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The AI Act kicks into action, forces companies to be clear about AI chatbots

The European Union (EU) has started enforcing key parts of the AI Act, with immediate, visible consequences for chatbots, deepfakes and other consumer‑facing Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems.

From August 2, what you’ll likely notice are more “this is AI” labels, clearer rules for powerful foundation models, and new ways for users and researchers to complain when systems go off the rails.

The AI Act moved from theory to practice for three big areas:

  • General‑purpose AI (GPAI) models: The new AI Office in Brussels, together with national regulators, can now enforce rules on providers of general‑purpose AI models (think large language models and other foundation models behind many tools).
  • Transparency obligations: Transparency rules kick in for interactive systems and AI‑generated content: chatbots must say they are bots, and synthetic audio, images, video and text need to be marked as AI‑generated or manipulated.
  • Banned AI uses: A set of “unacceptable risk” AI uses is now formally prohibited, with enforcement shared between the AI Office, national authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor for EU institutions.

Note that content that was generated and published before August 2, doesn’t need to be retro‑labelled, but anything published on or after that date falls under the rules, even if it was generated earlier.

From a security perspective, the AI Act’s transparency push is less about banning AI and more about taking away its best camouflage: pretending to be human.

Non‑compliance with transparency obligations can attract fines up to 15 million Euros (17.3 million USD) or 3% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher, which should be significant enough to get large providers’ attention.

To make enforcement more than a paper tiger, the AI Office has launched tools aimed at people who see problems from the inside or as users:

  • Complaint tool: Individuals and organizations can report alleged infringements of the AI Act by providers or deployers of AI systems supervised by the AI Office.
  • Whistleblower tool: People professionally connected to AI providers or deployers get an anonymous channel to flag potential violations that could endanger fundamental rights, health or public trust.
  • Downstream complaints channel: Firms building on top of GPAI models can report suspected breaches by the underlying model providers.

This creates a formal path for reporting systemic issues: think unsafe model behavior, ignored red‑team findings, or deployments that quietly cross legal lines around manipulation or discrimination.

Bans on “nudifiers” and abusive content

The AI Office has introduced explicit prohibitions on AI systems that generate non‑consensual sexually explicit or intimate content (including “nudifier” apps) and child sexual abuse material.

For victims of these abuses, that’s more than a symbolic move. It gives regulators and law enforcement a clear legal basis to go after both providers and deployers of such systems in the EU, rather than trying to squeeze them into older, less specific laws.

These rules will apply from December 2, 2026, with companies given time to bring their systems into compliance or pull them from the EU market.

Regrettably, this will not stop abuse completely. Attackers will still use unlabeled tools and infrastructure outside the EU. But it raises the bar for legitimate services and makes it harder for mainstream platforms to ignore the risks of deceptive AI‑driven features.

The AI Act won’t make AI safe overnight, but it shifts the default from “anything goes” to “you must play by some basic rules if you operate in the EU.” For users, that’s a step toward AI systems you can at least recognize and question, instead of having invisible technology quietly shape our online experience.


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Google Fined €890M Under EU Digital Markets Act Over Search and Play Store Practices

EU fined Google €890M under the DMA for favoring its own services and restricting Play Store competition, with AI search features also under scrutiny.

The European Commission hit Google with two fines totalling €890 million on Thursday for violating the Digital Markets Act, one for giving its own services preferential placement in Google Search and one for blocking app developers from directing users to cheaper alternatives outside the Play Store. These are Google’s first DMA fines, but the fifth and sixth competition penalties against the company overall, bringing the cumulative total to €10.38 billion over nearly two decades. At this pace, Google is basically funding a small member state.

“Today, the European Commission took two decisions finding non-compliance by Google with the Digital Markets Act (DMA) for self-preferencing its own services on Google Search, and for putting in place restrictions on businesses to direct consumers to alternative, often cheaper, purchase channels on Google Play (steering).” reads the press release published by the European Commission. “In this regard, the Commission issued Google a fine of €460 million and a fine of €430 million respectively.”

The search fine covers Google’s handling of shopping, hotels, transport, and sports results, where the Commission found the company systematically promoted its own products over rivals. The Play Store fine targets steering restrictions that prevented developers from telling users they could buy the same app or subscription elsewhere for less.

Despite the scale of the penalties, the Commission signaled that ongoing daily fines for non-compliance are unlikely.

“The Commission notes that, after a constructive dialogue, Google has proposed and started testing changes to how it presents its own services on Google Search for free services such as shopping, hotels and flights.” EU continues. “The Commission will monitor the implementation of these solutions which constitute substantial progress towards compliance.”

The Commission described this as substantial progress and flagged a “constructive dialogue” with Google, which is regulatory language for “we’re not done but we’re not going to war either.”

Google has 60 days to comply with orders to treat rivals fairly and allow developers to redirect users away from the Play Store. The company rejected the findings and didn’t rule out taking the Commission to court. President of Global Affairs Kent Walker argued that complying would force Google to strip out real-time search features like hotel pricing and flight availability, and remove safety protections from the Play Store, framing the decisions as harmful to European users rather than protective of them.

“The Commission also notes that Google has proposed and started testing changes to how it presents shopping ads and content related services, such as sports.” states the press release. “The Commission is currently assessing these changes and will continue its dialogue with Google in light of today’s decision.”

That extension to AI features is the part of this decision that will matter most in the long run, as AI-generated summaries are increasingly becoming the first layer of search results that users interact with. The fines are the third under the DMA after Apple and Meta were penalized in April last year, and the U.S. government’s response was predictable.

Reuters reported that trade Representative Jamieson Greer said the actions are “driving massive uncertainty for U.S. exports.” though no specific retaliatory measures were announced.

“The two non-compliance decisions were adopted after a thorough investigation, including feedback from market participants, and extensive dialogue with Google.” concludes the press release. “When calculating the fines, the Commission has assessed the gravity, duration and recurrence of the breaches and concluded that the level of fines imposed are proportionate and appropriate.

Google may challenge today’s decisions in court.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, EU)

Lidl Data Breach Exposes Customer Details in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands

Lidl says attackers stole customer data in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands via a third-party provider, raising concerns about phishing and GDPR compliance.

The post Lidl Data Breach Exposes Customer Details in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands appeared first on TechRepublic.

Europe Confirms Record €4.1B Penalty Against Google for Android Practices

EU’s top court upheld a €4.1B fine against Google, ruling it abused Android’s market dominance through restrictive licensing practices.

The Court of Justice of the European Union issued its ruling on July 2, 2026, and Google lost. The court dismissed the appeal brought by Google and its parent company Alphabet against an earlier judgment from the General Court, confirming a fine of €4,125,000,000. Alphabet is jointly and severally liable for €1,520,605,895 of that amount.

The case goes back to 2018, when the European Commission concluded that Google had abused its dominant market position through three categories of restrictions built into its Android licensing arrangements. Device manufacturers who wanted access to Google’s Play Store had to pre-install Google Search and Chrome. To get the licences needed for those apps, they also had to agree not to sell devices running Android versions that Google hadn’t approved. And Google paid manufacturers and mobile operators a share of its advertising revenue on the condition that they didn’t pre-install a competing search engine on a defined set of devices. The Commission concluded all three formed a single, coordinated strategy to protect Google’s search dominance, and fined the company €4,342,865,000.

The General Court reviewed the case in 2022 and agreed that the conduct was a single and continuous infringement. It annulled one piece of the Commission’s decision: the part dealing with revenue share agreements tied to the exclusive pre-installation of Google Search on a predefined device portfolio. That partial annulment led the court to recalculate the fine downward to €4.125 billion. Everything else held.

Google and Alphabet then appealed to the Court of Justice, the EU’s highest court, arguing the General Court had made legal errors in its analysis. The Court of Justice went through those arguments and rejected them all.

“The appeal brought by Google and its parent company Alphabet against the judgment of the General Court is dismissed, thereby confirming the penalty imposed for Google Search’s abuse of a dominant position in the context of the Android operating system.” the court’s press release states. “In 2018, the European Commission adopted a decision in which it concluded 1 that Google had abused its dominant position by requiring, in particular through pre-installation agreements and licensing conditions for certain apps, that its search engine, Google Search, and its Chrome browser be promoted on mobile devices running the Android operating system, which is also provided by Google. 2 It therefore found a single and continuous infringement covering the whole of that conduct and imposed an overall fine on Google of €4 342 865 000, with Alphabet jointly and severally liable as to €1 921 666 000.”

Google’s first argument was that the General Court assessed the anticompetitive effects of the pre-installation conditions incorrectly, in particular, that it should have run a counterfactual analysis to show what the market would have looked like without those conditions. However, the Court of Justice disagreed and confirmed the General Court was entitled to look at the full economic context, including the revenue share agreements, without needing to run a formal counterfactual test. The court also confirmed the finding that pre-installed apps enjoy a status quo bias, meaning users are less likely to switch away from them, and that Google hadn’t shown that user preferences or the quality of its services alone explained its market position.

On the pre-installation conditions specifically, Google argued that proving abuse of a dominant position requires showing the conduct could exclude competitors that are equally efficient. The Court of Justice rejected that too.

“Second, the General Court did not err in law by confirming the Commission’s assessment of the pre-installation conditions laid down by the Android agreements. Demonstrating an abuse of a dominant position is not conditional in any case on proof of a capability to foreclose only as-efficient competitors.” continues the press release. “Given the particular characteristics of the digital markets concerned, the General Court was entitled to conclude that those practices were liable to restrict competition and strengthen barriers to entry without applying that test.”

On the anti-fragmentation agreements, which required manufacturers to avoid selling devices running unapproved Android forks, the Court of Justice again sided with the General Court. Those agreements limited the commercial space for Android versions Google hadn’t blessed, which reinforced its dominant position. A counterfactual analysis wasn’t necessary because the anticompetitive effects were already sufficiently established on the facts.

Google also challenged how the fine was calculated, invoking procedural arguments including rights of defence. The Court of Justice endorsed the General Court’s use of its unlimited jurisdiction to set the penalty amount, ruling that the reasoning was sufficient and the procedural principles were respected.

“The Court of Justice endorses the exercise by the General Court of its unlimited jurisdiction to set the amount of the fine, ruling that its reasons were sufficient and that the procedural principles invoked by Google and Alphabet, including rights of defence, were adhered to.” states the report.

Google is disappointed with the ruling.

“We are disappointed with the ruling. Android has given people more choice, not less, enabling thousands of device makers to build affordable smartphones and giving billions of people access to a wide range of apps and services. We will review the judgment carefully.” the company said in a statement.

This is the end of the road for this particular case. The Court of Justice is the EU’s highest court on points of law. There’s no further appeal. The €4.1 billion fine stands, and the legal framework the Commission used to reach that conclusion has now been validated at every level of the EU court system.

The case also sets a precedent for how digital markets get treated under EU competition law. The court confirmed that the standard test used in traditional markets, whether conduct excludes equally efficient competitors, doesn’t automatically apply in digital contexts. That has implications well beyond Google. Any company with a dominant platform position in the EU now knows that structuring licensing arrangements to steer users toward its own products carries real legal risk, even if it can argue its products are genuinely better.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Google)

Denmark Ordered to Pay $12M Over Huawei Equipment Removal

A Danish court ordered the state to compensate TDC NET after the removal of Huawei fiber-network equipment, raising questions about telecom security costs.

The post Denmark Ordered to Pay $12M Over Huawei Equipment Removal appeared first on TechRepublic.

Apple’s £3B iCloud Lawsuit Could Affect 40M UK Users

Apple lost a bid to narrow a UK iCloud lawsuit from Which?, keeping a £3 billion competition claim on track for an October 2028 trial.

The post Apple’s £3B iCloud Lawsuit Could Affect 40M UK Users appeared first on TechRepublic.

Four Nationally Significant Cyberattacks Every Week — Is the UK Ready?

UK Cyberattacks

The tempo of UK cyberattacks has shifted from sporadic disruption to something far more systemic. When incidents reach a frequency of four national events each week, the issue stops being purely technical and becomes structural. It raises a more uncomfortable question than whether attacks will happen; it asks whether UK cybersecurity readiness is evolving fast enough to keep pace with a threat environment that is no longer linear, but compounding.

The latest assessment from the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) reveals a sharp escalation in UK national cyber threats. In the 12 months leading to September 2025, 204 incidents were classified as nationally significant, more than double the 89 recorded in the previous year. This is the highest figure on record.

The Acceleration of UK National Cyber Threats

In total, 429 cyber incidents required NCSC intervention during this period. Among them, 18 were categorized as “highly significant,” meaning they carried the potential to severely disrupt essential services or compromise national security. That figure alone notes an almost 50% increase compared with the previous year, continuing a three-year trend of intensifying severity in cyberattacks in the UK.

These are not isolated breaches caused by opportunistic threat actors. A large share of activity is linked to advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, well-funded, highly capable operators that pursue long-term access to critical systems. Their objectives range from strategic intelligence gathering to financial gain and, in some cases, deliberate disruption.

Dr Richard Horne, Chief Executive of the NCSC, has made the situation explicit: the growing frequency of serious incidents demonstrates that the UK’s exposure to cyber risk is rapidly. He has warned that delays in strengthening defenses are no longer neutral, they actively increase vulnerability.

When Cybersecurity Becomes a Boardroom Issue 

The rising intensity of UK cyberattacks has prompted direct intervention from the government. Senior executives across major UK businesses, including those in the FTSE 350, have been formally urged to treat cyber resilience as a board-level responsibility rather than a technical afterthought. 

This shift is not symbolic. It reflects recognition that cyber risk now sits alongside financial and operational risk. Organizations are being pushed to integrate security into strategic decision-making, rather than relegating it to IT departments. 

To support this, the NCSC has introduced tools aimed at improving baseline protections, particularly for smaller businesses that often lack dedicated security resources. The Cyber Essentials programme has been positioned as an accessible entry point, with added incentives such as free cyber insurance for eligible firms to encourage adoption. 

Energy Transformation and the Expanding Attack Surface 

One of the less obvious drivers behind the rise in UK national cyber threats is the transformation of the energy sector. The UK’s clean energy ambitions, particularly under the Clean Power 2030 initiative, are reshaping infrastructure at speed. 

Battery storage capacity is expected to increase sixfold, while wind and solar generation could nearly triple. At the same time, the system is becoming more decentralized, introducing a wider range of operators and digital interfaces. 

From a cybersecurity perspective, this creates a paradox. The energy system becomes more resilient in terms of generation diversity, but more vulnerable in terms of digital exposure. Each new connection, whether a distributed solar installation or a grid-scale battery, adds another potential entry point for attackers. 

This is why UK critical infrastructure attacks are increasingly focused on non-traditional targets. Recent incidents in Europe have shown adversaries probing distributed renewable assets, exploiting the reliance on remote management and interconnected control systems. 

The Cascading Risk of Infrastructure Disruption 

Energy systems do not operate in isolation. They underpin transport networks, healthcare services, communications, and financial systems. A disruption in energy supply can trigger cascading failures across multiple sectors. 

Even non-cyber incidents put a spotlight on this fragility. The 2025 North Hyde substation fire demonstrated how quickly a localized event can create broader disruption. In the case of coordinated cyberattacks, the potential for systemic impact is higher. 

This interconnectedness is what makes cyberattacks in the UK particularly concerning. The risk is not just service interruption, but the amplification of disruption across dependent systems. 

Rethinking Regulation for Modern Threats 

To address these challenges, the UK government is reassessing its regulatory framework, particularly the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations. Introduced in 2018, these rules were designed for a more centralized energy system and may no longer reflect current realities. 

The key issue is scope. Many organizations that contribute to system stability fall outside NIS requirements because they do not meet existing thresholds or have not been formally designated as critical operators. 

The proposed reforms aim to close this gap through two primary measures: 

  • Expanding NIS coverage under the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill to better capture modern critical infrastructure  

  • Introducing baseline cyber resilience requirements for all Ofgem licensees in the downstream gas and electricity sector  

This dual approach acknowledges that UK cybersecurity readiness cannot rely solely on protecting the largest players. In a decentralized system, smaller entities can represent equally critical points of failure. 

Baseline Security: Necessary but Not Sufficient 

The proposed baseline requirements are designed to establish a minimum standard of cyber hygiene across the sector. These measures are expected to be proportionate and widely applicable, focusing on preventing common attack vectors rather than enforcing advanced capabilities. 

They align closely with the Cyber Essentials framework, which emphasizes five core controls: firewalls, secure configuration, access management, malware protection, and patching. 

However, this approach has limitations. Cyber Essentials is primarily tailored to IT environments and does not fully address operational technology (OT), which is central to energy infrastructure. OT systems require different security models, as they interact directly with physical processes. 

Recognizing this, policymakers are considering a hybrid model that extends beyond technical controls to include governance, supply chain security, and incident response planning. This reflects a more mature understanding of UK national cyber threats, where organizational resilience is as important as technical defense. 

Conclusion 

With UK cyberattacks occurring at a rate of four national incidents per week, the financial impact of significant cyberattacks in the UK, often exceeding £436,000 per breach, makes gaps in UK cybersecurity readiness a measurable risk. As UK national cyber threats grow and UK critical infrastructure attacks become more likely, organizations need timely threat intelligence and faster response. 

Cyble provides real-time threat intelligence and automated detection to help identify and mitigate risks earlier. Schedule a demo to see how Cyble can support your security operations. 

References: 

The post Four Nationally Significant Cyberattacks Every Week — Is the UK Ready? appeared first on Cyble.

UK Businesses Are Being Targeted Through Their Middle East Supply Chains — What to Do Now

Middle East supply chain risk

The conversation around cyber risk in the UK has shifted. It is no longer confined to domestic networks, internal systems, or even direct attacks on British infrastructure. The weak link sits thousands of miles away, embedded within third-party vendors, logistics partners, and digital dependencies across the Middle East. This growing exposure has created a new layer of Middle East supply chain risk, one that is proving difficult to monitor and even harder to control. 

Recent warnings from the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) noted that organizations are not just facing isolated incidents, but a widening threat landscape where geopolitical tensions, hacktivism, and supply chain interdependencies intersect. The result is a sharp rise in UK business supply chain threats, particularly those that exploit indirect access points. 

A Threat That Travels Through the Supply Chain 

The most concerning aspect of today’s cyber environment is how attacks propagate. Threat actors are no longer required to breach a UK-based system directly. Instead, they can compromise a supplier, disrupt a regional service provider, or exploit a shared platform operating in the Middle East. 

This is where the Middle East supply chain disruption in the UK becomes a critical concern. Organizations with operations, vendors, or infrastructure in the region are now exposed to “collateral cyber risk”. Attacks that are not aimed at them specifically but still affect their operations. 

At the same time, pro-Russian hacktivist groups have intensified their campaigns. Since March 2022, groups such as NoName057(16) have targeted NATO-aligned countries using distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks are not financially motivated; they are ideological, designed to disrupt services and undermine confidence. 

Their methods are relatively less technical but highly effective on scale. By leveraging publicly distributed tools and coordinating through online communities, they can overwhelm services, take down websites, and degrade operational systems. This pattern has already contributed to a rise in supply chain cyberattack scenarios in the UK, where disruption spreads across interconnected systems. 

Why the Middle East Supply Chain Risk Matters More Than Ever 

While the direct cyber threat from nation-states like Iran to the UK remains under constant assessment, the indirect risk is already evident. The ongoing instability in the Middle East has increased the likelihood of cyber spillover, where regional conflicts trigger digital consequences beyond their borders. 

For UK organizations, this translates into heightened UK supply chain security risks, particularly in sectors reliant on international logistics, energy infrastructure, or outsourced technology services. The issue is not just connectivity, it’s dependency. Many UK businesses rely on third-party providers for critical operations, from cloud hosting to industrial control systems.  

If those providers are affected by cyber incidents or operational disruptions in the Middle East, the downstream impact can be immediate. 

The Evolution of Attack Tactics 

Modern attacks are evolving in both intent and execution. Traditional cybercrime focused on financial gain, ransomware, fraud, and data theft. Today’s threat actors are driven by political alignment, using disruption as a weapon. 

DDoS attacks, in particular, have become a preferred tactic. They are relatively easy to execute, difficult to attribute, and capable of causing significant operational damage. The NCSC has repeatedly warned that UK organizations must strengthen their defenses against these attacks, especially as they become more frequent and coordinated. 

What makes this more complex is the growing overlap between IT and operational technology (OT). Many attacks now target systems that control physical processes, energy grids, transport networks, and manufacturing systems. This convergence expands the potential impact of a successful breach. 

Building Resilience Against Distributed Threats 

Addressing Middle East supply chain risk requires more than perimeter security. It demands a shift in how organizations think about resilience. 

  • Understand the Full-Service Chain: Every service has multiple pressure points where resources can be exhausted. Organizations need to map these dependencies, both internal and external, and identify where attacks are most likely to occur. 

  • Strengthen Upstream Defenses: Internet service providers and third-party platforms play a crucial role in mitigating attacks before they reach core systems. Businesses should evaluate what protections are already in place and where additional safeguards, such as content delivery networks or dedicated DDoS mitigation services, are needed. 

  • Design for Scalability: Systems must be able to absorb unexpected surges in traffic. Cloud-native architectures offer a clear advantage here, allowing dynamic scaling during an attack. However, even private infrastructure can be adapted with sufficient planning and spare capacity. 

  • Plan for Degraded Operations: No system is immune. The goal should not be absolute prevention, but controlled failure. Services should be able to continue operating at reduced capacity, maintaining critical functionality even during an attack. 

The Role of Monitoring and Threat Intelligence 

Improved visibility is essential in tackling UK business supply chain threats. Increased monitoring, however, comes with its own challenges: more alerts, more noise, and greater demand for security teams. 

Organizations are being encouraged to adopt proactive threat hunting, rather than relying solely on automated detection. This includes: 

  • Analyzing log data to identify anomalies. 

  • Monitoring traffic patterns across both cloud and on-premises systems. 

  • Simulating attacks to test detection and response capabilities. 

For operational technology (OT) environments, this level of monitoring becomes even more important. Unlike traditional IT systems, OT networks tend to operate with highly predictable traffic patterns. Even minor deviations can indicate a potential compromise, especially in the context of a supply chain cyber-attack UK scenario where attackers exploit trusted connections. 

To operationalize this level of visibility at scale, organizations are turning to platforms like Cyble, which combine threat intelligence with real-time monitoring. By correlating external threat signals, such as dark web activity, emerging vulnerabilities, and attacker infrastructure, with internal telemetry, such platforms help security teams prioritize what matters.  

This is particularly valuable when dealing with Middle East supply chain disruption in the UK, where early indicators often surface outside traditional security boundaries. As UK supply chain security risks continue to expand, organizations need more than visibility; they need context, speed, and the ability to act decisively. Platforms like Cyble are designed to bridge that gap, enabling teams to detect, correlate, and respond to threats before they cascade across the supply chain. 

For organizations navigating UK business supply chain threats and rising Middle East supply chain risk, now is the time to move beyond reactive defense. Book a demo with Cyble to see how AI-driven threat intelligence can help identify hidden risks, strengthen monitoring, and stay ahead of supply chain cyber threats. 

References:

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