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Warning: Includes graphic descriptions of animal harm and images of animal parts from the outset.

A Bellingcat investigation has uncovered a Myanmar-based wildlife trafficker who has operated openly across social media for at least six years, claiming to have sold tiger bones, rhino horn, elephant skin and other products from protected and endangered species to customers in Myanmar, China and Thailand.

By analysing hundreds of adverts and customer conversations, Bellingcat traced more than US$21,000 in sales, identified cross-border shipments linked to multiple payment accounts, and geolocated the dealer’s home address. The seller frequently used graphic images to convince buyers that his wildlife products were genuine, sharing footage of animals before and after they were killed as proof of authenticity.

Following this investigation, Meta removed 10 Facebook accounts, WeChat suspended three accounts and revoked their payment functions, TikTok and YouTube each removed one account, and authorities in Myanmar and Thailand said they would examine the findings further.

On December 21 2022, a Facebook account shared a reel of a tiger cub lying unconscious beneath the caption: “Time for winemaking”, followed by several laughing face emojis. Four days later, the same account shared another reel, this time of an adult tiger lying motionless on an orange plastic sheet as a man approaches with a knife.

Two separate videos posted to Facebook by the account known as MB.

The account behind both videos belongs to Mei Ba (hereafter MB), a self-described Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) doctor based in Myanmar. In TCM, plants and animal products are used to prepare remedies based on established medicinal formulas. These remedies can take many forms, including herbal teas, simmered concoctions, ingredients steeped in wine, and pills. TCM is also sometimes associated with pseudoscientific beliefs, such as the idea that consuming an animal’s organ can nourish the corresponding organ in the human body.

A Bellingcat investigation has found that MB frequently advertises the trafficked parts of critically endangered and vulnerable species to customers in Myanmar, Thailand and China. An analysis of social media posts published by MB over six years found references to sales involving parts of bears, elephants, leopards, musk deer, otters, pangolins, rhinos, seahorses and tigers, all of which are protected species.

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Profiting from Protected Species

For at least six years, MB has used ten different Facebook accounts under versions of his name to advertise animal parts and products for sale, including those derived from vulnerable and protected species. 

MB has advertised tiger body parts and products, including skins and wine made from bones. Myanmar’s wild tiger population was last estimated at a minimum of 22 animals (in a 2019 study published before the civil war). Licensed tiger farms, described as being similar to zoos, also operate in the country. However, Myanmar law prohibits the killing of any tiger, wild or captive. 

Bellingcat has also identified adverts offering leopard body parts, including skin, bones and gallbladders, as well as a product described as a “whip”, a euphemism for a penis. Many of the adverts explicitly stated that the body parts came from wild animals. The Indochinese leopard is classified as critically endangered, with fewer than 800 mature individuals believed to remain in the wild across mainland South-East Asia.

MB has advertised body parts and other products derived from Asian elephants, an endangered species, including skin sold in pieces and powdered form, as well as their genitals.

One of MB’s more graphic posts showed a recently killed and butchered moon bear – a type of Asian black bear which is classified as a vulnerable species. MB has also advertised various bear body parts for sale, including paws, heads, gallbladders, bile and fat.

Whole rhino horns, as well as bracelets and medicinal products made from rhino horn, have been advertised by MB. Although rhinos have been extinct in Myanmar since the 1980s, the country remains a known transit route for rhino products moving from India to China and elsewhere in South-East Asia, suggesting the items advertised by MB originated outside Myanmar.

Rhino products as advertised by MB on Facebook. Labels added by Bellingcat.

Under Myanmar law, anyone convicted of killing, possessing or trading a “completely protected species,” or its parts, faces a minimum prison sentence of three years and a fine under a conservation law introduced in 2018. Completely protected species advertised by MB include Asiatic black bears, elephants, leopards and rhinos.

Bellingcat contacted multiple Myanmar government authorities for comment regarding MB’s wildlife trade. The Myanmar embassy in London confirmed receipt of Bellingcat’s request and said it would consult the relevant authorities in Myanmar. 

Convincing Customers

Counterfeits are common in the illegal wildlife trade. Buffalo horn is often carved to resemble rhino horn, while cattle penises are passed off as tiger parts. Much of MB’s promotional strategy therefore focuses on persuading buyers that his products are genuine. 

To market rhino horn, MB has posted images of the items on scales or held up against a light, which he claims demonstrates the texture of genuine horn. For tiger bones, in one post he said that a patch of skin would be left attached to demonstrate their authenticity. 

MB has also posted videos of recent leopard and tiger kills. He has shared footage of live tigers in cages followed by images of the same animals being butchered for their skins, bones, skulls, claws and fangs.

Bellingcat only analysed open source evidence, including social posts, customer conversations, visible transactions and shipping receipts. Therefore, the authenticity and composition of the wildlife products advertised or sold could not be independently verified.

Nevertheless, given the volume and graphic nature of these posts, MB’s ability to operate on Facebook for at least six years raises questions about why his accounts remained active up until Bellingcat contacted Meta.

Evading Platform Moderation

For years, MB has openly advertised his business on Facebook, posting hundreds of adverts across ten profiles and various groups. He often uses coded language, including Chinese-language euphemisms in his comments. 

For example, he uses “eraser” (橡皮) to refer to “elephant skin” (象皮), a Mandarin homophone with characters that are also visually similar, shown below.

MB also uses pinyin, the phonetic system for spelling Mandarin Chinese words using Latin letters. For example, in one post, he abbreviates the pinyin word for “rhino” (xīniú) as “X”, advertising “X horn powder”, and uses “Y” (pinyin: yào) as shorthand for “medicine”. He also frequently uses animal emojis, including tiger, elephant, rhino, deer and bear, to refer to products derived from those animals without naming them directly.

Asked why MB had been able to operate for so long without being banned and how it detects common evasion tactics such as coded language, Meta responded: “Bad actors constantly evolve their tactics to avoid enforcement, which is why we partner with groups and invest in tools and technology to detect and remove violating content.”

Cross-Border Trade

To map the scale of MB’s business, Bellingcat analysed more than 500 screenshots of customer conversations spanning May 2021 to May 2026. Originally taking place on Facebook, Viber and WeChat, these exchanges were later reposted by MB on Facebook.

Often blurred or cropped, the material appears to have been shared as part of a strategy to present MB as a trusted seller who reliably delivers to customers. However, given the content frequently included shipping labels with names and addresses, product descriptions, and price discussions, Bellingcat was able to trace part of MB’s customer base and income. Notably, only content MB chose to repost was available for analysis, meaning the findings represent only a sample of his overall activity. 

Across the dataset, Bellingcat identified more than 150 transactions totalling US$21,000. The United Nations estimated Myanmar’s annual per capita income at between $300 and $430 in 2023.

Bellingcat analysis of MB’s digital footprint showing revenue earned per species by MB. Currency in US$. Trade values are estimated based on yearly average black market exchange rates.

Based on delivery records, Bellingcat identified 119 deliveries within Myanmar, 27 to mainland China, and nine to Thailand. Within Myanmar, shipments were most often sent to shared pickup points in cities or towns, whereas those to China were more frequently sent directly to individual addresses. 

Shipments within Myanmar most often involved small quantities of powders or medicines, such as 3 to 7 g of rhino horn powder or 5 g of bear gall bladder. By contrast, deliveries to China more often included whole animal parts such as rhino horn or tiger bones, or larger quantities of products, including 500 g to 1 kg of elephant skin powder or 10 to 40 bottles of medicine.

MB’s highest-value recorded transaction was to a customer in Yiyang, Hunan Province, China and involved two tiger femur bones weighing just over 2.5 kg. Sold in July 2022, the bones fetched 23,500 Chinese Yuan (US$3,494). The customer was asked to provide a screenshot as proof of payment. MB later reposted this on Facebook, alongside a photograph of the bones wrapped in cling film and a shipping label for Deppon Logistics attached. 

Bellingcat contacted Deppon Logistics for comment, sharing the image and tracking number shown below, but received no response at the time of publication.

Under Chinese law, buying, transporting, or selling protected or endangered species can, in the most serious cases, carry prison sentences of more than 10 years. Asian elephants and wild tigers are listed as “Class 1” protected animals. A permit system does exist for the use of captive-bred tigers, although it remains controversial. 

Under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Appendix I, international trade in any endangered species, including Asian elephants and tigers, as well as their derivatives such as skin powder, scales and bones, is prohibited. China, Myanmar and Thailand are all parties to the treaty. 

Bellingcat contacted the General Administration of Customs of China for comment on MB’s wildlife sales to China but did not receive a response at the time of publication.

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Asia-Pacific

The Hunt for Malaysia’s Elusive Wildlife Trafficker

Bellingcat also found evidence of nine deliveries to Thailand, including a tiger penis and several TCM powders said to contain dog, yak and seahorse, all species regulated by Thai law and protected under CITES.

The Thai Natural Resources and Environmental Crime Division told Bellingcat that it already monitors packages falsely declared as traditional medicine but found to contain protected wildlife parts or ingredients derived from them. Following Bellingcat’s findings on MB’s activities, the division said it would investigate further.

A large proportion of MB’s exports to all three countries were bottles of TCM powders or tablets. For example, a “kidney replenishing medicine” was purported to contain deer, dog, gecko, praying mantis, seahorse and yak, while a “prostate medicine” was said to include deer, seahorse and dog. 

Under Chinese law, all packaged TCMs must carry labels clearly displaying the manufacturer’s name, full ingredient list, production and expiry dates, and information on side effects and safety. None of these details were present on MB’s labels.

Multiple banks accounts

Over six years of reposted conversations with customers, Bellingcat observed MB requesting payments to at least 15 different accounts, including seven via WeChat Pay, two via Alipay and six via third-party bank accounts, which MB described as belonging to friends or family.

For example, in May 2022, a customer purchased 1kg of elephant skin powder to be shipped to Chiuchow, Guangdong Province, China. MB told the customer his WeChat account could not currently receive the payment and instructed them to send the funds to his “sis” [female associate], shown below.

Both WeChat Pay and Alipay’s terms and conditions prohibit the use of their services to receive payments for illegal activities.

After being contacted by Bellingcat, WeChat suspended three accounts, revoking all payment functions and removing associated content. 

Alipay did not respond to Bellingcat’s request for comment.

Identifying MB

MB’s brazen online activities include operating at least ten Facebook profiles, two TikTok accounts, one WeChat account and one YouTube channel. He is the sole administrator of a Facebook group with nearly 1,000 members. Across these platforms, he has amassed some 12,000 followers. 

While using variations of “Mei Ba” (MB) across most of these accounts, he also uses the Chinese name “Mei Xiangfu” on his personal WeChat account. The name “May Kyin Phu” also appears alongside payment QR codes when customers are asked to transfer funds. Below is a QR code for Myanmar’s largest bank, KBZ, which includes what appears to be MB’s legal name: U May Kyin Phu, with “U” used as an honorific equivalent to Mr.

Since 2019, MB has used the same ID photo as his profile picture across multiple platforms, as well as his wedding photo as his TikTok profile picture and Facebook banner image. His wife, identified in the wedding photo and in other images posted by MB, has also been found advertising vulnerable and protected species via her Facebook account.

With more than 3,100 followers, she frequently reposts MB’s adverts while also sharing screenshots of conversations with customers. For example, in one WeChat exchange later reposted to Facebook, she discusses the cash sale of five “real” tiger penises.

From MB’s posts, Bellingcat geolocated a house in Lashio, eastern Myanmar, used to photograph animal parts for sale in his advertisements. MB has posted content from this property since 2020.

In the images below, what MB describes as “leopard gallbladders” can be seen hanging from a balcony, revealing the layout of the property’s backyard and the rooftops of adjacent buildings. Although Lashio is not covered by Street View, the distinctive roof visible in MB’s images matched with user-uploaded photographs on Google Maps.

Bellingcat contacted both MB and his wife for comment on the findings of this report. Both were reached via WeChat and appear to have received the request, but did not reply at the time of publication.

Data visuals by Galen Reich, Graphics by Merel Zoet, Editor, Claire Press.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.

The post Rhino Horn, Leopard Skin and Tiger Claws Sold Openly on Facebook appeared first on bellingcat.

A “river of blood” was how one survivor described the scene in western Myanmar. “I saw shooting. I saw mass killing.” Another told the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHRC) how 20 relatives, including three children, had been killed in the 2024 attack on Htan Shauk Khan village.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) said earlier this month that the Arakan Army (AA) “may have killed at least 170 Rohingya men, women, and children” in Hoyyar Siri (known as Htan Shauk Khan in Burmese) in Buthidaung Township. It described the May 2, 2024, attack as a “massacre”.

Buthidaung is one of the two townships in Rakhine State that is home to the majority of the Rohingya, a mainly Muslim ethnic minority in the predominantly Buddhist Myanmar.

At least 40 villages in Buthindaung were burned down in April and May 2024 amid clashes between the AA, an ethnic armed group fighting Myanmar’s military junta for control of Rakhine, and junta forces battling to retain their hold of the township.

Both sides committed abuses against civilians during the clashes, according to HRW. The military junta’s forced conscription of Rohingya to fight on its behalf has also intensified violence against them. 

The military and Rohingya armed groups began arson attacks in Buthidaung township in April 2024. By mid-May the AA had captured all junta bases, according to the think tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The destruction of Buthidaung has previously been documented by Bellingcat. 

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The AA has denied accusations that it massacred civilians in Buthidaung, claiming that those killed were junta soldiers and Rohingya militants.

Bellingcat emailed the United League of Arakan, AA’s political wing, about the alleged attack on civilians but did not receive a response at the time of publication. The United League of Arakan’s humanitarian office responded to Bellingcat after publication disputing the Human Rights Watch report and the allegation that Arakan Army personnel massacred Muslim civilians. Instead describing that the village became part of an intense military confrontation involving several armed groups, rather than a one-sided assault. Myanmar’s Ministry of Defence also did not respond to our questions. 

Evidence of civilian harm in Myanmar is slow to emerge and difficult to obtain due to the military’s strict control of the region and the tight grip of armed groups such as the AA in areas they control. 

“The mass killing could only be confirmed more than a year later,” the recent HRW report said, “when survivors eventually crossed into Bangladesh and found their way to the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar.” 

Aerial imagery shows that Htan Shauk Khan was almost entirely destroyed in May 2024.

Erasing Homes

A new investigation by Bellingcat has identified 115 villages in Rakhine State, similar to Htan Shauk Khan, as partially or completely destroyed since the February 2021 military coup that overthrew Myanmar’s democratically elected government.

The data points to a pattern of violence that leaves civilian areas uninhabitable and in some cases, erases them completely.

MapLibre | Protomaps | Planet Labs © OpenStreetMap contributors

Several buildings were set on fire when the junta allegedly dropped a bomb on the Muslim village of Zu La on Nov. 3, 2024. The fire was captured nearby on NASA FIRMS.

Satellite imagery indicates that it was attacked again on Dec. 9, 2024. Visible smoke can be seen rising from the village.

Zu La is located in Maungdaw Township. Along with neighbouring Buthidaung, Maungdaw is home to the majority of Myanmar’s persecuted Rohingya.

Zu La, and the neighbouring village of Gone Nar, previously faced violence during the 2017 Rohingya genocide.

Satellite imagery from that year shows them completely burned to the ground.

They show signs of reconstruction after 2017.

But repeated attacks in 2024 destroyed the villages again.

Neither of the villages appears on the latest maps from 2024. These are produced by the United Nations mapping unit, based on Myanmar government maps.

Steve Ross, Senior Fellow at the US nonprofit Stimson Center who is leading the ‘Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ project, told Bellingcat this is part of the military’s broader campaign to deny the existence of the Rohingya and erase identity in Rakhine.

Bellingcat contacted the Myanmar government but had received no response by the time of publication.

Villages in Mungdaw are inured to cycles of violence. Ywar Haung, a village south of Zu La, has stood barren since 2017.

So has Kan Kya, where the military built the Border Guard Police Battalion No. 5 (BGP5).

All four villages are among the growing number of Rakhine’s lost settlements.

Six of the 10 villages we found partially or totally destroyed in Maungdaw in 2024 aren’t marked on the UN’s township map.

Removing more villages from the map remains a possibility, Ross said. However, following this April’s elections, which critics dismissed as a sham, the military is eager to restore international credibility and avoid actions that might be seen as provocative, the expert told Bellingcat.

The AA announced the capture of Maungdaw when it seized BGP5 on Dec. 8, 2024.

And with that the armed group gained full control of Myanmar’s entire border with Bangladesh.

Shortly afterwards, the AA took control of the strategically important Ann Township in central Rakhine.

The armed group announced it had captured the headquarters of the Western Regional Military Command on Dec. 18, 2024.

It shared a video of the headquarters and nearby military installations burning.

Local residents in and around the township were trapped, displaced or forced to flee their homes due to the months-long fight for Ann.

According to reports, the military entered Pyaung Chaung village and burned it down on Oct. 31, 2024.

Satellite imagery from Nov. 1, 2024, shows large-scale damage in the village. There were reports that the military warned residents to evacuate the village a week before the attack.

Ross believes that the military’s intention has been to try to make Rakhine as ungovernable as possible if the AA gains full control of the state.

Nearby villages of Yat Thar Ywar Thit

and Pyaung Thay show similar evidence of destruction.

Sittwe city, the capital of Rakhine State, has become a focal area of fighting since late 2025. The city is in Sittwe township, one of the three townships still under junta control.

Su Mon Thant, Asia-Pacific analyst at Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), said capturing Sittwe would be highly symbolic for the AA as no non-state actor has yet taken control of a state capital in the country.

The AA already controls areas along an India-backed transport corridor in Myanmar that includes a port in Sittwe.

Sittwe is surrounded by water on three sides. Capturing it would be challenging, with the military maintaining naval superiority and building defences in and around the city to deter a potential AA offensive, Ross said.

On Dec. 27, 2024, the AA attacked the Kyauk Tan checkpoint near Sittwe on the highway linking the capital to Yangon, the largest city to the south of Rakhine.

There are many villages near the checkpoint.

Like Taw Kan

where, according to local reports, junta forces carried out an arson attack that destroyed 80 houses on Jan. 15, 2024.

Bellingcat found at least 13 villages near the checkpoint that had been destroyed, with only a few remaining structures. All but one of them were attacked in 2024-2025.

Less than 4km from the checkpoint is Yar Tan

which appears intact in a March 2024 Google Earth image

but several buildings look destroyed in high-resolution satellite image on Google Earth from March 2025.

Trenches and military outposts began appearing near the village around Nov-Dec 2024.

They grew as the months passed. However, due to a lack of updated high-resolution satellite images, we cannot tell whether these are currently in use or to what extent.

There are also villages that appear to have been replaced with defensive structures. For example, Kan Pyin Ywar Haung, for which the latest available high-resolution satellite image shows trenches on both sides.

Although such structures are clearly visible in high-resolution satellite imagery, lower-quality images can also help indicate whether a village was replaced with fortifications.

Kan Pyin Ywar Thit, located just south of Kan Pyin Ywar Haung, appears to have been completely destroyed; however, the same criss-crossing lines are not visible across the village.

Similar fortifications appear in other villages.

Defence infrastructure has replaced villages on the outskirts of Sittwe, making it more difficult for AA to advance towards the city, said Ross.

Bellingcat also found at least 10 villages partially or totally destroyed in Kyaukpyu Township since fighting intensified in February 2025.

Kyaukpyu, which has abundant oil, natural gas and marine resources, is also home to a junta naval base

As well as Chinese infrastructure projects that the AA fully or partially controls.

Nearly all the villages we found to be destroyed or damaged are within a 10km radius of the naval base.

In early March this year, clashes took place between the AA and the military near Say Maw village, located less than 5km from the base.

NASA FIRMS detected fire in the village and the surrounding areas on March 23, 2026.

The latest high resolution satellite image on Planet from April 2026 shows flattened buildings in the village.

A month earlier Saing Chon Dwein village, also less than 5km from the base, was reportedly burned down by the military.

The fire was caught on a Feb. 9, 2026 lower resolution satellite image

with burnt areas distinguishable the next day.

Like Sittwe, Kyaukpyu is surrounded by water, making it difficult for the Arakan Army, which lacks naval capabilities, to seize control. “AA has some advanced drones reportedly, but these areas also have jamming technology,” said Thant.

Methodology

The data was compiled using news reports, including social media channels, ACLED, satellite imagery and NASA FIRMS. The names of the villages were corroborated using the UN’s Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), news reports and Planet Labs. 

We only included areas where the destruction was clearly visible in high-resolution satellite imagery or significant enough to be detected in mid-resolution images. Our data is not exhaustive and the true number of affected villages is likely to be higher.

While it is difficult to ascertain whether the villages we found damaged or destroyed showed signs of reconstruction, at least five of them appear to show some buildings rebuilt in latest available satellite imagery.

Military Control Is Slipping

Last month, in the first election since Myanmar’s 2021 coup, the pro-military parliament chose junta chief Min Aung Hlaing to be the next president.  

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According to research group Data for Myanmar, at least 65 townships were excluded from voting, including the 14 in the AA’s control. In Rakhine’s 17 townships, voting was held in only three still under junta control – Kyaukpyu, Sittwe and Manaung.

The AA resumed attacks against the junta in Rakhine in November 2023, ending a year-long ceasefire.

Data published by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and analysed by Bellingcat reveals a sharp increase in the military’s air and drone strikes in Rakhine. After the AA resumed its offensive, strikes rose from 30 in 2023 to 461 in 2024. By the end of 2024, the AA had captured all but three townships in the state.

Bellingcat found that strikes were then concentrated in the townships where the junta is fighting to maintain control. They decreased in 13 townships captured by the AA and remained unchanged in one during 2025. By contrast, attacks increased in Kyaukpyu and Sittwe, yet to be captured by the AA. Data for Manaung is unavailable.

ACLED’s data comes from multiple sources, including news reports and social media. While the data is not exhaustive, a broad trend can be identified. You can read further details and caveats about the data here.

Su Mon Thant, Asia-Pacific analyst at ACLED,explained that the military conducts clearance operations to prevent the AA from using villages as buffers or shelters – a tactic employed across the country. “At the same time, it’s a warning sign for other villages,” she said, adding that when one village is set ablaze, it sends a signal to other villages not to “accept, shelter or harbor” armed groups. Thant also noted that people are displaced when their village is destroyed, eroding support for armed groups as locals suffer the consequences of the fighting. 

The AA has vowed to take control of all of Rakhine by 2027 and success may bring a geopolitical shift in the region. The armed group’s control over Kyaukpyu and Sittwe will give it significant leverage, with both India and China having infrastructure projects in the townships, Steve Ross of the Stimson Center told Bellingcat.

But neither side can control the state without further alleviation of civilian suffering, Ross said. According to UNHRC data, there are almost half a million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Rakhine as of March 30, 2026.

In Sittwe township alone, about 120,000 Rohingya have been displaced by communal conflict since 2012. 

“People displaced from other parts of Rakhine State during the war are in Sittwe, hundreds of thousands of civilians,” said Thant, adding that neither side can control the capital without significant loss of life.

There are also 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The futures of both the refugees and IDPs remain uncertain. 

“Nobody can go home yet at this stage,” said Thant.

---

Editor’s note: This article was updated on July 6, 2026 to include response from representatives of the United League of Arakan.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.

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