2,000 leaked files expose Bauman University’s hidden Department No. 4, which trained GRU-linked hackers and propagandists linked to APT28 and Sandworm.

Leaked Documents Expose Bauman University’s Hidden Department That Trained Hackers, Propagandists, and Malware Developers for the GRU

More than 2,000 internal documents from Bauman Moscow State Technical University have been reviewed by an international media consortium, and the picture they describe is not a conventional cybersecurity program. The files span academic and administrative records through 2025.

“Recently leaked records show that Bauman Moscow State Technical University’s Department No. 4 operated as a long-term training pipeline for Russian military intelligence and cyber operations.” reads the report published by DomainTools. “The department served several elements of the Russian General Staff and trained roughly 250 career and reserve students across three specialties: special intelligence (“Служба специальной разведки”), operational information-technical effects (“Применение сил и средств информационно-технического воздействия и защиты от информационно-технического воздействия”), and information-technology protection (”3ащита информационных технологий”). “

Department No. 4, also called “Special Training,” operated inside Bauman’s Military Training Center and doesn’t appear anywhere on the university’s public organizational chart. The GRU’s talent pipeline tends not to announce itself.

The investigation was carried out by a group of media outlets including The Insider, The Guardian, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, Delfi, VSquare, and FRONTSTORY.PL. DomainTools researchers also analyzed the leaked files independently. A DarkForums user known as “Losyash” may have shared the data, but it has not been confirmed that the account originally obtained the records.

The department trained students in three military specialties. These covered special intelligence, information and cyber operations, and the protection of IT systems. In practice, the courses included espionage, offensive cyber operations, electronic reconnaissance, secure systems, and influence operations.

Around 250 career and reserve students went through the program over six academic years. Researchers estimate that 10 to 15 students each year were selected for GRU-related assignments before graduating.

“Technical protection training covered cryptography and steganography, as well as code analysis and intrusion detection. Students were also trained in hardware inspection, the discovery of physical implants, and the identification of undocumented device functions. These subjects point to possible assignments in technical counterintelligence and supply chain security, as well as firmware analysis and embedded system inspection. Other likely functions include secure procurement and the protection of specialized military platforms.” continues the report. “The files also reveal an underreported malware-analysis and cyber threat intelligence program.”

One advanced practical assignment required the creation of a social-media video built around what the course materials called “manipulation, pressure, and hidden propaganda.” This counted as coursework.

Course materials defined “information-technical weapons” as tools and methods designed to alter, destroy, copy, block, or manipulate information. Red-team and blue-team functions were treated as a single discipline, not separate tracks, which mirrors how Russian military doctrine actually deploys cyber operators.

The personnel links are what make this more than a training curiosity. The leaked records identify Major General Viktor Netyksho as involved in Department No. 4’s oversight. Netyksho was the former commander of Military Unit 26165, the GRU formation publicly associated with APT28, also tracked as Fancy Bear, Sofacy, and STRONTIUM. He was among the 12 GRU officers indicted by the United States in 2018 for interference in the 2016 presidential election.

“Reporting identified graduates assigned to GRU Military Unit 26165 (associated with APT28) and Military Unit 74455 (associated with Sandworm), and linked senior officers, including former Unit 26165 commander Viktor Netyksho, to student oversight.” continues the report. “The data also connected senior GRU officers to the supervision and evaluation of Bauman students. Viktor Netyksho, the former commander of Unit 26165 and the 85th Main Special Service Center, is part of the department’s teaching and oversight structure.”

The reporting also identifies Aleksei Kondrashov, a 2024 Department No. 4 graduate, as linked to Military Unit 74455: the GRU’s Main Center for Special Technologies, known publicly as Sandworm, or APT44. That unit has been associated with the 2017 NotPetya attack and ongoing destructive operations against Ukraine. DomainTools also connected graduates and senior staff to Military Unit 29155, a GRU formation linked to sabotage and assassination operations in Europe.

A necessary precision: the reports establish unit placements, not individual operational involvement. A documented assignment to Military Unit 74455 doesn’t establish that a specific person participated in a specific attack. That distinction matters for both attribution work and legal proceedings.

What the leak does establish is the factory behind the names. APT28 and Sandworm are the threat groups that security teams track, attribute, and brief about. Department No. 4 is where some of the people running those operations were systematically trained, assessed, and selected.

For defenders, DomainTools summarizes the implication precisely: Russian operations should be tracked as a combined threat in which espionage, destructive attacks, military reconnaissance, technical surveillance, and influence campaigns draw on the same personnel pipelines and the same underlying doctrine. The Bauman material makes that pipeline visible for the first time at this level of institutional detail.

“The documents show that Department No. 4 is a small part of a larger long-term military training system, not a single hacking unit. The program prepared personnel for espionage and offensive cyber operations within a larger Russian technical university system.” concludes the report. “Its doctrine treated cyber warfare as more than network intrusion. Students were taught not only adversarial cyber warfare, but also a larger holistic doctrine of cyber war using both defense and attack to be better able to carry out successful campaigns.”

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Russia)

BlueDelta (APT28) uses webhook.site and Microsoft Edge to hide HOOKEDGE espionage traffic targeting European governments.

Recorded Future’s Insikt Group documented a campaign by BlueDelta, the Russian GRU-linked group that overlaps with the group APT28, running an entire espionage operation against European government targets using webhook.site, a service built for developers to test HTTP requests, as its command-and-control backbone.

The campaign ran from late September 2025 through early April 2026, targeting government and diplomatic organizations in Romania, Spain, and Türkiye.

“The campaigns delivered a lightweight Windows batch-script backdoor, dubbed “HOOKEDGE,” via macro-enabled Microsoft Word documents using diplomatic-themed lures, including material impersonating Spain’s Ministry of the Presidency, Justice and Relations with the Cortes, created shortly after a September 2025 meeting between Spanish and Moldovan officials.” states the report by Insikt Group.

“Insikt Group assesses with moderate confidence that this activity was conducted by BlueDelta (which overlaps with APT28, Fancy Bear, and Forest Blizzard), a Russian state-sponsored threat group attributed to the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).”

The attackers used a fairly old-school trick: macro-enabled Word documents. One of them looked like a real meeting agenda from Spain’s Ministry of the Presidency and appeared shortly after an actual meeting between Spanish and Moldovan officials. The timing was interesting because it came just before Moldova’s September 2025 parliamentary elections. The document looked credible enough to make the phishing attempt believable.

The backdoor, called HOOKEDGE, is surprisingly simple. It uses a Windows batch script and relies on two webhooks. One receives commands, while the other sends the stolen data back to the attackers. Every 30 minutes, a scheduled task downloads a command file through Microsoft Edge, runs it and sends the results to another endpoint. The malware uses Edge to make the traffic look like normal web activity, making it harder for security tools to spot.

That reliance on a real browser for both tasking and exfiltration is the cleverest part of the whole design.

“A notable aspect of HOOKEDGE is its use of msedge.exe for both tasking and exfiltration. By generating network traffic through a legitimate web browser rather than a commonly abused LotL binary (LOLBin) or a custom binary, the malware blends its communications with normal enterprise browsing activity.” continues the report.

Recorded Future explains, and that’s really the entire evasion strategy in one sentence: don’t build something exotic, just make your traffic look exactly like an employee checking a website.

BlueDelta didn’t build HOOKEDGE from scratch either. It shares deep code and structural overlap with HEADLACE, a backdoor the same group used years earlier, right down to identical JavaScript variable names and the same base64 encoding scheme for automated downloads.

“HOOKEDGE’s code and structural design have significant overlap with HEADLACE, a backdoor used by BlueDelta in previous campaigns.” states the report.

Recorded Future assesses with moderate confidence that HOOKEDGE is a direct evolutionary successor, maintained by the same operators rather than a fresh tool built by a different team, which fits BlueDelta’s long-documented habit of refining working tradecraft instead of reinventing it.

The operation also included a triage mechanism worth understanding on its own. Once a victim showed signs of being worth deeper attention, active communication with the initial webhook endpoints, BlueDelta deployed a second HOOKEDGE payload configured to check in every five minutes instead of thirty, giving operators much faster interactive control over higher-value targets. That two-tier setup also solved a practical infrastructure problem: webhook.site’s free tier caps out at 100 requests per endpoint, so spreading routine and high-priority tasking across separate endpoints kept any single one from getting exhausted mid-operation.

BlueDelta kept tuning the operation continuously rather than treating it as a finished product. Beaconing intervals stretched from 30 minutes to 61, deliberately timed to slip past sandbox environments that typically only watch a sample’s behavior for an hour. The group added canary tracking pixels named things like mailopened.jpg and docopened.jpg to monitor exactly when a phishing email got opened versus when the document itself got opened versus when macros actually executed, essentially building analytics for their own phishing funnel.

“The malicious document also contains a hidden image referencing a remote webhook URL: hxxp://webhook[.]site/62114596-33f5-47fb-9012-0223529e5a13/docopened[.]jpg. This serves as a document-open “canary,” alerting BlueDelta operators when a victim opens the lure. Later variants used the filename doc.jpg in place of docopened.jpg.” states Insik. “Insikt Group also identified webhooks using the filename mailopened.jpg, indicating that BlueDelta likely used a similar canary mechanism to monitor when recipients opened phishing emails, providing operators with visibility into campaign delivery success before any payload execution.”

That kind of detailed tracking of what victims do would look very familiar to a marketing team. The difference is that here the targets are victims, not customers.

For defenders, the useful indicators are quite clear. Block macros in documents downloaded from the internet, monitor scheduled tasks that launch scripts from user-writable folders, and flag Microsoft Edge running in headless mode or making automated connections to file-sharing and webhook services that the organization does not normally use. You don’t need sophisticated tools to spot these behaviors. Even a well-configured monitoring system should be able to detect them early. The worrying part is that a persistent, state-backed group can still rely on a small set of behaviors that defenders can identify and block.

For defenders, the actionable pieces here are concrete rather than abstract. Block macro execution from documents that arrived over the internet, watch for scheduled tasks spawning script interpreters from user-writable folders, and specifically flag Microsoft Edge running in headless mode or making automated requests to file-hosting and webhook services your organization doesn’t actually use for anything legitimate. None of this requires exotic tooling to catch, which is oddly reassuring: a threat group this persistent and state-backed is still, at its core, relying on the same handful of detectable behaviors that a properly configured monitoring setup would catch on day one.

“BlueDelta is likely to continue conducting initial access campaigns against European government and diplomatic organizations in support of Russian intelligence collection. Given the enduring strategic importance of European governance, NATO-related affairs, and diplomatic engagement with former Soviet republics, the intelligence requirements driving this activity are unlikely to diminish in the near term.” concludes the report.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, BlueDelta)

Hackers compromised hotel Wi-Fi gateways to redirect users to fake Microsoft 365 login pages and steal credentials.

ReliaQuest’s threat research team just documented attackers compromising the Wi-Fi gateways at hotels and conference centers, then quietly rerouting guests toward fake Microsoft login pages. No phishing email required. No malicious attachment. Just bad luck about which hotel you picked.

“Adversaries have been compromising public Wi-Fi gateways at hotels, conference centers, and other shared venues to hijack the accounts of traveling corporate employees.” reads the report published by ReliaQuest. “Once they control the Wi-Fi gateway, they quietly redirect users to attacker-controlled infrastructure to steal credentials, in activity ongoing since at least June 2026.”

The mechanism is simple once you see it. These gateways handle DNS for every device that connects, so whoever controls the gateway controls where your traffic actually goes, even when the address bar looks completely normal. ReliaQuest found compromised devices across several US cities plus India and Saudi Arabia, hitting employees from finance, law, healthcare, energy, and retail, which tells you this isn’t aimed at one industry. It’s aimed at anyone who travels for work.

Researchers think the entry point was weak or reused admin credentials on internet-facing management interfaces, things like exposed SSH or web consoles.

“ReliaQuest assesses with low-to-medium confidence that initial access into these devices exploited exposed management interfaces (including internet-facing SSH, SNMP, and web administration consoles) in combination with weak or reused administrative credentials.” continues the report. “We encountered visibility constraints into the individual devices that prevented confirmation of this hypothesis, but this methodology would be consistent with the gateway targeting and DNS poisoning patterns documented in recent reporting on an APT28-linked campaign known as “FrostArmada.””

Once inside, the attackers pointed DNS toward domains built to look like Microsoft’s login pages, including m365-owa.com and ms365-live.com. The whole thing runs on trust, since a device joining a network just assumes the DNS resolver it’s handed is telling the truth.

That trust gets abused in a way that dodges the DNS protections people already have. Switching to a hardcoded resolver like 8.8.8.8 doesn’t save you, because the query still leaves the laptop unencrypted and the gateway can rewrite the answer before it ever reaches Google’s server. Encrypted DNS tools help only if they run in strict mode; the default “opportunistic” mode quietly falls back to plaintext the moment encryption fails, and that fallback is exactly what gets hijacked.

“Two configurations do stop it. A full-tunnel VPN routes all DNS through the corporate tunnel before the gateway can touch the request. Encrypted DNS in strict mode (DNS over HTTPS or DNS over TLS with plaintext fallback disabled) ensures the gateway can’t forge a response.” states the cybersecurity firm. “Most DNS encryption tools default to opportunistic mode, which permits plaintext fallback when encrypted resolution fails. That fallback is what the gateway redirects, making opportunistic mode insufficient; only strict mode closes the gap.”

ReliaQuest also caught something extra in about a third of cases: an attempt to abuse Windows’ automatic proxy discovery feature, known as WPAD.

WPAD is a Windows feature that automatically discovers proxy settings when a device connects to a network. In this campaign, attackers abused it by controlling DNS responses, potentially tricking Windows into loading a malicious proxy configuration. If successful, they could intercept traffic from browsers, authentication services, and enterprise apps. Because the traffic still uses HTTPS, the attack can blend in with normal network activity and be difficult to detect.

Pull that off and the attacker routes a much wider slice of an employee’s traffic, not just login attempts, through their own proxy. In a smaller number of cases, the attackers skipped credential theft entirely and went after Microsoft’s device-code sign-in flow instead, tricking users into approving a login they didn’t realize belonged to someone else. Approve that prompt and the attacker walks away with a valid, MFA-cleared session token, no password needed.

“In roughly one-third of observed cases—Windows devices that didn’t have Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPAD) disabled, or Mac devices—the attacker also attempted WPAD abuse. If successful, it routes all Windows application traffic through the attacker’s proxy, broadening the redirection surface well beyond authentication traffic.” continues the report. “This technique wasn’t documented in prior FrostArmada-linked reporting, making it one of the clearest distinctions between this campaign and previously observed APT28 activity.”

There’s a pattern connecting all this to previous campaigns. The tradecraft echoes a Russian-linked operation called FrostArmada, which hit home routers the same way earlier this year, and researchers tie both to the group known as APT28 (aka UAC-0001, aka Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, Sofacy Group, Sednit, BlueDelta, and STRONTIUM). The link isn’t a smoking gun; it’s shared technique, not shared infrastructure, and the researchers say so plainly.

The fix is almost boringly simple, which is rare in this line of work. Force every corporate device onto an always-on VPN with full-tunnel routing, so DNS never touches the hotel network at all, and shut off split-tunnel exceptions that would let it sneak through anyway. Disable WPAD where nobody needs it, block Microsoft’s device-code flow at the identity provider unless someone has a real reason to keep it, and train people to check the certificate before they type a password on airport or hotel Wi-Fi.

None of this requires new budget or a six-month project. It requires someone actually flipping the switches that already exist.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Hotel Wi-Fi )