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Leaked Russian Cyber-Operations Training Materials

This is interesting:

The records describe a force-generation mechanism for several General Staff components, including the GRU, Main Operational Directorate, and 8th Directorate, which is associated with protected communications, cryptography, and information security.

[…]

The reporting also linked a 2024 Department No. 4 graduate, Aleksei Kondrashov, to Military Unit 74455, widely known as Sandworm.

That unit has been associated with destructive cyber activity against Ukraine and other targets, including the 2017 NotPetya attack.

The reports do not establish that every listed graduate participated in a named operation; assignments should therefore be described as reported unit placements, not proof of individual operational involvement.

The Bauman material reframes Russia’s cyber capability as an institutional system, not merely a collection of well-known threat groups.

It suggests that Moscow has formalized a recurring pathway from university recruitment to military service, where students receive supervised technical and ideological preparation before entering intelligence, cyber, and security roles.

For defenders, the leak reinforces the need to track Russian operations as a combined threat: espionage, destructive activity, military reconnaissance, technical surveillance, and influence campaigns may draw on related personnel pipelines and overlapping doctrine.

The exposure of Department No. 4 also provides researchers with a clearer lens for understanding how the GRU sustains cyber capacity beyond the familiar APT28 and Sandworm brand names.

New Mexico’s Meta Ruling and Encryption

Mike Masnick points out that the recent New Mexico court ruling against Meta has some bad implications for end-to-end encryption, and security in general:

If the “design choices create liability” framework seems worrying in the abstract, the New Mexico case provides a concrete example of where it leads in practice.

One of the key pieces of evidence the New Mexico attorney general used against Meta was the company’s 2023 decision to add end-to-end encryption to Facebook Messenger. The argument went like this: predators used Messenger to groom minors and exchange child sexual abuse material. By encrypting those messages, Meta made it harder for law enforcement to access evidence of those crimes. Therefore, the encryption was a design choice that enabled harm.

The state is now seeking court-mandated changes including “protecting minors from encrypted communications that shield bad actors.”

Yes, the end result of the New Mexico ruling might be that Meta is ordered to make everyone’s communications less secure. That should be terrifying to everyone. Even those cheering on the verdict.

End-to-end encryption protects billions of people from surveillance, data breaches, authoritarian governments, stalkers, and domestic abusers. It’s one of the most important privacy and security tools ordinary people have. Every major security expert and civil liberties organization in the world has argued for stronger encryption, not weaker.

But under the “design liability” theory, implementing encryption becomes evidence of negligence, because a small number of bad actors also use encrypted communications. The logic applies to literally every communication tool ever invented. Predators also use the postal service, telephones, and in-person conversation. The encryption itself harms no one. Like infinite scroll and autoplay, it is inert without the choices of bad actors ­- choices made by people, not by the platform’s design.

The incentive this creates goes far beyond encryption, and it’s bad. If any product improvement that protects the majority of users can be held against you because a tiny fraction of bad actors exploit it, companies will simply stop making those improvements. Why add encryption if it becomes Exhibit A in a future lawsuit? Why implement any privacy-protective feature if a plaintiff’s lawyer will characterize it as “shielding bad actors”?

And it gets worse. Some of the most damaging evidence in both trials came from internal company documents where employees raised concerns about safety risks and discussed tradeoffs. These were played up in the media (and the courtroom) as “smoking guns.” But that means no company is going to allow anyone to raise concerns ever again. That’s very, very bad.

In a sane legal environment, you want companies to have these internal debates. You want engineers and safety teams to flag potential risks, wrestle with difficult tradeoffs, and document their reasoning. But when those good-faith deliberations become plaintiff’s exhibits presented to a jury as proof that “they knew and did it anyway,” the rational corporate response is to stop putting anything in writing. Stop doing risk assessments. Stop asking hard questions internally.

The lesson every general counsel in Silicon Valley is learning right now: ignorance is safer than inquiry. That makes everyone less safe, not more.

The essay has a lot more: about Section 230, about competition in this space, about the myopic nature of the ruling. Go read it.

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