It sure seems like it.
The stores confirmed to be affected include Fort Irwin, Calif.; F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.; Fort Huachuca, Ariz.; Naval Station Newport, R.I.; Columbus Air Force Base, Miss.; and Travis Air Force Base, Calif., according to announcements made online by each installation.
Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif., also experienced an outage, according to M. Elizabeth, writer of the Substack newsletter Signal and Silence.
Each service declined to answer questions about how many
Each service declined to answer questions about how many bases are affected by the outages, referring all questions to the Defense Department. Pentagon officials did not respond to questions.
However, a defense official said the department is aware of a “possible refrigeration disruption at some Defense Commissary Agency commissaries.” The official was not authorized to comment publicly and spoke on the condition of anonymity.
All speculation at this point, but it’s hard to come up with another explanation for the coincidence.
Note The July 2026 Dark Web Breach Incident Trend Report was compiled based on data breach cases posted on deep web and dark web forums. Due to the nature of some posts, it is difficult to fully verify their accuracy; some posts related to South Korea included AI-generated false data or cases where it could […]
Note The July 2026 Dark Web Breach Incident Trend Report was compiled based on data breach cases posted on deep web and dark web forums. Due to the nature of some posts, it is difficult to fully verify their accuracy; some posts related to South Korea included AI-generated false data or cases where it could […]
Note The July 2026 Dark Web Threat Actor Trend Report focuses on trends among threat actors—including hacktivists—active on the deep web and dark web. It is explicitly noted that the factual accuracy of some content could not be verified. Major Issues Handala claimed to have compromised the core infrastructure of an Internet service provider in […]
Note The July 2026 Dark Web Threat Actor Trend Report focuses on trends among threat actors—including hacktivists—active on the deep web and dark web. It is explicitly noted that the factual accuracy of some content could not be verified. Major Issues Handala claimed to have compromised the core infrastructure of an Internet service provider in […]
Interesting empirical research: “Black Box Warfare: Human Judgment and Military Decision-Making in the Age of AI.”
Abstract: How is AI transforming decision-making in modern conflict? This study provides a unique empirical window into that question by deploying a high-fidelity replica of an AI decision-support system (DSS) used in military targeting. After reconstructing the interface and functionality of the real-world system, we tested its impact on combat decisions in two experiments involvin
Abstract: How is AI transforming decision-making in modern conflict? This study provides a unique empirical window into that question by deploying a high-fidelity replica of an AI decision-support system (DSS) used in military targeting. After reconstructing the interface and functionality of the real-world system, we tested its impact on combat decisions in two experiments involving 2,015 Israeli military personnel. Contrary to widespread fears of automation bias, we find strong evidence of algorithmic aversion, especially in scenarios involving high collateral damage. Yet we also show that integrating “explainable AI” features reduces algorithmic aversion and promotes more thoughtful evaluations of algorithmic recommendations. These findings challenge prevailing assumptions, revealing that trust in military AI is dynamic, varying with individual predispositions, perceived operational stakes, and the informational features of the interface. By grounding normative concerns in empirical evidence, our study offers critical insight into the integration of AI in warfare and underscores the enduring importance of human agency in high-stakes military decision-making.
Researchers found Chinese and Russian SDKs in Android apps marketed to U.S. military users, highlighting software supply chain and enterprise privacy risks.
The post Third-Party SDKs Raise Privacy Questions for Apps Marketed to U.S. Military appeared first on TechRepublic.
Researchers found Chinese and Russian SDKs in Android apps marketed to U.S. military users, highlighting software supply chain and enterprise privacy risks.
Cyberattacks on South Korea military reached their highest level in five years in 2025, highlighting growing cybersecurity risks as the Ministry of National Defense struggles to retain trained cyber specialists. The rise in attacks, coupled with phishing emails and concerns over North Korea’s expanding cyber capabilities, has intensified calls for stronger defense measures.
According to data submitted by the Ministry of National Defense to Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the main opposition People Powe
Cyberattacks on South Korea military reached their highest level in five years in 2025, highlighting growing cybersecurity risks as the Ministry of National Defense struggles to retain trained cyber specialists. The rise in attacks, coupled with phishing emails and concerns over North Korea’s expanding cyber capabilities, has intensified calls for stronger defense measures.According to data submitted by the Ministry of National Defense to Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the main opposition People Power Party and a member of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, cyberattacks on South Korea military systems declined from 11,700 cases in 2021 to 9,115 in 2022 before increasing to 13,599 in 2023 and 14,419 in 2024. Last year, the number surged to 18,951, representing a 108 percent increase from 2022 and a 31 percent rise compared with 2024, making it the highest annual total in the past five years.
Cyberattacks on South Korea Military
Most cyberattacks on South Korea military networks involved attempts to gain administrator privileges and compromise military websites, accounting for 18,792 incidents in 2025. Meanwhile, phishing emails disguised as messages from trusted senders rose sharply from just 16 cases in 2023 to 127 last year, indicating that cyberattack methods have become increasingly diverse.“Recent signs indicate that North Korea has begun using AI in its hacking operations, including malware development and attempts to infiltrate organizations through fake job applications, which allude to its cyber capabilities’ increasing sophistication,” the Cyber Operations Command said in materials submitted to Yu’s office.The concerns come as North Korea is expected to strengthen cyber operations by expanding its Reconnaissance General Bureau, while South Korea’s Defense Counterintelligence Command has been effectively dismantled.
Ministry of National Defense Faces Cyber Workforce Challenges
Despite rising cyberattacks on South Korea military infrastructure, the Ministry of National Defense continues to face difficulties retaining cybersecurity personnel. Since 2012, the ministry has operated a cyber officer cadet program that provides approximately 40 million won (US$26,700) in tuition support to students in designated university departments. Graduates are commissioned as officers and assigned to units including the Cyber Operations Command and the 777 Command, where they conduct cyber threat analysis, cybersecurity operations, and digital forensics.However, data obtained by Yu’s office shows that 89 of the 104 cyber specialist officers commissioned between 2016 and 2019—around 85 percent—left in the military after completing their mandatory seven-year service. Last year, only seven of 24 graduates accepted commissions. Although those declining military service members must repay their financial assistance, some have chosen that option instead, largely due to stronger demand, higher salaries, and better working conditions in the private AI and cybersecurity sectors.
Growing North Korean Cyber Threat
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recently ordered the expansion of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the country's primary intelligence agency responsible for overseas intelligence gathering, operations targeting South Korea, and cyber activities. During an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission of the ruling Workers’ Party, reported by the state-run Rodong Sinmun, officials proposed expanding the bureau’s responsibilities and strengthening its reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities.Created by reorganizing the former Reconnaissance Bureau under the Korean People’s Army General Staff, the agency is believed by South Korean military intelligence to oversee around 8,400 hackers. Analysts expect that number to increase following Kim’s directive.“At a time when North Korea is rapidly advancing its cyberattack capabilities, we cannot allow a system in which cyber specialists simply leave the military after fulfilling their mandatory service,” Rep. Yu said. “We need a systematic personnel management system that covers the recruitment, training and long-term retention of cyber experts.”
Note The June 2026 Dark Web Breach Incident Trend Report is based on major data breach cases posted on the deep web and dark web forums. Due to the nature of some sources, it was difficult to fully verify the accuracy of certain information, so the report includes content that requires further verification. Major Issue […]
Note The June 2026 Dark Web Breach Incident Trend Report is based on major data breach cases posted on the deep web and dark web forums. Due to the nature of some sources, it was difficult to fully verify the accuracy of certain information, so the report includes content that requires further verification. Major Issue […]
We know that ICE wants to deploy eyeglasses with facial recognition that can identify people in real time.
Turns out Meta is prototyping the feature with a Pentagon supplier. (Alternate news story.)
This is interesting:
The U.S. military has likely been quietly broadcasting codes for its global encryption network using public GPS for nearly 20 years, turning each satellite into a hidden “numbers station,” according to Steven Murdoch…
That means every device that uses GPS has been receiving hidden government information for years, and nobody outside the military knew it until now.
[…]
Murdoch discovered that this particular sentinel was transmitted by all 31 operational satellites within a w
The U.S. military has likely been quietly broadcasting codes for its global encryption network using public GPS for nearly 20 years, turning each satellite into a hidden “numbers station,” according to Steven Murdoch…
That means every device that uses GPS has been receiving hidden government information for years, and nobody outside the military knew it until now.
[…]
Murdoch discovered that this particular sentinel was transmitted by all 31 operational satellites within a window of a few hours on May 26, 2011, potentially heralding the activation of a new operational system. He confirmed that this timeline coincided with the rollout of the military’s Over-the-Air Distribution (OTAD) and the Over-the-Air Rekeying (OTAR) by cross-referencing declassified documents, including a 2015 presentation about the dates of the operation.
“There was a perfect match between the timeline and that presentation and the change points that were automatically identified from the data,” Murdoch said. “That was the smoking gun that made me think: This is what it’s for.”
These automated systems replaced the cumbersome manual distribution of cryptographic keying material, allowing military GPS receivers around the world to be rekeyed remotely through satellite broadcasts rather than through onsite procedures.
Notes the May 2026 Dark Web Threat Actor Trend Report summarizes the trends of threat actors and hacktivists operating on the deep web and dark web. some statements are not factually verifiable. Major Issues hacktivist activity targeting the South Korean Region was concentrated. some hacktivist groups claimed DDoS attacks against the website of the South […]
Notes the May 2026 Dark Web Threat Actor Trend Report summarizes the trends of threat actors and hacktivists operating on the deep web and dark web. some statements are not factually verifiable. Major Issues hacktivist activity targeting the South Korean Region was concentrated. some hacktivist groups claimed DDoS attacks against the website of the South […]
Bellingcat has geolocated and verified two new videos showing the deadly strikes that hit an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) compound as well as an adjacent school in the city of Minab in late February.
The new videos were released by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and show multiple missiles hitting the complex.
One of the new videos shows the area around the school being struck while the other shows a nearby IRGC clinic and two buildings within the IRGC facility being hit by
Bellingcat has geolocated and verified two new videos showing the deadly strikes that hit an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) compound as well as an adjacent school in the city of Minab in late February.
One of the new videos shows the area around the school being struck while the other shows a nearby IRGC clinic and two buildings within the IRGC facility being hit by Tomahawk missiles.
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Visual and solar analysis of the videos appears to show there was a time gap between when each was filmed, suggesting that there were at least two waves of strikes carried out in the area.
Applying the same solar analysis techniques to social media footage that showed the school after it had been hit indicates the school was impacted during the first wave of strikes.
Previous investigations by Bellingcat and other news organisations showed a US Tomahawk missile struck the IRGC facility on Feb. 28.
The US is the only party to the conflict to possess Tomahawk missiles.
Media reports, including from the New York Times and Reuters, have since detailed that a preliminary investigation by the US military concluded it was likely a US strike that hit the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school.
According to Iranian media, at least 175 people were killed in the attack, including children.
Analysing New Minab Videos
The first video (video one) is filmed from just over 2.5 kilometres (1.5 miles) away from the IRGC base and shows at least 10 missiles impacting the area over a period of 50 seconds.
The first explosion is visible five seconds into the video. The area around where the school was located is struck at 14 seconds. This is the fourth explosion visible in the footage.
Another structure that was damaged in the strikes is situated approximately 100 metres away from the school in the same general area. It was therefore not possible to determine which exact structure was hit from this footage alone.
Screenshot of Video one showing 10 missiles striking the area. The fourth impact hits the area round the school (white box), seconds after the first three explosions. Annotation by Bellingcat. Source: Tasnim News.
The second new video (video two) was filmed approximately two kilometres southeast of the school, and is of a higher quality than video one. This video shows three Tomahawk missiles in the moments before impact.
Screenshots from Video two showing each Tomahawk missile before impact. Annotations added by Bellingcat. Source: Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Video two includes annotations and pauses when each Tomahawk appears on screen.
A frame-by-frame analysis also shows what appear to be two minor visual glitches where some frames are transposed and annotations were added, highlighting when missiles can be seen.
The second impact seen in video two is the same as seen in footage released by Iranian media in early March, and previously reported on by Bellingcat and others, only from a different perspective.
Video two also only shows the southern part of the base, with its northern section not visible. The school is located on the northern edge of the base and is therefore not visible in video two.
Left: Tomahawk missile strike in footage previously published showing Tomahawk strike in Minab. Right: The same strike visible in Video two. Sources: Mehr News and Tasnim News.
Bellingcat asked the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs why only part of the strike, as seen in video one, was released and if there was a longer version that may show further impacts. We did not receive a response before publication.
Bellingcat also asked the US Department of Defense whether it had any further information on the strike since its reported preliminary findings. It referred us to CENTCOM, which said: “We have nothing for you on this. The investigation is still ongoing.”
Geolocating the Videos
Bellingcat was able to geolocate and verify video one by tracing sightlines on satellite imagery to determine the camera’s location and identify objects such as buildings, trees and a water tower within the IRGC facility.
According to this analysis, video one was most likely filmed from an electric substation southeast of the school.
Left: Screengrab from video one. The dashed vertical lines represent the intersection of planes of constant angle with the image plane. These planes connect the center of the camera and enable the selected elements to be geolocated. Right: annotated satellite imagery showing the corresponding perspective lines and the geolocated elements. The analysis allowed us to identify, geolocate buildings and locate the explosion points. Annotated by Bellingcat. Source: Tasnim News. Satellite Image: Google Earth/Airbus
Once all key elements were identified and geolocated, we analysed each explosion that can be seen in the footage.
Fourteen seconds into video one, the fourth impact appears to hit the area immediately around the school, which was approximately 200 meters behind a water tower.
While the school was walled off and outside the IRGC facility, the water tower and another building (situated between the school and the water tower) are located within it.
Due to the relatively small distance between the school and the other IRGC building (roughly 100m), it was not possible to determine what structure was hit at the moment of the strike visible in video one.
More information, such as obtaining the entire strike video sequence, would be needed to fully determine which structure was hit in this footage. However, social media footage captured at the scene does suggest that the school was hit around this time.
Left: Line of sight passing by the yellow building intersects the point of forth explosion from behind the IRGC water tower. Center: Direction of line of sight intersects school and passes close to a nearby IRGC building. Both buildings were damaged in the attack. Right: Satellite image showing both the school and IRGC building. More details would be needed to determine which of both buildings were hit in this video. Satellite image: Google Earth/Airbus
For video two, we stitched together a rough panorama of what could be seen in the footage.
This made it possible to match up multiple buildings visible southeast of the IRGC base and school, while also building rough sightlines to show which part of the base was being filmed.
Annotated geolocation with Google Earth imagery showing key visual elements visible in the stitched panoramic from the end of Video two and their corresponding locations in satellite imagery. Source: Tasnim News. Satellite Image: Google Earth/Airbus/Maxar.
Bellingcat was able to narrow down the areas hit by the three missiles seen in video two by comparing it with the point of view of a short video released in early March, showing a Tomahawk hitting the complex, as well as with what could be seen in video one. Post-strike satellite imagery also helped confirm the buildings that were hit in the footage.
We were thus able to determine that video two shows an IRGC clinic and two buildings within the IRGC compound being hit.
Left: Planet SkySat imagery of the IRGC Base, and the adjacent school and health clinic, collected March 04, 2026 after the strikes. Annotated by Bellingcat. Right: Screenshots of the three explosions in video two. Sources: Planet and Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Initial analysis did suggest that video one and two appeared to be filmed at different times as the strikes visible in each clip cannot be synced up.
Solar data also gives clues as to the time each was taken, suggesting that there was a time gap of at least an hour between the strikes seen in the two videos.
According to the New York Times, the strikes were first reported on social media just after 11:30 am.
Solar data, derived by the direction of shadows visible in video one and simulated via the SunCalc platform, appears to indicate it was filmed between 10:30 and 11:30am.
Left: Screengrab from video one showing an object on a roof casting a shadow consistent with a time between 10:30-11:30 a.m on February 28 2026. Right: Solar data simulation center on the object. Source: Tasnim News, SunCalc.org
Analysing the shadows seen in the earlier March video using the same method, appears to show that it was filmed between 13:30 and 14:30.
This would seem to indicate that video two and the earlier March video were likely filmed after video one.
Left: Screengrab from earlier March video showing rebars casting a shadow parallel to the building construction and consistent with a time between 13:30-14:30 on February 28 2026. Top Right: Solar data simulation center on the object. Bottom Right; Satellite image showing the shadow direction along the building line. Source: The Washington Post, SunCalc.org. Satellite Image: Google Earth Pro/Airbus
Solar data from a video posted to Telegram showing the smouldering school, and damage to the nearby IRGC building about 100m away, shows that it was recorded around the time of the first video.
Left: Screengrabs from a video released the day of the strikes, showing the destroyed school (blue), and damaged roof of the IRGC building about 100m away (red box). Inset: Planet SkySat imagery showing this building (red) and the school (blue). Right: The shadow cast by the bystander is consistent with a time between 11:00-12:00 on February 28 2026. Right: Solar data simulation centred on where the bystander was standing.. Sources: Mehr News, Planet, and SunCalc.
This, therefore, appears to confirm that the school was impacted before the wave of attacks seen in video two.
Bellingcat was not able to verify where the remnants were originally found, but was able to identify them as Tomahawk missile remnants. The New York Times also confirmed this identification by matching the contract number on a remnant to a contract for the Tomahawk missile.
Bellingcat’s Carlos Gonzales, Jake Godin and Trevor Ball contributed research to this article.
Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.
The US appears to have deployed the Gator Scatterable Mine system over Kafari, a village near Shiraz, in southern Iran overnight. Several people were killed according to Iranian media.
Three experts told Bellingcat the munitions appeared to be air-delivered US-made Gator anti-tank mines.
The US is the only participant in the Iran war known to possess Gator Scatterable Mines.
Bellingcat asked the US Department of Defense whether it had dropped the mines overnight, but did not receive
The US appears to have deployed the Gator Scatterable Mine system over Kafari, a village near Shiraz, in southern Iran overnight. Several people were killed according to Iranian media.
Three experts told Bellingcat the munitions appeared to be air-delivered US-made Gator anti-tank mines.
The US is the only participant in the Iran war known to possess Gator Scatterable Mines.
Bellingcat asked the US Department of Defense whether it had dropped the mines overnight, but did not receive a response at time of publication.
Dr NR Jenzen-Jones, Director of Armament Research Services, told Bellingcat that the images appeared to show US-made anti-tank landmines.
“These images show what appear to be American BLU-91/B scatterable anti-tank landmines.
“The BLU-91/B is dispensed from the CBU-78/B or CBU-89/B air-delivered cargo bombs (cluster munitions).
“The presence of square ‘aeroballistic adaptors’ indicates that the mines seen here were delivered by air. Similar mines can be dispensed from the vehicle- or helicopter-based Volcano system.”
Gator “SCATMINE” system. BLU-91/B pictured on the bottom left, BLU-92/B pictured on the bottom right. Source: Department of the Army.
Amael Kotlarski, Weapons Team leader at Janes, also identified the mines as BLU-91/B ‘Gator’ anti-tank mines. Kotlarski told Bellingcat “the BLU-91/B is dispensed from either the US Air Force’s CBU-89/B (72 BLU-91/B and 22 BLU-92/B) or the US Navy’s CBU-78/B (45 BLU-91/B and 15 BLU-92/B).”
He elaborated that the BLU/92B is an anti-personnel mine, similar in appearance to a BLU/91B, though not identical.
“No BLU-92/B is observable in the photographic evidence presented so far. This could be that they have not been found, or that the dispensers were loaded solely with AT mines to help reduce the risk to civilians.”
BLU-91/B anti-tank mine posted by Iranian Media. Source: IRIB News.
Gator Scatterable Mines System
The Gator system is an air-delivered dispenser system or cargo bomb that distributes mines over an area. These dispensers contain a mixture of either 94 or 60 BLU-92/B anti-personnel and BLU-91/B anti-vehicle mines depending on which dispenser is used. These dispensers release the mines over an area of approximately 200 by 650 metres. In the images reviewed by Bellingcat, it is not clear which dispenser was used, or how many dispensers were deployed.
Andro Mathewson, an independent open source analyst, who formerly worked at landmine-clearing NGO The HALO Trust, told Bellingcat the images showed BLU-91/B mines.
BLU-91/B mine found with an aeroballistic adaptor. Source: Tasnim News.
Some of the images of the mines posted by Iranian media show an aeroballistic adaptor. The aeroballistic adaptor is only present on the BLU-91/B and BLU-92/B, not on other mines within the US Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM), indicating that these were deployed from a Gator system aircraft dispenser.
BLU-91/B mine with a partially broken aeroballistic adaptor. Source: Tasnim News.
BLU-91/B and BLU-92/B Mines and Self-Destruct Features
Both BLU-91/B and BLU-92/B mines are activated two minutes after being deployed; however, a very small number can fail to properly arm and explode. These mines also have self-destruct features with a variable delay which means they may randomly explode hours or days after they are dispensed. They may also explode if disturbed. These features make them particularly dangerous.
So far, only visual evidence of magnetically influenced BLU-91/B anti-tank mines has been posted online, but these mines are usually deployed alongside the anti-personnel BLU-92/B. The BLU-92/B also deploys tripwires.
In addition to the self-destruct features, the BLU-92/B anti-personnel mines have an anti-handling device (AHD) that is intended to make the mine explode when disturbed. While BLU-91/B anti-tank mines do not have an anti-handling device (AHD), they “may detonate when moved, because the mine may sense a significant change from its original orientation.”
Amael Kotlarski of Janes told Bellingcat that “The mine will go off if subjected to significant movement.” This could explain local reports that a man was killed when he picked one up near his car.
The US is the only participant in the war known to possess these mines. They were developed after the US stopped supplying arms to Iran. A review of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database, and US Major Arms Sales does not show any transfers of these mines to Israel.
Dr Jenzen-Jones also told Bellingcat that “Scatterable anti-tank landmines may have been employed to deny vehicles access to or from so-called ‘missile cities’. This could both prevent TELs [missile launch vehicles] from leaving, and limit efforts to re-establish access to facilities (for example, by preventing excavators from operating at collapsed entrances).”
Two of the mines visible in the video geolocated by Bellingcat. The mine on the right has an aeroballistic adaptor, while the one on the left does not. Source: Reason2Resist with Dimitri Lascaris.
Bellingcat asked the US Department of Defense to confirm whether they dropped mines in this area, how many were deployed, and what the intended target was. They did not respond at time of publication.
Bellingcat was unable to determine how many more mines were scattered over the village. Some mines may not yet have been found due to where they landed.
Bellingcat’s Carlos Gonzales and Logan Williamsas well as Felix Matteo Lommerse contributed research to this article.
US President Donald Trump said on January 2 that the US was “locked and loaded and ready to go”. Trump was talking aloud about intervening in Iran if it continued a violent crackdown on demonstrators who had taken to the streets over spiralling inflation and ongoing repression.
Thousands of Iranian’s were reported to have been killed by state security forces in just under a month. According to Amnesty International, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij plainclothes militia
US President Donald Trump said on January 2 that the US was “locked and loaded and ready to go”. Trump was talking aloud about intervening in Iran if it continued a violent crackdown on demonstrators who had taken to the streets over spiralling inflation and ongoing repression.
On Saturday, February 28, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale attack against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and targeting military infrastructure throughout the country. President Trump initially told Iranians they should seize control of the government but on Tuesday this week said: “If you’re going to go out and protest, don’t do it yet. It’s very dangerous out there. A lot of bombs are being dropped.” Almost 800 Iranians have been killed in US and Israeli strikes so far, according to the Iranian Red Crescent.
While the US has released a list of military targets, including IRGC headquarters and missile systems, Bellingcat has reviewed strikes against another type of target inside the Islamic Republic — police stations.
Experts told the New York Times that strikes against these facilities may be part of an effort to motivate Iranians to challenge the regime, although satellite analysis alone doesn’t allow us to tell if it is the US, Israel or both nations who have targeted police stations.
Mapping Targeted Police Stations
Using medium-resolution PlanetScope satellite imagery from Planet Labs, Bellingcat has been able to locate at least 15 local police stations or similar buildings that were struck between March 1 and March 3. Videos and photos shared on social media also show the aftermath of some of these strikes.
Comparing the March 1 PlanetScope satellite imagery with imagery taken on March 3, it’s possible to make out visible signs of building destruction throughout Tehran. Some of these sites have already been widely-reported on, including the strike on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s compound and official residence.
But Bellingcat reviewed damage to a number of smaller buildings throughout Tehran and cross-referenced the locations with data on Google Maps, Open Street Maps and Wikimapia where we found that several were listed as police stations. The majority of sites we identified are in dense urban areas.
Video shared by Iranian state broadcaster Tasnim News showed the aftermath of a strike on what it describes as a “diplomatic police station” near Ferdowsi Square — one of downtown Tehran’s main intersections. Another video taken at the same location shows at least two people on the ground with a large amount of damage to nearby buildings. Geolocation of the videos puts them at 35.7032, 51.4189, adjacent to a school and office buildings.
An annotated image from Google Earth showing where a police station was destroyed in an airstrike. Video from Iran’s Tasnim News shows buildings that match those in the satellite imagery.
Another video, geolocated by a volunteer with Geoconfirmed — a volunteer geolocation collective — shows a heavily damaged police station near Tehran’s Grand Bazaar. PlanetScope imagery from March 3 shows heavy damage to the area around the police station.
Photos and video from the Golestan Palace, a UNESCO World Heritage Site that sits adjacent to the police office, shows that it also sustained damage.
Iran’s Police and Law Enforcement
Iran’s security apparatus includes a network of police, plain clothes officers, civilian militia battalions known as Basij and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. During recent protests security forces were seen shooting protestors on the streets, and many of those killed showed signs of being shot in the head.
Iran has experienced several waves of anti-regime protests over the past 15 years, all of which have been put down by the authorities who have not shied away from using extreme violence to contain them.
Although the Financial Times reported speaking to a Tehran resident that said one of the police stations we identified, in the Gisha neighborhood, had hosted a branch of Iran’s morality police, it is thus far unclear from the satellite data whether any of the police stations had any particular role during the recent protests.
Trevor Ball, Logan Williams and Felix Matteo Lommerse contributed reporting to this piece for Bellingcat. Anisa Shabir and StéphanieLadel contributed from Bellingcat’s Volunteer Community.
Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.
The United States and Israel launched an attack on Iran on Saturday morning, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as well as several senior regime figures and striking multiple sites across the country. Iran retaliated by firing at targets across the region, including Israel, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and other Gulf states. The conflict is ongoing despite no declaration of war by the US Congress. US President Donald Trump initially called for regime change in Iran but has since delivered
The United States and Israel launched an attack on Iran on Saturday morning, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as well as several senior regime figures and striking multiple sites across the country. Iran retaliated by firing at targets across the region, including Israel, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and other Gulf states. The conflict is ongoing despite no declaration of war by the US Congress. US President Donald Trump initially called for regime change in Iran but has since delivered a mixed message about the aims of “Operation Epic Fury”.
Israel has said it dropped more than 2,000 bombs in the first 30 hours of the war. While the US claims to have struck over 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours, with President Trump stating that “bombs will fall everywhere”. In response, Iran is reported to have launched at least 390 missiles and 830 drones in the first two days. Bellingcat has been monitoring strikes across the region, including those that caused civilian harm, and identified a wide variety of weapons have been used so far, including missiles and drones.
US-Made Weapons and Tomahawks Launched
The US reported that some of the first weapons they launched were Tomahawk missiles. Footage from the US McFaul also showed Tomahawks being launched.
Imagery of many other different munitions used by the US, Israel and Iran have appeared on social media.
This article covers some of the munitions Bellingcat has seen imagery of as the war enters its fourth day.
Many of the weapons used so far have also been deployed in other recent US conflicts, including the 12-day Israel-Iran war, and US strikes in Yemen and Venezuela.
The US is the major supplier of arms to allies in the region, including for Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and Jordan.
On Sunday, the US Department Of Defence (DOD) published photos showing weapons being prepared for loading on aircrafts, including the MK-80 series of bombs like MK-82 500-pound bombs, and BLU-109 2,000-pound ‘bunker busters’ equipped with Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb guidance kits.
Left: Feb. 27. 500-pound bombs equipped with JDAM guidance kits. Right: Feb. 28. 2,000-pound BLU-109 ‘bunker busters’ equipped with JDAM guidance kits. Sources: US Navy/DVIDS and US NAVY/DVIDS.
Image of a Precision Strike Missile being fired in the first 24 hours of the war. Source: US CENTCOM.
Many of the weapons deployed by the US have also been used by Israel. This includes the MK-80 series of bombs, BLU-109 bombs and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb guidance kits.
A Feb. 28. image shows an IAF F-15 equipped with a BLU-109 bomb with a JDAM guidance kit. Source: Israeli Air Force.
Israel also produces some of its own munitions, which they released video or photos of since the start of the conflict, including MK-83 1,000-pound bombs equipped with Israeli SPICE-1000 bomb guidance kits.
A Mar. 1. screenshot showing IAF personnel loading a MK-83 1,000 pound bomb equipped with a SPICE-1000 bomb guidance kit. Source: IAF.
Israel also produces RAMPAGE missiles, visible in the image below.
A Feb. 28. image showing an IAF F-16 with a RAMPAGE missile. Source: IAF.
On Sunday, the DOD said they had used the Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) one-way attack drones in strikes. The LUCAS drone is a US copy of the Iranian Shahed one-way attack drone.
A video of a crashed LUCAS drone has subsequently appeared online, reportedly in Iraq.
While Bellingcat could not geolocate this video, then men seen in the footage can be heard speaking Arabic while US CENTCOM has said that this is the first time they have used this drone in combat.
Local Iraqi residents are taking the newly deployed, nearly intact American LUCAS drone for themselves. pic.twitter.com/fbx411iAYU
— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) March 2, 2026
A video shows a LUCAS drone that allegedly crashed in Iraq.
Iranian Attacks
Iran has retaliated by firing one-way attack drones, including Shahed variants, and missiles at Israel, and US-bases in various countries across the region, including UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq.
A Feb. 28. video shows a Shahed drone hitting a residential tower in Bahrain.
Many missiles have a booster, a rocket motor that detaches from the missile after it is expended. These boosters fall to the ground under the flight path of the missile.
Bellingcat verified that Iranian missile boosters have fallen in nearby countries caught in the crossfire, including Qatar and Jordan (see below post geolocated to Al-Hashmi St. in Irbid, Jordan), while some Israeli boosters have reportedly fallen in Iraq.
A Feb. 28. post shows an Iranian ballistic missile booster that fell on Al-Hashmi St. in Irbid, Jordan.
Iranian Missiles Intercepted
The US and Israel, as well as several Gulf countries, have fired missiles, intended to destroy Iranian missiles or drones in the air before they reach their targets. Many Iranian weapons have been intercepted, but others have successfully hit, including in a strike on a US command post in Kuwait, killing six US troops.
Most ballistic missile interceptors are “hit-to-kill” where they are designed to destroy missiles by the impact. These interceptors have their own components that fall to the ground, as well as the debris from interceptions.
Feb. 28.Two photos showing the same remnants of a US-made Patriot Air Defense System PAC-3 CRI interceptor missile published by the UAE MOD. The UAE operates the Patriot system. Source: UAE Ministry of Defense.
A Sea of Unverified Images and Misidentification of Munitions
Many close-up images of munition debris have been posted on social media over recent days which are difficult to geolocate. While we have not been able to verify the location of these munitions, we used reverse image search tools to verify they had not been posted online prior to the current conflict. The munition remnants are also consistent with those used by the US, Israel and Iran. But as we cannot geolocate or chronolocate them yet, we cannot fully verify them. Many of these images have been posted with false claims about the object and who fired it.
Despite Bellingcat being unable to fully verify them, we are including a selection of them with accurate identifications, due to the likelihood that more images of these same objects will continue to appear online as the war continues.
One example of incorrectly identified munitions, is the below picture of an aircraft’s external fuel tank, or drop tank that was posted on Telegram on March 1 alongside the claim that it is an Israeli missile.
A Mar. 1. image shows a drop tank from an Israeli jet reportedly found in Anbar, Iraq. Source: NAYA.
Drop tanks are used on jets to extend the range and are jettisoned after use, resulting in these tanks falling to the ground. These tanks have been mistaken for missile parts in previous conflicts.
Despite Iran’s prevalent use of missiles, not all missile boosters are Iranian. On February 28 missile boosters from Israeli air-launched ballistic missiles were reportedly found just east of Tikrit, Iraq. The below image shows the booster from Israel’s Blue Sparrow series, and can be matched to images previously identified and posted on the likes of the Open Source Munitions Portal.
A Feb. 28. post shows an Israeli Blue Sparrow series missile booster, reportedly found in Duraji, Iraq.
Additionally, unexploded WDU-36/B warheads from Tomahawk missiles were reportedly found –, one in Kirkuk, Iraq and one found near Jablah, Syria. Tomahawk warheads and other remnants are frequently misidentified, often as drones.
Left: Feb. 28. Unexploded Tomahawk warhead reportedly found in Kirkuk, Iraq. Right: Mar. 2. Unexploded Tomahawk warhead reportedly found near Jablah, Syria. Sources: NAYA and Qalaat Al Mudiq.
These titanium cased warheads comprise a small part of the much larger Tomahawk missile, and have been found intact in numerous countries when the warhead has failed to explode, as seen in images shared on the Open Source Munitions Portal.
Unexploded Tomahawk warheads from strikes in other conflicts have also been identified by the Open Source Munitions Portal .
Remnants of an Israeli Arrow 2 interceptor missile were posted online, falsely identified as an Iranian missile, and were allegedly found in eastern Syria. These images could again be matched to those found from previous conflicts on the Open Source Munitions Portal.
An Iranian missile fell in Al-Shoula area, south of DeirEzzor eastern Syria!. pic.twitter.com/TsWVuda2nf
A Israeli Arrow 2 interceptor missile falsely identified as as an Iranian missile in a post on X.
An Ancient US Munition Used by Iran
One photo of a remnant reportedly found in Ahvaz, Iran, included a false claim that it was a US ATACMS missile. Bellingcat was able to confirm the image does not match ATACMS construction by comparing it to imagery of that munition. We have as yet been unable to confirm if it was indeed located in Ahvaz, Iran – although we were able to identify the munition.
An actuator section of a MIM-23 HAWK missile, falsely identified by the post above as an ATACMS missile.
The markings on the remnant include an “FSN” or federal stock number, that can be looked up to identify the item. The FSN was replaced by the national stock number (NSN) in 1974, meaning this missile was produced prior to 1974.
The markings on a actuator section of a MIM-23 HAWK missile.
Bellingcat looked up the FSN/NSN (1410002343266) which corresponds with the US manufactured MIM-23B HAWK, an air defence missile.
There are many other US, Israeli and Iranian munitions that may have been used in the current conflict, but images have not yet appeared on social media.
With fresh strikes carried out overnight/ early Tuesday and President Trump saying that “likely more” US troops will die, the conflict continues to escalate and shows no sign of ceasing in the days ahead. And despite the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei the Iranian regime has vowed revenge and continued strikes against Israel, the US and their Gulf allies.
Bellingcat’s Carlos Gonzales, Jake Godin and Felix Matteo Lommerse contributed research to this article. Anisa Shabir from Bellingcat’s Volunteer Community also contributed to this piece.
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A Bellingcat investigation has identified remnants of an AGM-88 series missile inside a three-storey apartment complex that was hit in Catia La Mar during the US military raid on Venezuela on Jan. 3, 2026 that reportedly killed at least one civilian.
According to the Venezuelan independent media outlet, El Pitazo, Rosa Gonzalez, 79, was killed in this airstrike in the city of Catia La Mar in La Guaira State, 30 km north of the capital Caracas. The attack reportedly left a second individual s
A Bellingcat investigation has identified remnants of an AGM-88 series missile inside a three-storey apartment complex that was hit in Catia La Mar during the US military raid on Venezuela on Jan. 3, 2026 that reportedly killed at least one civilian.
According to the Venezuelan independent media outlet, El Pitazo, Rosa Gonzalez, 79, was killed in this airstrike in the city of Catia La Mar in La Guaira State, 30 km north of the capital Caracas. The attack reportedly left a second individual severely wounded.
Bellingcat asked the US Department of Defense to confirm our findings. However, they stated that “a Battle Damage Assessment is ongoing”. We also reached out to the Department of State but they did not respond to our questions at the time of publication.
The Jan. 3 US attack on Venezuela targeted multiple locations across the country, including military installations and areas within and around the capital, Caracas. US military helicopters, jets and drones provided cover for an assault force that landed at Fort Tiuna, the largest military complex in Caracas; captured President Nicolas Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, and flew them out of the country.
About 75 people, including civilians, were killed in the operation, US officials familiar with the matter told the Washington Post. Among the military fatalities were 32 Cuban and 21 Venezuelan soldiers, according to various media reports.
According to El Pitazo, a second woman, Yohana Rodríguez Sierra, 45, was killed, and her daughter wounded, in other strikes at a communications station at Cerro El Volcán. Multiple residential houses were also reportedly destroyed in the nearby area of La Boyera.
The military operation in Caracas follows a series of attacks on alleged drug boats which have reportedly killed at least 114 in the Caribbean Sea and the Eastern Pacific Ocean.
Identifying the Munition
Bellingcat has found videos showing the aftermath of the Catia La Mar attack and remnants of the munition filmed at the location. The strike destroyed some exterior walls of one apartment complex and caused extensive damage to at least two apartments.
Left: Screenshot from a video showing the destroyed exterior walls of the apartment building. Source: LaTrIncHEra/Instagram. Right: Screenshot from a video filmed inside the apartment complex showing an extensive fragmentation pattern on a neighbouring building. Source: Carlos Marea/Instagram.
Bellingcat geolocated the apartment complex to an area in Catia La Mar about 30 km north of Caracas (10.592796, -67.037721) and approximately 500 m east of a targeted air defence storage inside a military facility.
Top: Panoramic composite showing the damaged building hit in the strike. Credit: Youri van der Weide/Bellingcat. Bottom: Location where the residential building was hit in Catia La Mar, La Guaira, Venezuela. Source: Airbus/Google Earth.
Screenshot showing what appears to be weapon system remnants found at the apartment complex that was struck. Source: Carlos Marea/Instagram.
One video also reveals remnants of a munition. According to an analysis of visual evidence by Bellingcat, the remnants appear to show an AGM-88 series missile.
Another remnant of the AGM-88 series missile appears in a video published by Euronews. This remnant is a BSU-60 tail fin, that according to an analyst note on the Open Source Munitions Portal (OSMP), is used exclusively with the AGM-88 series missile.
The AGM-88 HARM/AARGM series are American-produced air-to-surface missiles that are designed to hit ground-based radar-emitting targets, such as air defence systems like the Buk-M2E used by Venezuela’s military, with several of them destroyed during the US military raid.
“Venezuela does not operate the AGM-88 HARM. Its F-16 acquisition occurred in 1983, when the US wouldn’t release anti-radiation tech to the region,” Dr Andrei Serbin Pont, International Analyst and President of the Regional Coordinating Centre for Economic and Social Investigations, CRIES, told Bellingcat. Later Israeli upgrades added guided munitions/AAMs, not ARMs, he said.
US Navy aircraft were photographed in the region with AGM-88E AARGM missiles in the weeks before the operation. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Caine, stated that jets of this type, designed to suppress and destroy air defences, took part in the operation.
Left: US Navy E/A-18 equipped with an AGM-88E AARGM missile photographed in Puerto Rico on Dec. 15. Source: Ricardo Arduengo/Reuters. Right: US Navy Jet aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford, equipped with an AGM-88E AARGM missile on Dec. 22. Source: Seaman Abigail Reyes/DVIDS.
Air Defence Systems Targeted
The US struck several air defence systems across Venezuela as part of the operation, with Buk-M2E launchers being destroyed at La Guaira Port, and the Higuerote and La Carlota airbases. Satellite imagery from Vantor shows that the area near a BuK-M2E storage building at Fort Guaicaipuro was also struck, but no air defence systems can clearly be seen.
According to satellite imagery, Buk-M2E launchers appear to have been stored at the military base approximately 500m from the residential building that was hit.
Aug. 19, 2025, Airbus Satellite imagery of the site showing vehicles outside the buildings, including two Buk-M2Es with missiles loaded. Source: Airbus via Google Earth.
Bellingcat was not able to determine what caused the missile to strike the apartment building or if Buk-2ME launchers at Catia La Mar or a different system were the intended target.
The AARGM variant is capable of having designated missile “impact zones” and “avoidance zones” programmed to determine where the missile can or can’t impact when used on missions, a feature added to “prevent collateral damage”.
Bellingcat asked the US Department of Defense if any weapons used in the operation transmitted a weapons impact assessment or other data that indicated they hit an unintended or civilian location. They said that a Battle Damage Assessment is ongoing.
Carlos Gonzales, Giancarlo Fiorella, Jake Godin, Trevor Ball and Youri van der Weide contributed to this report.
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