Last week, Anthropic released a long and detailed document describing current misuses of their Claude models. I’m still reading it, but I wanted to flag this:

We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant.

The actors used Claude Code in place of human software engineers to develop the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) software that steers and stabilizes a flying vehicle. For example, they used Claude to integrate an open-source autopilot onto a phone-class flight computer, writing the control and position estimation software, tuning the control settings, running a firmware build pipeline, and performing a flight simulation. The actors managed several Claude instances at once, assigning each one a role, much as a lead would delegate work on a small engineering team: the actors tasked one instance with writing the code, another with research, and a third with reviewing the code the first instance produced.

Our safeguards blocked many of their requests, but not all of them. The actors used a variety of tactics to evade our safeguards, including hiding their goals and the products the software was meant for, and they split their work across multiple sessions so no single session revealed their full intent.

These actors carried out a sustained effort to develop guided weapons, including using Claude to design guidance software. We do not have evidence the actors succeeded in fielding an operational device; but they did test-fire a guided rocket. This field test appears to have failed: within hours, the actors returned to Claude to work out why it failed.

Expect more of this. AI systems democratize expertise and capability. Most of the time that’s a good thing, but sometimes it’s not.

Anthropic says researchers used Claude for biological work that could support weapons development, exposing new challenges for AI safeguards.

The post Anthropic Says Claude Used in Possible Bioweapon Research appeared first on TechRepublic.

Bellingcat has geolocated and verified two new videos showing the deadly strikes that hit an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) compound as well as an adjacent school in the city of Minab in late February.

The new videos were released by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and show multiple missiles hitting the complex. 

One of the new videos shows the area around the school being struck while the other shows a nearby IRGC clinic and two buildings within the IRGC facility being hit by Tomahawk missiles. 

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Visual and solar analysis of the videos appears to show there was a time gap between when each was filmed, suggesting that there were at least two waves of strikes carried out in the area. 

Applying the same solar analysis techniques to social media footage that showed the school after it had been hit indicates the school was impacted during the first wave of strikes.

Previous investigations by Bellingcat and other news organisations showed a US Tomahawk missile struck the IRGC facility on Feb. 28. 

The US is the only party to the conflict to possess Tomahawk missiles.

Media reports, including from the New York Times and Reuters, have since detailed that a preliminary investigation by the US military concluded it was likely a US strike that hit the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school.

According to Iranian media, at least 175 people were killed in the attack, including children.

Analysing New Minab Videos

The first video (video one) is filmed from just over 2.5 kilometres (1.5 miles) away from the IRGC base and shows at least 10 missiles impacting the area over a period of 50 seconds.

The first explosion is visible five seconds into the video. The area around where the school was located is struck at 14 seconds. This is the fourth explosion visible in the footage.

Another structure that was damaged in the strikes is situated approximately 100 metres away from the school in the same general area. It was therefore not possible to determine which exact structure was hit from this footage alone.

The second new video (video two) was filmed approximately two kilometres southeast of the school, and is of a higher quality than video one. This video shows three Tomahawk missiles in the moments before impact.

Video two includes annotations and pauses when each Tomahawk appears on screen. 

A frame-by-frame analysis also shows what appear to be two minor visual glitches where some frames are transposed and annotations were added, highlighting when missiles can be seen.

The second impact seen in video two is the same as seen in footage released by Iranian media in early March, and previously reported on by Bellingcat and others, only from a different perspective.

Video two also only shows the southern part of the base, with its northern section not visible. The school is located on the northern edge of the base and is therefore not visible in video two.

Bellingcat asked the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs why only part of the strike, as seen in video one, was released and if there was a longer version that may show further impacts. We did not receive a response before publication.

Bellingcat also asked the US Department of Defense whether it had any further information on the strike since its reported preliminary findings. It referred us to CENTCOM, which said: “We have nothing for you on this. The investigation is still ongoing.”

Geolocating the Videos

Bellingcat was able to geolocate and verify video one by tracing sightlines on satellite imagery to determine the camera’s location and identify objects such as buildings, trees and a water tower within the IRGC facility. 

According to this analysis, video one was most likely filmed from an electric substation southeast of the school.

Once all key elements were identified and geolocated, we analysed each explosion that can be seen in the footage. 

Fourteen seconds into video one, the fourth impact appears to hit the area immediately around the school, which was approximately 200 meters behind a water tower. 

While the school was walled off and outside the IRGC facility, the water tower and another building (situated between the school and the water tower) are located within it.

Due to the relatively small distance between the school and the other IRGC building (roughly 100m), it was not possible to determine what structure was hit at the moment of the strike visible in video one.

More information, such as obtaining the entire strike video sequence, would be needed to fully determine which structure was hit in this footage. However, social media footage captured at the scene does suggest that the school was hit around this time.

For video two, we stitched together a rough panorama of what could be seen in the footage. 

This made it possible to match up multiple buildings visible southeast of the IRGC base and school, while also building rough sightlines to show which part of the base was being filmed.

Bellingcat was able to narrow down the areas hit by the three missiles seen in video two by comparing it with the point of view of a short video released in early March, showing a Tomahawk hitting the complex, as well as with what could be seen in video one. Post-strike satellite imagery also helped confirm the buildings that were hit in the footage. 

We were thus able to determine that video two shows an IRGC clinic and two buildings within the IRGC compound being hit.

Time of the Strikes

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has claimed that two waves of strikes occurred. 

Initial analysis did suggest that video one and two appeared to be filmed at different times as the strikes visible in each clip cannot be synced up. 

Solar data also gives clues as to the time each was taken, suggesting that there was a time gap of at least an hour between the strikes seen in the two videos.

According to the New York Times, the strikes were first reported on social media just after 11:30 am.

Solar data, derived by the direction of shadows visible in video one and simulated via the SunCalc platform, appears to indicate it was filmed between 10:30 and 11:30am.

Analysing the shadows seen in the earlier March video using the same method, appears to show that it was filmed between 13:30 and 14:30. 

This would seem to indicate that video two and the earlier March video were likely filmed after video one.

Solar data from a video posted to Telegram showing the smouldering school, and damage to the nearby IRGC building about 100m away, shows that it was recorded around the time of the first video.

This, therefore, appears to confirm that the school was impacted before the wave of attacks seen in video two.

Iranian media previously released images of munition remnants they claim they recovered from the school. 

Bellingcat was not able to verify where the remnants were originally found, but was able to identify them as Tomahawk missile remnants. The New York Times also confirmed this identification by matching the contract number on a remnant to a contract for the Tomahawk missile.

Bellingcat’s Carlos Gonzales, Jake Godin and Trevor Ball contributed research to this article.

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The post Two Waves of Bombing: New Videos Reveal Further Details About Iran School Strike appeared first on bellingcat.

The US appears to have deployed the Gator Scatterable Mine system over Kafari, a village near Shiraz, in southern Iran overnight. Several people were killed according to Iranian media. 

Three experts told Bellingcat the munitions appeared to be air-delivered US-made Gator anti-tank mines. 

The US is the only participant in the Iran war known to possess Gator Scatterable Mines. 

Bellingcat asked the US Department of Defense whether it had dropped the mines overnight, but did not receive a response at time of publication.

Dr NR Jenzen-Jones, Director of Armament Research Services, told Bellingcat that the images appeared to show US-made anti-tank landmines. 

“These images show what appear to be American BLU-91/B scatterable anti-tank landmines. 

“The BLU-91/B is dispensed from the CBU-78/B or CBU-89/B air-delivered cargo bombs (cluster munitions). 

“The presence of square ‘aeroballistic adaptors’ indicates that the mines seen here were delivered by air. Similar mines can be dispensed from the vehicle- or helicopter-based Volcano system.”

Amael Kotlarski, Weapons Team leader at Janes, also identified the mines as BLU-91/B ‘Gator’ anti-tank mines. Kotlarski told Bellingcat “the BLU-91/B is dispensed from either the US Air Force’s CBU-89/B (72 BLU-91/B and 22 BLU-92/B) or the US Navy’s CBU-78/B (45 BLU-91/B and 15 BLU-92/B).”

He elaborated that the BLU/92B is an anti-personnel mine, similar in appearance to a BLU/91B, though not identical.

“No BLU-92/B is observable in the photographic evidence presented so far. This could be that they have not been found, or that the dispensers were loaded solely with AT mines to help reduce the risk to civilians.”

Gator Scatterable Mines System

The Gator system is an air-delivered dispenser system or cargo bomb that distributes mines over an area. These dispensers contain a mixture of either 94 or 60 BLU-92/B anti-personnel and BLU-91/B anti-vehicle mines depending on which dispenser is used. These dispensers release the mines over an area of approximately 200 by 650 metres.  In the images reviewed by Bellingcat, it is not clear which dispenser was used, or how many dispensers were deployed.

Andro Mathewson, an independent open source analyst, who formerly worked at landmine-clearing NGO The HALO Trust, told Bellingcat the images showed BLU-91/B mines.

Some of the images of the mines posted by Iranian media show an aeroballistic adaptor. The aeroballistic adaptor is only present on the BLU-91/B and BLU-92/B, not on other mines within the US Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM), indicating that these were deployed from a Gator system aircraft dispenser.

BLU-91/B and BLU-92/B Mines and Self-Destruct Features

Both BLU-91/B and BLU-92/B mines are activated two minutes after being deployed; however, a very small number can fail to properly arm and explode. These mines also have self-destruct features with a variable delay which means they may randomly explode hours or days after they are dispensed. They may also explode if disturbed. These features make them particularly dangerous.

The self-destruct can be set for 4 hours, 48 hours, or 15 days, but the mines may self-destruct before then.

So far, only visual evidence of magnetically influenced BLU-91/B anti-tank mines has been posted online, but these mines are usually deployed alongside the anti-personnel BLU-92/B. The BLU-92/B also deploys tripwires.

In addition to the self-destruct features, the BLU-92/B anti-personnel mines have an anti-handling device (AHD) that is intended to make the mine explode when disturbed. While BLU-91/B anti-tank mines do not have an anti-handling device (AHD), they “may detonate when moved, because the mine may sense a significant change from its original orientation.”

Amael Kotlarski of Janes told Bellingcat that “The mine will go off if subjected to significant movement.” This could explain local reports that a man was killed when he picked one up near his car. 

Uniquely US Weapons

The US is the only participant in the war known to possess these mines. They were developed after the US stopped supplying arms to Iran. A review of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database, and US Major Arms Sales does not show any transfers of these mines to Israel.

Dr Jenzen-Jones also told Bellingcat that “Scatterable anti-tank landmines may have been employed to deny vehicles access to or from so-called ‘missile cities’. This could both prevent TELs [missile launch vehicles] from leaving, and limit efforts to re-establish access to facilities (for example, by preventing excavators from operating at collapsed entrances).”

Bellingcat geolocated some of the mines to the village of Kafari, Iran (coordinates 29.50544059, 52.48745447 and 29.50964897, 52.48920842). This video shows at least three mines approximately two kilometres away from the entrance to what is reported to be Shiraz South Missile Base, an Iranian “missile city.” 

Bellingcat asked the US Department of Defense to confirm whether they dropped mines in this area, how many were deployed, and what the intended target was. They did not respond at time of publication.

Bellingcat was unable to determine how many more mines were scattered over the village. Some mines may not yet have been found due to where they landed. 

Bellingcat’s Carlos Gonzales and Logan Williams as well as Felix Matteo Lommerse contributed research to this article.

The post Evidence Points to US Scattering Mines over Iranian Village appeared first on bellingcat.

Munition remnants pictured at the site of a strike that killed at least 17 people in the town of Tiné, Chad, last week appear to match a weapon previously used by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the war with Sudanese government forces – despite RSF denials of involvement in the incident.

Photographs showed what appeared to be a match for the rear control section of a Chinese-made GB25A or GB50A bomb, which can be dropped by Chinese-made drones. Amnesty International previously identified a GB50A used by the RSF that it said had “almost certainly” been re-exported to the group by the UAE. 

The first photographs of the remnants were posted by Chad’s by ATPE CHAD publication, which reported a public prosecutor had visited the site of impact.

A separate set of photographs showing even clearer visuals of the remnants was subsequently shared by the N’Djamena-based broadcaster MRTV. It’s Facebook page showed Chadian soldiers standing beside the remnants.

Images were also posted by posted on Facebook by the Department of Public Safety and Immigration in Chad.

By using the time displayed on a watch worn by an official in one of the pictures it was possible to estimate that the images were likely taken in the late afternoon. By comparing this with solar data, the shadows visible in the photos and other visual details, it was then possible to infer the approximate layout of nearby buildings and the distribution of trees where the remnants were found.

With this information, and using satellite imagery, we then geolocated the photos to the northwest of the Bir Tine neighbourhood, just 650 metres from the border with the Western Darfur region of Sudan that is largely controlled by the RSF.

Remnants from the control sections of other GB25A or GB50A bombs have previously been found after RSF attacks in Sudan, including attacks on Kassala Airport and Coral Marina Hotel in Port Sudan (as seen in the images below).

BBC News reported that the RSF is suspected of carrying out the attack.

However, the RSF has denied any involvement and blamed Sudan’s army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF has in turn said the RSF was responsible. Chad’s president on Thursday ordered the military to retaliate against future attacks from Sudan. 

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RSF spokesperson Al-Fateh Qurashi told Bellingcat via WhatsApp: “Our forces are not responsible for any targeting of neighboring Chad, and we have no connection to this targeting.” Qurashi instead blamed forces aligned with the Sudanese government over the strike. 

Imran Abdullah, an adviser to the RSF commander, told Bellingcat via WhatsApp that satellite imagery tracked the drone and that it belonged to the forces aligned with the Sudanese government. However, Abdullah refused to share the imagery he referred to saying: “It can be published if an independent international commission of inquiry is in place.”

The SAF are not known to use any Chinese-made drones or bombs, like the GB25A or GB50A. The SAF has been observed using Turkish and Iranian made drones and munitions such as the MAM-L bomb. 

Bellingcat sought comment on the use of these weapons from the Chinese manufacturer, Norinco, as well as the UAE given Amnesty’s previous reports about how a GB50A was used by the RSF after “almost certainly” being re-exported to Sudan. Neither responded prior to publication.

The conflict has previously spilled over the border into Chad. Reuters reported last month the country closed its border with Sudan after five Chadian soldiers were killed following clashes in Tiné between the RSF and militia fighters loyal to the Sudanese government.

Ziyu Wan and Riccardo Giannardi contributed from Bellingcat’s volunteer community.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.

The post Munition Remnants Pictured at Site of Deadly Chad Strike Match Weapon Previously Used by Sudan’s RSF appeared first on bellingcat.