascension Health employees, which we can only assume were used for phishing or password guessing. Ransomware gangs often used Zoominfo to profile their targets to determine whether it is worth it for them to attack and get a ransom from them.

The ransomware gang themselves wrote in their Matrix chat that CBS News had written about a cyberattack on Ascension Health on 9 May 2024 and exclaimed that “it looks like one of the largest attacks of the year.”

Another BlackBasta member “gg” confirmed in the chat that it was them and appeared to be surprised that the news was writing about it.

Later, “gg” appeared to feel bad about the attack and concerned that cancer patients were suffering. However, at this stage it is hard to tell if they are serious or being sarcastic.

One member of BlackBasta who used the moniker “tinker” then stated that he wanted to be the negotiator for the BlackBasta team and began to strategize how to extract a ransom payment.

“gg” says they encrypted Ascension Health’s network using the Windows Safe Mode Boot technique, which is a function that BlackBasta is well-known to do.

The negotiator, “tinker” begins to weigh up their options. He states he believes the FBI and CISA will be involved, as well as Mandiant and begins to compare the incident to the Change Healthcare attack by ALPHV/BlackCat (and later RansomHub) who received a 22 million USD ransom payment.

“gg” shares that all the stolen data was put on a server named “ftp8” and tagged as “ALBIR_DS” and says to “tinker” that he should “look at the folder name, everything we downloaded from them is there."

The operator, “gg” also shared a summary of the target environment of Ascension Health. This includes number of servers being over 12,000, what security tools they use such as Cylance, Tanium, and McAfee. Plus, “gg” said they downloaded over 1.4TB of data to "ftp8" and used BlackBasta ransomware version 4.0 and attacked them on 8 May 2024.

Interestingly, “gg” appears to have also recommended to bluff to the victim that they stole more than 1.5TB and say to the victim that they stole 3TB instead.

Negotiation Strategizing

After having established the details of the incident, Tinker (the negotiator) began to wonder about the likelihood of getting a ransom payment as well as estimate how much Ascension Health is likely losing per day.

Tinker (negotiator) then explains to the rest of the BlackBasta members involved in the attack what course of action they should take to get the ransom from Ascension Health. Tinker says they would normally set a 3% of the annual revenue and negotiate from there. They note that there are clear problems with the victim being a hospital and that this attack followed the Change Health attack by ALPHV/BlackCat. They also noted that they are worried as they believe the US National Security Agency (NSA) attacked TrickBot's servers four years ago and that the FBI took down Qakbot more recently. Tinker is  also worried that one of Ascension Health’s patients will die and they will be blamed and labelled as a terrorist attack.

Tinker also noted that when BlackSuit attacked Octapharma that it was labelled by the news as "hostile actions by Russia" and they warned that Conti was already under sanctions and that because they are tied to Conti they may not get paid.

Tinker, ransomware negotiator for BlackBasta, ultimately recommended giving the decryptor for free to Ascension Health and resorting to data theft extortion. This is notable, as it is a similar situation to the Irish HSE ransomware attack by Conti, who also provided the decryptor for free.

Healthcare Impact

The fact Ascension Health is a major medical organisation with many patients appeared to take its toll on the BlackBasta members. Tinker wrote in the BlackBasta chat they he found a post on Reddit by a doctor that works for Ascension Health who described the damage of the attack.

Another member of BlackBasta, “nn” also found out that Ascension Health is a group of hospitals. He immediately recommends giving them a decryptor for free.

Interestingly, “gg” compares the attack on Change Health and also recognises Mandiant and warns that the FBI and CISA will be involved. Plus, “gg” noted that they did not encrypt via virtualization (such as vCenter, ESXi or Hyper-V) and reconfirmed they used Safe Mode Boot. Further, “gg” was also inclined to give Ascension the decryptor for free too.

Another BlackBasta member, “nickolas” comments about the situation. He warned and was particularly concerned about law enforcement retaliation, such as hacking back, sanctions, indictments. He recommended auditing the entire infrastructure and having a rebrand of the BlackBasta name, which means changing the ransomware, leak site, and other personas.

Tinker (negotiator) is aware however of the risk of someone dying and how it will impact their chances of getting the ransom.

Tinker also discussed the politics of the scenario. He compared the situation to the colonial pipeline incident of 2021. He mentioned how Russia reacted and arrested ransomware operators. He also brought up the war in Ukraine and how ransomware attacks on the US impact the politics with Russia.

Tinker highlighted that the ransomware was used to encrypt patient data and how it caused the hospital management system to crash. He was particularly concerned about the ambulances being unable to operate but also tries to minimize the severity of the incident. Nevertheless, he asked to see the stolen data himself to get a better understanding of what data BlackBasta operators have that they can leverage against Ascension Health.

By the end of deliberations, Tinker recommends giving a free decryptor and then demand a ransom for the stolen data.

tinker edited his message to then clarify that he reckons they should demand a ransom in the 10s of millions USD or over 100 million USD.

Ransomware Negotiations

The operator “gg” then shared the opening message to Ascension Health shared via the Black Basta negotiation portal:

The negotiator for Ascension Health (who BlackBasta believes is Mandiant) replied to the negotiation chat portal:

“gg” then clarified the terms of the ransom demand. A payment will be needed to delete and share the stolen data He maintains the offer to provide a free decryptor:

The negotiator for Ascension Health asked for the decryption tool:

The decryptor was then provided to Ascension Health:

Later, “gg” then shares a file tree for ""DS"" (which is equal to Ascension Health). The file is added to a ZIP and shared via a temp[.]sh link and is password protected:

The operator “gg” then uses Privat (a screenshot sharing site) to show the proof that they have deleted the data of Ascension Health:

From these messages, it appears no ransom was paid and BlackBasta returned the data and deleted it.

Change of Heart

The most interesting part of this engagement with Ascension Health by BlackBasta was that the members deliberated back and forth about whether to provide a free decryption tool but all appeared to be fine with demanding a ransom for the victim data.

The operator “gg” appears to have a change of heart. He exclaims that they (the members of the BlackBasta ransomware gang) are "pentesters" and not "killers" and claims he “held a meeting in the office” which is interesting as it further proves they are a cybercrime enterprise, potentially with full-time employees.

The operator “gg” decided to help Ascension Health and requests not to work on hospitals anymore.

He also said “the software will fly to the trash” which likely means the group was thinking of ditching the brand of BlackBasta and rebrand to another name. Finally, “gg” warns other BlackBasta members not to target hospitals any more:

The Impact of the BlackBasta Attack on Ascension Health

According to the HIPAA Journal, the personal data of up to 5.6 million patients was exposed and Ascension confirmed that some patient data was stolen during the attack. Ascension said that it found no evidence that the ransomware group gained access to electronic health records or other clinical systems, so full medical histories have not been stolen. During the attack, however, Ascension was forced to divert ambulances, close pharmacies, take critical IT systems offline and resort to pen and paper to record patient information. The attack affected a large percentage of its 136 hospitals across the US and took Ascension around 6 weeks to restore access to its electronic medical record system and resume normal operations. The ransomware attack reportedly caused delays in revenue cycle processes, claims submission, and payment processing, in addition to significant remediation costs.

Lessons Learned

This chat log confirms that BlackBasta attacked Ascension Health using version 4.0 of their ransomware and used the Safe Mode Boot technique on 12,000 endpoints of the healthcare system.

If reconnaissance began on 3 November 2023 and the attack happened on the 8 May 2024, that would make the amount of time they took to gain access and deploy the ransomware was up to 187 days long or around six months. Due to this, cybercriminal campaign appears to be comparable to a more focused state-sponsored level intrusion where months of planning and numerous attempts are made to infiltrate a target.

The BlackBasta negotiator, Tinker, believed that they were going to get a very high ransom payment in the 10s of millions or up to 100 million USD and compared the attack to the Change Health incident by ALPHV/BlackCat who got 22 million USD.

The high ransom payment by Change Health has appeared to be like a dinner bell for ransomware gangs to go after other healthcare sector victims. Paying the ransom as a healthcare organisation clearly has significant downstream impact on the rest of the industry and it should be an absolute last resort and default to be to never pay the ransom.

There was an interesting change of heart and moment where the operator “gg” decided to give up on the Ascension Health attack, provide them a decryptor, provide the data back to them, and share proof that they deleted it. The members of BlackBasta were clearly concerned about hack-backs from law enforcement or intelligence services, as well as sanctions and deanonymization. The BlackBasta team also mentioned several times during this incident that they were going to have to rebrand because of the attack.

Overall, this incident goes to show that even Russia-based cybercrime enterprises with dozens of members remain paranoid about being attack by law enforcement and intelligence services. It is really interesting that they themselves admit that their actions warrant such a response.

One of the key lessons to learn from this engagement is that if a healthcare organisation is attacked by a ransomware gang, then it would be a valid strategy to tell the news about the incident. News about patients lives being at risk and dying will get the attention of these ruthless cybercriminals who will realise the mistakes they made and are potentially likely to at least provide a free decryptor and may give up entirely on their ransom payment pursuit and move on to the next target.

Lastly, these chat logs appear to prove that the West’s policies aimed at increasing pressure on Russia-based ransomware gangs is evidently working. These organised cybercrime enterprises are beginning to alter their targeting behaviour as a result to avoid the wrath of law enforcement retaliation.

Introduction to Infrastructure Pivoting

Pivoting on infrastructure is a handy skill for cyber threat intelligence (CTI) analysts to learn. It can help to reveal the bigger picture when it comes to malware, phishing, or network exploitation campaigns. Infrastructure pivoting essentially is the act of looking for more systems an adversary has created. The main benefit of this pursuit is the identification of additional targets or victims, more tools or malware samples, and ultimately new insights about the adversary’s capabilities.

If done correctly, being able to pivot on adversary infrastructure will be very useful during incident response (IR) engagements. For example, it may lead to being able to attribute the intrusion to a known adversary. This will help others during an IR engagement understand the level of threat posed to the victim organisation.

Receiving Threat Data

To be able to pivot on adversary infrastructure, threat data is needed such as the intelligence shared by threat reports put out by various researchers from public and private sector organisations. This scenario, however, involves relying on the analysis skills of other researchers to explain what the infrastructure is and when they observed it in use.

This blog will examine threat data provided by public sector organisations such as the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) as well as cybersecurity vendors such as Deep Instinct, Cyble, and Fortinet. These organisations have shared indicators of compromise (IOCs) uncovered following analysis of adversary intrusion activities or upload to online malware sandboxes, such as VirusTotal, among others.

Introduction to the Ghostwriter Campaign

On 3 June 2024, Fortinet shared a report on malicious XLS macro documents leading to Cobalt Strike Beacons. Analysis of the XLS documents showed that they appeared to be targeting the Ukrainian military and linked to a known Belarusian state-sponsored APT group tracked as Ghostwriter (aka UNC1151, UAC-0057, TA445). On 4 June 2024, Cyble also shared a report on a similar campaign.  

In both reports, if the XLS was opened and the macros were executed by the target, a malicious DLL file was downloaded from an adversary-created domain. In Fortinet’s report, two similar “.shop” domains were mentioned. In Cyble’s report another “.shop” domain was also called out.

Overlapping IOCs

The first pivot on Ghostwriter APT infrastructure that will be demonstrated involves finding indicators of compromise (IOCs) such as domains and IP addresses that appear in multiple threat reports.

The fastest way to realize these overlaps is through continuous collection of reported IOCs into a Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP). This will reveal IOCs that appear in multiple threat reports through tagging and sources of where IOCs come from. Eventually, one domain or IP address will get reported by multiple entities and the connection will make itself apparent.

In Figure 1 (see below) the domain “goudieelectric[.]shop” appeared in both Cyble’s blog and Fortinet’s blog. Analysis of all three domains found that they use the same generic top-level domain (gTLD), registrar, and name servers, as well as have a robots.txt directory configured. These common infrastructure characteristics indicate that all three domains were created by the same adversary.

Figure 1. Three similar domains appearing in two threat reports.

Domain Registration & Hosting Overlaps

When more IOCs are reported in other threat reports it is possible to link them to other known domains, this is due to adversaries reusing the same registrars, name servers, and gTLDs.

In Figure 2 (see below), Deep Instinct reported two more domains that could also be linked to the previous three domains through the mutual use of the PublicDomainsRegistry registrar, Cloudflare name servers, and the robots.txt file.

Figure 2. Five similar domains that appear across three threat reports.

Further, CERT-UA reported three more domains (see Figure 3 below) that could be linked to the infrastructure cluster through this same method as well. This pattern of behaviour is a strong indicator that these domains were created by the same adversary.

Figure 3. Eight similar domains that appear across four threat reports.

Finding Unreported Domains

Since the domains from the above threat reports were collected and linked together through overlapping attributes, it is now possible to use these attributes to find more domains that had gone unreported.

Using a VirusTotal domain attribute query, additional domains can be found by using the following registration pattern:

• Name Servers: CLOUDFLARE
• Registrar: PublicDomainRegistry
• TLD: *.shop

This revealed up to 24 domains that matched this pattern that were likely created by Ghostwriter, a state-sponsored APT group:

• backstagemerch[.]shop
• bryndonovan[.]shop
• chaptercheats[.]shop
• clairedeco[.]shop
• connecticutchildrens[.]shop
• disneyfoodblog[.]shop
• eartheclipse[.]shop
• empoweringparents[.]shop
• foampartyhats[.]shop
• goudieelectric[.]shop
• ikitas[.]shop
• jackbenimblekids[.]shop
• kingarthurbaking[.]shop
• lansdownecentre[.]shop
• lauramcinerney[.]shop
• medicalnewstoday[.]shop
• moonlightmixes[.]shop
• penandthepad[.]shop
• physio-pedia[.]shop
• semanticscholar[.]shop
• simonandschuster[.]shop
• thevegan8[.]shop
• twisterplussize[.]shop
• utahsadventurefamily[.]shop

Note: VirusTotal domain searches are only available to VirusTotal Enterprise users. There are other providers which allow you to search for domain registration patterns such as DomainTools, Validin, and Zetalytics. There also some free OSINT sites such as nslookup.io and viewdns.info that can be useful in certain scenarios.

Finding Related Malware Samples

Using the list of similar domains that were uncovered through the registration pattern search, it is then possible to find additional malware samples communicating with them.

This can be achieved by looking at domains in VirusTotal and checking the Relations tab can show communicating files as shown in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4. Additional malware samples uncovered via the VirusTotal relations tab

Using a VirusTotal graph can help to reveal every communicating file with every domain discovered through the registration pattern search, as shown in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5. All communicating files with every additional domain identified.

URL to the VirusTotal Graph: https://www.virustotal.com/graph/embed/gd2c04407d9ba4b75b2ce73d6155d166d3ef75eaf29894ff5ac287c90400072bc?theme=dark

URL to the VirusTotal Collection: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/2aa6b36a717be8bc49f7925434ca40f3ecb9f628414b491da3e985677508ca08/iocs

Lessons Learned

In conclusion, it is important for CTI analysts to closer inspect the attributes of the IOCs they come across. It is not uncommon for state-sponsored APT groups to make such mistakes when creating their infrastructure to launch attacks from. By exploiting this fact, CTI analysts can learn much more about the adversary’s targets, capabilities, and the behaviours of the humans themselves behind such campaigns.

The importance of this type of work was demonstrated in December 2023 when the US Treasury sanctioned members of the Russian APT group known as Callisto (aka Star Blizzard, BlueCharlie, COLDRIVER, GOSSAMER BEAR). The real world identity of Andrey Korinets was revealed after he was sanctioned for fraudulently creating and registering malicious domain infrastructure for Russian federal security service (FSB) spear phishing campaigns.