The Cyber Express Weekly Roundup: Claude Session Hijacking, PaperCut Exploits, and Enterprise Cyberattacks









"This is effectively a Mini Shai-Hulud campaign: it uses the same core tactics of install-time execution, credential harvesting, CI/CD targeting, encrypted exfiltration, and potential downstream propagation," Socket said.
"It commits the encrypted result envelope through the GitHub API," Socket said. "The commit message can include: IfYouInvalidateThisTokenItWillNukeTheComputerOfTheOwner:."Researchers from OX Security identified the first commit containing the phrase "Miasma: The Spreading Blight" on May 29, 2026. This suggests either that the malware variant had already been active by that date or that attackers began testing the campaign around that time.
"runOn": "folderOpen" to ensure automatic execution whenever a project is opened."Because the malware includes background execution and potential developer-tool persistence mechanisms, uninstalling the npm package or deleting node_modules should not be considered sufficient cleanup," Socket explained.The company also urged organizations operating CI/CD pipelines to suspend affected workflows, invalidate any build artifacts created during the exposure period, and review whether software releases, container images, npm packages, or deployment artifacts were generated after installation of the malicious package.


Image source: Cyble[/caption]
Researchers noted that partial remediation efforts are ineffective because any surviving component can rapidly rebuild the full compromise. Even if administrators remove several malicious files or cron jobs, remaining persistence layers can silently restore the infection.
Source: Cyble[/caption]
Additional overlaps involving command-and-control infrastructure, file paths, credential implantation patterns, and binary names matched prior reporting from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Check Point Research, and SANS Internet Storm Center.
Source: Cyble[/caption]
Cron payloads were hidden inside encoded variables, causing malicious crontab entries to appear relatively benign during casual inspection.
JOMANGY’s double-obfuscation design represents a notable evolution over earlier malware associated with INJ3CTOR3. Many automated analysis tools decode only the outer Base64 layer, leaving unreadable ROT13 output rather than functional PHP code.
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Source: Cyble[/caption]
Combined with dead-code anti-analysis logic, these techniques contributed to extremely low antivirus detection rates. Researchers reported that both k.php and wr.php showed zero detections on VirusTotal during analysis, while the Stage 1 dropper was detected by only four out of 76 antivirus engines.

In a world where digital threats are becoming more confusing, Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) has uncovered one of the most extensive deceptive domain spoofing campaigns to date.
Dubbed Operation TrustTrap, this large-scale operation has leveraged over 16,800 malicious domains to exploit cognitive trust mechanisms and harvest sensitive user data from unsuspecting victims.
The scope and scale of this operation reveal a shift in how cybercriminals are evolving their tactics to bypass traditional technical security measures.
Since early 2026, CRIL has been tracking a well-coordinated infrastructure involving a massive network of spoofed domains. These domains were designed to mimic legitimate government portals, particularly those related to transportation services like Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) portals, toll payment systems, and vehicle registration services in the United States. The aim of this campaign is clear: credential and payment card harvesting through the exploitation of trusted government-facing services.
However, the technical complexity of the attack isn't based on advanced hacking techniques. Instead, Operation TrustTrap exploits how humans visually interpret URLs. By embedding government-like subdomains, attackers have created fraudulent domains that resemble legitimate government addresses, deceiving individuals into visiting these sites and providing sensitive information.
The spoofed domains were predominantly hosted on Tencent Cloud and Alibaba Cloud APAC, both of which have significant data centers in the Asia-Pacific region. These platforms have been linked to the infrastructure of the campaign, and their concentrated use adds another layer of complexity to the attribution process.
Furthermore, CRIL found that the domains were primarily registered through Gname.com Pte. Ltd., a registrar known for its significant Chinese customer base. Other registrars, such as Dominet (HK) Limited and NameSilo LLC, were also identified in the campaign.
These domain names were often associated with .bond, .cc, and .cfd top-level domains (TLDs), which were frequently used to evade detection and blacklisting.
The most common method used in Operation TrustTrap is subdomain trust injection. This technique involves embedding trusted government tokens, such as mass.gov or wa.gov, in subdomains rather than the root domain. In legitimate URLs, the .gov component typically appears at the end of the domain string, but in these malicious domains, .gov is cleverly placed as part of a subdomain.
For instance, a URL such as mass.gov-bzyc[.]cc will lead a user to believe they are accessing an official Massachusetts government page, but in reality, they are on a fraudulent site designed to capture personal and financial data.
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Fake Massachusetts RMV citation landing page (Source: Cyble)[/caption]
This manipulation of the domain’s structure is visually convincing, but it bypasses traditional security filters that only check the root domain for trusted indicators like .gov.
Another obfuscation technique used is hyphen-based semantic manipulation, where hyphens are inserted into familiar government identifiers to create visually similar URLs. This tactic further complicates the detection of malicious domains.
While Operation TrustTrap is heavily focused on the United States, targeting state portals such as those in California, Washington, and Florida, the operation is not confined to one region. CRIL identified similar spoofing efforts targeting government portals in India, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom.
In India, attackers have specifically targeted portals that follow the .gov.in domain structure. By injecting subdomains like www.in.gov-bond, the attackers were able to replicate the appearance of legitimate government websites, particularly those related to the Indian Department of National Investigation (NIA) and other defense-adjacent sites.
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APT36 impersonating NIA (Source: Cyble)[/caption]
This specific targeting suggests that the threat actor has knowledge of government infrastructure and how it operates.
In addition to the use of Tencent Cloud and Alibaba Cloud, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed in the campaign bear a striking resemblance to those used by APT36 (also known as Transparent Tribe). This Pakistan-based Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group has a long history of targeting Indian government entities, defense personnel, and diplomatic infrastructure.
The infrastructure used in Operation TrustTrap shows similarities to APT36’s previous campaigns, particularly in terms of the domain registration patterns and use of Tencent Cloud and Alibaba Cloud APAC infrastructure. Furthermore, the behavior observed, including domain rotation and the use of disposable domains, matches previous APT36 activities.
The dominance of Gname.com as the registrar of choice for over 70% of the spoofed domains points to a specific trend in the campaign’s operational setup. This Singapore-based registrar, which serves a large number of Chinese entities, is part of the broader infrastructure strategy that focuses on low-cost hosting in the Asia-Pacific region.
Notably, Tencent Cloud and Alibaba Cloud APAC offer cloud services with global reach, providing the necessary infrastructure to scale this type of malicious operation. These services have been instrumental in supporting the rapid deployment of phishing sites across a variety of government services, especially those involving time-sensitive financial transactions.




MiningDropper attack chain (Source: Cyble)[/caption]
MiningDropper’s infection chain unfolds across multiple stages:



