Bellingcat has geolocated footage showing Shahed-136 type kamikaze drones in operation in Mali.

Defence Blog and France 24 previously published reports that these drones were being deployed on the battlefield in northern Mali. But Bellingcat and Jeune Afrique subsequently verified two recent strikes using geolocation, satellite imagery and expert analysis to provide some of the clearest open-source evidence to date documenting their deployment.

The two strikes took place in the villages of Inafarak on July 12 and Talahandak on July 17. While the available evidence does not allow the exact variant to be identified, experts told Bellingcat it is quite likely the drones were manufactured in Russia given the deployment of the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps group and the broader pattern of Russian military support to Mali.

Leo Jarry, a drone expert with Tungsten Strategies, told Bellingcat: “If the drones are Russian manufactured, they represent a visible demonstration of Russian support for Mali.”

Reports that Russian drones had been used in Mali first emerged in May, when Defence Blog published photographs of drone wreckage from strikes near the town of Savare.

Earlier this month, France 24 also identified debris from several Russian drone systems in Mali, pointing to an expanding Russian drone presence in the country. Until now, however, there has been no verified footage showing how Shahed-136 type drones in flight and hitting targets. 

Mali has been mired in conflict since a rebellion erupted in the country’s north in 2012. In recent years, Russian forces, first through the Wagner Group and now through its successor, Africa Corps, have supported the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) in operations against Tuareg rebel groups and jihadist organisations

Inafarak –  July 12, 2026

On  July 12, footage showing the aftermath of a drone strike in the village of Inafarak was published on X.

Bellingcat geolocated the footage to the town, which is close to the border with Algeria (21.32330, 0.72980) using satellite imagery. We confirmed the location by comparing a post-strike satellite image captured on July 15 with imagery from 2024. The comparison shows several buildings that were standing in 2024 had been destroyed by July, 15, 2026. This damage was consistent with that visible in the geolocated footage. The strike appears to have hit a commercial facility, with a damaged truck and numerous damaged fuel drums visible.

One of the videos shows the remains of an engine which appears consistent with an MD-550, a distinctive four-cylinder two-stroke engine which is found on the Shahed-136 family of drones. We showed the image of the engine to two weapons researchers – Trevor Ball, an independent weapons expert and former Bellingcat investigator, and Leo Jarry, a drone expert with Tungsten Strategies – who said the engine is consistent with the Shahed-136 family of drones.

The component also closely matches reference imagery of MD-550 engines published by the Open Source Munitions Portal (OSMP), an expert-reviewed database of documented weapons remnants, and on the war & sanctions component database.

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The footage we found on X was  also republished by the Wagner- and Africa Corps-affiliated Telegram channel “White Uncles in Africa”, which regularly shares racist memes and graphic posts  and which Bellingcat has previously reported on.

The channel captioned the videos: “Now the Azawadi ‘khokhols’ will be seeing Gerans all the time.” The use of “Geran” refers to a Russian-manufactured version of the Shahed-136. The post also uses the derogatory Russian slur “khokhol” for Ukrainians and applies it to people from Azawad, the name used by Tuareg separatists for northern Mali.

Talahandak –  July 17, 2026

On  July 17, graphic footage showing the aftermath of another Shahed-136 type drone strike was posted on X, showing one casualty as well as a burning truck. An additional video of the burning vehicle shows what appear to be bottles of cooking oil spilling from the truck indicating it may have been a commercial truck.

Bellingcat geolocated these videos to the village of Talahandak (20.26369, 1.80095), which is also close to the border with Algeria but around 100 miles southeast of Inafarak, by matching the surrounding buildings to satellite imagery.

Shortly afterwards, a Wagner-affiliated X account claimed that the drone responsible for the strike had been shot down by rebels before hitting the truck. The post showed one video where a Shahed-type drone could be seen in flight.

We were able to geolocate where the footage that captured the drone’s final moments before impact was filmed to another area of Talahandak, nearly a kilometer away (20.266907, 1.792656) from the video that showed the impact site.

A distinctive smoke plume can be seen rising from the sight of impact in several other videos posted online shortly after the strike. 

Bellingcat geolocated each of these videos and matched the plume of smoke adding further confirmation that the footage showing the drone in flight is authentic. 

The video shows the drone descending directly towards the location where the person and truck were hit, and there appears to be no interception before impact.

A New Weapon Raises New Risks

The Shahed-136 is a series of long-range one-way attack drones originally developed in Iran and now also manufactured in Russia. Unlike the drones typically used by Mali’s Armed Forces- the  Bayraktar TB2 , which launch relatively small precision-guided munitions before returning to base, one-way attack drones are designed to explode on impact, allowing them to attack over longer distances given they do not require recovery.

Leo Jarry, a drone expert with Tungsten Strategies, told Bellingcat that the drone provides Africa Corps and FAMa with an “expendable, cost-effective” long-range strike capability, allowing them to engage targets in Mali’s far north beyond the effective reach of the Bayraktar TB2. “The fact that these systems are relatively cheap and expendable changes the risk calculation for operators,” Jarry said. “They can be used more freely, potentially forcing insurgents in northern Mali to adapt their behaviour to a new aerial threat.”

However, Jarry said the system is inherently less precise than the Bayraktar TB2 because it cannot verify its targets during flight. Instead, it relies on separate surveillance assets to identify and track targets before launch. “In Mali, where armed groups are highly mobile and frequently operate among civilian populations, any gap between target identification and impact creates a risk of striking the wrong target.” Combined with the drone’s larger warhead, this increases the potential for civilian harm when employed in or near populated areas.

From Ukraine to Sahel

In Ukraine, Russian forces have used Shahed-136 type drones extensively in long-range strike campaigns that have repeatedly targeted civilian infrastructure, causing civilian casualties. Their appearance in Mali raises the possibility that the operational practices associated with these weapons are also being exported to this conflict. 

The deployment  also follows Bellingcat’s and Jeune Afrique’s recent investigation documenting the use of banned Russian cluster munitions in Mali.

Malian forces and Africa Corps currently face mounting pressure in northern Mali following a series of rebel offensives. Fighting has intensified in recent months, with rebels capturing several military bases and reportedly inflicting heavy losses on both FAMa and Africa Corps. 

Jarry told Bellingcat that the relatively low cost and expendable nature of these new drones make them well suited to retaliatory strikes following attacks by rebels.

Bellingcat’s Carlos Gonzales contributed to this report as well as the following members of Bellingcat’s volunteer community: Nicole Kiess, Afton Briones, Riccardo Giannardi and Ziyu Wan.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.

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This investigation is a collaboration between Bellingcat and Jeune Afrique. You can read Jeune Afrique’s article in French here.

Unexploded Russian-made cluster munition bomblets, as well as damage consistent with bomblet impacts, have been found in a village in northern Mali – despite the West African country being a state party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) which prohibits their use. 

The deployment of cluster munitions in northern Mali was first reported by Radio France International last week, citing local sources yet without showing images of the munitions or strikes in the reporting. However, social media footage posted on May 17, and since analysed by Bellingcat and our publishing partner, Jeune Afrique, shows unexploded Russian manufactured ShOAB-0.5 submunitions (bomblets).

Bellingcat geolocated a video showing the unexploded ShOAB-0.5 bomblets in the village of Tadjmart (18.977305, 0.86072), located approximately 55-kilometers (34-miles) south of the larger town of Aguelhok in northern Mali. This matches the location of airstrikes announced by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) on May 17. FAMa claimed it had identified armed groups in the area.

Russia’s paramilitary Africa Corps group, which is controlled by the Russian government and which replaced the Wagner mercenary group in the country, has been supporting Malian military operations.

Mali’s civil war has been ongoing since 2012. But the conflict has spiked in recent weeks as Tuareg separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and militants from the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) seized control of parts of the country in coordinated attacks against Malian and Africa Corps forces.

Les mercenaires continuent de larguer des bombes sur des maisons et certains diront pourquoi se révolter contre ces genres des pratiques inhumaines ne respectant aucun Droit. https://t.co/5jynKwUgeW pic.twitter.com/nB3ym4yooc

— Mohamed Lilly (@MedLilly1) May 17, 2026

The footage geolocated by Bellingcat shows the unexploded submunitions near buildings, alongside multiple small craters, consistent with submunition explosions.

The buildings and landmarks visible in the footage allowed us to geolocate where it was taken.

Additional footage geolocated by Bellingcat to nearby coordinates 18.97954, 0.85989 shows destroyed and burning buildings several hundred meters away, although this damage is not consistent with cluster munition use. The damage appears more significant than that which would be caused by submunition impacts.

Cluster munitions are explosive weapons which open mid-air to release large numbers of submunitions. They are prohibited from being used by signatories of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) because they are indiscriminate, saturate a wide area and can leave behind highly volatile unexploded bomblets which can kill civilians long after deployment. 

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While Mali is a signatory to the CCM, Russia is not a state party to the agreement. 

Brian Finucane, a senior adviser with the US Program at the International Crisis Group, told Bellingcat that as a party to the CCM, Mali is “subject to its prohibitions and requirements. These include not only prohibitions on the use of cluster munitions, but also obligations to clear and destroy such munitions on its territory.”

ShOAB-0.5 submunitions are carried by the Russian RBK-500 cluster munition dispenser. A single RBK-500 dispenser can deploy about 565 ShOAB-0.5 submunitions. There is as yet no footage posted online showing a spent dispenser linked to this incident.Footage did circulate online on May 16 showing the remnants of an RBK-500. It was claimed to have been used in a separate cluster munition strike in the Timbuktu region of Mali. However, this footage was not geolocatable, given it only shows a close up of the dispenser at night, nor was it possible to tell when the footage was taken.

A second video appears to show the same dispenser, but shows the side with visible Russian markings denoting the model: “РБК-500; ШОАБ-0.5; ТГ-30”. This identifies the dispenser, RBK-500, the submunition inside, ShOAB-0.5, and the explosive filler, TG-30.

RBK-500 dispensers are deployed by Russian-made aircraft including several MiG and Su models. According to the 2024 IISS Military Balance report, Mali does not have any known operational Russian fixed-wing attack aircraft. Two Russian Su-25 aircraft delivered to Mali – one in 2022 and another in 2023 – are reported to have crashed and been out of service since late 2023.

An Su-24M model has since appeared in satellite imagery captured at Modibo Keita International Airport in Bamako. The imagery was first published by France 24 in April 2025, although it was unclear if this aircraft was, or has been, operated by Africa Corps or Malian forces.

Bellingcat contacted the Malian military and Russian Ministry of Defence requesting comment, and asking which force was responsible for deploying cluster munitions. We did not receive a substantive response by publication time beyond the initial statement made by the FAMa which detailed it was responsible for the May 17 strike.

A video posted on May 17, by an account linked to Azawad rebels in Northern Mali, shows a person handling components of a ShOAB-0.5 submunition, seemingly unaware of the danger. However, as the video shows only a close up of the submunition, it has not been possible to geolocate the video or confirm when it was taken.

Les Azawadiens ne fabriquent pas les armes au contraire ils les démontent ! pic.twitter.com/0tqOb6ut9G

— Oumayya AG Ambeiry (@AgOumayya) May 17, 2026

The FLA condemned the use of cluster munitions in a statement published on May 18. 

Bellingcat has previously reported on the use of cluster munitions in Syria and Ukraine and the danger they pose to civilians.

Youri van der Weide contributed to this report.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.

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Attacks by a jihadist group on fuel convoys bound for Bamako, the capital of Mali, have destroyed more than 130 tankers since September, a Bellingcat investigation has found. 

The systematic attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) have brought Bamako and other regions of the West African nation to a standstill as the Al Qaeda-affiliated militia uses economic warfare to pressure the military government.

Landlocked Mali depends on fuel imports transported via tankers by road from neighbouring Senegal and Ivory Coast. Disrupting these convoys strikes directly at the country’s “economic core”, the independent global conflict monitor ACLED said.

Mali has struggled to contain Islamist insurgent groups since a rebellion in the country’s north in 2012. Large swathes of the country remain outside government control despite the junta’s pledges to root out jihadists. Since 2021, Bamako has relied heavily on a Russian security partnership, first with Wagner and now its Africa Corps successor created by the Russian Ministry of Defense, after cutting ties with French and UN peacekeeping missions.

JNIM, an Islamist coalition affiliated with Al Qaeda, has been designated as a terrorist organisation by several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. Mostly active in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, it has become one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups.

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Bellingcat has used open source methods to track the JNIM blockade across key supply routes in Mali, verifying evidence of six separate attacks across three regions between mid-September and early November which destroyed more than 130 fuel tankers.

Héni Nsaibia, senior West Africa analyst at ACLED, said the campaign marked an escalation of JNIM’s economic warfare tactics, which are aimed at weakening the military regime by undermining its legitimacy. 

While the blockade has not caused a high death toll, Nsaibia said the economic and social repercussions were severe, with fuel shortages disrupting trade and transport across much of the country. It is “a humiliation for the military regime in Bamako, which has been unable to secure the country’s main trade and supply routes,” the analyst told Bellingcat.

A Communications War

Monitoring conflict in West Africa’s Sahel region is especially difficult due to limited digital connectivity, restricted access for journalists, and state controls on reporting. Yet the blockade has generated a large volume of verifiable online material, making it possible to track using open source methods. 

JNIM hosts its main media channel on ChirpWire, an encrypted social media application. The group set out its long-term ambitions on the platform on Nov. 20, Jacob Boswall, a senior journalist at BBC Monitoring who analyses jihadist propaganda in the Sahel, told Bellingcat. JNIM urged Malians, and Bamako residents in particular, to rise up and establish an Islamist government based on Sharia.

The group’s “communications are now predominantly in video format – a shift from the previous written statements,” Boswall said. Since September, videos posted to JNIM channels and circulated on social media show a series of attacks on fuel convoys in southern Mali. These posts, Nsaibia said, were intended to “directly undermine the centre of power, where the regime’s credibility is most at stake.”

In a televised address the night before Independence Day on Sep. 22, the country’s military leader, Colonel Assimi Goïta, urged people to “resist disinformation campaigns orchestrated by armed terrorist groups”. Nsaibia told Bellingcat that the launch of a new media channel highlighting operations by JNIM in the country’s south shows “a deliberate calibration of the group’s public messaging” toward southern audiences, including the junta’s core support base.

Mapping the Siege

MapLibre | Protomaps | Planet Labs © OpenStreetMap contributors

Bellingcat verified half a dozen JNIM attacks on fuel convoys in Mali, finding open source evidence of more than 130 burnt-out tankers on four separate routes, illustrating the scale of the campaign. It must be noted that it was not possible to match all the torched vehicles visible in the satellite imagery with vehicles seen in footage posted online.

Follow a detailed timeline of the attacks by scrolling through this map, you can interact with it by clicking incident dates or by zooming and dragging.

Three attacks occurred northwest of Bamako against convoys arriving from Senegal, with two taking place less than 70 km from the capital.

The other three attacks took place southeast of Bamako, and targeted convoys travelling up from Ivory Coast.

On Sept. 14, fighters ambushed a fuel convoy traveling from Senegal in the region of Kayes. Videos recorded by fighters and people at the scene show dozens of burning and destroyed tankers. One video shows a tanker engulfed in flames and exploding, and insurgents firing machine guns at vehicles which spray fuel through multiple bullet holes.

A Malian military light tactical vehicle (ACMAT ALTV) also appears to have been hit, with one visible casualty (graphic footage blurred).

Bellingcat identified the general location of the site using NASA FIRMS, an open source tool which uses remote-sensing to detect fire activity. We matched the locations of tankers visible in the insurgent-filmed footage to those on a Sep. 19 satellite image, confirming the exact location of the ambush was 14.55455, -9.98426.

In a video released the day of the attack, JNIM commander Al Bambari congratulated the fighters involved. The Malian Armed Forces said the convoy “came under a terrorist attack, to which they responded vigorously”.

Planet Labs satellite imagery captured five days after the attack shows more than 50 tankers at the site, over 30 of which appear blackened by burn marks.

On Sep. 19, a fuel convoy was attacked between the villages of Neguela and Soribougou in the Koulikoro region, according to reports on social media. By comparing medium-resolution satellite imagery from Sept. 16 and Sept. 27, we identified new burn marks on the road at 12.90289, -8.56459, less than 70 km northwest of Bamako.

Bellingcat verified the precise location by matching high-resolution satellite imagery captured on Nov. 22 with the configuration of nine burnt-out tankers seen in footage posted online in the aftermath of the attack.

On Oct. 17, JNIM claimed via ChirpWire to have ambushed a fuel convoy between the towns of Kolondieba and Kidiana in the Sikasso region. NASA FIRMS data corroborated this claim, showing heat signatures along this road consistent with fire activity.

Bellingcat verified the location of the attack through satellite imagery captured on Oct. 21, which shows 50 burnt tankers. Verified footage, geolocated to 10.82640, -6.67186, filmed by what appear to be fighters on motorcycles, shows a long line of burnt-out tankers, matching the satellite evidence.

On Oct. 21, another attack occurred near Sikasso. Although NASA FIRMS data did not detect a fire, Bellingcat geolocated footage (left) showing multiple destroyed tankers and what appears to be a dead body next to a weapon (graphic footage was blurred.) The location was verified by matching the distinctive three-towered structure seen in one of the videos (right) to 11.17092, -5.62559.

Satellite imagery from Oct. 25 shows more than 40 tankers destroyed at the site, matching those seen in the footage.

On Oct. 28, JNIM claimed a second ambush between the villages of Neguela and Soribougou, less than 70 km northwest of Bamako.

This was corroborated by NASA FIRMS data, which indicated fire activity in the area. A comparison of medium-resolution satellite imagery captured hours before the attack and on the day after the attack confirmed the location as: 12.90847, -8.60058, with smoke plumes rising from the site on Sep. 29.

On Oct. 30, Telegram channels linked to Russia’s Africa Corps circulated aerial footage showing fuel convoys traveling under military escort, supported by helicopters. One of these clips has been geolocated to the southern route toward Bamako. Other footage disseminated by state-aligned media has shown convoys arriving in the capital under heavy military protection, indicating that the junta is succeeding at getting some fuel through.

On Nov. 6, JNIM claimed an attack on fuel tankers between the cities of Zégoua and Sikasso in a statement posted to ChirpWire. Footage posted later to the group’s newly created media channel claimed to show the attack. NASA FIRMS did not detect fire activity in this region, but Bellingcat verified the location by matching the roadside structures seen in footage showing the aftermath of the attack to Google satellite imagery, geolocating it to: 11.12997, -5.60889.

A comparison of medium resolution imagery taken on Nov. 6 (prior to the attack) and Nov. 13 shows a large burn mark at this location, which is consistent with at least nine destroyed tankers seen in the footage and the reported timing of the attack.

Disruption of Daily Life

The fuel blockade has paralysed Mali. Food prices have soared, universities have suspended classes, and the US and the UK embassies have withdrawn non-essential staff. Social media videos verified by Bellingcat show people in Bamako queuing for fuel in lines stretching hundreds of meters and, in some cases, pushing their vehicles after pumps ran dry. A video verified from Oct. 23 shows a single fuel tanker in Bamako being followed by a large number of vehicles. The video’s caption suggests the motorists were hoping to obtain petrol.

The blockade’s broader effects can also be observed from space. NASA’s Black Marble nighttime imagery shows a noticeable dimming of Bamako’s lights when comparing May 29 and Oct. 25 – dates chosen outside of Mali’s rainy season to ensure clear skies for a reliable comparison. Mali relies on a “roughly equal mix of diesel and hydraulic sources”, meaning reduced fuel flows can cause diminished electricity availability and consumption, which is consistent with the dimming seen from space.

NASA Black Marble imagery from May 29 and Oct. 25 shows a difference between Bamako’s lights.

This investigation shows how open source information can help track a conflict that is often not possible with traditional reporting. Bellingcat has previously documented JNIM’s targeting of convoys in neighbouring Burkina Faso. By monitoring online content, geolocating footage and carrying out satellite analysis, it is possible to piece together a detailed view of a crisis that has left much of Mali in the dark.

Youri van der Weide and Miguel Ramalho contributed to this report.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here and Mastodon here.

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