The UK Ukraine AI partnership will give Britain access to Ukraine’s Avengers AI Labs, bringing together Ukrainian battlefield experience, operational data and engineering expertise with the UK’s AI ecosystem. The agreement, signed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Andy Burnham in Ukraine, will focus initially on defence and national security. Under the partnership, British innovators and researchers will gain access to data and insights collected across the battlefield. The UK government described Avengers AI Labs as a “goldmine of battlefield data,” offering researchers access to real-world operational information used to train AI models.

How Avengers AI Labs Uses Battlefield Data

The data is collected through thousands of daylight cameras and infrared sensors deployed across the battlefield. The systems capture images and information involving tanks, artillery, air defence systems, infantry and aerial targets, including Shahed drones and reconnaissance UAVs. The data is used to train AI models to recognize and classify battlefield objects. Ukraine’s Defense Ministry has previously said that systems trained using the Avengers Labs platform analyze more than 100,000 drone video feeds each month and help identify about 70% of enemy targets in real time. The UK’s access to the platform is intended to allow British startups, researchers and engineers to work with operational insights and develop technologies based on real-world datasets. The partnership will initially bring together engineers, academics, businesses and military operational expertise from both countries to address national security challenges. The two countries will also explore additional platforms for future collaboration.

UK Ukraine AI Partnership Test New Defence Technology

Several pilot projects involving British startups have already been rolled out as part of the agreement. The companies named are Bristol-based Sintela, Oxford’s Mind Foundry and London’s Skyral. The first technology is due to be deployed at a UK defence site to help protect bases from protestors and hostile actors seeking intelligence. The project combines Ukrainian data with UK technology and turns buried fibre-optic cables into an AI-enabled sensor. The technology could also be used in other critical locations, including airports, prisons, railways and energy plants, according to the information released about the partnership. A second project will examine the development of next-generation low-power AI chips designed for future drones, robotics and autonomous systems. If successful, the technology could support machines designed to operate for longer, respond faster and function in environments where conventional systems face limitations.

AI Sovereignty and Defence Innovation

The agreement forms part of the UK and Ukraine’s 100 Year Partnership and expands cooperation between the two countries in AI and defence technology. The UK will provide access to its universities, researchers, technology companies and AI ecosystem, while Ukraine will provide access to operational experience and datasets generated during the war. Minister for AI Kanishka Narayan described the arrangement as AI sovereignty in practice, focused on developing national capabilities and turning frontline experience into technologies for military and critical infrastructure protection. The partnership also follows the UK government’s announcement that defence firm MBDA can release classified information on UK components for the long-range SCALP missile to establish local assembly lines in Ukraine. The broader agreement is intended to combine Ukrainian battlefield data with British scientific, engineering and technology expertise, with the initial focus remaining on defence, national security and the development of future defence technology.

An exposed operator directory reveals how one actor compromised 14,000+ Dahua cameras across Ukraine and Russia, no password needed for most.

A researcher discovered an exposed directory containing the tools of an attacker who compromised more than 14,000 Dahua cameras between June 17 and July 22, 2026, mainly in Ukraine and Russia. Hunt.io reconstructed the operation, named Operation CameraSwarm, from the leaked files and telemetry.

The find started with a mistake. On 23 July, Hunt.io’s AttackCapture system crawled a server at 154.86[.]119.60 and pulled down 2,616 files across 234 subdirectories, 407 MB in total, from an HTTP directory the operator had left wide open. That single slip handed researchers the operator’s scanning engine, exploit chains, exfiltration bot, and a Windows stealer staged on the same box.

“This is the second Dahua-related camera compromise operation we’ve traced back to an exposed operator directory in as many weeks. Where last week’s investigation centered on a Russian-speaking operator running a purpose-built platform against 58 cameras, this one is a different scale entirely.” reads the report published by Hunt.io.

The brute-force engine alone reached over 12,300 unique addresses. A separate authentication-bypass chain, built around two 2021 Dahua vulnerabilities, planted a persistent backdoor account on 1,923 cameras, an account stored independently of the admin password that survives both a password change and, on most firmware, a factory reset. A third path skipped IP addresses entirely and reached 283 cameras purely by serial number, through Dahua’s own cloud relay.

That third path is the part worth sitting with. Most of those cameras were exposed online without authentication.

Dahua’s cloud relay lets any app reach a camera sitting behind NAT using nothing but its serial number, and authentication to that relay runs on credentials baked identically into every Dahua client ever shipped. The operator’s own code logs the result of probing this channel at scale: 89.4 percent of live serials returned an open, no-authentication channel. Nine out of ten cameras, reachable by anyone who could guess or harvest a serial number.

“The device never authenticates the connecting party. It authenticates the session, via a token the cloud issued before the device was contacted. Obtaining that token requires only the fixed SDK credentials shared by every legitimate Dahua application.” continues the report. “The only real barrier to reaching any camera through this path is knowing its serial number, precisely what the operator’s harvesting pipeline exists to produce at scale.”

Getting from the tunnel session to full admin access still requires valid credentials or an authentication bypass. However, the attacker’s own logs suggest that most exposed cameras did not need this final step.

There are also two important details about the reported CVEs. The tool links its persistent backdoor technique to CVE-2024-39943, but that CVE actually refers to a different command-injection flaw in Rejetto’s HTTP File Server. The technique is valid, but the CVE reference is wrong. Likewise, the relay abuse is not CVE-2025-31702, which Dahua describes as a narrower authenticated privilege-escalation flaw. Incorrect CVE references can send defenders looking for the wrong fix.

Hunt.io also found something that had nothing to do with cameras: a UPX-packed Windows binary, tagged as SalatStealer, staged on the same server alongside a PowerShell script that disables Windows Defender five different ways, including a Group Policy key built to survive reboots and Defender updates. The researchers treat it as a separate, unrelated capability riding along on shared infrastructure, not part of the camera campaign proper.

What stands out across the whole toolkit is that none of it was built from scratch. The brute-force engine, the bypass chain, the relay tooling, the recovery-code generator: each traces to a different public repository, credited (sometimes accurately) to at least six other developers. The operator assembled, patched, and rewrote, layering Russian comments over Spanish code in one component recovered in three separate stages of the same rewrite.

“The same toolkit also recovers stored device passwords outright, through a routine that derives its decryption key entirely from values the attacker already holds, device class prefix and serial number, so no device secret is needed. A residual Spanish comment in that code confirms it came from the same upstream source as the original brute-forcer.” states the report.a

The offline recovery-code generator is arguably the most consequential piece precisely because it doesn’t need a compromised device at all. Given a live serial number, it derives a code entirely offline that unlocks Dahua’s cloud-level account-recovery flow, no current credentials required. Removing a backdoor account doesn’t touch this. Only Dahua changing how the code is derived would.

For anyone running Dahua gear, or the OEM-rebranded lines built on the same backend (Amcrest, Lorex, Annke, Swann, among others), the practical checklist is short: check for a p2pwn account and remove it, disable P2P on any device where it isn’t actually needed, confirm firmware is patched against the 2021 bypass pair, and rotate every credential that camera ever held, since the exfiltration bot grabbed those too. None of that fixes the recovery-code problem. That one sits with the vendor.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)

A suspected ARMA cyberattack has targeted Ukraine's Asset Recovery and Management Agency as it prepares to select a manager for assets linked to IDS Ukraine. ARMA said its servers experienced unauthorized interference ahead of the August 22 deadline for applications, prompting an investigation into whether the incident was part of a broader effort to disrupt its operations. The Asset Recovery and Management Agency, known as ARMA, manages assets seized by Ukrainian authorities, including assets linked to sanctioned Russian individuals and alleged collaborators with Moscow.

ARMA Cyberattack Raises Questions Over IDS Ukraine Competition

ARMA said the attack occurred shortly before the August 22 deadline for applications to participate in the competition to select a manager for assets controlled by sanctioned Russian oligarch Mikhail Fridman. The agency said its experts and law enforcement authorities are examining the cyberattack and the events surrounding the IDS Ukraine competition. The Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU, is investigating the recent attack, while a broader National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, or NABU, investigation is examining earlier alleged interference. According to ARMA, signs of illegal interference in processes connected to its work have been recorded since spring. These included unauthorized access to the agency's officials' register. ARMA said the combination of cyber incidents, information activity and increased inquiries from some media outlets and members of parliament had raised concerns about a possible coordinated campaign. The agency said investigators must determine whether these events were intended to disrupt its work, create pressure or affect the competition. ARMA has not identified those it believes may have organized or carried out the alleged campaign.

IDS Ukraine Selection Continues Despite Cyberattack

Despite the incident, ARMA said the competition to select the IDS Ukraine asset manager will proceed according to the procedures and timeframe established by law. The deadline for applications is August 22, 2026, with the competition announcement published through Ukraine's Prozorro public procurement system. The agency said it has also started an audit of the financial indicators of seized IDS group assets to support the legality, objectivity and transparency of the transfer process. ARMA said additional information concerning possible unauthorized access to officials' email accounts and official information will be provided to law enforcement authorities for investigation and legal assessment. Acting ARMA Head Yaroslava Maksymenko said the agency would continue the competition despite what it described as information pressure, political interference and attempts to gain unauthorized access to its resources.

Ukraine Investigates Possible Coordinated Interference

ARMA said the latest incident is not being viewed in isolation. The agency pointed to a similar episode earlier this year, when Reuters reported on a cyberattack involving attempts at interference and hacking alongside increased information activity and inquiries. The agency said each event could have an individual explanation, but their timing and combination warranted further investigation. The cyberattack comes as Ukraine continues efforts to prevent sanctioned Russian capital from retaining control over assets seized in the country. ARMA said this includes preventing control through management arrangements, intermediaries or influence groups. Fridman has been sanctioned by Ukraine and several Western governments since Russia's invasion. ARMA said the final responsibility for determining the organizers, customers and perpetrators of the attack rests with the ongoing investigations. The agency said it will continue the IDS Ukraine competition and act within the law while law enforcement agencies examine the reported cyber incidents and possible attempts to interfere with its activities.

UAC-0099 delivers malware via a fake Notepad++ plugin after phishing, using a loader that sabotages itself if run without the correct arguments to hinder analysis.

CERT-UA published a new advisory attributing a phishing campaign to UAC-0099, a Russia-aligned threat actor active since at least mid-2022 and previously known for exploiting WinRAR vulnerabilities and using phishing emails to deliver malware families including LONEPAGE, MATCHBOIL, and DRAGSTARE.

The latest campaign, observed earlier this summer, uses a trojanized Notepad++ plugin as the infection mechanism. It’s a meaningful change in delivery method for a group that’s been refining its toolset steadily for three years.

The attack starts with a phishing email carrying an image attachment. Clicking it opens a URL hidden behind a link shortener, which redirects to a file-sharing service such as EasySend[.]co where a ZIP archive waits. Inside the ZIP is a VBScript file disguised as a PDF document.

Running the VBScript triggers two things simultaneously. A legitimate decoy PDF downloads and opens in front of the victim to hold their attention, while in the background the script fetches a second archive called Evernote.zip. That archive contains a full working copy of Notepad++ version 8.8.3, a malicious DLL plugin named NppExport.dll, a password-protected RAR archive called updater.rar, and a legitimate WinRAR executable.

“The mentioned archive contains a VBS script with a double extension, the name of which may intentionally contain a significant number of spaces before the final .vbs extension , for example “Zavodskyi rayon.pdf .vbs”. In turn, when launched, the script will download a decoy file (for example “Zavodskyi rayon.pdf”) and the “Evernote.zip” archive.” reads the advisory. “The archive contains a full set of Notepad++ program components version 8.8.3, as well as the “/plugins/NppExport/” directory, which contains a third-party plugin library “NppExport.dll”, a password-protected archive “updater.rar” and the WinRAR executable file “winrar.exe”.”

The VBScript extracts everything and launches Notepad++, which loads NppExport.dll as it starts up. The victim sees a text editor open normally and has no reason to suspect anything happened.

The malicious DLL, codenamed LUNCHPOKE by CERT-UA, uses the bundled WinRAR binary to unpack the password-protected archive. That archive contains two files: RemoteLibUpdater.exe and InitTest.dll. LUNCHPOKE copies them to a specific directory and creates a scheduled task that runs RemoteLibUpdater.exe every three minutes. The three-minute interval is aggressive and keeps the implant active even after unexpected process termination.

“The file “NppExport.dll” is classified as a LUNCHPOKE utility , the main purpose of which is to create the directory ” %PUBLIC%\Libraries\fFthY3-Ytrevc3w-ab3\ “, extract the contents of the archive “updater.rar” to it using a password (in particular, the files “RemoteLibUpdater.exe” and “InitTest.dll”), copy the standard utility “schtasks.exe” to the file ” %PUBLIC%\Wallpapers\Background.exe ” and create a scheduled task with the name ” \W1n3r-U09oTy-Ap5\Updates ” to run the file ” %PUBLIC%\Libraries\fFthY3-Ytrevc3w-ab3\RemoteLibUpdater.exe ” with the arguments “setup nodisplay” every three minutes (the name of the directory ” fFthY3-Ytrevc3w-ab3 ” changes).” states CERT-UA.

RemoteLibUpdater.exe is BURNYBEAR, a loader whose job is to execute InitTest.dll. That DLL is a modified version of MATCHBOIL, a C#-based loader capable of fetching and running additional payloads, now designated MATCHBOIL.V2. The update indicates active development on the toolchain rather than a static deployment.

BURNYBEAR includes an unusual built-in sabotage behavior.

“The executable file “RemoteLibUpdater.exe” is classified as a BURNYBEAR utility , the functionality of which is designed to load the DLL file “InitTest.dll”. However, if “RemoteLibUpdater.exe” is launched incorrectly, namely without specifying arguments, BURNYBEAR instead activates logic designed to exhaust computer resources (RAM and CPU).” states the report.

That behavior serves a dual purpose: it makes behavioral analysis harder by producing unexpected output if someone runs the binary without the correct arguments, and it provides a rough sandbox detection mechanism since automated analysis environments often execute binaries without arguments.

This campaign arrives alongside a separate U.S. government advisory documenting Laundry Bear, another Russia-linked actor, running a phishing campaign against Zimbra mail servers belonging to Western government and commercial organizations since at least July 2025. That campaign uses a “half-click” exploit abusing CVE-2025-66376 to deliver malicious JavaScript called ZimReaper, which can harvest email communications without requiring the victim to click anything beyond opening a malicious email in a vulnerable webmail client. The U.S. government’s assessment of Laundry Bear’s intent is unambiguous:

CERT-UA recommends updating WinRAR, 7-Zip, and Notepad++ to their latest versions to close known vulnerabilities that groups like UAC-0099 use to facilitate follow-on stages once they’ve established a foothold.

The campaign’s use of a bundled legitimate WinRAR executable rather than relying on one already installed is notable: it means the attack chain doesn’t depend on the victim having a vulnerable version present, which makes the update recommendation more relevant as a general hygiene measure than as a specific remediation for this particular campaign. Organizations receiving unexpected emails with image attachments that open URLs through link shorteners should treat those as high-risk regardless of what the displayed content looks like.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Notepad++)

Russian hackers from the TA488 group exploited a Zimbra webmail flaw triggered when emails were opened or previewed, stealing credentials and up to 90 days of messages from victims.

Ukraine's computer emergency response team, CERT-UA, has warned that the Kremlin-backed Sandworm hacking group is leveraging fake CAPTCHA checks on compromised websites that persuade users to run malicious code. Read more in my article on the Hot for Security blog.

Ukraine’s SSU and the FBI Just Confirmed Russian Intelligence Has Been Systematically Hacking Messenger Accounts for Years.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), working jointly with the FBI, has formally exposed a sustained Russian intelligence campaign targeting the messaging accounts of government officials, military personnel, politicians, and activists across Ukraine, Europe, and the United States.

The operation is ongoing. The goal isn’t disruption; it’s intelligence collection.

“Cyber ​​experts of the Security Service of Ukraine together with the Federal Bureau of Investigation exposed Russian special services in systematic cyberattacks on messengers of officials, military personnel, politicians and activists from Ukraine, Europe and the USA.” read the alert by SSU.

“The purpose of these ‘hacks’ is to gain access to sensitive information of a military, political and economic nature that was exchanged between users, as well as to steal their personal data.”

The attack method is low-tech by design. Operators send SMS messages impersonating platform support bots, asking targets to hand over account credentials, confirmation codes, PINs, or account recovery keys. The SBU notes that these messages tend to arrive in the morning hours, when targets are physically and emotionally less guarded. Timing is a social engineering choice, not an accident.

The scope is broader than most people assume.

“The SBU emphasizes that Russian special services and hackers associated with them attack not only organizations, officials or public figures, but also personal accounts of Ukrainians.” continues the alert.

This isn’t a targeted elite program. It’s a mass collection operation with a tiered approach: high-value targets get more sophisticated techniques, ordinary citizens get the SMS impersonation play. The SBU didn’t attribute the campaign to a specific group by name, but prior reporting from Google, the FBI, and CISA ties similar activity to clusters tracked as UNC5792 and UNC4221, both linked to FSB operations, as well as Star Blizzard.

The FBI’s June 26 advisory added a new technique to what the March warning described. Russian operators have evolved from chasing one-time verification codes to specifically targeting Signal Backup Recovery Keys, which unlock an account’s entire message history and remain valid even if the user creates a new account with the same phone number afterward. This is a meaningful escalation: a stolen verification code expires, a stolen Recovery Key doesn’t.

QR codes are another active vector the SBU specifically calls out. Scanning a QR code received from an unknown bot or user can silently link the attacker’s device to the victim’s account, a technique Google’s Threat Intelligence Group documented against Signal’s linked-devices feature in early 2025.

“Russian hackers use a variety of tools and methods for such cyberattacks. For example, to extract passwords to an account, the enemy most often uses SMS messages on behalf of ‘support teams.'” states SSU.

The variety matters: blocking one delivery mechanism doesn’t stop the campaign, because the operators rotate techniques and targeting lists continuously.

The SBU’s practical guidance covers the basics that still fail most users in practice. Check active sessions in your messenger regularly and end anything you don’t recognize. Enable two-factor authentication with a complex alphanumeric PIN, not a four-digit code. Never provide confirmation codes, PINs, passwords, or recovery keys to anyone, regardless of how legitimate the request appears. Don’t scan QR codes from unknown sources. Don’t follow suspicious links even from accounts you know, because that account may already be compromised. Anyone who receives a suspicious message in a messenger can report it to the SBU’s Cybersecurity Situation Center at incident@dis.gov.ua.

Last week, the FBI and CISA updated their March 2026 warning about Russian intelligence phishing campaigns, and the new advisory adds a detail that wasn’t in the original: the operators have shifted their primary objective from stealing verification codes to stealing Signal Backup Recovery Keys.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Ukraine)

Researchers warn GhostShell is using fake drone documents to target Ukrainian defence teams, stealing passwords and sensitive data in a new cyber campaign.

Ukrainian national Oleksii Lytvynenko has pleaded guilty in the US to wire fraud conspiracy linked to Conti ransomware, which hit more than 1,000 victims and generated at least $150 million in ransom payments.

The National Police of Ukraine has disclosed an international cybercrime operation tied to the theft of nearly 30,000 customer accounts belonging to a California-based online retailer, authorities said this week. According to Ukraine’s Cyber Police Department, investigators identified an 18-year-old resident of Odessa who allegedly played a key role in a large-scale account theft scheme involving stolen session data, malicious software, and unauthorized online purchases that caused millions of hryvnias in losses. The investigation was conducted by cyber police officers in the Odessa region and the Main Investigation Department of the National Police under the procedural guidance of the Prosecutor General’s Office. Ukrainian authorities said the operation was carried out in cooperation with US law enforcement agencies through international legal assistance mechanisms. [caption id="attachment_112203" align="aligncenter" width="817"] Image Source: Cyber ​​Police Department, National Police of Ukraine[/caption]

Account Theft Scheme Targeted Thousands of Online Store Users

Investigators said the account theft scheme operated throughout 2024 and 2025 and targeted customers of an online store based in California. According to law enforcement officials, attackers gained unauthorized access to more than 28,000 customer accounts. At least 5,800 compromised accounts were later used to make fraudulent purchases worth approximately $721,000. Authorities estimated the resulting financial damage, including chargebacks and related losses, exceeded $250,000, or roughly 11 million Ukrainian hryvnias. Officials believe the cybercriminal group relied heavily on infostealer malware to compromise victims’ devices and collect sensitive login credentials.

Infostealer Malware Used to Steal Session Data

Investigators said attackers deployed malicious software commonly known as “infostealers” to secretly infect users’ devices. The malware was designed to harvest:

• Login credentials
• Session cookies
• Authentication data
• Browser-stored information

Once collected, the stolen information was transmitted to infrastructure controlled by the attackers. Law enforcement officials said the data was later processed, organized, and sold through specialized underground online platforms and Telegram bots frequently used by cybercriminal communities. Cybersecurity experts have repeatedly warned about the growing use of infostealer malware in credential theft campaigns because stolen session tokens can sometimes allow attackers to bypass passwords and authentication mechanisms. The investigation suggests the stolen session data became a central component of the broader account theft scheme uncovered by Ukrainian authorities.

Odessa Resident Accused of Managing Criminal Infrastructure

During the investigation, police identified an 18-year-old suspect from Odessa who allegedly managed parts of the online infrastructure used in the cybercrime operation. According to authorities, the suspect administered systems connected to:

• Processing stolen session data
• Selling compromised credentials
• Managing access to stolen accounts
• Supporting transactions involving cryptocurrency

Investigators also alleged that cryptocurrency services were used to conduct financial settlements between members of the cybercriminal network. Ukrainian law enforcement officers conducted two searches at the suspect’s residence, where they seized multiple digital devices and other evidence connected to the case.

Police Seize Digital Evidence in Cybercrime Investigation

During the searches, authorities confiscated:

• Mobile phones
• Computer equipment
• Bank cards
• Electronic storage devices
• Cryptocurrency exchange account information

Investigators said they also discovered access credentials linked to platforms used for selling stolen data, email accounts associated with compromised customer profiles, and server activity logs connected to the cybercrime operation. Officials stated the seized evidence further confirmed the suspect’s alleged involvement in the account theft scheme and broader illegal cyber activities. The investigation remains ongoing as authorities continue working to identify additional individuals connected to the operation.

Growing Threat of Infostealer Attacks

The latest case highlights the increasing global threat posed by infostealer malware and account takeover operations targeting online platforms and e-commerce services. Cybercriminal groups are increasingly using credential-stealing malware to harvest browser data and session information from infected devices. Stolen credentials are then sold through underground marketplaces or used directly for financial fraud, identity theft, and unauthorized purchases. Security researchers have also warned that Telegram-based cybercrime services are making stolen credentials and malware distribution more accessible to lower-skilled attackers. The operation uncovered by Ukrainian authorities reflects how international cybercrime networks continue exploiting compromised accounts, cryptocurrency infrastructure, and underground data markets to carry out financially motivated attacks across borders.

Europol has seized First VPN, a service used by ransomware gangs, arrested its administrator and gained access to data linked to thousands of users.

Ukrainian cyber defenders reported a newly intensified cyber campaign that is targeting Ukraine’s healthcare system and local government agencies, with attackers deploying increasingly sophisticated malware and social engineering tactics.

In a fresh advisory, the CERT-UA said the activity—linked to a threat cluster tracked as UAC-0247—spiked between March and April 2026, with clinical hospitals, emergency services, and municipal bodies bearing the brunt of the attacks.

UAC-0247 Used Humanitarian Aid Lures as Entry Point

The campaign begins with phishing emails disguised as offers of humanitarian assistance—a tactic designed to exploit trust during wartime conditions. Victims are urged to click on links that appear legitimate, sometimes backed by convincingly crafted fake websites or compromised third-party resources.

Behind the scenes, however, the links trigger a multi-stage infection chain that ultimately gives attackers remote control over the victim’s system.

Once clicked, victims download an archive containing a malicious shortcut file. This file activates a built-in Windows tool to execute remote code, initiating a sequence that includes decoy documents to avoid suspicion.

Also read: Hackers Impersonate Ukrainian CERT to Plant a RAT on Government, Hospital Networks

The attack escalates quickly. Malicious executables are deployed via scheduled tasks, injecting code into legitimate system processes such as RuntimeBroker.exe to evade detection.

Recent campaigns show an evolution in sophistication, with attackers introducing multi-stage loaders and custom executable formats. Payloads are often encrypted and compressed, making analysis and detection more difficult.

At later stages, attackers deploy reverse shell tools—including variants resembling “RAVENSHELL”—to establish encrypted communication with command-and-control servers and execute remote commands.

Persistent Access and Remote Control

To maintain long-term access, attackers install a custom backdoor known as AGINGFLY, a C#-based malware designed for full remote system control. The tool enables:

• Command execution
• File exfiltration
• Screenshot capture
• Keylogging

Unlike conventional malware, AGINGFLY dynamically retrieves and compiles its command logic from remote servers, making it more adaptable and harder to detect.

Complementing this is a PowerShell-based tool dubbed SILENTLOOP, which helps maintain persistence and retrieves command server addresses—sometimes even pulling them from Telegram channels.

Credential Theft and Lateral Movement

Once inside a network, attackers move quickly to expand access. CERT-UA observed tools like CHROMELEVATOR being used to extract browser credentials, while ZAPIXDESK targets WhatsApp data.

The attackers also conduct internal reconnaissance using both custom scripts and publicly available tools such as RUSTSCAN. For stealthy movement across networks, tunneling tools like LIGOLO-NG and CHISEL are deployed.

In at least one case, attackers went further—embedding the XMRIG cryptocurrency miner inside a modified version of the legitimate WireGuard application, highlighting a secondary motive of financial gain.

Military Targets Also in Scope

The campaign isn’t limited to civilian infrastructure. CERT-UA noted an incident in March where individuals connected to Ukraine’s defense sector were targeted via the Signal platform.

Attackers distributed a trojanized version of software used by FPV drone operators, packaged as a seemingly legitimate update. In reality, the download triggered a DLL side-loading attack that installed the AGINGFLY backdoor.

CERT-UA recommends reducing exposure by restricting the execution of high-risk file types such as LNK, HTA, and JavaScript files. The agency also urges organizations to limit the use of native Windows tools like mshta.exe and PowerShell where possible, as these are frequently abused in attacks.

Russian state has tolerated parallel probiv market for its convenience but now Ukrainian spies are exploiting it

Russia is scrambling to rein in the country’s sprawling illicit market for leaked personal data, a shadowy ecosystem long exploited by investigative journalists, police and criminal groups.

For more than a decade, Russia’s so-called probiv market – a term derived from the verb “to pierce” or “to punch into a search bar” – has operated as a parallel information economy built on a network of corrupt officials, traffic police, bank employees and low-level security staff willing to sell access to restricted government or corporate databases.

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© Photograph: Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP

© Photograph: Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP

© Photograph: Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP