What HappenedNemesis Dark Web Drug Dealers ArrestedOn 14 May 2026, two Cambridgeshire drug dealers were sentenced after being arrested in July 2024 by the Eastern Region Special Operations Unit (ERSOU).ERSOU officers recovered Royal Mail parcel labels, order lists, Gorgonites-branded packaging, and a USB memory stick containing login credentials for multiple dark web marketplace accounts.The dealers reportedly used the dark web to supply heroin, cocaine, and amphetamine to hundreds of users acro
On 14 May 2026, two Cambridgeshire drug dealers were sentenced after being arrested in July 2024 by the Eastern Region Special Operations Unit (ERSOU).
ERSOU officers recovered Royal Mail parcel labels, order lists, Gorgonites-branded packaging, and a USB memory stick containing login credentials for multiple dark web marketplace accounts.
The dealers reportedly used the dark web to supply heroin, cocaine, and amphetamine to hundreds of users across the UK.
The drug deals were initially arranged via a Telegram channel under the handle Gorgonites, which was linked to at least 570 individual sales on Nemesis Market since September 2023.
AEGIS Dark Web Drug Market Seizure
On 17 March 2026, the London Metropolitan Police’s Cyber Crime Unit announced the seizure of AEGIS Marketplace.
In June 2025, the Met Cyber Crime Unit became aware of AEGIS Marketplace, which was a site where individual sellers could market drugs for sale to users who could make purchases using cryptocurrency.
By March 2026, the website had 30 active sellers and was estimated to have generated 10,000 drug sales in ten months, leading to an estimated annual turnover of almost £2 million.
Officers from the Met managed to infiltrate the site, retrieving server data that led to the identification of administrators, sellers and customers.
Online Killers Marketplace (OKM) Admins Arrested
On 19 January 2026, two suspects were arrested in Romania as part of an ERSOU investigation into a bogus ‘harm-for-hire’ website which offered services including murder.
The arrests were connected to a dark web scam website called Online Killers Marketplace (OKM), which purported to facilitate criminal activities including the hiring of hitmen and extortion.
ERSOU noted that even though none of the services OKM offered were genuine, successful prosecutions have previously been pursued by police forces of individuals attempting to use it to cause harm to others.
The investigation led to the seizure of US crypto currency worth at least $600,000, as well as cash which included almost €50,000 Euros, and around £48,000 worth of Romanian Leu.
Analyst Comment
The anonymity and connectivity of encrypted messaging apps, the Tor network, cryptocurrency, and online marketplaces makes it nearly impossible to prevent such crime. However, law enforcement can achieve strategic containment by targeting specific infrastructure for seizure and individuals for arrest. These activities support the overall strategy for national law enforcement agencies is to deter criminals from being active in their country.
Telegram is increasingly used as a front-end service for all sorts of cybercrime activities. As seen in the Nemesis investigation, the dealers operated a Telegram channel under the handle Gorgonites to coordinate and funnel buyers toward more secure transactions. It is an easy-to-use mobile application that makes access to such illicit services simple for buyers. It is more accessible than having to download the Tor browser and use a desktop or laptop browser. Many of these illicit services also would not exist without cryptocurrency. The ability to send funds via peer-to-peer networks and obfuscate transactions continues to be the main enabling factor for most cybercrime operations.
Interestingly, the sole administrator of Nemesis Market was sanctioned in March 2025 by the US Treasury OFAC department. The admin was an Iran-based individual named Behrouz Parsarad. Prior to its takedown by law enforcement in March 2024, Nemesis had over 30,000 active users and 1,000 vendors and facilitated the sale of nearly $30 million USD worth of drugs around the world between 2021 and 2024.
Defensive Takeaways
Blockchain Analytics:While cryptocurrency provides a layer of perceived anonymity for illicit markets it also leaves a permanent, public ledger. Law enforcement and threat intelligence firms, such as TRM Labs and Chainalysis, can leverage blockchain analytics to follow the money and deanonymise the administrators. By mapping transaction inputs and outputs, investigators can trace mixed funds, identify exchanges used to cash out into fiat currency, and map the financial infrastructure of a marketplace.
Breach Data Pivoting: To catch these cybercriminals, threat intelligence analysts can use historical breach data repositories to pivot from a known dark web alias or leaked credential to find a real-world identity. If an administrator used the same password or a variation of a username on a compromised gaming forum ten years ago, that footprint can blow their operational security (OPSEC).
Profile Scraping: Dark web vendors and market admins often leave massive digital footprints across forums, marketplaces, and messaging apps like Telegram. Continuous profile scraping can be achieve via automated bots to collect vendor profiles, feedback ratings, PGP keys, styles of writing (stylometry), and active hours. By aggregating this data over time, defenders can create a comprehensive profile of a target and identify them.
Dark Web Market Sock Puppet Accounts: Law enforcement and threat intelligence analysts can deploy sock puppets accounts, which are undercover, synthetic personas, into these dark web ecosystems. These accounts are kept for long periods of time and actively posting in an attempt to build trust within the cybercrime underground. Investigators can use them to buy products, interact with admins, and gain access to private vendor portals or escrow systems to support evidence gathering for a takedown.
Infrastructure Analysis: As dark web markets rely on servers, hosting providers, DNS, and Tor is is possible to analyse these attributes and look for configuration mistakes. This can include exposed IP addresses, trackable X509 certificates, or open port banners that reveal the true location of a hidden service. Once a server's true IP is uncovered, law enforcement can issue subpoenas to hosting providers or execute physical raids to seize the hardware and unmask administrators, vendors, and buyer databases.
Small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) remain attractive targets for cybercriminals – in both mass cyberattacks and sophisticated campaigns targeting larger enterprises through trusted relationship attacks. At the same time, smaller businesses may lack the robust cybersecurity policies and necessary resources to protect themselves against an evolving threat landscape.
Kaspersky believes that raising awareness can help small and medium-sized enterprises develop an effective protection strategy.
Small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) remain attractive targets for cybercriminals – in both mass cyberattacks and sophisticated campaigns targeting larger enterprises through trusted relationship attacks. At the same time, smaller businesses may lack the robust cybersecurity policies and necessary resources to protect themselves against an evolving threat landscape.
Kaspersky believes that raising awareness can help small and medium-sized enterprises develop an effective protection strategy. Ahead of International SMB Day on June 27, Kaspersky presents the findings of its 2026 threat analysis for SMBs, which includes real-world examples of attacks.
Key findings
In the first four months of 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected over 33,300 cyberattacks on SMBs masquerading as popular artificial intelligence (AI) tools – almost five times more than in 2025 and 39% more than the number of attacks disguised as the office and collaboration tools that Kaspersky’s research focuses on.
Popular messengers and communication services remained the attacker’s most widespread lure, with almost 415,000 attacks involving fake messenger apps and video conferencing software.
The attackers follow trends: the AI tools Claude and OpenClaw (ex-ClawdBot/MoltBot), which have gained popularity in 2026, were among the common AI lures.
Fraudsters use fake AI tools to scam businesses out of money, while corporate accounts on social media also remain targets.
The majority of initial accesses to corporate infrastructures sold on the dark web are allegedly accesses to SMBs. This could be because SMBs tend not to be as well protected as large enterprises and, at the same time, may be trusted contractors for those well-protected enterprises.
Malware and potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) disguised as popular services
Kaspersky researchers used data from Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) to explore how frequently malicious and unwanted files are disguised as legitimate applications that may be used by SMBs. KSN is a system for processing anonymized cyberthreat-related data shared voluntarily by Kaspersky users. For this part of the report, only anonymized data received from users of Kaspersky solutions for SMBs were analyzed.
According to a survey by the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council (SBE Council), small business owners continue to embrace artificial intelligence and digital transformation as they maintain a generally positive outlook on the economy. Threat actors are also aware of the hype surrounding AI and exploit it for their own benefit. In particular, they actively distribute cyberthreats under the guise of popular AI services.
From January to April 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected 33,352 attacks on SMB users in which malware or potentially unwanted applications for PCs were disguised as five popular AI services. This figure represents an increase of almost five times compared to the previous year. This highlights an evolving trend in which threat actors are weaponizing trust in widely used AI platforms and services, especially popular ones like Claude. Kaspersky experts note that it’s important to download apps from official sources and to verify which apps are available for which platforms.
Share of attacks targeting SMBs in which malware or PUAs mimic the five popular, legitimate AI apps that Kaspersky’s research focuses on, first four months of 2025 and 2026 (download)
In the first four months of 2026, Kaspersky researchers also identified more than1,100 unique samples of malware and PUAs detected in the SMB sector that masqueraded as five popular AI applications, representing a 21% increase compared to the same period of 2025. The samples were mainly different types of Trojware (Trojans and Trojan-like malware), including those capable of downloading and running other malware on compromised devices. Trojware disguises itself as harmless files to trick users into installing them. Their functionality may vary depending on the particular type of Trojware. This may include stealing, deleting, blocking, modifying or copying users’ data, as well as other malicious actions. Trojware therefore represents a highly dangerous cyberthreat to entrepreneurs and businesses.
Kaspersky experts also note that the threat landscape is constantly evolving with new lures appearing all the time. For example, in the first four months of 2026, Kaspersky solutions blocked hundreds of attacks in which malware or PUAs for PCs were disguised as OpenClaw (previously known as Clawdbot or Moltbot).
Other lures for SMBs: Fake communication apps and office software
Kaspersky analysts also explored how attackers leverage other legitimate applications as lures to target SMBs. For example, from January to April 2026, Kaspersky solutions blocked 414,736 attacks on SMB users in which malicious software or PUAs for PCs were disguised as the popular communication apps that Kaspersky’s report focuses on. The number of attacks changed marginally compared to the previous year’s figure, indicating that the lure of fake communication apps remains a serious cyberthreat.
Share of attacks targeting SMBs in which malware or PUAs mimic the four legitimate communication apps covered by Kaspersky’s research, first four months of 2025 and 2026 (download)
Various fake office applications and collaborative platforms also remain among the lures that attackers may exploit to target SMBs. According to Kaspersky telemetry, more than 24,000 attacks were detected from January to April 2026 in which malware or PUAs for PCs were disguised as specific office applications.
Share of attacks targeting SMBs in which malware or PUAs mimic the six popular office applications and collaboration tools covered by Kaspersky’s research, first four months of 2025 and 2026 (download)
In 2026, AI-related baits have become more widespread among cybercriminals than traditional fake office and collaboration tools. Kaspersky experts note that the more publicity and hype there is around certain tools, the more likely a user is to come across a fake package online.
Scammers and phishers tricking victims into providing credentials and funds
In 2026, Kaspersky researchers observed a wide range of phishing campaigns and scams targeting businesses and entrepreneurs. Fraudsters mimic financial and AI services as well as other platforms in order to steal credentials, personal information and funds.
In the following example, fraudsters disguise themselves as a bank that allegedly offers services for businesses (in other similar schemes they may offer business loans). Entrepreneurs are prompted to visit a scam website and enter their data to open a business account. The requested information varies depending on the scam, but may include name, email address, phone number, social security number, date of birth and address. Scammers may then use this data in their schemes or sell it on the dark web.
Kaspersky experts advise: if you encounter such a website, you should not rush to enter any data. First, examine it. Does the purported financial organization actually exist? How old is the website? Check the WHOIS records and read user reviews before entering any information on the page.
Example of a scam page targeting entrepreneurs
As with many other cyberthreats, AI services are also leveraged as a lure in scams. For example, Kaspersky experts identified a scam website for an AI service “built for contractors”. According to the text on the fraudulent page, the tool can help with “estimates, invoices and schedule”. However, in reality, in such schemes victims usually receive nothing after paying for a subscription, while the scammers get all the money.
Example of a scam page promoting an AI tool
Kaspersky experts note that business accounts on social networks and messengers remain attractive targets for cybercriminals in 2026. In one scheme, phishers distributed notifications with fake alerts related to companies’ business pages. The notifications claimed that Facebook’s review system had detected behavior that seriously violated its Community Standards and Advertising Policies. To avoid permanent restriction of their business page on the social network, owners were prompted to fill out an appeal form and provide personal and business email addresses, phone numbers, as well as the name of their business page and the password for their social network account. The attackers’ goal was to obtain credentials. To reduce user vigilance and appear legitimate, fraudsters also sent victims a fake appeal code.
Example of a fake notification
Email threats: Fake online documents and exploitation of legitimate platforms
Email remains one of the most widely used channels for cyberattacks targeting enterprises, including small and medium-sized businesses. In 2026, attackers have frequently combined email distribution with the exploitation of legitimate third-party platforms. This is how phishers and scammers usually attempt to bypass traditional email filters and exploit user trust in reputable services. Kaspersky researchers have also observed a large number of schemes targeting corporate users in which phishers and scammers use fake online documents or nonexistent meetings as bait.
In one recent scheme detected by Kaspersky, the attackers sent a fake notification disguised as a letter from OneDrive. The victim was prompted to access the document by clicking a button, but in reality, it led to a phishing website where users risked losing their confidential data. To make the email appear legitimate, the attackers added a phrase designed to lower the victim’s vigilance: “This item is encrypted and hosted within your secure cloud perimeter.” They also parsed the recipient’s email address and used the extracted data in the fake notification text so that the email looked like a standard notification from this type of service: “[email address domain as company name] has successfully uploaded a new file for [the user’s name as stated in their email address].”
Example of a phishing scheme with fake online documents
Attackers also use other pretexts to trick victims into sharing confidential information, for example fake compliance issues. In the example below, the attackers posed as Apple representatives. The fake notification stated: “Apple has identified a compliance issue related to Google Ads campaigns directing traffic to Apple product detail pages associated with the victim’s seller account.” However, the button in the email led to a phishing website where users are tricked into sharing confidential data.
Example of a fake compliance issue notification
Kaspersky experts observed another notable two-stage scheme aimed at stealing credentials from corporate emails, which involved distributing an invitation to a nonexistent meeting. The scheme is deployed in two stages. In stage one, a corporate user receives an email about a fictitious meeting. After clicking the “Accept Meeting Invitation” button, the user is redirected to a legitimate Zoom Docs (previous Zoom canvas brand) page. In stage two, the victim is prompted to click a hyperlink that reads “Click Here to Accept Meeting”. However, the URL of a phishing page is hidden behind this hyperlink.
Example of an email with a fake meeting
Zoom Docs page containing the phishing link
Malware is also actively distributed via email. In 2025, individuals and corporate users encountered over 144 million malicious and potentially unwanted email attachments, representing a 15% increase from the previous year.
Kaspersky experts note that the lures used in subject lines and texts of malicious emails can appear relatively harmless and rather unsophisticated. In the example below, the attackers target businesses with a fake request for “the best quote for the items attached.” However, the attached file actually contains a Trojan.
Example of a malicious email
Corporate infrastructure access for sale: Posts on the dark web
To assess threat actor activity, Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence experts analyzed hundreds of posts offering initial access to corporate infrastructures published on dark web forums from January to April of both 2025 and 2026. Kaspersky experts note that a single post may contain several offers for access to different allegedly compromised companies.
Example of a post on a darknet forum
Initial access brokers (IABs) sell initial access to compromised businesses, for example, via RDP or web shells. In their posts, IABs may provide information about the region where the allegedly compromised companies are located, their industry and revenue, as well as the type of access. IABs sell access that the buyers can then use for different purposes, including ransomware attacks, stealing corporate confidential information or other fraudulent activity. The price of initial access on dark web forums may depend on the revenue, industry or location of the allegedly compromised companies, or on the access privileges. For example, accounts with admin rights are usually more expensive because they can provide attackers with a wide range of possibilities.
According to the research, there were more posts offering initial access to companies of different sizes located in the Middle East (up 53% from last year), Africa (up 40%) and Latin America (up 17%). Meanwhile the number of posts related to companies located in Europe decreased by 34%. According to Kaspersky experts, this decline can be partially explained by the closure of a dark web forum containing such posts around the time of the study. The number of publications related to companies located in the APAC region also decreased slightly (down 4%), but remained at a consistently significant level for the second year in a row.
At the same time, the number of posts where the region was not specified decreased by 56% in 2026 compared to the previous year. Kaspersky analysts assume that this may indicate that initial access posts from IABs are becoming more targeted and unique.
Share of posts with initial access offers by business size
For this research, Kaspersky experts defined a small business as having an annual revenue of up to US$50 million, and a medium-sized business as having an annual revenue of between US$50 million and US$1 billion.
According to Kaspersky’s research, at the beginning of 2026 the share of posts on dark web forums with offers of initial access to allegedly compromised small businesses was larger than the shares of posts offering access to medium, large or nonprofit organizations. However, this share decreased in the first four months of 2026 compared to the same period in 2025. The share of posts concerning medium‑sized organizations also remained significant for two consecutive years. Taken together, posts concerning small and medium‑sizedorganizations account for more than half of all the analyzed posts with initial access offers on dark web forums.
At the same time for a certain number of posts initial access brokers didn’t indicate companies’ revenue, therefore, making it impossible to determine the size of the company.
Share of posts with initial access offers by business size, January–April 2025 (download)
Share of posts with initial access offers by business size, January–April 2026 (download)
Kaspersky experts note that despite the prevalence of posts concerning small businesses, threat actors may target medium‑sized businesses because they generate higher revenues than small businesses and may have weaker security defenses than large businesses.
SMBs can also become targets as a part of trusted relationship attacks, which enable the attackers to reach larger organizations. According to the Global Report by Kaspersky Security Services, the share of trusted relationship attacks among the initial vectors increased from 12.7% in 2024 to 15.5% in 2025. Therefore, the common belief that small and medium‑sized enterprises are of no interest to attackers is a misconception. Companies of all sizes need to understand the cyberthreat landscape, adhere to cybersecurity rules, implement appropriate cybersecurity solutions, and continuously improve employee awareness.
Cybersecurity action plan for SMBs
SMBs can reduce risks and ensure business continuity by investing in comprehensive cybersecurity solutions and increasing employee awareness. To protect themselves from the ever-evolving threat landscape, companies are advised to follow these rules:
Define access rules for corporate resources such as internet services, email accounts, shared folders, and online documents. Keep access lists up to date and revoke access promptly when employees leave the company.
Regularly back up important data to ensure the preservation of corporate information in case of emergencies.
Establish clear guidelines for using external services and resources. Create well-defined procedures for coordinating specific tasks, such as implementing new software, with the IT department and other responsible managers. Develop short, easy-to-understand cybersecurity guidelines for employees, with a special focus on account and password management, email protection, and safe web browsing. A well-rounded training program will equip employees with the necessary knowledge and ability to apply it in practice.
Raise employees’ security awareness. Conduct dedicated training to teach staff how to detect and address potential threats, and track their educational progress. Organizations can achieve this with the Kaspersky Automated Security Awareness Platform through interactive online modules and simulated phishing campaigns that build sustainable cyber hygiene habits across all teams.
Implement specialized cybersecurity solutions that fit your budget, size, and industry requirements, with an emphasis on scalability and ease of integration.
Kaspersky Small Office Security Premium is an easy-to-use solution that protects against advanced threats and also provides access to security awareness training for employees, making it ideal for micro-businesses.
Small and medium-sized enterprises with more mature IT expertise should consider Kaspersky Next Optimum, which is designed specifically for growing organizations and offers real-time protection, threat visibility, as well as EDR and XDR investigation and response capabilities.
Protect your business against email-borne threats.Kaspersky Security for Mail Server, a comprehensive email security platform that offers robust, multi-layered protection at mailbox and gateway levels, can help with this. Powered by machine learning and leading global threat intelligence, it effectively addresses all mail security challenges.
Adopt specialized solutions such as Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence to monitor the surface, deep, and dark webs for information about a company’s credentials, leaked data, and lookalike websites. Small and medium-sized companies with limited IT security budgets can partner with a managed security service provider (MSSP) to access this comprehensive digital risk protection service at an affordable, subscription-based price point.
With International Anti-Ransomware Day taking place on May 12, Kaspersky presents its annual report on the evolving global and regional ransomware cyberthreat landscape.
Ransomware remains one of the most persistent and adaptive cyberthreats. In 2026:
New families continue to emerge, adopting post-quantum cryptography ciphers.
As ransom payments drop, some groups implement encryptionless extortion attacks.
In a constantly changing ecosystem of threat actors, initial access brokers maintain a re
With International Anti-Ransomware Day taking place on May 12, Kaspersky presents its annual report on the evolving global and regional ransomware cyberthreat landscape.
Ransomware remains one of the most persistent and adaptive cyberthreats. In 2026:
New families continue to emerge, adopting post-quantum cryptography ciphers.
As ransom payments drop, some groups implement encryptionless extortion attacks.
In a constantly changing ecosystem of threat actors, initial access brokers maintain a relevant role in this market, showing increased focus on access to RDWeb as the preferred method of remote access.
Ransomware attacks decline but remain a major threat
According to Kaspersky Security Network, the share of organizations affected by ransomware decreased in 2025 across all regions compared to 2024.
Percentage of organizations affected by ransomware attacks by region, 2025 (download)
Despite the formal decrease, organizations across all sectors continue to face a high likelihood of attack, as ransomware operators refine their tactics and scale their operations with increasing efficiency. Kaspersky and VDC Research have found that in the manufacturing sector alone, ransomware attacks may have caused over $18 billion in losses in the first three quarters of the year.
The continued rise of EDR killers and defense evasion tooling
In 2026, ransomware operators increasingly prioritize neutralizing endpoint defenses before executing their payloads. Tools commonly referred to as “EDR killers” have become a standard component of attack playbooks. This reflects a continuing trend toward more deliberate and methodical intrusions.
Attackers attempt to terminate security processes and disable monitoring agents, often by exploiting trusted components such as signed drivers. This technique is called Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) and allows adversaries to blend into legitimate system activity while gradually degrading defensive visibility.
Thus, evasion is no longer an opportunistic step but a planned and repeatable phase of the attack lifecycle. As a result, organizations are increasingly challenged not just to detect ransomware but also to maintain control in environments where security controls themselves are actively targeted.
The appearance of new families adopting post-quantum cryptography
We predicted that quantum-resistant ransomware would appear in 2025. Looking back at the previous year, we see that advanced ransomware groups indeed started using post-quantum cryptography as quantum computing evolved. The encryption techniques used by this quantum-proof ransomware could be used to resist decryption attempts from both classical and quantum computers, making it nearly impossible for victims to decrypt their data without having to pay a ransom.
One example is the appearance of the PE32 ransomware family (link in Russian); it leverages the cutting-edge ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) standard to secure its AES keys. This specific cryptographic framework was recently selected by NIST as the primary standard for post-quantum defense.
Within the PE32 ransomware architecture, this is realized through the Kyber1024 algorithm, a robust mechanism providing Level 5 security, roughly equivalent in strength to AES-256. Its primary function is the secure generation and transmission of shared secrets between parties, specifically engineered to withstand future quantum computing attacks. This shift toward post-quantum readiness is part of a broader industry trend; for instance, TLS 1.3 and QUIC protocols have already adopted the X25519Kyber768 hybrid model, which fuses classical encryption with quantum-resistant security.
The shift to encryptionless extortion
In 2025, the share of ransoms paid dropped to 28%. As a response to this, one of the developments in the 2026 landscape is the growing prevalence of extortion incidents in which no file encryption takes place at all. Instead, attackers leave out the “ware” in “ransomware” and focus on extracting sensitive data and leveraging the threat of public disclosure as their primary means of extortion. ShinyHunters is an excellent example of such a group, using a data leak site to publicize its victims.
By avoiding encryption, attackers may aim at reducing the likelihood of immediate detection, shortening the duration of the attack, and eliminating dependencies on stable encryption routines. Often, this model is used alongside traditional tactics in so-called double extortion schemes, but an increasing number of campaigns rely exclusively on data theft.
For victims, this shift fundamentally changes the nature of the risk. While backups remain effective against encryption-based disruption, they provide no protection against data exposure, regulatory consequences, and reputational damage. Ransomware is therefore evolving from a business continuity issue into a broader data security and compliance challenge.
Industrialization of initial access (Access-as-a-Service)
The ransomware ecosystem continues to evolve toward a highly industrialized and specialized model, with initial access remaining as one of its most critical components. In 2026, many ransomware operators keep relying on IABs (initial access brokers), a network of intermediaries who supply pre-compromised access to corporate environments, aiming to no longer perform full intrusions themselves.
This “access-as-a-service” model is fueled by credential theft operations, and the widespread availability of compromised accounts harvested through infostealers and phishing campaigns.
The primary access vectors offered for sale have not changed: RDP, VPN, and RDWeb are still the top access vectors. Consequently, remote access infrastructure remains the primary attack surface for initial access sales. In response to the measures against public exposure of RDP access points to the internet, attackers are now targeting RDWeb portals, which are frequently vulnerable and occasionally inadequately safeguarded.
The result is a threat landscape where unauthorized access is increasingly commoditized, and the barrier to launching ransomware attacks declines. This means that preventing initial compromise is only part of the challenge; equal emphasis must be placed on detecting misuse of legitimate credentials and limiting lateral movement within already-breached environments.
Ransomware developments on the dark web
Telegram channels and underground forums increasingly function as platforms for the distribution and sale of compromised datasets and access credentials including those that were obtained as a result of ransomware attacks.
Advertisements posted on these resources typically include the nature of the access, a description of the exfiltrated or compromised data, price terms, and contact information for prospective buyers. In addition, some malicious actors mention their collaboration with other ransomware groups. Lesser-known gangs can use this name-dropping to promote themselves
Multiple threat actors not related to ransomware groups distribute datasets downloaded from ransomware blogs on underground forums and Telegram. By re-publishing download links and files, they spread compromised data as well as information on the ransomware attack within the community.
The ransomware itself is also sold or offered for subscription on the dark web platforms. The sellers underscore the uniqueness of their malware, as well as its encryption and defense evasion features.
Law enforcement actions
Law enforcement agencies are actively shutting down dark web platforms and ransomware data leak sites. A major underground forum, RAMP, which also functioned as a platform for threat actors to advertise their ransomware services and publish service‑related updates, was seized by authorities in January 2026. Another underground forum, LeakBase, where malicious actors distributed exfiltrated and compromised data, was seized in March 2026. In 2025, law enforcement agencies seized well-known forums like Nulled, Cracked, and XSS. Also in 2025, the DLSs of BlackSuit and 8Base ransomware groups were seized. These takedowns cause inconvenience to ransomware coordination, specifically for initial access brokers and affiliates, though similar forums are expected to fill the void over time.
Top ransomware groups in 2025
RansomHub’s sudden dormancy in 2025 marked a shift, and Qilin became the dominant player from Q2 onward. According to Kaspersky research, Qilin was the most active group executing targeted attacks in 2025.
Each group’s share of victims according to its data leak site (DLS) as a percentage of all reported victims of all groups during the period under review (download)
Qilin stands out as one of the fastest-growig and dominant RaaS platforms. Its combination of high-volume operations and structured affiliate model positions it as a central player in the current ecosystem.
Clop, the second most active group in 2025, is distinguished through its large-scale, supply-chain-style attacks, exploiting widely used file transfer and enterprise software to compromise hundreds of victims simultaneously. This one-to-many approach sets it apart from more traditional, single-target campaigns.
Third place is occupied by Akira, which remains notable for its consistency and operational stability, maintaining a steady stream of victims without major disruption. Its ability to sustain activity over time makes it one of the most reliable indicators of baseline ransomware threat levels.
Although no longer active, RansomHub stands out for its rapid rise and equally rapid disappearance in 2025, highlighting the volatility of the RaaS market. Its shutdown created a vacuum that significantly reshaped affiliate distribution across other groups.
DragonForce is also notable – not just for its own operations, but for its broader influence within the ransomware ecosystem, including reported involvement in infrastructure conflicts and possible links to the disruption of competing groups. Thus, the group claims that RansomHub “has moved to their infrastructure.” This positions it as more than just an operator and potentially an ecosystem-level actor.
New actors in 2026
While emerging actors generally operate on a smaller scale, they provide insight into the continuous churn and low barrier to entry within the ransomware ecosystem.
The Gentlemen group caught our attention in early 2026, as they managed to attack a significant number of victims over a short time. This actor is also notable for reflecting a broader shift toward professionalization and controlled operations within the ransomware ecosystem. Unlike many emerging groups that rely on opportunistic attacks and inconsistent leak activity, The Gentlemen demonstrate a more deliberate approach: structured intrusion workflows, selective targeting, and measured communication with victims. This signals a move away from chaotic, high-noise campaigns toward predictable, business-like execution models that are easier to scale and harder to disrupt. Their TTPs include the massive exploitation of hardware very common on big corporations, such as FortiOS/FortiProxy, SonicWall VPN, and Cisco ASA appliances. The group might be comprised of professional cybercriminals who left other prominent groups.
The group is also notable for its emphasis on data-centric extortion strategies, often prioritizing exfiltration and leverage over purely disruptive encryption. This aligns with one of the defining trends of 2026: ransomware evolving into a form of data breach monetization rather than just system denial. By focusing on controlled pressure and reputational risk instead of immediate operational damage, The Gentlemen exemplify how attackers are adapting to lower ransom payment rates and improved backup practices among victims.
Some other groups to take note of in 2026:
Devman appears to be an emerging actor with limited but growing activity, likely leveraging existing tooling rather than developing custom capabilities.
MintEye hasn’t been very active yet, with just five known victims, suggesting opportunistic campaigns without a consistent operational tempo.
DireWolf is associated with small-scale, targeted attacks, though its overall footprint remains relatively limited compared to larger RaaS groups.
NightSpire demonstrates characteristics of an amateur group, such as mistakes during its operations, uncommon communication channels with the victims, and sometimes giving them insufficient time to pay up. Although they both encrypt and leak data, they prioritize publication rather than encryption.
Vect shows low-volume activity. It is yet unclear whether they use a completely new codebase or are rather a rebrand of an existing group.
Tengu is a less prominent actor, with limited public reporting and no clear distinguishing tactics beyond standard extortion models.
Kazu appears to be created by ransomware operators previously engaged with multiple other groups. As of now, they don’t stand out for scale or technique.
Although there is little to say about these groups at the time of writing this report, each of them may be equally likely to disappear from the threat landscape or grow into a prominent threat. That’s why it’s important to track them from their early days. Moreover, collectively, these groups illustrate how dynamic the ransomware landscape is, with new entrants constantly replenishing it.
Conclusion and protection recommendations
Despite the growing effort by law enforcement agencies across the globe to seize and disrupt dark web platforms and threat actor infrastructures, ransomware operations remain stable, with new groups quickly taking the place of those who went silent. In 2026, we see a shift towards encryptionless extortion, with data leaks increasingly becoming the main threat to target organizations. At the same time, data encryption is also upgrading to the next level with the emergence of post-quantum ransomware.
To resist the evolving threat, Kaspersky recommends organizations:
Prioritize proactive prevention through patching and vulnerability management. Many ransomware attacks exploit unpatched systems, so organizations should implement automated patch management tools to ensure timely updates for operating systems, software, and drivers. For Windows environments, enabling Microsoft’s Vulnerable Driver Blocklist is critical to thwarting BYOVD attacks. Regularly scan for vulnerabilities and prioritize high-severity flaws, especially in widely used software.
Strengthen remote access: RDP and RDWeb connections should never be directly exposed to the internet, only through VPN or ZTNA (Zero Trust Network Access). It’s highly recommended to adopt multi-factor authentication on everything; the architecture may require continuous authentication for access, as one valid credential captured is enough to cause a breach. Monitoring the underground for stolen employee credentials is essential. Audit open ports across the entire attack surface. The adoption of the “Principle of Least Privilege” (PoLP), where users, systems, or processes are granted only the minimum access rights, such as read, write, or execute permissions, necessary to perform their specific job functions, is highly recommended.
Strengthen endpoint and network security with advanced detection and segmentation. Deploy robust endpoint detection and response solutions such as Kaspersky NEXT EDR to monitor for suspicious activity like driver loading or process termination. Network segmentation is equally important. Limit lateral movement by isolating critical systems and using firewalls to restrict traffic. Complete and immediate offboarding for employees is necessary as well as periodic permission reviews, with automatic revocation of unused access. Sessions with complete logging for privileged accounts are more than necessary. Monitoring the traffic divergence to new sites or even to legitimate endpoints can help the defenders to spot a new insider threat.
Invest in backups, training, and incident response planning. Maintain offline or immutable backups that are tested regularly to ensure rapid recovery without paying a ransom. Backups should cover critical data and systems and be stored in air-gapped environments to resist encryption or deletion. User education is essential to combatting phishing, which remains one of the top attack vectors. Conduct simulated phishing exercises and train employees to recognize AI-crafted emails. Kaspersky Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) can help develop and test an incident response plan to minimize potential downtime and costs.
The recommendation to avoid paying a ransom remains robust, especially given the risk of unavailable keys due to dismantled infrastructure, affiliate chaos, or malicious intent. By investing in backups, incident response, and preventive measures like patching and training, organizations can avoid funding criminals and mitigate the impact.
Kaspersky also offers free decryptors for certain ransomware families. If you get hit by ransomware, check to see if there’s a decryptor available for the ransomware family used against you.
Over 200,000 files containing sensitive personal information have been leaked following the University of Warsaw cyberattack that targeted the institution’s digital systems. The attack, which resulted in the publication of the stolen data on the darknet in mid-April 2026, has raised significant concerns about the university's cybersecurity protocols.
In response to the breach, the University of Warsaw took immediate action, isolating affected systems and working closely with relevant authoritie
Over 200,000 files containing sensitive personal information have been leaked following the University of Warsaw cyberattack that targeted the institution’s digital systems. The attack, which resulted in the publication of the stolen data on the darknet in mid-April 2026, has raised significant concerns about the university's cybersecurity protocols.
In response to the breach, the University of Warsaw took immediate action, isolating affected systems and working closely with relevant authorities to assess the scope of the incident. Rector Alojzy Z. Nowak commented, “Immediately after detecting the incident, the University undertook a series of actions aimed at limiting its impact and securing the IT environment. These included isolating affected systems, terminating unauthorized access, enforcing password resets for all users, strengthening authentication mechanisms, and conducting a comprehensive security review of the infrastructure.”
How the University of Warsaw Cyberattack Unfolded
The cyberattack unfolded over several months, with attackers gaining access to the university's systems using valid login credentials. These credentials were likely obtained through malware that infected a user’s device, allowing the attackers to quietly exfiltrate large amounts of data over time. The stolen data was eventually posted on the darknet on the night of April 15, 2026, in an 850-gigabyte data dump.
The breach was initially detected on February 9, 2026, during a routine security scan, triggered by global ransomware threats. At first, it was believed that the stolen data had not left the university’s infrastructure. However, subsequent investigation revealed that a significant portion had already been leaked online.
In response to our inquiry, the university clarified: “At this stage, the investigation is ongoing, and no definitive attribution has been publicly confirmed. The incident involved unauthorized access using valid credentials that had likely been previously compromised, most probably through malware on a user’s device.”
What Data Was Exposed?
The leaked files, which total over 200,000 documents, include a broad range of sensitive information. A large portion of the data came from the Faculty of Applied Social Sciences and Resocialization, as well as the Faculty of Neophilology. The breach exposed approximately 650 GB of publicly accessible audiovisual materials, along with 200 GB of sensitive personal data.
Among the types of personal data exposed were:
Identification details: Full names, birthdates, gender, nationality, PESEL numbers, and identity document numbers (e.g., passport numbers).
Contact information: Home addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, and usernames.
Financial and tax information: Bank account numbers and tax records.
Employment data: Employment contracts and career histories.
Health records: Information from medical certificates, including sick leave records.
The university has acknowledged that it’s still too early to definitively determine which individuals' data has been impacted. In an official statement, they noted, “Given the nature of the incident, it is not yet possible to conclusively determine which specific individuals’ data may have been impacted; therefore, we encourage all members of the academic community to follow the recommended guidance and monitor further updates.”
Official Response and Security Measures
Following the breach, the university has worked diligently to mitigate further damage. In addition to isolating the affected systems, the university has collaborated with Poland’s Central Bureau for Combating Cybercrime (CBZC) and CERT Polska to investigate the incident and fortify its cybersecurity defenses.
“We remain committed to fully clarifying the circumstances of this incident and to continuously improving the protection of personal data,” Rector Nowak stated. The university also emphasized its ongoing efforts to enhance security measures, including expanding advanced authentication methods, increasing network monitoring, and further segmenting IT infrastructure to reduce exposure to future risks.
Moreover, the university has published a detailed communication, following GDPR guidelines, to inform affected individuals about the breach and provide recommendations on how they can protect themselves. “Affected individuals are being informed through an official public communication available on the University’s website,” the statement said. “These include, among others, monitoring financial activity, securing personal data (e.g., PESEL number), changing passwords, enabling multi-factor authentication, and remaining vigilant against phishing or fraud attempts.”
Consequences of the Warsaw University Data Leak
The leaked data presents a serious risk to those affected. The exposure of personal identification details, financial information, and health records could lead to a range of harmful outcomes, including:
Identity theft: Cybercriminals could use the stolen data to impersonate individuals, open accounts in their names, or conduct fraudulent transactions.
Financial fraud: With access to sensitive financial information, attackers may attempt to take out loans, make unauthorized purchases, or commit tax fraud.
Health and privacy violations: Unauthorized access to medical records could lead to misuse of health-related information for fraud or exploitation.
Moreover, the data leak also carries legal and operational risks, such as wrongful use of personal data in official systems or academic environments. University applicants could face fraudulent claims or be targeted by scams related to university admissions or scholarship offers.
Preventive Actions and Recommendations
While the university has taken immediate steps to isolate the affected systems and enhance its security infrastructure, there are additional measures individuals can take to protect themselves from potential fallout:
Monitor financial and credit activity: Individuals should check their credit reports for any suspicious activity and set up alerts for new credit inquiries.
Change passwords and use multi-factor authentication: Affected individuals should update their passwords for email, bank accounts, and university systems, ensuring they use strong, unique passwords for each service.
Be cautious of phishing attempts: The exposure of personal data may lead to targeted phishing attacks. Individuals should remain vigilant when receiving unsolicited messages, particularly those related to banking or health services.
In 2025, the financial cyberthreat landscape continued to evolve. While traditional PC banking malware declined in relative prevalence, this shift was offset by the rapid growth of credential theft by infostealers. Attackers increasingly relied on aggregation and reuse of stolen data, rather than developing entirely new malware capabilities.
To describe the financial threat landscape in 2025, we analyzed anonymized data on malicious activities detected on the devices of Kaspersky security produc
In 2025, the financial cyberthreat landscape continued to evolve. While traditional PC banking malware declined in relative prevalence, this shift was offset by the rapid growth of credential theft by infostealers. Attackers increasingly relied on aggregation and reuse of stolen data, rather than developing entirely new malware capabilities.
To describe the financial threat landscape in 2025, we analyzed anonymized data on malicious activities detected on the devices of Kaspersky security product users and consensually provided to us through the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), along with publicly available data and data on the dark web.
We analyzed the data for
financial phishing,
banking malware,
infostealers and the dark web.
Key findings
Phishing
Phishing activity in 2025 shifted toward e-commerce (14.17%) and digital services (16.15%), with attackers increasingly tailoring campaigns to regional trends and user behavior, making social engineering more targeted despite reduced focus on traditional banking lures.
Banking malware
Financial PC malware declined in prevalence but remained a persistent threat, with established families continuing to operate, while attackers increasingly prioritize credential access and indirect fraud over deploying complex banking Trojans. To the contrary, mobile banking malware continues growing, as we wrote in detail in our mobile malware report.
Infostealers and the dark web
Infostealers became a central driver of financial cybercrime, fueling a growing dark web economy where stolen credentials, payment data, and full identity profiles are traded at scale, enabling widespread and destructive fraud operations.
Financial phishing
In 2025, online fraudsters continued to lure users to phishing and scam pages that mimicked the websites of popular brands and financial organizations. Attackers leveraged increasingly convincing social engineering techniques and brand impersonation to exploit user trust. Rather than relying solely on volume, campaigns showed greater targeting and contextual adaptation, reflecting a maturation of phishing operations.
The distribution of top phishing categories in 2025 shows a clear shift toward digital platforms that aggregate multiple user activities, with web services (16.15%), online games (14.58%), and online stores (14.17%) leading globally. Compared to 2024, the rise of online games and the decline of social networks and banks indicate that attackers are increasingly targeting environments where users are more likely to take a risk or engage impulsively. Categories such as instant messaging apps and global internet portals remain significant phishing targets, reflecting their role as communication and access hubs that can be exploited for credential harvesting.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices, 2025 (download)
Regional patterns further reinforce the adaptive nature of phishing campaigns, showing that attackers closely align category targeting with local digital habits. For example, online stores dominate heavily in the Middle East.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in the Middle East, 2025 (download)
Online games and instant messaging platforms feature more prominently in the CIS, suggesting a focus on younger or highly connected user bases.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in the CIS, 2025 (download)
APAC demonstrates almost equal shares of online games and banks which signifies a combined approach targeting different users.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in APAC, 2025 (download)
In Africa, a stronger emphasis on banks reflects the continued importance of traditional financial services. Most likely, this is due to the lower security level of the financial institutions in the region.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in Africa, 2025 (download)
Whereas in LATAM, delivery companies appearing in the top categories indicate attackers exploiting the growth of e-commerce logistics.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in Latin America, 2025 (download)
Europe presents a more balanced distribution across categories, pointing to diversified attack strategies.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in Europe, 2025 (download)
Attackers actively localize their tactics to maximize relevance and effectiveness.
The distribution of financial phishing pages by category in 2025 reveals strong regional asymmetries that reflect both user behavior and attacker prioritization.
Globally, online stores dominated (48.45%), followed by banks (26.05%) and payment systems (25.50%). The decline in bank phishing may suggest that these services are becoming increasingly difficult to successfully impersonate, so fraudsters are turning to easier ways to access users’ finances.
However, this balance shifts significantly at the regional level.
In the Middle East, phishing is overwhelmingly concentrated on e-commerce (85.8%), indicating a heavy reliance on online retail lures, whereas in Africa, bank-related phishing leads (53.75%), which may indicate that user account security there is still insufficient. LATAM shows a more balanced distribution but with a higher share of online store targeting (46.30%), while APAC and Europe display a more even spread across all three categories, pointing to diversified attack strategies. These variations suggest that attackers are not operating uniformly but are instead adapting campaigns to regional digital habits, payment ecosystems, and trust patterns – maximizing effectiveness by aligning phishing content with the most commonly used financial services in each market.
Distribution of financial phishing pages by category and region, 2025 (download)
Online shopping scams
The distribution of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages in 2025 highlights a clear shift toward globally recognized digital service and e-commerce brands, with attackers prioritizing platforms that have large, active user bases and frequent payment interactions.
Netflix (28.42%) solidified its ranking as the most impersonated brand, followed by Apple (20.55%), Spotify (18.09%), and Amazon (17.85%). This reflects a move away from traditional retail-only targets toward subscription-based and ecosystem-driven services.
TOP 10 online shopping brands mimicked by phishing and scam pages, 2025 (download)
Regionally, this trend varies: Netflix dominates heavily in the Middle East, Apple leads in APAC, while Spotify ranks first across Europe, LATAM, and Africa. Although most of the top platforms are highly popular across different regions, we may suggest that the attackers tailor brand impersonation to regional popularity and user engagement.
Payment system phishing
Phishing campaigns are impersonating multiple payment ecosystems to maximize coverage. While PayPal was the most mimicked in 2024 with 37.53%, its share dropped to 14.10% in 2025. Mastercard, on the contrary, attracted cybercriminals’ attention, its share increasing from 30.54% to 33.45%, while Visa accounted for a significant 20.06% (last year, it wasn’t in the TOP 5), reinforcing the growing focus on widely used banking card networks. The continued presence of American Express (3.87%) and the increasing number of pages mimicking PayPay (11.72%) further highlight attacker experimentation and regional adaptation.
TOP 5 payment systems mimicked by phishing and scam pages, 2025 (download)
Financial malware
In 2025, the decline in users affected by financial PC malware continued. On the one hand, people continue to rely on mobile devices to manage their finances. On the other hand, some of the most prominent malware families that were initially designed as bankers had not used this functionality for years, so we excluded them from these statistics.
Changes in the number of unique users attacked by banking malware, by month, 2023–2025 (download)
Windows systems remained the primary platform targeted by attackers with financial malware. According to Kaspersky Security Bulletin, overall detections included 1,338,357 banking Trojan attacks globally from November 2024 to October 2025, though this number is also declining due to increasing focus on mobile vectors. Desktop threats continued to be distributed via traditional delivery methods like malicious emails, compromised websites, and droppers.
In 2025, Brazilian-origin families such as Grandoreiro (part of the Tetrade group) stood out for their constant activity and global reach. Despite a major law enforcement disruption in early 2024, Grandoreiro remained active in 2025, re-emerging with updated variants and continuing to operate. Other notable actors included Coyote and emerging families like Maverick, which abused WhatsApp for distribution while maintaining fileless techniques and overlaps with established Brazilian banking malware to steal credentials and enable fraudulent transactions on desktop banking platforms. Besides traditional bankers, other Brazilian malware families are worth mentioning, which specifically target relatively new and highly popular regional payment systems. One of the most prominent threats among these is GoPix Trojan focusing on the users of Brazilian Pix payment system. It is also capable of targeting local Boleto payment method, as well as stealing cryptocurrency.
There was also a surge in incidents in 2025 in which fraudsters targeted organizations through electronic document management (EDM) systems, for example, by substituting invoice details to trick victims into transferring funds. The Pure Trojan was most frequently encountered in such attacks. Attackers typically distribute it through targeted emails, using abbreviations of document names, software titles, or other accounting-related keywords in the headers of attached files. Globally in the corporate segment, Pure was detected 896 633 times over 2025, with over 64 thousand users attacked.
Contrary to PC banking malware, mobile banker attacks grew by 1.5 times in 2025 compared to the previous reporting period, which is consistent with their growth in 2024. They also saw a sharp surge in the number of unique installation packages. More statistics and trends on mobile banking malware can be found in our yearly mobile threat report.
Complementing traditional financial malware, infostealers played a significant role in enabling financial crime both on PCs and mobile devices by harvesting credentials, cookies, and autofill data from browsers and applications, which attackers then used for account takeovers or direct banking fraud. Kaspersky analyses pointed to a surge in infostealer detections (up by 59% globally on PCs), fueling credential-based attacks.
Financial cyberthreats on the dark web
The Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence (DFI) team closely monitors infostealer activity on both PC and mobile devices to analyze emerging trends and assess the evolving tactics of cybercriminals.
Fraudsters especially target financial data such as payment cards, cryptocurrency wallets, login credentials and cookies for banking services, as well as documents stored on the victim’s device. The stolen data is collected in log files and shared on dark web resources, where they are bought, sold, or distributed freely and then used for financial fraud.
With access to financial data, fraudsters can gain control of users’ bank accounts and payment cards, and withdraw funds. Compromised accounts and cards are also frequently used in subsequent activities, turning the victims into intermediaries in a fraud scheme.
Compromised accounts
Kaspersky DFI found that in 2025, over one million online banking accounts (these are not Kaspersky product users) served by the world’s 100 largest banks fell victim to infostealers: their credentials were being freely shared on the dark web.
The countries with the highest median number of compromised accounts per bank were India, Spain, and Brazil.
The chart below shows the median number of compromised accounts per bank for the TOP 10 countries.
TOP 10 countries with the highest compromised account median (download)
Compromised payment cards
Seventy-four percent of payment cards that were compromised by infostealer malware, published on dark web resources and identified by the Digital Footprint Intelligence team in 2025, remained valid as of March 2026. This means that attackers could still use the cards that had been stolen months or even years prior.
It should be noted that the number of bank accounts and payment cards known to have been compromised by infostealers in 2025 will continue to rise, because fraudsters do not publish the log files immediately after the compromise but only after a delay of months or even years.
Data breaches
Regardless of the industry in which the target company operates, data breaches often expose users’ financial data, including payment card information, bank account details, transaction histories and other financial information. As a consequence, the compromised databases are sold and distributed on underground resources.
It should be noted that the threat is not limited to the exposure of financial information alone. Various identity documents and even seemingly public data, such as names, phone numbers and email addresses, can become a risk when they are published on the dark web. Such data attracts fraudsters’ attention and can be used in social engineering attacks to gain access to the user’s financial assets.
An example of a post offering a database
Sale of bank accounts and payment cards
The dark web often features services provided by stores that specialize in selling bank accounts and payment cards. Fraudsters typically obtain data for sale from a variety of sources, including infostealer logs and leaked databases, which are first repackaged and then combined.
Examples of a post (top) and a site (bottom) offering payment cards
Often, sellers offer complete victim profiles, referred to by fraudsters as “fullz”. These include not only bank accounts or payment cards but also identification documents, dates of birth, residential addresses, and other personal details. A full‑information package is usually more expensive than a payment card or a bank account alone.
Examples of a post (top) and a site (bottom) offering bank accounts
Compiled databases
Fraudsters exploit various sources, including previously leaked databases, to compile new, thematic ones. Finance- and, in particular, cryptocurrency-related databases, are among the most popular. Compilations aimed at specific user groups, such as the elderly or wealthy people, are also of interest to cybercriminals.
Usually, thematic databases contain personal information about users, such as names, phone numbers, and email addresses. Fraudsters can use this data to launch social engineering attacks.
An example of a message offering compiled databases
Creation of phishing websites
Phishing websites have become a powerful tool for the financial enrichment of fraudsters. Cybercriminals create fraudulent sites that masquerade as legitimate resources of companies operating in various industries. Gambling and retail sites remain among the most popular targets.
In order to obtain personal and financial information from unsuspecting users, adversaries seek out ways to create such phishing websites. Ready-made layouts and website copies are sold on the dark web and advertised as profitable tools. Moreover, fraudsters offer phishing website creation services.
Examples of posts offering creation of phishing websites
Conclusion
The decline of traditional PC banking malware is not an indicator of reduced risk; rather, it highlights a redistribution of attacker effort toward more efficient methods targeting mobile devices, credential theft, and social engineering. Infostealers, in particular, are a force multiplier, enabling widespread compromise at scale.
Looking ahead to 2026, the financial threat landscape is expected to become even more data-driven and automated. Organizations must adapt by focusing on identity protection, real-time monitoring, and cross-channel threat intelligence, while users must remain vigilant against increasingly sophisticated and personalized attack techniques.
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