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JanelaRAT: a financial threat targeting users in Latin America
Background
JanelaRAT is a malware family that takes its name from the Portuguese word “janela” which means “window”. JanelaRAT looks for financial and cryptocurrency data from specific banks and financial institutions in the Latin America region.
JanelaRAT is a modified variant of BX RAT that has targeted users since June 2023. One of the key differences between these Trojans is that JanelaRAT uses a custom title bar detection mechanism to identify desired websites in victims’ browsers and perform malicious actions.
The threat actors behind JanelaRAT campaigns continuously update the infection chain and malware versions by adding new features.
Kaspersky solutions detect this threat as Trojan.Script.Generic and Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.gen.
Initial infection
JanelaRAT campaigns involve a multi-stage infection chain. It starts with emails mimicking the delivery of pending invoices to trick victims into downloading a PDF file by clicking a malicious link. Then the victims are redirected to a malicious website from which a compressed file is downloaded.
Malicious email used in JanelaRAT campaigns
Throughout our monitoring of these malware campaigns, the compressed files have typically contained VBScripts, XML files, other ZIP archives, and BAT files. They ultimately lead to downloading a ZIP archive that contains components for DLL sideloading and executing JanelaRAT as the final payload.
However, we have observed variations in the infection chains depending on the delivered version of the malware. The latest observed campaign evolved by integrating MSI files to deliver a legitimate PE32 executable and a DLL, which is then sideloaded by the executable. This DLL is actually JanelaRAT, delivered as the final payload.
Based on our analysis of previous JanelaRAT intrusions, the updates in the infection chain represent threat actors’ attempts to streamline the process, with a reduced number of malware installation steps. We’ve observed a logical sequence in how components, such as MSI files, have been incorporated and adapted over time. Moreover, we have observed the use of auxiliary files — additional components that aid in the infection — such as configuration files that have been changing over time, showing how the threat actors have adapted these infections in an effort to avoid detection.
JanelaRAT infection flow evolution
Initial dropper
The MSI file acts as an initial dropper designed to install the final implant and establish persistence on the system. It obfuscates file paths and names with the objective to hinder analysis. This code is designed to create several ActiveX objects to manipulate the file system and execute malicious commands.
Among the actions taken, the MSI defines paths based on environment variables for hosting binaries, creating a startup shortcut, and storing a first-run indicator file. The dropper file checks for the existence of the latter and for a specific path, and if either is missing, it creates them. If the file exists, the MSI file redirects the user to an external website as a decoy, showing that everything is “normal”.
The MSI dropper places two files at a specified path: the legitimate executable nevasca.exe and the PixelPaint.dll library, renaming them with obfuscated combinations of random strings before relocating. An LNK shortcut is created in the user’s Startup folder, pointing to the renamed nevasca.exe executable, ensuring persistence. Finally, the nevasca.exe file is executed, which in turn loads the PixelPaint.dll file that is JanelaRAT.
Malicious implant
In this case, we analyzed JanelaRAT version 33, which was masqueraded as a legitimate pixel art app. Similar to other malware versions, it was protected with Eazfuscator, a common .NET obfuscation tool. We have also seen previous JanelaRAT samples that used the ConfuserEx obfuscator or its custom builds. The malware uses Control Flow Flattening method and renames classes and variables to make the code unreadable without deobfuscation.
JanelaRAT monitors the victim’s activity, intercepts sensitive banking interactions, and establishes an interactive C2 channel to report changes to the threat actor. While screen monitoring is also present, the core functionality focuses on financial fraud and real-time manipulation of the victim’s machine. The malware collects system information, including OS version, processor architecture (32-bit, 64-bit, or unknown), username, and machine name. The Trojan evaluates the current user’s privilege level and assigns different nicknames for administrators, users, guests, and an additional one for any other role.
The malware then retrieves the current date and constructs a beacon to register the victim on the C2 server, along with the malware version. To prevent multiple instances, the malware creates the mutex and exits if it already exists.
String encryption
All JanelaRAT samples utilize encrypted strings for sending information to the C2 and obfuscating embedded data. The encryption algorithm remains consistent across campaigns, combining base64 encoding with Rijndael (AES). The encryption key is derived from the MD5 hash of a 4-digit number and the IV is composed of the first 16 bytes of the decoded base64 data.
C2 communication and command handling
After initialization, JanelaRAT establishes a TCP socket, configuring callbacks for connection events and message handling. It registers all known message types, executing specific system tasks based on the received message.
Following socket initialization, the malware launches two background routines:
- User inactivity and session tracking
This routine activates timers and launches secondary threads, including an internal timer and a user inactivity monitor. The malware determines if the victim’s machine has been inactive for more than 10 minutes by calculating the elapsed time since the last user input. If the inactivity period exceeds 10 minutes, the malware notifies the C2 by sending the corresponding message. Upon user activity, it notifies the threat actor again. This makes it possible to track the user’s presence and routine to time possible remote operations.
Timer that looks for 10 minutes of inactivity
- Victim registration and further malicious activity
This routine is launched immediately after the socket setup. It triggers two subroutines responsible for periodic HTTP beaconing and downloading additional payloads.- The first subroutine executes a PowerShell downloaded from a staging server during post-exploitation. Its main objective is to establish persistence by downloading the
PixelPaint.dllfile once again. The routine then builds and executes periodic HTTP requests to the C2, reporting the malware’s version and the victim machine’s security environment. It loops continuously as long as a specific local file does not exist, ensuring repeated telemetry transmission. The file was not observed being extracted or created by the malware itself; rather, it appears to be placed on the system by the threat actor during other post-exploitation activities. Based on previous incidents, this file likely contains instructions for establishing persistence.This JanelaRAT version constructs a second C2 URL for beaconing, using several decrypted strings and following a pattern that uses different parameters to report information about new victims:
<C2Domain>?VS=<malwareversion>&PL=<profilelevel>&AN=<presenceofbankingsoftware>
We have observed constant changes in the parameters across campaigns. A new parameter “AN” was introduced in this version. It is used to detect the presence of a specific process associated with banking security software. If such software is found on the victim’s device, the malware notifies the threat actor.
Parameter Description VS JanelaRAT version PL OFF by default AN Yes or No depending on whether banking security software process exists - The second subroutine is responsible for monitoring the user’s visits to banking websites and reporting any activity of interest to the threat actor. JanelaRAT 33v is specifically engineered to target Brazilian financial institutions. However, we have also observed other versions of the malware targeting other specific countries in the region, such as the “Gold-Label” version targeting banking users in Mexico that we described earlier.
This subroutine creates a timer to enable an active system monitoring cycle. During this cycle, the malware obtains the title of the active window and checks if it matches entries of interest using a hardcoded but obfuscated list of financial institutions. Although the threat actors behind JanelaRAT primarily focus on one country as a target, the list of financial institutions is constantly updated.
If a title bar matches one of the listed targets, the malware waits 12 seconds before establishing a dedicated communication channel to the C2. This channel is used to execute malicious tasks, including taking screenshots, monitoring keyboard and mouse input, displaying messages to the user, injecting keystrokes or simulating mouse input, and forcing system shutdown.
To perform these actions, the malware uses a dedicated C2 handler that interprets incoming commands from the C2. Notably, 33v supports live banking session hijacking, not just credential theft.
Action Performed Description Capture desktop image Send compressed screenshots to the C2 Specific screenshots Crop specific screen regions and exfiltrate images Overlay windows Display images in full-screen mode, limit user interactions, and mimic bank dialogs to harvest credentials Keylogging Keystroke capture Simulate keyboard Inject keys such as DOWN, UP, and TAB to navigate or trigger new elements Track mouse input Move the cursor, simulate clicks, and report the cursor position Display message Show message boxes (custom title, text, buttons, or icons) System shutdown Execute a forced shutdown sequence Command execution Run CMD or PowerShell scripts/commands Task Manager
manipulationLaunch Task Manager, find its window, and hide it to prevent discovery by the user Check for banking security software process Detect the presence of anti-fraud systems Beaconing Send host information (malware version, profile, presence of banking software) Toggle internal modes Enable and disable modes such as screenshot flow, key injection, or overlay visibility Anti-analysis Detect sandbox or automation tools
- The first subroutine executes a PowerShell downloaded from a staging server during post-exploitation. Its main objective is to establish persistence by downloading the
C2 infrastructure
Unlike other versions, this variant rotates its C2 server daily. Once a title bar matches the one in the list, the software dynamically constructs the C2 channel domain by concatenating an obfuscated string, the current date, and a suffix domain related to a legitimate dynamic DNS (DDNS) service. This communication is established using port 443, but not TLS.
Decoy overlay system
This version of JanelaRAT implements a decoy overlay system designed to capture banking credentials and bypass multi-factor authentication. When a target banking window is detected, the malware requests further instructions from the C2 server. The C2 responds with a command identifier and a Base64-encoded image, which is then displayed as a full-screen overlay window mimicking legitimate banking or system interfaces. The malware ensures the fake window completely covers the screen and limits the victim’s interaction with the system.
The malware blocks the victim’s interaction by displaying modal dialogs. Each modal dialog corresponds to a specific operation, such as password capture, token/MFA capture, fake loading screen, fake Windows update full-screen modal and more. The malware resizes the overlay, scans multiple screens, and loads deceptive elements to distract the user or temporarily hide legitimate application windows.
Among other fake elements, the malware displays fake Windows update notifications, often accompanied by messages in Brazilian Portuguese, such as:
- “Configuring Windows updates, please wait.”
- “Do not turn off your computer; this could take some time.”
When a message command is received from the operator, the malware constructs a custom message box based on parameters sent from the server. These parameters include the message title, text content, button type (e.g., OK, Yes/No), and icon type (e.g., Warning, Error). The malware then creates a maximized message box positioned at the top of the screen, ensuring it captures user focus and blocks the visibility of other windows, mimicking a system or security alert.
An obfuscated acknowledgement string is sent back to the C2 to confirm successful execution of this task.
Anti-analysis techniques
In addition to the conditional behavior based on whether the process of banking security software is detected, the malware includes anti-analysis routines and computer environment checks, such as sandbox detection through the Magnifier and MagnifierWindow components. These components are used to determine if accessibility tools are active on the infected computer indicating a possible malware analysis environment.
Persistence
The malware establishes persistence by writing a command script into the Windows Startup directory. This script forces the execution chain to run at each user logon enabling malicious activity without triggering privilege escalation prompts. The script is executed silently to evade user awareness.
This method is either an alternative or a supplement to the persistence method previously described in the subroutines responsible for periodic HTTP beaconing section.
Victimology
Consistent with previous intrusions and campaigns, the primary targets of the threat actors distributing JanelaRAT are banking users in Latin America, with specific focus on users of financial institutions in Brazil and Mexico.
According to our telemetry, in 2025 we detected 14,739 attacks in Brazil and 11,695 in Mexico related to JanelaRAT.
Conclusions
JanelaRAT remains an active and evolving threat, with intrusions exhibiting consistent characteristics despite ongoing modifications. We have tracked the evolution of JanelaRAT infections for some time, observing variations in both the malware itself and its infection chain, including targeted variants for specific countries.
This variant represents a significant advancement in the actor’s capabilities, combining multiple communication channels, comprehensive victim monitoring, interactive overlays, input injection, and robust remote control features. The malware is specifically designed to minimize user visibility and adapt its behavior upon detection of anti-fraud software.
To mitigate the risk of communication with the C2 infrastructure utilizing similar evasive techniques, we recommend that defenders block dynamic DNS services at the corporate perimeter or internal DNS resolvers. This will disrupt the communication channels used by JanelaRAT and similar threats.
Indicators of compromise
808c87015194c51d74356854dfb10d9e MSI Dropper
d7a68749635604d6d7297e4fa2530eb6 JanelaRAT
ciderurginsx[.]com Primary C2
