Passkeys were supposed to make stolen passwords a thing of the past. No password to phish, no secret to reuse, and no string of characters sitting in a database waiting to be leaked.
Over time, it’s thought that passkeys will replace passwords entirely. But what happens when malware steals the master key?
Researchers have found a way for malware to hijack passkey-protected accounts through Google Password Manager, highlighting an important exception: passkeys can be very secure but the software surrounding them still has weaknesses.
Passkeys are a password replacement based on public‑key cryptography. Instead of a secret you remember and type, each account gets a key pair where the private key never leaves your devices, and the website only ever sees the public key and signed challenges. Because there’s nothing reusable to phish or reuse on another site, passkeys are marketed as “phishing‑resistant” and safer than passwords stored in a browser or password manager.
By the end of 2024 Google reportedly said that 800 million Google accounts used passkeys.
Passkeys have a major advantage over passwords: there is nothing useful for a phishing site to steal. A passkey is also tied to the website it was created for, making it much harder to trick into authenticating to the wrong domain.
The other significant difference is that if malware steals a password vault, an attacker still often needs to get past a second factor on another device, such as an authenticator app on your phone, before they fully own the account. With passkeys, many services relying on them simply trust the passkey assertion, and in some cases even trust a single “user verified” flag without confirming whether a real biometric or PIN event occurred.
The researchers, however, started with a malware infected Windows computer and came up with three possible attack scenarios to steal Google synchronized passkeys. Google Password Manager can synchronize passkeys between devices, which is convenient since you don’t want to register a new passkey every time you buy a new computer. But it also opens them up to abuse.
From bad to worse the attacks are:
The researchers urge services to stop blindly trusting the user verification flag and to properly validate that a real User Verified event occurred before granting access. Google, in turn, is encouraged to harden device registration and recovery, and verify that new devices and keys are backed by genuine hardware rather than accepting them at face value.
For end users, passkeys still offer strong protection against classic phishing websites and credential stuffing attacks based on reused passwords. The weak point highlighted here is not so much the concept of passkeys, but the way they’re implemented, synchronized, and trusted without enough verification on the server side.
Until vendors close these gaps, basic anti‑malware hygiene remains critical. The best ways to prevent malware from using your passkeys are:
From reporting threats to removing them.
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
Explore how passkey implementation gaps undermine security when relying parties fail to validate the User Verified flag, reducing MFA to a single factor.
The post Pass the Passkey: A Novel Attack Surface in Passwordless Authentication appeared first on Unit 42.
A new phishing campaign is targeting Signal users by attempting to steal their backup recovery keys to access encrypted message archives.
The attack is initiated by a text message pretending to come from Signal Support.
“Action Required: Data Recovery Needed
Your Signal account data (message and media) Is at risk of permanent loss due to a sync issue.
To avoid losing your messages and media:
1. Go to Settings -> Backups -> Configure -> Enable backups -> View Recovery Key.
2. Copy the recovery key to your clipboard.
3. Paste the key into this chat.
This links your existing backup to your account. Failure to do this may result in losing access to your account and all stored data.”
There are a few red flags in this message:
The attack exploits Signal’s Secure Backups feature, which allows users to store encrypted archives of their conversations on Signal’s servers. These backups are protected by a 64-character recovery key.
That key should never leave the user’s device and is never shared with Signal’s servers. If hackers obtain this key and gain control of a victim’s account, they can download and decrypt the entire message history.
For an attacker, that’s even better than hijacking an account, which would only give them access to future messages.
For now, the attacks appear to be targeted. We have seen reports from journalists, reports of attacks on Chinese activists, and warnings from a researcher who investigates cyberattacks against journalists, dissidents, and human rights activists. But now that other cybercriminals are aware of this opportunity, the tactic could spread rapidly.
Signal explicitly states that it will never reach out to users first and will never request registration codes, PINs, or recovery keys.
Scammers know more about you than you think.
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