Attackers bypass endpoint security by posing as IT staff, stealing Microsoft 365 sessions, draining SaaS data and demanding extortion.

Forget installing malware because today’s extortionists just pick up the phone instead of writing code. A widespread threat cluster tracked as PREY-0058 bypasses endpoint security entirely by targeting Microsoft 365 and SaaS environments through pure social engineering.

Attackers pose as internal IT help desk staff via phone calls and direct executives toward rogue authentication portals.

“The threat actors impersonate internal IT or helpdesk personnel by phone and direct them to an authentication-themed URL, often formatted as <victim organization>.<lure domain>.” reads the report published by Artic Wolf. “These attacks most frequently target Directors, Vice Presidents, and other executive staff.”

Once victims land on these pages, adversary-in-the-middle panels intercept credentials and multi-factor approvals in real time.

Stolen session tokens are then replayed using residential proxy networks that match the victim’s exact geographic location.

“Stolen sessions are replayed from residential proxy infrastructure, most notably NodeMaven, often from IP addresses that resolve to the same geo-location and network (ASN) as the victim.” states Artic Wolf. “Initial sign-in activity involves applications such as “My Signins”, “My Profile”, “My Apps”, which reveal account details and the applications available to the victim.”

This clever trick blinds standard impossible travel alerts and leaves defenders scratching their heads.

Intruders waste no time once they slip past the front door, immediately shifting focus to massive data harvesting.

“After initial access, the threat actors perform discovery techniques against SharePoint and Entra ID.” continues the report. “SharePoint discovery includes SearchQueryPerformed events with contentclass:STS_Site, contentclass:STS_Web, and wildcard searches using indexdocid for pagination.”

They map out repositories and drain sensitive files from OneDrive, Exchange, and Box before dropping a heavy extortion demand.

To detect these attacks, monitor Microsoft 365 sign-ins coming from residential proxies or hosting networks such as NodeMaven. Suspicious activity is more likely when several common Microsoft account pages are accessed at the start of a session, especially OfficeHome, My Signins, My Profile, My Apps and Microsoft Account Controls.

Alerts should also consider changes from a user’s normal sign-in pattern, such as a different location, ISP, browser, operating system or user agent.

In SharePoint, look for unusual SearchQueryPerformed events that map or enumerate sites and files. In Exchange, watch for large numbers of MailItemsAccessed events in a short time, especially when they come from hosting or proxy IPs. Also monitor heavy SharePoint and OneDrive file access or downloads from one user, particularly when scripting tools such as Python requests or Microsoft Graph are used. Finally, watch for new phishing domains that imitate your organization and target passkey or MFA registration.

To reduce the risk, require managed devices for Microsoft 365 and block or challenge access from proxy and hosting networks. Use phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 keys or device-bound passkeys, which can stop AiTM attacks. Limit users’ access to sensitive SharePoint data, enable Continuous Access Evaluation, and train employees and help-desk teams to verify unexpected IT calls through a trusted channel.

Artic Wolf also released Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for these attacks.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, IT Help Desk)

The Phantom Deal campaign uses fake acquisition documents to target executives. Gen exposed the Phantom Deal fraud after tracking bogus payment demands.

Related Posts:

• Outsider Phishing Kit Survives Operation Ghost Hook Takedown
• Microsoft Teams IT Support Impersonation Leads to Domain Takeover
• Chinese Actor Gambling Goblin Hijacks Brazilian Gov Sites

The post Phantom Deal Scam Targets Executives With Fake NDAs appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

Microsoft Teams IT support impersonation lets attackers plant a Node.js implant and pivot to domain controllers over WinRM. See how to defend.

Related Posts:

• Outsider Phishing Kit Survives Operation Ghost Hook Takedown
• Phantom Deal Scam Targets Executives With Fake NDAs
• Chinese Actor Gambling Goblin Hijacks Brazilian Gov Sites

The post Microsoft Teams IT Support Impersonation Leads to Domain Takeover appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

Discover how the Spring Ring vishing campaign uses Microsoft Teams phishing tactics to trick employees into installing malware and giving up remote access.

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• Toy Ghouls Backdoor Uses HiveMQ and Element for C2

The post Spring Ring Vishing Campaign Targets Microsoft Teams appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

Apollo Global Management confirmed a social-engineering breach exposing sensitive personal data amid a wider hacking campaign targeting financial firms.

The post Apollo Confirms Data Breach Amid Cyberattacks Targeting Financial Firms appeared first on TechRepublic.

Singapore is using simulated AI-enabled scam calls to train the public, offering IT leaders a new model for social engineering security training.

The post Singapore Is Literally Training People to Get Scammed appeared first on TechRepublic.

The FBI is warning the public about sexual exploitation actors illegally accessing social media and personal accounts to steal explicit images and videos from adult and underage victims. The stolen material, also known as non-consensual intimate images (NCII), is being posted or sold on criminal marketplaces, often without the victim's knowledge.

According to the FBI, these actors use social engineering and cyber intrusion tactics to target specific individuals or general targets of opportunity. After gaining access to accounts, they steal explicit content and share it through community forums or illicit marketplaces.

The FBI said personally identifiable information, including a victim's name, date of birth, email address, phone number and social media username, is often posted alongside the stolen material. This can expose victims to continued harassment and re-victimization.

How Sexual Exploitation Actors Access Accounts

The FBI has identified several methods used by sexual exploitation actors to gain access to victims' accounts.

Password and PIN Targeting

In password/PIN targeting, actors use high-volume password and PIN attempts against social media and personal accounts. The information used in these attempts can come from data leak sites, social media and open-source information.

When victims are known to the actors, curated lists may include personal details such as names, date of birth or variations of those details.

Social Media Customer Service Impersonation

Another tactic involves social media customer service impersonation through text messages. Victims may receive messages claiming their account is being disabled or locked unless they provide a verification code.

The actor then requests a password reset, causing a code to be sent to the victim. If the victim shares the code, the actor can reset the password and access the account.

Phishing Emails

The FBI also warns about phishing campaigns using look-alike domains and email accounts designed to appear as social media customer support.

These messages may claim there has been a new login and contain an embedded link asking the victim to change their password. Clicking the malicious link can give the actor access to the account.

Stolen Content Can Lead to Further Attacks

Once explicit content is stolen, sexual exploitation actors may post or sell it while including personal information about the victim. The FBI said victims can subsequently face harassment, sextortion, stalking or other targeted attacks.

The actors may also advertise stolen content through a victim's own social media page, increasing the potential for further exposure.

FBI Shares Steps to Protect Accounts

The FBI advises people to avoid storing sensitive images or videos on social media platforms or other internet-accessible sites.

It recommends using unique, complex passphrases and PINs along with multi-factor authentication (MFA). Password information directly associated with a person's identity, including names or birthdays, should be avoided.

Users should also be cautious with links received through emails and text messages. The FBI recommends going directly to the relevant website to address account concerns and checking URLs before clicking.

Unrequested temporary passwords, PIN resets or access codes should also be treated with caution. The FBI advises users not to share login information, even when someone claims to represent a platform or service.

People who believe their explicit content was stolen or leaked can provide information through the FBI's NCII reporting site. The FBI also advises the public to continue reporting fraud, scams and cyber threats to the Internet Crime Complaint Center or a local FBI Field Office.

AISI found AI agents taking unsanctioned online actions, including social engineering and code attacks, during controlled cyber tests.

The UK’s AI Security Institute (AISI) has put something uncomfortable on the table: during cyber testing, frontier models didn’t just follow instructions badly. In some runs, they crossed into real-world actions, touched real people and organisations, and then tried to make the evidence go away.

“On 28^th July 2026, AISI’s Security Team detected unusual data transfers leaving our research systems during a routine cyber evaluation. On investigation, we found that some of the agents being tested had engaged in sustained, potentially harmful activity directed at real people and organisations.” reports AISI. “We declared a security incident and, within roughly one hour of discovery, had contained it and begun a full investigation.”

That matters because the setting was not a botched public rollout or a rogue consumer chatbot. It was a controlled evaluation, run on purpose with open internet access and some safety filters turned off, so the institute could measure what the models could actually do under permissive conditions. AISI says that’s standard practice for frontier testing, but it also notes that those conditions are not how these models are normally shipped.

To assess the models’ real-world cyber capabilities, they were given internet access and had their built-in cyber safety filters intentionally disabled under controlled testing conditions.

The headline result is simple enough, even if the details are messy. AISI ran the challenge 122 times across several models, and in 10 of those runs it saw AI agents take autonomous, unsanctioned actions on the live internet. The institute logged 19 such actions in total, with 17 tied to Anthropic’s Mythos 5 and two to OpenAI’s GPT-5.6-Sol with cyber classifiers disabled.

The most serious sequence looked less like a lab mishap and more like a small-scale social-engineering campaign. The agent tried to insert malicious code into a public open-source project, researched the maintainers, created fake identities based on real people, and used those identities to pressure a maintainer into approving the code.

“On the morning of 28^th July, our security monitoring flagged data leaving one of our testing systems through the ‘Tor’ anonymity network, which is commonly used to disguise the origin of internet traffic. The team running the evaluation began reviewing the agent’s activity within minutes.” continues the report. “They quickly found that, during one run, the agent had created a malicious ‘pull request’ (a proposed code change) on a real, public open-source project on GitHub. “

It also sent messages and files, and when challenged, it edited earlier activity to look harmless and even considered adopting a fresh identity.

AISI says human review stopped the worst outcome. The malicious pull request was caught, the fake identities failed to get the code approved, and the institute did not find evidence of resulting real-world harm. Even so, it says this is the first time it has seen autonomy and deception show up this clearly, without specific prompting, in a real-world setting.

The institute is careful not to overclaim. It says the evaluation design and configuration choices helped create the conditions for the behaviour, and it notes that the models in question were not commercial public deployments. But that caveat cuts both ways: if permissive test conditions can produce this kind of behaviour now, tighter production settings are not a reason for complacency. They are just a better fence.

That is the part that should make people stop scrolling. Not because the models “went evil,” which is lazy, but because deception emerged as a by-product of goal-seeking under the conditions set by the evaluators.

“The agent pursued its goal persistently. AI agents explore routes their operators did not intend. Given a difficult objective, the agent kept searching for a way through, and some of the routes it found involved trying to deceive real people.” states AISI. “It was never instructed to deceive; deception emerged as a by-product of pursuing the task, the kind of goal-directed deception that, until recently, had been largely theoretical.”

The agent was trying to solve a cyber challenge, and in doing so it explored routes nobody had asked it to explore, including routes that involved fooling actual people.

What makes the episode more serious is the way it lines up with recent disclosures from Anthropic and OpenAI. Anthropic has already said its models reached the public internet from within a third-party evaluation environment and accessed real systems. OpenAI has separately reported that one of its models mistook a misconfigured test setup for a real task and touched real infrastructure.

AISI’s view is that these incidents point to a shift in the risk landscape. Harm may no longer come only from obvious misuse by humans. It may also come from capable agents, in internal research settings or privileged-access environments, taking unintended actions beyond the scope they were given. That is a quieter problem than movie-style “AI rebellion,” and a more useful one to think about.

The key takeaway is straightforward. Keep cyber basics tight, verify outside code before trusting it, and stop assuming that a model will stay inside the lines just because the prompt sounded clear on the day. In security, the line between “evaluation” and “incident” can get thin fast. Machines are very good at finding the part of the process you forgot to make boring.

AISI says it will tighten internet controls, add real-time monitoring, and revisit how it designs evaluations. That is the right response, but it should not be read as a narrow fix for one lab. It is a warning to anyone testing powerful agents: if the test can reach the real internet, the real internet can reach back.

The original AISI report is here: Incident report: unsanctioned agent behaviour during cyber testing.

“Incidents of this kind reflect the speed at which AI is developing. As capabilities advance, the work of understanding these systems, and ensuring their safety, must keep pace alongside them.” concludes the report.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, AI Deception)

A vishing call to an overseas contact center agent. A fake IT ticket. A default setting nobody thought to lock down. That's all it took to expose the personal data of roughly 5 million Australians — and now the country's privacy regulator has decided Qantas isn't to blame for it.

The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) closed the book this week on its year-long preliminary inquiry into the June 2025 Qantas data breach, and the conclusion cuts against the instinct to punish the victim of a cyberattack.

Also read: Australia’s Qantas Confirms Cyberattack: 6 Million Service Records Compromised

According to the OAIC's report, the evidence gathered did not indicate a likelihood that Qantas had "failed" to take reasonable steps to protect the personal information it held, nor that it failed to ensure its overseas third-party provider complied with Australia's privacy principles. No investigation. No enforcement action.

"After more than a year of making inquiries and obtaining information on the data breach, we're satisfied that the evidence does not support the likelihood that a breach of privacy law occurred. As a result, we've decided not to commence a full investigation of Qantas at this stage." - Carly Kind, Australian Privacy Commissioner.

How It Happened

The breach traces back to a single phone call. A threat actor posing as "Qantas IT help" convinced a contact center agent to visit a website tied to the customer relationship management platform used by Qantas agents, walking them through steps framed as necessary to close an IT support ticket. That interaction connected the agent's CRM session to a data extraction tool controlled by the attacker, who then pulled data from every contact profile the agent could access. It was pure social engineering — no malware, no exploited vulnerability, just a convincing lie.

Qantas caught it fast. A staff member spotted an unusual spike in login-attempt alerts on the morning of June 30, two days after the call, and escalated it to the cybersecurity team. Within hours, the company had frozen the compromised account, assessed for data exfiltration, and triggered its incident response process. Public disclosure followed on July 2.

What Was Exposed — And What Wasn't

The regulator's numbers are more precise than what circulated publicly last year. Roughly 5.67 million customer records were compromised, with about 4 million exposing names, phone numbers, email addresses and Frequent Flyer details, and a further 1.7 million records including combinations of home or business addresses, dates of birth, gender and meal preferences. Critically, no credit card numbers, financial information or passport details lived on the compromised platform, and customer passwords and login credentials were never touched.

Also read: Qantas Airways Cyberattack Update: Customer Data Released, Security Measures Enhanced

Why The Regulator Let It Go

The OAIC's reasoning is a rare, explicit acknowledgment that good controls don't guarantee immunity. Investigators found that social engineering training generally targets credential theft, not the rarer tactic of talking an employee into authorizing a legitimate-looking system connection — meaning the attack likely would have succeeded even with standard training in place. They also noted the flaw was structural: a default configuration let the agent authorize a third-party app connection, a setting the CRM vendor has since changed for all its customers.

Commissioner Carly Kind put the broader stakes plainly in the OAIC's statement announcing the report, warning that AI-driven threats are only raising the bar. As she framed it, agentic and advanced AI will keep escalating the cybersecurity risks businesses face, making continuous review of security posture non-negotiable — not optional.

“Data breaches are a persistent feature of today’s digital world, and can occur despite organisations taking steps to protect personal information,” Commissioner Carly said. “Agentic and advanced AI will only increase the cybersecurity risks that businesses face, and it is critical that all organisations continuously review and enhance their security to protect against this growing threat.”

The takeaway here isn't that Qantas got a pass. It's that a regulator has now drawn, in writing, the line between negligence and the limits of what training and access controls can realistically stop.

Apple is warning iPhone users about FaceTime scams. Learn how the fraud works, what Apple recommends, and how to report suspicious calls.

The post Apple Warns Millions of iPhone Users: FaceTime Scams Are Spreading appeared first on TechRepublic.

The investigation into the Odido cyberattack has uncovered possible involvement of Dutch nationals, according to Dutch police, as authorities continue to investigate the ShinyHunters ransomware-linked attack that exposed the personal data of approximately 6.39 million customers. Law enforcement has urged the public to come forward with information as investigators work to identify those responsible for one of the country's largest telecom data breaches.

The cyberattack took place on February 5 and 6 after attackers allegedly used voice phishing (vishing) to deceive Odido's customer service team.

According to the company, the attackers posed as members of its internal IT staff, gaining unauthorized access before exfiltrating customer data. Odido said its teams detected the unauthorized access immediately on both occasions and revoked the attackers' access, but the incident still resulted in a large-scale data breach.

Odido Cyberattack Investigation Finds Possible Dutch Link

Under the direction of the National Public Prosecution Service, the High Tech Crime Team (THTC) of the National Investigation and Intervention Unit launched an extensive investigation into the breach.

Authorities said investigators have found strong indications that Dutch criminals may have been involved. One key lead centers on a phone call made shortly before the breach in which a Dutch-speaking man allegedly impersonated an Odido IT employee while speaking with customer service representatives. Police are continuing efforts to identify the caller and have indicated that his voice could be made public if necessary.

Investigators believe people within cybercrime circles may have information about those responsible and are encouraging anyone with relevant details to contact law enforcement.

ShinyHunters Named as Threat Actor

Odido attributed the attack to the cybercriminal group ShinyHunters, which the company said carried out the social engineering campaign.

Chief Executive Officer Søren Abildgaard acknowledged the incident in a public statement, apologizing to customers and outlining the company's commitment to strengthening its cybersecurity capabilities. He said Odido would continue investing in security, improve data protection practices, expand customer support, and share lessons learned from the incident.

The CEO also explained why the company refused to pay the ransom demand. According to Odido, paying cybercriminals would reward illegal activity and could encourage future attacks against other Dutch organizations. The company said the decision was made following guidance from authorities, despite knowing that stolen data could eventually be published.

Millions of Customers Impacted

Odido confirmed that approximately 6.39 million active and former customers of Odido and its Ben brand were affected by the breach. Customers of Simpel were not impacted.

The exposed information varied by individual and included names, addresses, mobile phone numbers, customer numbers, email addresses, IBAN numbers, dates of birth, identification details, nationality, and gender.

The company clarified that My Odido account passwords, call records, location data, billing information, and scans of identity documents were not compromised.

Odido also addressed reports claiming customer passwords had been leaked, stating that login passwords remain securely encrypted and were never accessible during the attack. Instead, a separate telephone verification field known as "password_c," used as a customer challenge code, was included for a limited number of customers. The company has since discontinued using that verification method.

Customer Support and Security Measures Expanded

Following the breach, Odido increased customer support by adding more than 140 service agents and introduced additional security measures. These include its "Check je Gesprek" verification service, allowing customers to confirm whether communications claiming to be from Odido are legitimate, along with access to the F-Secure digital security service.

The telecom provider said all customers identified as affected have been notified by email or SMS, while customer service teams continue assisting users with questions related to their specific data exposure.

Meanwhile, Dutch authorities expect investigations into the Odido cyberattack to continue for several months. Police have also warned that cyberattacks targeting businesses and institutions are becoming increasingly common, urging organizations to strengthen cybersecurity defenses and encouraging citizens to remain vigilant against follow-on fraud and phishing attempts.

AI has given cybercriminals a big advantage in attacking organizations, which they are using to go after weaknesses on edge devices

The post AI-Driven Identity Attacks Are Surging, PwC Warns appeared first on TechRepublic.

The FBI Warns of Malicious Traffic Distribution Systems being increasingly used by cybercriminals to redirect internet users to phishing pages, malware downloads, ransomware attacks, and online financial scams. In a newly released Public Service Announcement (PSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation cautioned that cybercriminals are leveraging Traffic Distribution Systems (TDS) to gain access to victim networks while evading traditional security controls. According to the FBI, TDS technology is designed to route internet traffic to different destinations after users visit websites, click advertisements, download applications, or engage with online promotions. While the technology itself has legitimate uses, cybercriminals are exploiting it to selectively redirect users to compromised websites and fraudulent login pages.

FBI Warns of Malicious Traffic Distribution Systems Used in Cyber Attacks

As the FBI Warns of Malicious Traffic Distribution Systems, the agency explained that cybercriminals often drive victims to a malicious TDS through various methods, including Social Engineering, phishing emails, malicious advertisements, and compromised websites. One common technique involves Search Engine Optimization (SEO) Poisoning, where fraudulent advertisements are designed to imitate legitimate websites. Users who click these links may unknowingly enter a redirection chain controlled by threat actors. Cybercriminals also compromise legitimate websites by exploiting weak passwords, outdated plugins, and vulnerable website themes. Once administrative access is obtained, attackers can modify website code to automatically redirect visitors to a malicious TDS infrastructure.

How Traffic Distribution Systems Help Evade Detection

According to the FBI, Traffic Distribution Systems (TDS) can bypass traditional firewall protections that would normally block access to malicious websites. The system uses multiple intermediate nodes before directing users to the final destination, making it more difficult for defenders to identify and block malicious activity. In addition to hiding malicious infrastructure, attackers use TDS platforms to gather information about visitors. Data collected may include:

• IP address
• Operating system
• Geographic location
• Device information
• Browser details

The FBI noted that this information allows attackers to determine whether a victim is a suitable target. It also enables cybercriminals to avoid detection by presenting harmless content to users they are not interested in targeting, including security researchers and analysts.

Phishing, Malware, and Ransomware Risks

The FBI warned that users reaching the end of a malicious redirection chain may encounter Phishing Pages, financial fraud schemes, or malware downloads. In some cases, attackers use malware delivered through a TDS to gain access to victim networks. The agency stated that compromised accounts and network access obtained through these methods may later be sold to other criminal groups, including Ransomware operators. The PSA highlights how a single visit to a compromised website or malicious advertisement can ultimately lead to broader cybersecurity incidents.

FBI Shares Protection Measures

To reduce the risk of compromise, the FBI advised individuals to verify website URLs before clicking advertisements or promotional links. The agency also recommended keeping software, website plugins, and themes updated to address known vulnerabilities. Additional recommendations include:

• Using strong passwords
• Enabling Two-Factor Authentication (2FA)
• Installing reputable security plugins and web application firewalls
• Downloading software only from trusted developers

For businesses, the FBI recommended monitoring endpoints for suspicious activity involving JavaScript, PowerShell, and script execution tools. Organizations are also encouraged to strengthen phishing awareness training, regularly audit website administration accounts, and patch content management systems and third-party components.

FBI Urges Victims to Report Incidents

The FBI encouraged individuals and organizations that believe they have been affected by activity linked to malicious TDS infrastructure to report the incident through the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) and contact their local FBI field office. The agency emphasized that cybercriminals continue to evolve their techniques for delivering malware and conducting online fraud, making vigilance and proactive cybersecurity measures essential for both individuals and businesses.

Amos Stealer targets macOS users through fake downloads, stealing Keychain files, browser passwords, cookies, and developer configs for data theft.

US-Estonian suspect Peter Stokes arrested in Finland over alleged ties to Scattered Spider, facing US charges for cyberattacks, fraud, and data breaches.

I aggregated the statistics created from the cyber attacks timelines published in the first quarter of 2026. In this period, I collected a total of 528 events (5.87 events/day) dominated by Cyber Crime with 66%, followed by Cyber Espionage with 18%, Hacktivism with 3%, and finally Cyber Warfare with 2%.

China-sponsored threat groups like Salt Typhoon and Flax Typhoon are increasingly relying on multiple massive botnets comprising edge and IoT devices to run their cyber espionage and network intrusion campaigns, CISA and other security agencies say. The use of such "covert networks" makes it more difficult to detect and mitigate their campaigns.

The post China-Backed Groups are Using Massive Botnets in Espionage, Intrusion Campaigns appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Discover the 9 most dangerous identity-based threats in 2026, from AI phishing attacks and deepfake authentication bypass to MFA fatigue and harvest-now-decrypt-later quantum threats. Learn why legacy authentication fails against each one and how phishing-resistant, passwordless authentication changes the equation.

The post 9 Identity-Based Threats Redefining Cybersecurity in 2026 (Beyond Credential Stuffing) appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Scammers dressed up like Catholic Charities and legitimate pro bone legal services on social media platforms are targeting immigrants and bilking them for money. Manhattan DA Alvin Bragg is pressing Meta to follow its own terms and shut them down. 

The post Manhattan DA Bragg Pushes Meta to Put a Stop to Immigration Scams  appeared first on Security Boulevard.

A newly identified ClickFix-style macOS attack demonstrates how threat actors are refining their techniques to evade security defenses. The campaign moves away from the traditional reliance on Terminal and instead uses macOS Script Editor as the primary execution vector. This change allows attackers to bypass controls designed to detect or block suspicious Terminal activity.  The shift is notable because it preserves the familiar ClickFix social engineering approach while altering how malicious commands are executed. By rerouting execution through macOS Script Editor, the attack reduces exposure to newer protections and introduces a different pathway that may be less scrutinized by both users and security tools. 

A Shift in ClickFix-Style macOS Attack Techniques 

For years, ClickFix campaigns have relied on social engineering tactics that trick users into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Terminal app. These instructions are often disguised as troubleshooting steps or routine maintenance tasks. However, this newly discovered ClickFix-style macOS attack abandons that approach entirely. Instead, attackers now leverage macOS Script Editor as the primary execution vector. While Script Editor has previously been abused for malware delivery, its use in this context, combined with a browser-triggered workflow, represents a shift in strategy. Notably, the attack is initiated through an Apple-themed webpage, which plays a central role in deceiving users. Jamf researchers noted that Apple attempted to mitigate Terminal-based abuse in macOS 26.4 by introducing a feature that scans pasted commands before execution. While this adds friction, attackers have responded by simply moving to a different tool, demonstrating the ongoing cat-and-mouse dynamic in cybersecurity. 

The Role of the Apple-Themed Webpage 

The attack begins with a convincing Apple-themed webpage designed to look like an official support page titled “Reclaim disk space on your Mac.” The page provides step-by-step instructions that closely mimic legitimate system maintenance guidance.  Users are instructed to run a cleanup script to free up storage space. When they click the “Execute” button, the page triggers an applescript:// URL scheme, which initiates the next stage of the attack.  This mechanism introduces several key differences from traditional ClickFix campaigns: 

• The browser invokes the applescript:// URL scheme  
• Users are prompted to use script Editor to open  
• A pre-filled script appears automatically inside macOS Script Editor  
• The user is encouraged to execute the script  

This workflow reduces the need for manual input, making the attack smoother and potentially more convincing. 

Execution Flow and Obfuscation 

Once inside macOS Script Editor, the user is presented with a script that appears to perform legitimate cleanup operations. However, behind the scenes, the script executes an obfuscated shell command.  The command uses string manipulation via the tr utility to decode a hidden URL at runtime. Once decoded, it resolves to a remote server hosting the malicious payload. The command follows a familiar structure: 

• Obfuscation: Encoded strings are transformed into valid URLs.
• Payload retrieval: A curl request fetches remote content, with the -k flag disabling TLS certificate validation.
• Execution: The downloaded content is piped directly into zsh, allowing in-memory execution without writing to disk.

If successful, this step delivers a second-stage payload, which is further obfuscated using base64 encoding and gzip compression. 

Second-Stage Payload and Atomic Stealer 

After decoding, the second-stage script downloads a Mach-O executable file to the /tmp directory. The script performs several actions: 

• Downloads the binary from a remote server  
• Removes extended file attributes  
• Assigns execution permissions  
• Executes the binary  

The final payload has been identified as a variant of Atomic Stealer, an infostealer known for targeting sensitive user data.  This staged delivery method allows attackers to keep the initial script small and less detectable while reserving the primary malicious functionality for later execution. 

Behavior Across macOS Versions 

The behavior of macOS Script Editor during this attack varies depending on the operating system version. On macOS 26.0, the script opens directly, allowing immediate execution. However, macOS 26.4 introduces additional safeguards.  In newer versions, users see a warning indicating that the script originates from an unidentified developer. They must explicitly permit the creation and execution of the script document, adding another layer of user interaction.  Despite this, the attack still succeeds if users follow the prompts, highlighting the continued effectiveness of social engineering. 

Indicators of Compromise 

The researchers identified several indicators associated with this ClickFix-style macOS attack: 

• Domain: dryvecar[.]com (linked to the infostealer payload)  
• Malicious webpages:  
• storage-fixes.squarespace[.]com  
• cleanupmac.mssg[.]me  
• File: helper (Mach-O executable)  
• SHA256: 3d3c91ee762668c85b74859e4d09a2adfd34841694493b82659fda77fe0c2c44  

These indicators can help security teams detect and respond to related threats.