Operation Endgame has dealt another blow to cybercriminal operations after international law enforcement agencies and private sector partners dismantled infrastructure supporting the SocGholish, Amadey, and StealC malware families. The coordinated operation resulted in the seizure of more than EUR 41 million in criminal cryptocurrency assets, the recovery of 27 million stolen login credentials, and the disruption of hundreds of servers and domains used to distribute malware.

Led by Europol and Eurojust, the operation brought together authorities from Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Microsoft, and several cybersecurity organizations. Officials said the objective was to disrupt the infrastructure cybercriminals rely on to launch ransomware attacks, financial fraud, and attacks against critical infrastructure.

Operation Endgame Targets Cybercrime Infrastructure

During the coordinated action, authorities targeted the infrastructure supporting malware delivery rather than focusing on a single malware family.

Law enforcement and industry partners took action against 326 servers and 142 domains, significantly disrupting malware distribution channels. Investigators also identified and restricted criminal cryptocurrency assets currently valued at more than EUR 41 million (USD 47 million) while recovering approximately 27 million stolen login credentials.

According to Europol, the operation aimed to disrupt the "assembly line" used by cybercriminals to gain initial access to victim systems before deploying ransomware or stealing sensitive information.

[caption id="attachment_112936" align="aligncenter" width="600"] Image Soure: Europol[/caption] [caption id="attachment_112937" align="aligncenter" width="600"] Image Source: Europol[/caption]

SocGholish, Amadey and StealC Malware Played Different Roles

The operation focused on three malware families that are commonly offered under the cybercrime-as-a-service model.

• SocGholish functioned as a malware loader that distributed fake browser updates through compromised WordPress websites. Users who installed these fake updates unknowingly infected their systems, allowing attackers to gain initial access and later deploy ransomware or other malicious tools.
• StealC malware primarily targeted sensitive information stored on infected devices, including passwords, authentication data, and digital identities. The stolen information was later used for fraud or traded within cybercriminal marketplaces.
• Amadey was mainly distributed through phishing campaigns. It provided attackers with initial access to compromised systems while also offering information-stealing capabilities that enabled the theft of sensitive user data.

Microsoft reported that during the first two weeks of May 2026 alone, Amadey and StealC malware were linked to more than 140,000 infected computers worldwide.

Thousands of Infected WordPress Sites Cleaned

One of the largest actions under Operation Endgame targeted SocGholish, also known as FakeUpdates.

Authorities remediated 14,971 infected WordPress websites, including websites belonging to restaurants, automotive repair businesses, and other organizations. Investigators also disabled the SocGholish botnet by taking control of domains and shutting down supporting servers.

Website owners whose credentials had been exposed were notified through platforms including Have I Been Pwned, DIVD, Spamhaus, CheckjeHack, NoMoreLeaks, Shadowserver, and NL-NCSC.

The Dutch Police urged WordPress administrators to change passwords, enable multi-factor authentication, remove unknown administrator accounts, and keep their websites updated to reduce future compromise risks.

SocGholish Linked to Evil Corp

Authorities said SocGholish has been linked to Evil Corp, a Russian cybercriminal group previously associated with the Zeus and Dridex malware families, as well as multiple ransomware and money laundering operations.

Rather than targeting only malware operators, investigators focused on disrupting the broader infrastructure supporting cybercriminal activity. Europol said this strategy increases operational costs for threat actors and makes large-scale cyberattacks more difficult to execute.

Europol Coordinates Global Cyber Operation

Europol's European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) coordinated operational intelligence sharing through SIENA while providing analytical, technical, and cryptocurrency tracing support throughout the investigation.

The operation forms part of Operation Endgame, described by Europol as the largest international initiative to disrupt ransomware enablers worldwide.

Officials said the latest disruption reflects a growing international strategy of targeting the infrastructure that enables cybercrime operations, rather than responding only after attacks have occurred.

Sunil Varkey has been appointed as Executive Vice President (EVP) and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) at Hexaware Technologies, where he will lead the company's information security strategy, governance, risk management, and enterprise resilience initiatives. The appointment marks the latest leadership role for the cybersecurity veteran, who brings more than three decades of experience across global enterprises and multiple industry sectors. Based in Chennai, India, and operating in a hybrid work model, Varkey will be responsible for strengthening enterprise cybersecurity governance, risk management frameworks, and overall security strategy at Hexaware Technologies. His appointment was announced in June 2026.

Sunil Varkey to Lead Cybersecurity Strategy at Hexaware Technologies

In his new role, Sunil Varkey will oversee key areas including information security governance, enterprise risk management, and resilience initiatives. His responsibilities align with Hexaware Technologies' broader technology and growth objectives as the company continues to support large-scale digital transformation programs for clients worldwide. Hexaware Technologies delivers technology-led services across application development, cloud services, automation, data analytics, and enterprise IT operations. The company serves organizations across multiple industries and supports digital modernization initiatives at scale. Varkey's appointment comes as organizations continue to focus on strengthening cybersecurity programs and managing digital risks across increasingly complex technology environments.

More Than 30 Years of Cybersecurity Leadership Experience

Varkey brings over 30 years of experience in cybersecurity leadership spanning banking, telecommunications, IT services, manufacturing, and enterprise technology sectors. His professional experience extends across India, the Middle East, and the United States. His areas of expertise include cybersecurity governance, risk and compliance (GRC), security architecture, incident response, DevSecOps, cloud security, privacy management, cyber defense, business continuity management, security operations, and AI security. Prior to joining Hexaware Technologies, Varkey served as Cyber Security Consultant and Advisor at TAHAKOM in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, from June 2023 to March 2025. In that role, he worked alongside the organization's CISO to enhance cybersecurity resilience and strengthen security posture. Before TAHAKOM, he held the position of Vice President and Chief Technology Officer for EMEA and APJ at Forescout Technologies Inc. between April 2021 and November 2022. Based in Dubai, he focused on IT/OT security strategy, enterprise cybersecurity advisory services, and product positioning across global markets.

Leadership Roles Across Global Organizations

Between March 2020 and January 2021, Varkey served as Managing Director and Global Head of Cyber Security Assessments and Testing at HSBC in Hyderabad. He led a team of approximately 300 professionals responsible for penetration testing, threat modeling, vulnerability management, and third-party security risk assessments. Earlier, from December 2018 to February 2020, he worked as CTO and Security Strategist for the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe region at Symantec. His responsibilities included developing cybersecurity strategies for enterprise, government, industrial, and financial sector organizations. His career also includes senior leadership positions such as Global CISO at Wipro, CISO for Security and Privacy at Idea Cellular, and Vice President of Security Engineering at Barclays. Additionally, he held global security leadership roles at GE Capital, Genpact, Paramount Computer Systems, and other multinational organizations.

Focus on Governance, Risk Management, and Enterprise Resilience

Throughout his career, Varkey has overseen cybersecurity functions covering governance, compliance, strategy, security engineering, incident response, privacy, cloud security, cyber defense, and enterprise resilience. His experience includes leading security programs for organizations with large-scale user bases and complex operational environments. At Wipro, he served as Global CISO for a technology company supporting more than 200,000 end users. At Idea Cellular, he led security and privacy initiatives for a telecom operator with approximately 120 million subscribers. With his appointment, Hexaware Technologies adds a cybersecurity leader with extensive experience in building and scaling security programs across global enterprises. The move underscores the company's continued focus on strengthening cybersecurity operations, governance frameworks, and digital risk management capabilities as part of its ongoing technology initiatives.

The cybersecurity posture of the U.S. oil and gas sector has come under renewed scrutiny following Operation Epic Fury, with a new independent survey revealing a disconnect between operator confidence and actual operational technology (OT) security capabilities. While companies across the upstream and midstream energy segments have accelerated cybersecurity investments since the February 28 launch of Operation Epic Fury, the findings suggest many organizations may still lack the tools needed to identify real-time cyber threats targeting OT environments.  The independent survey, conducted on behalf of Tosi, examined the views of OT decision makers across U.S. oil and gas operators. The research found that most respondents believe they can detect an active OT cyber breach within 24 hours. However, the same OT decision makers acknowledged relying heavily on systems and processes not specifically designed to monitor OT infrastructure.  According to the survey data, 87 percent of operators rated themselves as confident in their ability to detect an OT breach within a day, assigning their organizations a score of four or five on a five-point confidence scale. Despite that confidence, 51 percent said their detection capabilities primarily depend on IT security tools that provide only limited visibility into OT-specific network traffic.  Another 27 percent of respondents said they would depend on field operators or technicians identifying irregularities manually, while only 16 percent reported using continuous OT monitoring as the primary basis for cyber threat detection. Sakari Suhonen, CEO of Tosi U.S., warned that this gap represents a major vulnerability for the energy sector in the wake of Operation Epic Fury.  “This is the most consequential blind spot in U.S. energy infrastructure right now,” Suhonen said. “The sector has the budget, the executive attention, and the will to act. What it does not yet have is detection that actually sees OT. After Operation Epic Fury, that distinction is the difference between catching an intrusion in hours and finding out about it from a production outage.” 

Operation Epic Fury Drives Rapid OT Security Spending 

The independent survey was fielded in April 2026, approximately six weeks after Operation Epic Fury began. Researchers noted that the speed of the sector’s response has been unusually aggressive compared to previous cybersecurity cycles.  One of the clearest trends identified by OT decision makers involved changing perceptions of cyber risk. Sixty-three percent of surveyed operators said cyber risk is now higher than it was before February 28, with 13 percent describing the increase as significant.  Respondents identified several key factors contributing to elevated risk levels, including growing convergence between IT and OT systems, increased targeting of energy infrastructure by state-sponsored cyber actors, and expanding dependence on third-party remote access technologies.  The independent survey also showed that emergency cybersecurity funding is already being deployed. Ninety-four percent of operators said they had either approved or were actively reviewing unplanned OT security spending linked directly to the post-Operation Epic Fury threat landscape. Among OT decision makers surveyed, 95 percent expect OT cybersecurity budgets to increase over the next 12 months, while one in four anticipated budget growth exceeding 20 percent. 

OT Decision Makers Prioritize Detection and Visibility 

The survey findings indicate that OT decision makers are placing greater emphasis on visibility and detection capabilities rather than traditional perimeter security tools.  When respondents were asked to identify the single most important OT security capability to improve over the next year, 22 percent selected continuous monitoring and anomaly detection. Another 20 percent pointed to OT-specific incident detection and response solutions.  Additional priorities included asset discovery at 15 percent and OT-specific secure remote access at 14 percent. Combined, detection, visibility, and remote access technologies accounted for 71 percent of all named priorities among surveyed OT decision makers.  At the same time, operational disruptions linked to cybersecurity incidents appear widespread throughout the sector. According to the independent survey, 99 out of 100 operators reported experiencing at least one category of cyber incident since February 28.  Ransomware affecting OT-connected systems impacted 48 percent of operators surveyed, while another 48 percent reported precautionary OT shutdowns triggered by incidents originating on the IT side of operations. 

Human Challenges Continue to Slow OT Security Progress 

Despite the increase in cybersecurity spending following Operation Epic Fury, many organizations continue to struggle with internal operational barriers. The independent survey found that 45 percent of operators consider the cultural divide between IT and OT teams to be the single largest obstacle preventing faster cybersecurity improvements. Respondents said IT security personnel often lack the specialized expertise required to secure OT environments effectively.  Operational risk aversion ranked as the second-largest barrier at 28 percent. By contrast, only 11 percent of respondents identified budget constraints as a major challenge, marking a notable change from previous industry research in which financial limitations consistently ranked as the top concern for OT decision makers.  The findings emerge amid continuing warnings from federal authorities regarding Iran-aligned cyber activity targeting Western critical infrastructure after Operation Epic Fury. On April 7, six U.S. federal agencies — including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the FBI, and the Department of Energy — issued joint advisory AA26-097A. The advisory confirmed that Iranian-affiliated threat actors were actively disrupting programmable logic controllers across U.S. energy, water, and government sectors, resulting in operational disruptions and financial losses.  The Railroad Commission of Texas later issued a parallel warning to operators on April 10. According to Tosi, the independent survey represents the first dataset quantifying how the oil and gas sector itself is responding to the cybersecurity environment created by Operation Epic Fury. Suhonen said the industry’s next decisions regarding OT security investments will determine whether organizations close existing detection gaps or reinforce systems that remain ineffective for OT environments.  “The next twelve months will see oil and gas spend more on OT security than in the previous several years combined,” Suhonen said. “That spend will land in one of two places. It will close the detection gap with OT-native monitoring, asset visibility, and purpose-built secure remote access. Or it will deepen the IT-tool stack that operators have already told us they cannot see what they need it to see. The data is unambiguous about which path the market needs to take.” 

A newly identified cyber campaign involving JanaWare ransomware is targeting users in Turkey, with researchers linking the activity to a customized version of the Adwind Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The findings come from an analysis by researchers at Acronis’ Threat Research Unit (TRU), who identified the threat cluster during an investigation into suspicious Java-based malware samples. According to the researchers, the JanaWare ransomware operation appears to have been active since at least 2020. Evidence from malware samples and infrastructure indicates that the campaign has continued into late 2025, suggesting sustained activity with limited visibility. The attack relies on a modified Adwind RAT that includes polymorphic capabilities. This allows the malware to change its structure across infections, making detection more difficult. Combined with code obfuscation, these techniques have likely contributed to the campaign remaining relatively unnoticed. Unlike large ransomware groups that focus on high-value enterprise targets, JanaWare ransomware appears to follow a different strategy. Observed ransom demands range between $200 and $400, pointing to a model that prioritizes volume over large individual payouts.

Phishing Identified as Primary Infection Vector

The JanaWare ransomware campaign primarily spreads through phishing emails. Victims are lured into clicking malicious links, which lead to the download of a Java archive file. In many observed cases, the payload is hosted on cloud storage platforms. Telemetry data reviewed by researchers shows a consistent attack chain. A phishing email is opened in Microsoft Outlook, followed by a browser session that downloads the malicious file. The file is then executed using Java, triggering the infection. [caption id="attachment_111347" align="aligncenter" width="761"] Image Source: Acronis’ Threat Research Unit (TRU)[/caption] User reports on public cybersecurity forums also describe similar incidents, supporting the assessment that phishing is the main entry point.

Geofencing Restricts Janaware Ransomware Attacks to Turkey

A key feature of the JanaWare ransomware is its use of geofencing. The malware is designed to execute only on systems that meet specific regional criteria linked to Turkey. It checks system language, locale settings, and external IP geolocation before proceeding. If the system does not match Turkish parameters, the malicious activity is halted. Researchers note that this approach likely serves both operational and defensive purposes. It allows attackers to focus on a specific region while reducing exposure to global security monitoring and automated analysis systems.

Obfuscation and Polymorphism Hinder Detection

The JanaWare ransomware incorporates multiple techniques to evade detection. Researchers identified the use of known obfuscation tools such as Stringer and Allatori, alongside custom methods that complicate analysis. The malware also includes a self-modifying component that alters its file structure during deployment. By adding random data to its Java archive, each instance generates a unique file hash, limiting the effectiveness of signature-based detection. In addition, the malware contains embedded configuration parameters that control its behavior. These include command-and-control server details, communication ports, and authentication values used during initial connections.

Security Controls Disabled Before Encryption Stage

Before encrypting files, the malware attempts to weaken system defenses. It executes commands to disable Microsoft Defender, suppress security alerts, and remove recovery mechanisms such as Volume Shadow Copies. It also interferes with Windows Update and scans for installed antivirus software. These steps reduce the likelihood of detection or recovery once the ransomware payload is activated. The encryption process is carried out by a secondary module delivered after the initial compromise. This module uses AES encryption and communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over the Tor network.

Turkish-Language Ransom Notes Signal Targeted Approach

After encryption, the malware drops ransom notes across affected systems. These notes are written in Turkish and instruct victims to contact the attackers through encrypted communication channels such as qTox or Tor-based websites. Researchers say the consistent use of Turkish-language content, combined with geofencing, indicates a deliberate focus on users in Turkey rather than a broad, global campaign. The JanaWare ransomware campaign highlights how targeted, lower-profile operations can persist over long periods without drawing significant attention. By focusing on home users and small businesses, and keeping ransom demands relatively low, the attackers appear to maintain a steady but less visible operation. Researchers caution that such localized campaigns may continue to operate alongside larger ransomware groups, adding another layer to the evolving threat landscape.