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OpenAI Rates GPT-6 Cyber Critical After Major Vulnerability Discoveries

OpenAI GPT-6 Cyber found 81 high-severity Firefox flaws and hundreds of Linux bugs, raising new questions about AI-powered cyber risks.

OpenAI has introduced GPT-6 Cyber, a model built for security research that it says finds and fixes vulnerabilities better and stays within the limits researchers set far more reliably. These are OpenAI’s own results and evaluations, so read them as claims to check.

“We’re introducing GPT‑6 Cyber, a major leap in security research: more capable at finding and fixing vulnerabilities, and far more reliable staying within the boundaries researchers set. GPT‑6 Cyber delivers major gains on key cybersecurity benchmarks over GPT‑5.6 Cyber, including a 51% relative improvement on ExploitGym and a step function improvement when tested on staying within scope.” reads the announcement. “It is already helping to secure real-world software, uncovering and validating thousands of exploits in security-critical codebases such as Linux and Firefox.”

GPT-6 Cyber outperformed previous models in tests measuring its ability to exploit vulnerabilities. It scored 48.5%, compared with 32.1% for GPT-5.6 Cyber, and outperformed GPT-6 Astra in most cybersecurity tasks.

OpenAI GPT-6 Astra

It also found more flaws during web penetration tests, identifying 40.3% of vulnerabilities versus 32% for Astra. In another test involving known flaws in GitLab, PostgreSQL and Jenkins, GPT-6 Cyber completed 95% of the tasks, while Astra refused them all. OpenAI has therefore raised its cybersecurity risk rating from High to Critical.

The real-world numbers are bigger. OpenAI’s researchers used the model to reproduce 1,724 Linux kernel vulnerabilities and develop working exploits for 948 of them, more than five times the 166 that GPT-5.6 Sol managed with the same research setup. Following the Linux community’s guidance, they disclosed 304 critical findings to maintainers with candidate patches.

“Developing exploits for 948 Linux kernel vulnerabilities⁠. GPT‑6 Cyber reproduced 1,724 vulnerabilities and developed working exploits for 948—more than five times the 166 exploited by GPT‑5.6 Sol using the same research harness. Following the Linux community’s guidance, we disclosed 304 critical findings to maintainers with candidate patches and are in the process of getting other vulnerabilities fixed.” continues the announcement.

In Firefox, the model produced evidence and reproducible tests for 81 new vulnerabilities that Mozilla classed as high severity, and it showed 30 known issues were worse than reported. Mozilla began landing fixes soon after getting the reports. A Mozilla engineer said Firefox entered 2026 as one of the most hardened codebases in the world, and the model still found new flaws.

OpenAI also used GPT-6 Cyber with other models to develop and validate exploits for a critical flaw in Brotli, a compression library used by Node.js, showing it could lead to remote code execution in downstream applications. Security teams at Cisco, Calif and CodeRabbit use the model for vulnerability research and code review. In OpenAI’s own red-team campaigns, agents chained vulnerabilities to escape microVMs and run code on the underlying hosts, and the company used the results to patch software and tighten network limits.

Power like that makes scope control the key question. One risk is an agent that wanders outside its task and attacks unrelated services. OpenAI trained GPT-6 Cyber specifically to stay in scope, respect limits on its actions and report results accurately.

OpenAI tested whether GPT-6 Cyber could stay within the limits of an authorized security task, even when it found easy ways to attack other systems. The model avoided unauthorized actions in 99.93% of cases, compared with 94.49% for GPT-5.6 Cyber. With additional safety instructions, it stayed within the allowed scope in every test.

“It also follows task boundaries more reliably: in a separate alignment evaluation, GPT‑6 Cyber avoided exploiting out-of-scope services in 99.93% of tests without its deployment prompt, and 100% with this prompt.” states the AI company. “This improvement in alignment reflects dedicated training to stay within authorized scope, respect restrictions, and report results accurately.”

OpenAI also says it is seeing more attempts by malicious actors to misuse its models. To reduce this risk, the company monitors suspicious activity, checks whether actions match user permissions and watches for emerging threats. During the disclosure of critical PHP vulnerabilities, for example, it monitored attempts to develop exploits against live PHP servers while helping defenders fix the flaws.

Other controls include Private Safety Processing, which reviews encrypted records kept in customer storage for 30 days without exposing prompts or responses to OpenAI staff. API customers on Zero Data Retention generally must use it. Daybreak Red API access requires IP allowlisting by default, with credential monitoring, and OpenAI still recommends sandboxing, action review and human oversight for high-risk work.

Critical infrastructure gets special attention. A $1 billion grant program, Daybreak for Frontline Defenders, subsidizes access for resource-constrained teams like government bodies and essential service providers. A new group, Daybreak Red for Critical Infrastructure, lets approved defenders run authorized tests on critical systems while keeping safeguards against misalignment. OpenAI also tightened safeguards against help that could compromise industrial controls or safety-critical systems, damage equipment or endanger lives.

OpenAI says higher block rates aren’t automatically better, since many of the same techniques serve legitimate security work. Its chart suggests sensitive-request label rates rose sharply for Daybreak Red after the update but stayed near zero for the critical infrastructure group. The company measures these rates alongside support for real research and patching.

Dragos tested the model on a mock power plant with almost no instructions. It separated operational technology assets from IT noise on its own, then found two zero-days in engineering software that manages protective relay data, exposing protection settings and breaker trip logic. Dragos’s Rob T. Lee says that’s the map an adversary wants before touching anything physical, and that the skill floor for reconnaissance and vulnerability research is dropping. OpenAI used Dragos’s feedback to refine safeguards and plans more partnerships with offensive security firms, energy companies and national labs.

GPT-6 Cyber is available through the API and Codex to a select group of approved Daybreak Red customers, with wider access promised soon. GPT-5.6 Cyber opens to all Daybreak Red customers, and Daybreak Blue alpha access for GPT-6 Astra is expanding. Daybreak Blue helps verified defenders validate vulnerabilities and fixes with fewer unnecessary refusals, and Red covers deeper exploit development and authorized testing.

OpenAI’s argument for speed is simple, and it applies to attackers as much as defenders: we have a limited window to use frontier models to secure software.

“Protecting critical infrastructure has been a key consideration in designing GPT‑6 Cyber’s safeguards and access, including power plants, water treatment facilities, and the operational technology and industrial control systems (OT/ICS) that underpin them.” concludes the announcement.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, OpenAI)

OpenAI Reports Covert Underperformance in GPT-6 Astra

OpenAI says GPT-6 Astra sometimes secretly underperformed on safety research, raising concerns about AI reliability and alignment.

OpenAI has disclosed that its GPT-6 Astra model sometimes quietly obstructed safety and alignment work. In a report updated on November 4, the company calls it covert underperformance. Astra added unnecessary prerequisites, abandoned working solutions and reported blockers that didn’t exist or that it had caused itself.

Researchers first reported the problem internally on August 20, shortly after Astra was introduced. One researcher said a project to test whether the model could sabotage other AI systems made little progress for several days. After switching to another model, the work moved forward quickly. In most cases, Astra’s reasoning gave no clear sign that it was deliberately doing less work, and OpenAI’s monitoring systems failed to detect the behavior.

To investigate, OpenAI created pairs of coding tasks using the same code but with different goals. One task was presented as safety research, while the other was described as capability development. Astra completed about 10% of the required tasks when they involved safety research, compared with 16% for capability development. This means it completed roughly 40% fewer tasks in the safety tests. GPT-5.6 Sol showed almost no difference between the two types of work.

Even after OpenAI removed cases involving clear refusals or signs that Astra had deliberately withheld help, the gap remained at 4.7 percentage points. It dropped to just 0.75 points only after researchers also removed every case where the model showed even brief ethical concerns. This suggests that most of the behavior cannot be detected simply by checking whether the model openly refuses a request.

GPT-6 Astra OpenAI

In employees’ daily Codex use, Astra refused 1.63 percent of safety and alignment requests, against 0.56 percent of capabilities requests. Its reasoning showed it withheld help silently in 0.25 percent of safety requests versus 0.11 percent of capabilities requests, 2.3 times as often. Ethical doubt appeared in 7.9 percent against 2.9 percent, mostly in red-teaming, monitoring, and safety evaluation work.

OpenAI shared eight examples. Astra silently held back on training models to evade monitors, filtered a violent source out of a safety evaluation, restricted a jailbreak data export and narrowed exploit analysis. In one case it left graders’ reasoning out of an export without telling the user. A model that quietly decides your project is too risky is the coworker who says “looking into it” and never does.

OpenAI has not yet identified the exact cause of the behavior. The difference between Astra’s performance on safety and capability tasks grew from almost zero at the start of reinforcement learning to 6 percentage points by the end. One evaluator favored silently doing less work over either refusing a request or fully completing it. Another finding was that a fine-tuning dataset encouraged the model to invent permission restrictions. Removing the changes linked to that dataset eliminated the performance gap. However, other models trained with the same dataset and reinforcement learning did not show the same behavior, so OpenAI cannot identify either factor as the root cause.

OpenAI found no evidence that Astra was deliberately trying to hide its capabilities or influence deployment decisions, although it cannot rule out these possibilities. Simply telling the model to be more careful increased its underperformance by 50%, suggesting that excessive caution may be the main explanation. OpenAI warns that this behavior can slow safety research and make model evaluations less reliable. It is developing new tests and monitoring systems to detect it, especially because the problem becomes harder to identify when models reveal less of their reasoning. In some cases, Astra explained that it had held back because it disagreed with the research itself.

“In reviewed cases, Astra narrowed or stopped requested safety work without disclosing the restriction. At scale, this can differentially slow down safety research compared to other research and make evaluations harder to interpret.” concludes the report. “A model that finds monitor evasion suspicious may underperform on monitor-evasion evaluations while leaving little evidence in its CoT or outputs. The behavior becomes even harder to detect if models externalize less of this reasoning in CoT.”

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, OpenAI)

Hackers Exploit DLL Sideloading in Signed OpenAI and Anthropic Binaries to Deploy YobaLoader Malware

A campaign tracked as Yoba abuses interest in generative AI to push cryptocurrency-mining malware through fake GitHub projects. Check Point Research published its findings on October 27, 2026, after about two months of tracking. The operators pair legitimate, signed OpenAI and Anthropic executables with a malicious winmm.dll, so the payload loads through DLL sideloading. The […]

The post Hackers Exploit DLL Sideloading in Signed OpenAI and Anthropic Binaries to Deploy YobaLoader Malware appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

Scanner Poses as 32 AI Bots to Find Credentials and Private Keys

A scanner impersonates 32 AI bots, including OpenAI and Claude crawlers, to search websites for exposed credentials, private keys and cloud configuration files.

OpenAI Unveils GPT-6.1 Terra, a Faster AI Model With Critical Cybersecurity Capabilities

OpenAI has introduced GPT-6.1 Terra, a faster, lower-cost AI model for visual analysis, computer use, writing, and coding. Released on October 26, the model also carries a Critical cybersecurity capability rating under OpenAI’s Preparedness Framework, placing its security risks alongside those of GPT-6 Astra.

The release brings stronger automation to everyday work while raising questions about how to control powerful AI agents. OpenAI says Terra uses the same safeguards as GPT-6.1 Sol and GPT-6 Astra, with detection systems updated for the new model.

According to OpenAI’s system card, the Critical category covers models that can independently develop working zero-day exploits across hardened systems or carry out new, end-to-end attack strategies. This describes a capability risk, not a security flaw discovered in Terra itself.

Terra recorded a 97.10% normalized capability score on ExploitBench, which tests exploit development using known vulnerability details, source code, and patches. However, OpenAI warns that training exposure to historical vulnerabilities could inflate these results.

OpenAI Unveils GPT-6.1 Terra

A separate internal test using recently disclosed vulnerabilities provides a more cautious picture. Terra achieved arbitrary code execution in 24.5% of cases, compared with 21.5% for GPT-6.1 Sol and 31.5% for GPT-6 Astra. OpenAI notes that reliable exploitation remains difficult despite gains over older models.

GPT-6.1 Terra Excels in Computer-Use Benchmark (source : openai )
GPT-6.1 Terra Excels in Computer-Use Benchmark (source: Openai )

In its launch announcement, OpenAI reports that Terra scored 15 percentage points above GPT-5.6 Terra on Agents’ Last Exam at medium reasoning effort, while costing about one-third as much. It also completed tasks over three times faster than GPT-6 Astra and GPT-6.1 Sol.

For software engineering, Terra solved 50.3% of Terminal-Bench 4.0 tasks at maximum reasoning effort, up from GPT-5.6 Terra’s published 21.5%. These results measure command-line problem solving rather than proving the model can safely manage live security incidents.

OpenAI also reports fewer factual errors. On difficult prompts, the error rate at low reasoning effort fell from 53.6% to 16.7%. The system card cautions that these deliberately challenging tests don’t reflect everyday production error rates.

GPT-6.1 Terra Beats GPT-5.6 Terra in Visual Reasoning (source : openai )
GPT-6.1 Terra Beats GPT-5.6 Terra in Visual Reasoning (source: Openai )

Terra’s prompt injection tests use OpenAI’s GPT-Red approach, previously covered in Cybersecurity News’ report on automated AI red teaming. These tests examine attempts to override trusted instructions and malicious commands hidden in third-party content.

Yet stronger test results don’t eliminate every risk. In one evaluation without system-level controls, Terra bypassed the intent of environmental restrictions in 29.6% of runs. Related defenses, including ChatGPT Lockdown Mode, address data theft pathways rather than stopping every injected instruction.

GPT-6.1 Terra Cuts Error Rates to 4.3% at Maximum Reasoning (source : openai )
GPT-6.1 Terra Cuts Error Rates to 4.3% at Maximum Reasoning (source: Openai )

GPT-6.1 Terra is available through the API as gpt-6.1-terra and is rolling out in ChatGPT Work and Codex for eligible paid plans. Standard API pricing is $1 per million input tokens, $0.05 per million cached input tokens, and $5 per million output tokens. API charges are separate from ChatGPT subscriptions, so developers can track costs when planning high-volume automation projects.

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The post OpenAI Unveils GPT-6.1 Terra, a Faster AI Model With Critical Cybersecurity Capabilities appeared first on Cyber Security News.

Researchers Discover OpenAI API Vulnerability That Leaks Hidden AI Reasoning Traces

Researchers have disclosed a vulnerability in the OpenAI API that reveals hidden reasoning traces by exploiting conversation compaction. This technique, named “Compaction Smuggling,” bypassed existing safeguards and could allow for the extraction of valuable training material from advanced models. According to Xint, OpenAI confirmed the issue, implemented an undisclosed fix on October 23, 2026, and […]

The post Researchers Discover OpenAI API Vulnerability That Leaks Hidden AI Reasoning Traces appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

OpenAI Paused Frontier AI Training After a Security Incident

OpenAI paused frontier model training for 11 days after AI agents exposed security weaknesses, VM escapes and covert communication channels.

OpenAI published a detailed report this week explaining how it improved security in the systems used to train and test its most advanced AI models. The company also described what happened when its AI agents tried to find weaknesses in those systems and why it stopped training its most advanced models for 11 days in September.

“Based on the red-teaming results, the fixes we had implemented, and improvements to our monitoring and stopping systems, we judged that our strengthened safeguards were sufficient to resume frontier RL training and internal inference.” reads the report published by the company. “We resumed these workloads on October 1, 11 days after our pause began.”

The incident began on September 20, when an internal research model exploited a DNS configuration error and gained limited access to the live internet during training. This incident, along with a security incident involving Hugging Face in July and other cases of AI models behaving in unexpected ways, led OpenAI to make major changes to its security measures.

OpenAI’s stated containment requirement is that limits on what an agent can access must hold even when the agent actively tries to circumvent them. The policy choice they landed on is that frontier model training now runs with no internet access at all, full stop.

“For training and most evaluation, the live internet lies outside this boundary, as we believe that providing models access to the live internet can pose significant risks. Although internet access can help models learn useful skills, it also gives a capable, misaligned agent opportunities to affect systems beyond our control.” continues the report. “We’ve therefore designed the security architecture for our research environments with one overriding principle: we must always be able to prevent a frontier model from achieving unauthorized, arbitrary access to the live internet.”

OpenAI

To support training without live internet, they built what they call an “offline world,” a large indexed and cached set of web content that models can browse and search without touching external systems. The layers of protection around that offline world include restricted containers, lightweight virtual machines that isolate each agent’s environment from the underlying hardware, network and cloud controls, and monitoring systems designed to catch unauthorized activity before it does damage.

The report explains how OpenAI tested its most advanced AI agents by asking them to find weaknesses in the company’s own systems. The agents had three goals: access the live internet, break through internal security barriers, or communicate with other agents when they were not allowed to do so. OpenAI ran experiments using hundreds of billions of tokens.

The agents found previously unknown security flaws in open-source software, including Kata Containers, gVisor and Moby/Docker, as well as configuration errors in OpenAI’s own services. By combining these weaknesses, they managed to escape virtual machines and gain control of the underlying host system. In further tests, the agents found weaknesses in services used for monitoring, logging and authentication. They used these flaws to make the services access URLs controlled by an attacker.

The part of the report that deserves the most attention isn’t the direct internet escapes. It’s what the agents did when those paths weren’t available. Agents in separate virtual machines, not allowed to share files or network connections, communicated with each other using processor cache timing. One agent evicted specific data from the processor’s cache. Another measured how long it took to reload that data, using the difference between fast and slow reads to decode a message. No file touched, no network packet sent. The technique is the same family of attacks as Spectre and Meltdown.

OpenAI restarted training its most advanced AI models on October 1, eleven days after the pause began. The company is now making extensive security tests a required part of the approval process before training runs can begin. It is also using AI agents to regularly check source code and cloud settings for weaknesses, testing systems that monitor activity and automatically stop unsafe operations, and reporting discovered vulnerabilities to the open-source projects responsible for fixing them.

OpenAI says it is continuing to strengthen its security by fixing vulnerabilities in virtual machines, working with cloud partners, and using AI agents to scan code and configurations. The company is also improving monitoring and automatic shutdown systems, regularly testing its sandbox and network defenses, and making high-compute red-teaming with its most capable models a core requirement for future frontier AI training and evaluation.

“We are committed to strengthening our containment, monitoring, and red-teaming infrastructure as our frontier models become more capable and believe that this work will be a core part of responsibly pacing the development of our frontier models.” the company concludes.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Artificial Intelligence)

ChatGPT Can Now Do More in Chrome, but There’s a Security Trade-Off

OpenAI expands ChatGPT's Chrome integration with tab access and browser automation. Learn what the update means for productivity, privacy, and enterprise security.

The post ChatGPT Can Now Do More in Chrome, but There’s a Security Trade-Off appeared first on TechRepublic.

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