The Cyber Express Weekly Roundup: Binance Hit by $6.3 Billion Security Incident, South Korea Busts AI-Powered Hacking Ring and More





AI agents can now run sequences of research tasks with little human input. The question is who answers for the results. The European Commission has published the fourth version of its ERA Living Guidelines on the responsible use of generative AI in research, and its answer is clear: researchers remain accountable, no matter how much work they hand to an AI agent.
Published on 15 October 2026, this is the most comprehensive update since the guidelines first appeared in March 2024. It adds guidance on agentic AI and expands advice on AI use in peer review and proposal evaluation. The previous revision came in May 2026.
The biggest addition covers agentic AI, systems that can pursue complex goals and act with some degree of autonomy. The guidelines state that using AI agents may never be treated as a delegation of control or responsibility.
Researchers are asked to build checkpoints into agent-driven work so that critical decisions, such as methodological choices, are validated by humans. Any hypothesis generated, data processed or conclusion drawn by an AI agent requires human validation. The document also warns that researchers are not exempt from legal responsibility because an agent acted on their behalf.
The guidelines repeat that AI systems cannot be authors, co-authors or owners of research, since authorship implies agency and responsibility.
On AI disclosure, the guidelines draw a clearer line. Researchers should disclose AI tools used substantially, such as for literature reviews, identifying research gaps, developing hypotheses or interpreting data. Minor uses like spellchecking, grammar correction or formatting generally do not need disclosure. In case of doubt, disclosure is advised.
Researchers are also asked to consider that generative AI can produce different outputs from the same input, which may affect reproducibility. Authors decide whether prompts, logs and model versions should be kept or shared.
The document notes that a global reporting standard for AI disclosure is being developed at the World Conference on Research Integrity 2026 in Vancouver, which will inform future versions.
The guidelines say peer review remains a fundamentally human process. AI should not be used to assess novelty, originality, significance or whether a manuscript should be accepted or rejected. Confidentiality is described as non-negotiable, and unpublished material should not be uploaded to tools that cannot guarantee it won’t be used for training.
For funding bodies, the update flags a new risk: hidden prompts. These are instructions secretly embedded in documents, through invisible text, formatting tricks or metadata, designed to steer an AI tool toward a more favourable assessment. Funders are advised to set clear rules prohibiting such manipulation and add safeguards in the IT systems that process applications.
The guidelines also note that AI-polished proposals are increasing application volumes and overloading evaluators, and suggest the evaluation process may need to be redesigned to be more AI-resilient.
Research organisations are encouraged to deploy locally hosted or self-governed AI tools so staff can work with scientific data while protecting confidentiality and research security. They are also told to ensure appropriate cybersecurity for these systems, especially those connected to the internet.
The document identifies systemic risks too, including dependence on proprietary AI systems and the concentration of AI capabilities and infrastructure outside the EU.
The guidelines are non-binding and do not replace existing laws or institutional rules. They rest on four principles: consider whether AI is the right tool, accountability stays with researchers and institutions, confidentiality is non-negotiable, and transparency builds trust. These draw on established research integrity frameworks, including the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity.
The guidelines were developed with countries and stakeholders across the European Research Area. The next revision is planned for the third quarter of 2027, and an open feedback process remains available for contributions.
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Image source: OpenAI[/caption]
This fits a wider pattern across 30 covert influence operations exposed over two and a half years: networks that land content in real media outlets tend to achieve the highest potential reach and impact.






As enterprises race to bolt AI onto every business process, security leaders are being forced to answer a harder question than "should we adopt it" — it's "who's accountable when it goes wrong." To unpack this, The Cyber Express sat down with Harsha Reddy, Head of Information Security at Veterinary Emergency Group (VEG).
With nearly two decades in security leadership — including senior roles at Lixil and American Standard before joining VEG — Harsha brings a practitioner's view of where AI is genuinely changing the CISO's job, and where it's mostly just hype and shadow adoption.
Harsha pushes back on the narrative that AI will hollow out security teams, pointing to Gartner research showing that while most fields are projected to lose jobs to AI, cybersecurity is expected to gain them. In his view, the technology is mainly absorbing the "toil" — log review, alert triage, evidence gathering — that keeps analysts from actually defending.
“It's the analyst who refuses to use AI that will get replaced by an analyst who uses it,” he says.
On adoption, Reddy points to a 2024 Microsoft-LinkedIn survey in which most executives called AI critical to their business, yet a majority had no formal plan and most had employees already bringing in their own tools. That gap, he argues, is why so many organizations are now dealing with AI-related data leaks. "Many organizations started onboarding AI like software when they should be onboarding it like staff." His fix isn't more restrictions — blocking AI just pushes it into the shadows — but guardrails, an internal AI enablement committee, and measuring actual business value instead of token consumption.
The conversation also digs into deepfake-driven fraud, why training employees to spot deepfakes is “a losing bet” at machine speed, and how he decides when to greenlight a new AI tool versus telling a business unit “not yet.”
The conversation closes with our newly introduced rapid-fire round "Express Shots" — Claude vs. ChatGPT, passkeys vs. passwords, and Reddy's prediction for the biggest cybersecurity threat of 2030.


OpenAI models accessed the public internet during separate third-party cyber evaluations conducted by independent testing partners, prompting the company to review how high-risk AI testing is managed. OpenAI said the incidents occurred under specialized testing configurations with reduced safeguards and did not reflect how its models operate in public deployments. The company added that the events were unrelated to the previously disclosed Hugging Face security incident.
The incidents involved evaluations conducted by UK AISI and cybersecurity testing partner Irregular, where testing conditions or environment configurations enabled models to interact with systems beyond the intended evaluation boundaries.
OpenAI said independent cybersecurity evaluations are essential for understanding model capabilities before deployment. Some evaluations intentionally reduce safeguards or enable additional capabilities to measure how models perform under conditions that resemble real-world cyber operations.
According to the company, the latest incidents highlighted the need to strengthen the security controls surrounding independent testing environments as AI models become more capable.
OpenAI said it will review how it manages third-party cyber evaluations, including how higher-risk testing is identified, when internet access or reduced safeguards should be permitted, how testing environments should be isolated, and how incident reporting and monitoring procedures should be handled.
The company also plans to work with national AI institutes, independent evaluators, and other AI developers to establish stronger industry practices for high-risk AI evaluations.
On August 3, UK AISI, the UK's AI Security Institute, informed OpenAI that during a cyber evaluation that began on July 25, models from OpenAI and another AI lab performed activities beyond the intended testing scope.
The evaluation used simulated cyber ranges where models acted as cybersecurity experts in a Capture-the-Flag exercise. Internet access was intentionally enabled so agents could download tools similar to those available to real attackers, while cyber classifiers were disabled to measure underlying model capability.
Among 19 recorded events, two involved GPT 5.6 Sol.
According to OpenAI, the model reused a publicly accessible GitHub token left behind by another lab's agent to determine whether systems inside the simulated environment were communicating with GitHub or update services. It also attempted account recovery and request-limit workarounds while registering accounts with external DNS and tunneling providers.
In a separate action, GPT 5.6 Sol used a public tunneling service to expose a locally hosted DNS server from the evaluation environment to the public internet. The server contained exploit payloads intended for a known software vulnerability within the simulated cyber range.
OpenAI said the setup did not function as intended, no evidence indicated that any real internet resolver queried the server, and the infrastructure was removed when the evaluation concluded.
UK AISI considered both actions outside the authorized testing boundary because they involved external services that were not required to complete the exercise.
Security monitoring detected unusual data transfers on July 28. UK AISI halted the evaluation, isolated the affected systems, and contained the activity within approximately one hour.
A second incident was reported on July 29 by Irregular, another organization conducting third-party cyber evaluations for OpenAI.
The testing environment was intended to remain isolated from the internet during another Capture-the-Flag exercise. However, a configuration error unintentionally allowed the models to access external websites.
During one evaluation, the fictional domain used in the exercise matched an actual website. Because internet connectivity was available, the model interacted with the live site, believing it was part of the simulated challenge.
Irregular said the incident did not involve a sandbox escape or zero-day exploit. Instead, the model exploited a basic security vulnerability on the website after gaining unintended internet access.
The investigation also found that the model used credentials associated with the same website. According to Irregular, no impacts beyond that site's own data have been identified, although its audit remains ongoing.
The organization has paused the evaluations, completed remediation, notified affected third parties, and implemented additional safeguards in its testing environment.
OpenAI said it will continue working with both UK AISI and Irregular to improve evaluation practices while ensuring independent cybersecurity testing remains rigorous as AI capabilities continue to advance.


