Using autonomous AI agents, an attacker breached an enterprise network in a matter of hours. Understand how to address and defend against agentic attacks.
The post An AI-Assisted Cyber Attack: Inside a Unit 42 Investigation appeared first on Unit 42.
New research reveals that AI safety refusal lives in a thin neural layer, highlighting the critical need for external, multi-layered security.
The post Perturbation Probing: A New Diagnostic for the Fragility of LLM Safety appeared first on Unit 42.
Attackers are targeting CI/CD pipelines and developer tools instead of application code, requiring total SDLC visibility and strict security controls
The post Connecting the Dots: Securing the Overlooked Corners of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) Supply Chain appeared first on Unit 42.
Ransomware rarely appears out of nowhere. Before encryption, extortion, or data theft begins, attackers often spend time establishing access, stealing credentials, moving laterally, and identifying valuable systems. These activities occur during the ransomware pre-execution phase, when malicious activity may be difficult to distinguish from legitimate administration.
For security teams, understanding ransomware attack vectors, ransomware initial access methods, and how ransomware evades detection is critical. Endpoint security blind spots can give attackers the time they need to prepare an attack without triggering an obvious alarm.
Here are five areas where ransomware activity can remain hidden before detonation.
VPNs, RDP, and remote management tools are essential for distributed organizations, but they are also among the most important ransomware attack vectors.
Qilin affiliates have abused tools including WinSCP, AnyDesk, and ScreenConnect to facilitate lateral movement. Attackers who obtain valid credentials can potentially use legitimate remote-access software without immediately deploying obvious malware.
This is one reason why ransomware evasion cannot be reduced to antivirus evasion alone. Attackers can blend into normal administrative activity.
Organizations should enforce MFA on remote-access systems, monitor unusual login behavior, and restrict remote administration privileges.
A compromised laptop or workstation may be only the beginning. Attackers can use credential-stealing tools to obtain additional passwords and authentication material, allowing them to move toward servers, backups, and privileged accounts.
CRIL has tracked ransomware operators using credential-harvesting techniques associated with tools such as NirSoft and Mimikatz. BYOVD, or Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver, is another technique security teams should monitor because vulnerable drivers can help attackers bypass security controls.
These activities represent major endpoint security blind spots when organizations monitor servers but have limited visibility across employee workstations.
EDR coverage across every endpoint can help identify unusual processes, credential access, and other indicators during the ransomware pre-execution phase.
Manufacturers rarely operate alone. Suppliers, contractors, logistics providers, and software vendors can all connect to corporate environments.
Attackers may compromise a smaller vendor with weaker defenses and use that trusted relationship to reach a larger target, a technique commonly known as island hopping.
A shared credential, remote connection, vulnerable integration, or compromised software update can become one of the most dangerous ransomware initial access methods.
Organizations therefore need visibility beyond their own infrastructure. Vendor access should be reviewed regularly, unnecessary connections should be removed, and third-party privileges should follow least-privilege principles.
Manufacturing environments face additional endpoint security blind spots because operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) often have long lifecycles and cannot be patched as easily as conventional computers.
Many industrial systems were designed for reliability rather than modern cybersecurity requirements. Connecting previously isolated systems to corporate networks, cloud platforms and remote-management tools has expanded their attack surface.
A ransomware attack affecting production systems can disrupt manufacturing lines, robotics, quality controls and logistics. Attackers can also steal product designs, supplier contracts, pricing information, and other intellectual property before encryption.
Network segmentation, vulnerability monitoring, and strict access controls can reduce the risk while allowing production environments to remain operational.
Phishing remains one of the most effective ransomware initial access methods, but modern campaigns are often highly targeted.
Attackers may research procurement, finance, and supplier relationships before sending messages that closely resemble legitimate business communications. Once credentials are stolen, attackers can monitor conversations before attempting fraud or using the account to gain further access.
This activity can remain hidden because the attacker may initially use legitimate credentials rather than obviously malicious software.
MFA, payment verification, email monitoring, and employee awareness training can reduce exposure. Security teams should also investigate unusual authentication patterns and unexpected account behavior.
Ransomware-as-a-service has lowered the barrier for criminals seeking to conduct sophisticated attacks. Cyble identified 57 new ransomware groups and 27 new extortion groups in 2025, along with more than 350 new ransomware strains.
Between January and April 2025, global ransomware incidents increased by 86%, with Cl0P accounting for 28% of activity during that period, according to Cyble.
Double extortion has also become common. Attackers may steal data before encryption and threaten to leak it. Some groups have escalated to triple extortion by adding DDoS attacks or directly contacting victims' customers.
For organizations with limited security resources, this makes early detection particularly important.
Effective ransomware defense starts before encryption begins. Organizations should patch exploited vulnerabilities, enforce MFA, segment networks, and maintain tested backups while continuously monitoring endpoint security blind spots.
Cyble Titan Endpoint Security combines behavioral detection, threat intelligence from Cyble Vision, and Blaze-AI-powered autonomous response to detect and contain threats before they escalate. See Cyble Titan in action and strengthen endpoint protection today—request a demo.
1. What are endpoint security blind spots?
Endpoint security blind spots are areas where security teams have limited visibility into devices, applications, accounts, or activities. These gaps can allow attackers to establish access and move through an environment before ransomware is detected.
2. How does ransomware evade detection?
Ransomware can evade detection by using legitimate remote-access tools, stolen credentials, fileless techniques, and vulnerable drivers. Attackers may also remain inactive during the ransomware pre-execution phase to avoid triggering security alerts.
3. What are common ransomware attack vectors?
Common ransomware attack vectors include phishing emails, compromised credentials, vulnerable internet-facing systems, remote-access tools, third-party vendors, and exposed operational technology environments.
4. How can organizations reduce ransomware risks on endpoints?
Organizations can reduce risk by deploying EDR or advanced endpoint protection, enforcing MFA, applying least-privilege access, patching vulnerabilities, segmenting networks, and continuously monitoring endpoint activity.
5. How can Cyble Titan help prevent ransomware attacks?
Cyble Titan combines behavioral detection, next-generation antivirus, endpoint telemetry, and Cyble Vision cyber threat intelligence. Its Blaze AI engine can analyze threats, prioritize alerts, and support automated containment and remediation to help security teams respond faster.
Media Disclaimer: This blog was compiled from publicly available advisories and open-source security reporting. It is provided for reference purposes only; readers bear full responsibility for their reliance on it.
The post Endpoint Blind Spots: The 5 Places Ransomware Hides Before It Detonates appeared first on Cyble.
The Americas carried the heaviest ransomware burden of any region on the planet in the first half of 2026. According to Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL), North and South America combined experienced 2,188 documented ransomware attacks between January and June 2026.
That single figure — 2,188 attacks — represents more than 57% of the 3,836 ransomware incidents CRIL tracked worldwide, making the Americas the undisputed center of gravity for global ransomware operations.
But the Americas is not a single threat theatre — it is two. North America alone absorbed 1,981 attacks, driven by a mature, multi-group Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) economy competing for market share. South America, by contrast, recorded 207 attacks concentrated around a much smaller set of operators, with one group — The Gentlemen — claiming nearly a quarter of all regional incidents outright. Understanding the Americas means understanding both halves of that story: a saturated northern market and a consolidating southern one.
Security leaders operating across the hemisphere cannot apply a single threat model to both sub-regions. The data shows meaningfully different attacker behavior, concentration, and monetization strategy north and south of the equator.
| Metric | North America | South America |
| Ransomware Attacks | 1,981 | 207 |
| Dominant Ransomware Actor | Qilin (370 attacks) | The Gentlemen (46 attacks) |
| Top Targeted Sector | Construction | IT & ITES |
| Top Targeted Nation | United States (1,721) | Brazil (71) |
| Distinct Ransomware Groups Active | 50+ | 30+ |
| % of Attacks from Top 3 Groups | ~40% (Qilin, Akira, INC Ransom) | ~57.5% (The Gentlemen, Qilin, LockBit) |
Why the split matters: North America's threat landscape is a genuine marketplace — dozens of RaaS operators compete for affiliate loyalty, and no single group commands more than a fifth of total volume. South America's landscape is more consolidated, with three groups controlling well over half of all attacks.
For defenders, that means North American organizations need broad-spectrum threat intelligence covering a long tail of active groups, while South American organizations can build highly specific defenses against a short list of named adversaries.
Across both sub-regions combined, five ransomware operators account for the overwhelming share of documented activity: Qilin, Akira, INC Ransom, Dragonforce, and The Gentlemen. Together, these five groups are linked to roughly 1,148 of the Americas' 2,188 attacks — approximately 52.5% of all regional ransomware activity.
Attack Volume: 410 documented incidents across the Americas (370 in North America, 40 in South America) — 18.7% of the regional total.
Qilin is the single most prolific ransomware actor operating in the hemisphere, and its dominance is not evenly spread — it is concentrated hardest in the United States.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting: Qilin's targeting logic is deliberate rather than opportunistic:
Operational Characteristics:
Qilin's affiliate model is built for scale. Initial access brokers handle reconnaissance and compromise, mid-tier operators manage lateral movement, and dedicated crews execute encryption and exfiltration. This compartmentalization lets Qilin run dozens of concurrent operations across the United States without any single point of failure. The group's near-total dominance of the American ransomware market (323 of 1,721 US attacks) suggests either an unusually large affiliate roster or a payout structure attractive enough to pull operators away from competing platforms.
Why Qilin Dominates:
Americas Security Implications: Any organization in construction, professional services, manufacturing, or healthcare operating in the US or Canada should treat Qilin as a primary named threat, not a generic ransomware risk.
Attack Volume: 268 documented incidents, almost entirely concentrated in North America — 12.2% of the regional total
Akira is the second most active group in the Americas, and unlike Qilin, its footprint is almost exclusively North American. CRIL's data shows Akira's South American presence is negligible to date.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting:
Operational Characteristics:
Akira has built a reliable playbook around compromising small-to-medium-sized businesses through unpatched public-facing network devices, then pivoting into construction and manufacturing environments where downtime tolerance is lowest. The group's consistency — rather than explosive growth — is its defining trait; it has neither the explosive scale of Qilin nor the geographic diversification of The Gentlemen, but it reliably executes against the same target profile month after month.
Americas Security Implications: North American SMBs in construction, manufacturing, and professional services should assume Akira is actively scanning for exposed remote access infrastructure. Its South American absence should not be mistaken for permanence — RaaS groups expand geographically once North American markets saturate.
Attack Volume: 171 documented incidents (164 in North America, 7 in South America) — 7.8% of the regional total
INC Ransom distinguishes itself through sector specialization rather than volume. The group shows a clear, repeated preference for Professional Services organizations — particularly law firms — leveraging the sensitive, high-stakes nature of legal client data.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting:
Operational Characteristics:
INC Ransom's rapid operational pace and consistent targeting of law firms, healthcare providers, and transportation/energy operators reflects a strategy built entirely around double-extortion leverage. The sensitivity of the data matters more than the size of the victim. A regional law firm holding privileged client communications is, to INC Ransom, a more valuable target than a much larger manufacturer with less sensitive data.
Americas Security Implications: Law firms, accounting practices, and consulting shops across the US, Canada, and Brazil should assume INC Ransom is actively targeting client confidentiality as leverage — not just encrypting file servers for disruption.
Attack Volume: 153 documented incidents (148 in North America, 5 in South America) — 7.0% of the regional total
Dragonforce maintains an aggressive operational tempo focused heavily on the United States, with a strategy that suggests supply-chain-aware targeting rather than random opportunism.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting:
Operational Characteristics:
Dragonforce's manufacturing and construction focus mirrors Qilin's and Akira's playbooks, but its concentration in the US combined with limited-but-present South American activity hints at interest in transnational manufacturing supply chains. North American organizations with manufacturing partners or subsidiaries in Latin America should treat this as a lateral-access risk, not just a direct-targeting one.
Americas Security Implications: Manufacturers and construction firms with cross-border operations — a common structure across USMCA supply chains — should extend Dragonforce-specific monitoring to subsidiaries and vendors, not just headquarters networks.
Attack Volume: 146 documented incidents (100 in North America, 46 in South America) — 6.7% of the regional total, but the single most active ransomware group in South America specifically.
While The Gentlemen rank fifth across the combined Americas, they are the #1 threat actor in South America on their own — responsible for roughly 22% of every ransomware attack recorded in that sub-region.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting:
Operational Characteristics:
The Gentlemen are a relatively new operator that has achieved outsized scale in a short window, and their South American concentration is the most important regional signal in this dataset. Unlike Qilin or Akira — which built North American dominance first and are only beginning to diversify — The Gentlemen appear to have prioritized South America as a primary theatre from early in their operational life, an unusual strategic choice that may reflect lower defensive maturity, less aggressive law enforcement cooperation, or simply less competitive pressure from other RaaS operators in the sub-region.
Americas Security Implications: South American organizations — especially in healthcare, manufacturing, and IT services — should treat The Gentlemen as their single highest-priority named adversary. North American organizations should not discount them either; 100 US-focused attacks is a substantial footprint for a group still building its brand.
Three additional groups warrant inclusion in any Americas threat model:
Attack Volume: 1,721 ransomware attacks — 78.7% of all Americas ransomware activity, and roughly 45% of every ransomware attack recorded worldwide.
No other country on Earth comes close to the volume of ransomware activity absorbed by the United States in H1 2026. The country functions as the default target for nearly every major RaaS operator active today.
Threat Actor Concentration:
Sectoral Breakdown: Manufacturing, Professional Services, Construction, and Healthcare bear the brunt, consistent with the broader North American pattern of operationally sensitive, low-downtime-tolerance industries.
The scale of the US economy, its dense concentration of mid-market manufacturers, law firms, and healthcare providers, and its comparatively high ransom-payment history combine to make it the most economically rational target for every major ransomware operator. US organizations also frequently anchor cross-border supply chains stretching into Canada, Mexico, and South America — meaning a US compromise can cascade into lateral access against hemispheric partners.
Defensive Priority: US organizations across construction, manufacturing, professional services, and healthcare should assume Qilin, Akira, INC Ransom, Dragonforce, Play, and The Gentlemen are all actively scanning for exploitable entry points into their networks simultaneously — not sequentially.
Attack Volume: 179 ransomware attacks — 8.2% of the regional total.
Canada's threat profile closely tracks the United States, reflecting deep economic integration and shared supply chains rather than a distinct targeting logic of its own.
Sectoral Breakdown: Manufacturing, professional services, and construction dominate, mirroring the US pattern almost directly.
Canadian organizations are frequently subsidiaries, suppliers, or joint-venture partners of US enterprises, which means the same RaaS groups saturating the US market extend naturally northward. Cross-border manufacturing in particular creates lateral access opportunities that Dragonforce and Akira appear well-positioned to exploit.
Defensive Priority: Canadian organizations should not assume distance from US headquarters provides insulation — the same threat actors, exploiting the same vulnerability classes, are already active on both sides of the border.
Attack Volume: 71 ransomware attacks — 3.2% of the regional total, but the largest single concentration in South America.
Brazil represents South America's most complex threat environment, combining traditional ransomware pressure with a maturing, sophisticated financial malware ecosystem.
Threat Actor Concentration: The Gentlemen (15 attacks), LockBit, and a fragmented tail of smaller operators.
Sectoral Breakdown: Government & Law Enforcement, BFSI, and Healthcare are the most consistently targeted sectors.
Beyond ransomware, Brazil emerged in H1 2026 as a focal point for new Android banking trojan families — TCLBANKER and BTMOB RAT — which use self-propagation, evasion techniques, and Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) distribution models to target banking and cryptocurrency users directly. Brazil also suffered an alleged 250-million-record breach of Serasa, one of the country's largest credit bureaus, alongside an access sale allegedly targeting the Central Bank of Brazil — a listing that, if genuine, represents one of the most significant initial-access offerings tracked anywhere in the report.
Defensive Priority: Brazilian financial institutions should treat mobile banking malware and ransomware as converging risks rather than separate problems — the same underground economy is monetizing both. Government and BFSI entities should assume access-broker listings referencing critical national infrastructure require immediate incident-response-level validation, not routine monitoring.
Attack Volume: 39 ransomware attacks — 1.8% of the regional total.
Mexico's attack volume is meaningfully lower than the US, Canada, or Brazil, but its position within North American manufacturing supply chains — accelerated by ongoing nearshoring trends — makes it a nation to watch closely rather than dismiss.
As global manufacturers continue relocating production closer to the US market, Mexican facilities increasingly sit inside the same supply chains that Dragonforce, Akira, and Qilin already target aggressively north of the border. Lower current attack volume may reflect earlier-stage targeting rather than lower risk — a pattern security teams should not mistake for durable safety.
Defensive Priority: Manufacturers with Mexican operations should extend the same OT/IT segmentation and vulnerability management discipline applied to US and Canadian facilities to their Mexican sites, rather than treating them as lower priority.
Attack Volume: 33 ransomware attacks — 1.5% of the regional total.
Colombia's ransomware volume is modest, but the country stands out for the density of ideologically motivated activity layered on top of financially driven attacks.
Groups such as Anonymous Colombia (#OpColombia) ran active campaigns throughout H1 2026 blending website defacement, DDoS attacks, and data leak activity — consistent with the broader South American pattern in which hacktivist-branded channels frequently overlap with financially motivated cybercrime infrastructure.
Defensive Priority: Colombian government and law enforcement entities — the most frequently targeted sector across South America overall — should treat hacktivist claims as credible threat intelligence signals rather than dismissing them as purely ideological noise.
Attack Volume: The second most heavily impacted sector in North America.
Professional services firms — law, accounting, and consulting practices — are one of the top jobs on North America's ransomware target list, driven overwhelmingly by INC Ransom and AiLock's aggressive targeting of client-confidential data.
Notable Incident Pattern: AiLock's activity stood out for a coordinated wave of victim disclosures on a single day — March 3, 2026 — a pattern consistent with mass-exploitation of a shared vulnerability rather than individually researched targeting.
Defensive Recommendations:
Attack Volume: Construction and Manufacturing rank first and third in North America; combined, they represent the largest share of Qilin, Akira, Dragonforce, and The Gentlemen's worldwide targeting.
Constructions and manufacturing share a common vulnerability across the Americas: both operate on tight, contractually enforced timelines where downtime translates directly into cascading financial penalties.
Defensive Recommendations:
Attack Volume: One of the top four most heavily impacted sectors in South America.
Healthcare organizations across the Americas — but particularly in South America — face a threat dynamic distinct from financial pressure alone: ransomware attacks against hospitals directly endanger patient safety.
Defensive Recommendations:
Attack Volume: 33% of all North American initial access listings — the second-most targeted sector in the region's access brokerage market.
A distinctive Americas finding: initial access brokers targeting the region show unusually strong interest in Agriculture & Livestock, second only to Technology.
North America's food supply chain increasingly depends on connected logistics, cold-chain monitoring, and precision agriculture technology — creating an attack surface that did not meaningfully exist a decade ago. Access brokers appear to be positioning themselves ahead of ransomware operators, selling footholds into agricultural operations before ransomware crews weaponize them. This mirrors a pattern seen elsewhere globally but is particularly pronounced in North America's access brokerage data.
Defensive Recommendations:
Unlike most hacktivist channels tracked in this report, SOLDADOS DIGITALES – UNIÓN AMERICANA operates across both North and South America, making it one of the few genuinely hemispheric threat actors identified in H1 2026 — a significant finding given how regionally siloed most hacktivist activity tends to be.
Combined Hacktivism Metrics (North + South America):
Notable Collectives by Sub-Region:
The Convergence Problem: As with hacktivist activity documented elsewhere in CRIL's global dataset, several Americas-based channels marketed as ideological collectives function as hybrid operations — logging DDoS attacks and defacement claims alongside stolen-data brokerage and DDoS-for-hire services. Security teams should treat these channels as credible threat intelligence sources rather than dismissing their claims as purely political theater.
If You're in Professional Services:
If You're in Manufacturing or Construction:
If You're in Healthcare:
If You're in BFSI:
If You're in Agriculture & Livestock:
If You're in Government & Law Enforcement (South America specifically):
Based on CRIL's H1 2026 regional data, Americas security leaders should prioritize defensive investment in the following sequence.
Phase 1: Critical Infrastructure Protection (30 days)
Phase 2: Data Protection (60 days)
Phase 3: Operational Resilience (90 days)
Phase 4: Threat Hunting and Detection (Ongoing)
The Americas is not just the largest ransomware theatre in the world by volume — it is two distinct threat environments operating under a single regional label. North America hosts a saturated, competitive RaaS marketplace where no single group dominates outright. South America is consolidating around a smaller set of operators, led decisively by The Gentlemen.
Key Takeaways:
For security leaders across North and South America, the strategic imperative is the same even where the tactical details diverge: know which named actors are active in your specific country and sector, prioritize risk-based patching over blanket cycles, treat data exfiltration as inevitable rather than optional, and build recovery infrastructure that assumes an attack will happen — not one that hopes it won't. The data confirms the Americas will remain the world's most heavily targeted ransomware region through the remainder of 2026. The only open question is how prepared each organization chooses to be.
How many ransomware attacks hit the Americas in H1 2026?
2,188 documented ransomware attacks were observed across North and South America in H1 2026, according to Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) findings.
Which ransomware group is most active in the Americas in H1 2026?
Qilin is the most active group across the combined Americas, with 410 documented attacks (370 in North America, 40 in South America). Within South America specifically, however, The Gentlemen — not Qilin — is the dominant actor.
How many ransomware attacks hit North America in H1 2026?
CRIL recorded 1,981 ransomware attacks in North America during H1 2026, representing roughly 52% of all ransomware activity tracked worldwide.
How many ransomware attacks targeted the US in H1 2026? Is it the highest?
Yes. CRIL observed 1,721 ransomware attacks targeted at the US — which is 78.7% of the American continent (North and South, both), and nearly 45% of every ransomware attack recorded worldwide.
Which sector was the most targeted in South America?
IT & ITES remained the most targeted sector in South America for H1 2026.
Ransomware actors targeted which country the most in South America?
Brazil. With 71 attacks, it was the prime target of ransomware actors in H1 2026.
Is Brazil a significant ransomware target?
Yes. Brazil recorded 71 ransomware attacks — the highest total in South America — and additionally faced an alleged 250 million record breach at credit bureau Serasa, an access sale allegedly targeting the Central Bank of Brazil, and new Android banking trojan families (TCLBANKER, BTMOB RAT) targeting financial and cryptocurrency users.
What is the most targeted industry in the Americas?
Construction tops North America's target list, while IT & ITES, Healthcare, and Professional Services top South America's. Across the whole Americas, Construction and Manufacturing remain consistently high-risk due to their low tolerance for operational downtime.
The post Ransomware Threats in the Americas H1 2026: Dissecting the Regional Attack Patterns and Dominant Actors appeared first on Cyble.
Ransomware stopped being an isolated incident type in 2025. It became the dominant force behind the modern breach landscape, and the ransomware data breach statistics from Cyble's own tracking make the shift impossible to ignore. For organizations facing this growing threat, having a ransomware incident response plan in place is becoming just as important as preventing an attack in the first place.
Cyble's Global Cybersecurity Report 2025 documented 5,967 ransomware attacks for the year, a 50% year-over-year jump. Against the 6,046 data breaches and leaks recorded in the same period, ransomware accounted for nearly half — 49.7% — of the combined ransomware-and-breach total tracked by Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL). That's the "nearly half" this blog's title refers to, and it isn't a projection. It's what Cyble observed.
The pace hasn't slowed into 2026:
CRIL identified 57 new ransomware groups and 27 new extortion groups in 2025, alongside more than 350 new ransomware strains built largely on the MedusaLocker, Chaos, and Makop families.
This is the mechanics of RaaS: affiliates rent pre-built toolkits, and operational capacity scales faster than any single group's headcount. Between January and April 2025, this dynamic drove an 86% spike in global incidents, with Cl0P alone responsible for 28% of that quarter's activity, per Cyble's Ransomware Threat Landscape report.
Encrypt-and-leak is now standard operating procedure. CRIL's research into extortion technique evolution tracked groups layering in triple extortion (DDoS on top of encryption and data theft) and direct outreach to a victim's clients — a tactic CL0P has used to compound reputational damage beyond the initial breach. For a lean team, this means "we have backups" no longer neutralizes the threat; the data theft component still forces a decision.
Cyble's Europe Q1 2026 findings noted that attackers are deliberately targeting sectors with narrow downtime tolerance — manufacturing and construction firms face contract penalties and supply-chain breakage within days of an outage, which shortens the runway between intrusion and ransom decision. Lean security teams, by definition, have the least slack to absorb that pressure.
The October 2025 surge to 5,194 year-to-date attacks was fueled by a steady supply of critical vulnerabilities and unpatched internet-facing assets, per Cyble's analysis. For small teams, prevention priorities follow directly from that finding:
Zero trust doesn't require a full architecture overhaul on day one. The practical entry points for a lean team:
Given that Qilin and similar groups deploy Linux-based binaries on Windows hosts and harvest credentials via NirSoft and Mimikatz-style toolkits, EDR coverage across every endpoint — not just servers — is the difference between detection in hours versus discovery via a ransom note.
A working ransomware incident response plan and cybersecurity incident response checklist should cover, at minimum:
The ransomware incident response plan and recovery speed depend on preparation done months earlier: validated backup integrity, a pre-mapped list of critical systems in priority order, and a rehearsed communication plan for customers and regulators. Teams that treat recovery as an extension of the incident response plan — rather than an improvised scramble — cut both downtime and the pressure to pay.
Every ransomware statistic in this ransomware incident response plan playbook — the leak-site counts, the group rankings, the extortion techniques, the sector targeting — traces back to one thing: visibility into where attackers operate before they hit a victim's network. That's the gap Cyble Vision is built to close.
Cyble Vision is the threat intelligence platform behind CRIL's own research, continuously monitoring deep, dark, and surface web sources — ransomware leak sites, underground forums, and threat actor chatter — through its Blaze AI engine.
For a lean security team, that means the same early-warning signal CRIL uses to track Qilin, Akira, and every emerging RaaS affiliate becomes available as a live feed for their own organization: exposed credentials, brand mentions on cybercrime forums, ransomware group activity tied to their sector, and third-party breach exposure, all correlated and prioritized automatically instead of requiring a dedicated analyst to piece it together manually.
For a team that can't staff round-the-clock dark web monitoring or manually track which of the dozens of active ransomware groups is circling their industry, this is the difference between finding out from a leak site and finding out weeks earlier.
Lean teams can't out-staff ransomware operators, but they can out-see them. Request a Cyble Vision demo to get the same dark web and ransomware-tracking intelligence CRIL uses to build reports like this one — built for teams that need to know who's targeting them before the leak site does.
A ransomware incident response plan for small security teams isn't about matching enterprise headcount. It's about aligning limited resources against the specific mechanics CRIL has documented: patch the exploited CVEs first, lock down remote-access tools, deploy EDR broadly, and rehearse the incident response plan before the RaaS-fueled affiliate economy finds the gap.
The post Ransomware Now Shows Up in Nearly Half of All Breaches: A Survival Playbook for Lean Security Teams appeared first on Cyble.
Identity-based attacks drive 90% of incidents. Learn how modern attackers exploit identities and what SOC leaders can do to respond.
The post Inside the Modern SOC: The Identity Front Door appeared first on Unit 42.
Europe faced a ransomware onslaught in the first half of 2026 that sets a troubling precedent for the remainder of the year. According to Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL), the region experienced 866 documented ransomware attacks, 51 confirmed data breach incidents, and 7 initial access sales between January and June 2026. These figures represent not just a volume problem, but a fundamental shift in how threat actors are organizing, targeting, and monetizing their operations within European territory.
What distinguishes the ransomware threats in Europe from other global regions is the concentration of power among a small number of highly sophisticated threat actors. While the threat ecosystem encompasses dozens of groups, five dominant ransomware operators account for approximately 55% of all documented activity. This concentration creates predictability—European security leaders can now identify, profile, and build specific defensive strategies against known adversaries.
Attack Volume: 158 documented incidents (18.2% of regional total)
Qilin stands as the dominant ransomware threat actor targeting Europe, commanding operational superiority through sophisticated affiliate management, rapid exploit weaponization, and industry-specific targeting intelligence.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting: Qilin demonstrates deliberate sectoral selection rather than opportunistic targeting:
Operational Characteristics:
Qilin's dominance stems from understanding European organizational economics. Construction projects operate under time-sensitive contracts with contractually-defined penalties for delay. A single day of downtime on a €50 million construction project can trigger cascading costs exceeding €100,000. This economic reality translates directly into ransom payment likelihood, making Qilin's targeting strategy rational and highly effective.
The group maintains an extensive affiliate network capable of concurrent operations across multiple European nations. Evidence suggests Qilin has compartmentalized its operations: initial access brokers handle reconnaissance and network compromise, mid-tier operators manage lateral movement and privilege escalation, and final-stage operators execute encryption and exfiltration. This division of labor enables rapid scaling and reduces attribution risk.
Why Qilin Dominates:
European Security Implications: Organizations in construction, professional services, and manufacturing should treat Qilin as their primary threat actor concern. Defensive strategies must prioritize data exfiltration prevention, network segmentation, and immutable backup infrastructure.
Attack Volume: 144 documented incidents (16.6% of regional total)
The Gentlemen represent an emerging threat actor that has achieved remarkable scale in a relatively short operational window. Unlike established groups that evolved from other cybercriminal operations, The Gentlemen appear purpose-built for ransomware-as-a-service operations.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting:
Operational Characteristics:
The Gentlemen's rapid emergence and sustained growth suggest significant operational funding and technical sophistication. The group's geographic diversification—maintaining European dominance while aggressively expanding into Asia-Pacific—indicates either organizational scale or partnerships with regional threat actors.
Notably, The Gentlemen's Thailand targeting (35 incidents) suggests supply-chain attack sophistication. By compromising manufacturing and logistics operations in Thailand, the group can leverage these beachheads for downstream attacks against Western European organizations. This cross-continental supply-chain targeting represents a significant evolution in ransomware operational sophistication.
Key Distinction: While Qilin focuses on maximizing ransom payments from individual targets, The Gentlemen appear to prioritize operational scale and geographic expansion. This suggests the group may be building toward either:
European Security Implications: The Gentlemen's emergence signals market competition is intensifying. Organizations should monitor this group's operational evolution closely, as aggressive growth often precedes operational mistakes that create defensive opportunities.
Attack Volume: 61 documented incidents (7.0% of regional total)
LockBit's presence in European targeting represents a significant finding given sustained law enforcement pressure and multiple platform disruption attempts. Despite being targeted by coordinated international takedown operations, LockBit maintained operational capability throughout H1 2026.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting:
Operational Resilience:
LockBit's continued operations despite international enforcement actions demonstrate several critical lessons:
The group's continued viability suggests that law enforcement actions, while disruptive, are insufficient to eliminate established RaaS operations. Organizations cannot rely on law enforcement intervention as a defensive strategy; they must assume LockBit and similar groups will remain operational threats indefinitely.
European Security Implications: LockBit should remain on European security teams' active threat monitoring lists. The group maintains technical sophistication, access to critical zero-day exploits, and demonstrated willingness to target European critical infrastructure.
Attack Volume: 59 documented incidents (6.8% of regional total)
Akira represents a secondary-tier ransomware group with focused European operations. The group demonstrates strong preference for Manufacturing and Construction sectors, suggesting industry-specific expertise or targeted affiliate recruitment.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting:
Operational Profile:
Akira's disproportionate North American presence (268 attacks) with lower European activity (59 attacks) suggests the group may have established affiliate networks in North America with secondary capacity for European operations. The strong manufacturing and construction focus mirrors Qilin's strategy, indicating these sectors offer superior ransom payment likelihood across multiple geographic markets.
European Security Implications: While not as immediately threatening as Qilin or The Gentlemen, Akira's persistent operations warrant inclusion in threat modeling exercises. European manufacturing and construction organizations should monitor Akira's affiliate recruitment channels and tactical innovations.
Attack Volume: 54 documented incidents (6.2% of regional total)
Dragonforce rounds out the top-five European threat actors with apparent specialization in Manufacturing and Technology sectors, suggesting possible supply-chain attack capabilities.
Geographic Concentration:
Worldwide Sectoral Targeting:
Operational Pattern:
Dragonforce's heavy US focus with secondary European operations suggests the group may be leveraging North American-based supply chains to gain access to European targets. Manufacturing supply chains are deeply interconnected across transatlantic partners; compromising US manufacturers could provide lateral access into European operations.
European Security Implications: European manufacturing organizations should implement aggressive third-party risk management programs, particularly for US-based suppliers. Dragonforce's supply-chain sophistication suggests the group may bypass direct targeting in favor of compromising upstream vendors.
Attack Volume: 155 ransomware attacks (17.9% of regional total)
Germany's position as Europe's manufacturing powerhouse places it at the center of ransomware targeting campaigns. The nation's industrial sector—encompassing automotive, machinery, chemicals, and precision manufacturing—represents the most valuable ransomware target set in Europe.
Threat Actor Concentration:
Sectoral Breakdown:
German organizations represent an optimal target combination: high asset value, supply-chain criticality, strong operational technology integration, and proven willingness to pay ransoms to maintain production schedules. Additionally, Germany's federal structure creates jurisdictional complexity that may slow law enforcement response.
The nation's Mittelstand (mid-market manufacturing firms) are particularly vulnerable—large enough to justify ransom payments, but sometimes lacking enterprise-grade security infrastructure.
Defensive Priority: German manufacturing organizations should assume Qilin, The Gentlemen, Akira, and Dragonforce all maintain active operations targeting their sector. Network segmentation between IT and operational technology (OT) environments should be elevated to critical priority.
Attack Volume: 138 ransomware attacks (15.9% of regional total)
The UK faces a different threat profile than Germany, driven primarily by London's position as a global financial services hub. While manufacturing is targeted, Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance (BFSI) organizations command disproportionate attention.
Threat Actor Concentration:
Sectoral Breakdown:
London's financial services ecosystem manages trillions in assets, making it extraordinarily valuable to data-exfiltrating threat actors. BFSI organizations hold customer financial data, internal financial records, and strategic information that commands premium prices on dark web marketplaces.
Additionally, regulatory requirements (FCA, PRA, etc.) create pressure for rapid ransom payment to avoid breach notification delays that could trigger regulatory sanctions.
Data Exfiltration Risk: The UK's status as a financial services hub makes it particularly vulnerable to data-centric attack strategies. Organizations should assume that successful breach attempts will include aggressive data exfiltration alongside encryption deployment.
Defensive Priority: UK BFSI organizations must implement robust data loss prevention (DLP), encryption for data in transit and at rest, and aggressive monitoring for unauthorized data access or exfiltration attempts.
Attack Volume: 119 ransomware attacks (13.7% of regional total)
France experiences balanced threat distribution across multiple sectors, reflecting both its manufacturing capacity and significant professional services sector.
Threat Actor Concentration:
Sectoral Breakdown:
As Europe's second-largest economy, France is attractive to ransomware operators across multiple sectors. The nation's professional services sector (legal, accounting, consulting) is particularly valuable for data exfiltration, while manufacturing remains a consistent target.
Defensive Priority: French organizations should implement sector-specific defensive strategies: professional services firms should prioritize client data protection and DLP, while manufacturing organizations should focus on OT segmentation and operational resilience.
Attack Volume: 115 ransomware attacks (13.3% of regional total)
Italy faces concentrated targeting in construction and manufacturing sectors, with particular pressure on small-to-medium enterprises in industrial regions.
Threat Actor Concentration:
Sectoral Breakdown:
Italy's construction industry is particularly vulnerable to ransom attacks due to tight project timelines and significant financial exposure. The nation's manufacturing sector, while sophisticated, sometimes operates with legacy infrastructure that creates exploitation opportunities.
Defensive Priority: Italian construction and manufacturing organizations should prioritize incident response readiness, backup infrastructure resilience, and supply-chain risk management.
Attack Volume: 87 ransomware attacks (10.0% of regional total)
Spain experiences lower absolute attack volume than Germany, UK, France, or Italy, but faces concentrated pressure in manufacturing and professional services sectors.
Threat Actor Concentration:
Sectoral Breakdown:
Regional Observation: Spain's lower attack volume may reflect either lower overall ransomware targeting or more effective defensive implementations. Spanish security teams should not interpret lower numbers as reduced threat but rather as a baseline for future comparison.
Attack Volume: 107 documented incidents (58% of all sector targeting across regions – not just in Europe – analyzed)
Construction organizations face disproportionate ransomware targeting across the entire European region. This concentration reflects understood economic vulnerabilities that threat actors exploit with precision.
European Construction Risk Mapping:
Defensive Recommendations for Construction:
Attack Volume: 86 documented incidents
Professional services firms (law, accounting, consulting) face sophisticated targeting driven by data exfiltration opportunities rather than operational disruption pressure.
European Professional Services Risk:
Key Finding: Professional services firms experience disproportionate data breach incidents (exfiltration with confirmed leak activity) compared to other sectors. Of the 51 total data breach incidents across Europe and UK, professional services represents a concentrated target.
Defensive Recommendations:
Attack Volume: 123 documented incidents
European manufacturing organizations face sophisticated, supply-chain-aware threat actors who understand production dependencies and downtime economics.
Geographic Manufacturing Risk Concentration:
Critical Vulnerability Pattern: Manufacturing organizations are disproportionately targeting known, exploitable vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure appliances (network appliances, security tools, identity systems). Rather than deploying zero-days, threat actors exploit patched vulnerabilities that organizations have not implemented.
Defensive Recommendations:
Attack Volume: 35 documented incidents
Healthcare organizations face a unique threat dynamic where ransomware directly endangers patient safety, creating existential operational pressure distinct from financial threats.
European Healthcare Risk Distribution:
Critical Finding: Healthcare organizations experience disproportionately high data breach incident rates, suggesting organized threat actors specifically target health information exfiltration.
Defensive Recommendations:
Confirmed Data Breaches: 51 Incidents Across Europe and UK
While ransomware attacks total 866, only 51 incidents resulted in confirmed data breaches and leaks (5.9% confirmation rate). This apparent low percentage masks a critical operational truth: organizations cannot distinguish between encryption-only attacks and data exfiltration scenarios until exfiltration attempts or threats emerge.
Data Breach Distribution by Sector:
| Sector | Confirmed Breaches | Percentage |
| BFSI | 9 | 17.6% |
| Telecom | 9 | 17.6% |
| Retail | 8 | 15.7% |
| Government & LEA | 6 | 11.8% |
| Media & Entertainment | 5 | 9.8% |
| Technology | 4 | 7.8% |
| Healthcare | 4 | 7.8% |
| Automotive | 3 | 5.9% |
| Construction | 2 | 3.9% |
| Education | 1 | 2.0% |
| Others | 6 | 11.8% |
Critical Observation: BFSI and Telecom sectors experience disproportionate data breach incidents, suggesting these industries are specifically targeted for data exfiltration rather than operational disruption. The strategic implication is clear: threat actors targeting financial and telecommunications organizations prioritize data monetization over ransom payment.
Primary Exfiltration Actors:
| Actor | Confirmed Leak Posts | Targeting Pattern |
| tanaka | 6 | Industry-agnostic, global operations |
| kazutlg | 4 | BFSI and Professional Services focus |
| aslan1 | 2 | Government and Technology sectors |
| darkcybervault | 2 | Retail and Professional Services |
| breach3d | 2 | Technology focus |
| frog | 2 | Diverse sector targeting |
| ken6k | 2 | BFSI concentration |
| max9898 | 2 | Retail and Technology |
| worldrdp | 2 | Technology sector |
| zyad2drkwb | 2 | Government targeting |
| zoozkooz | 2 | Diverse sector |
| mr_x1 | 1 | Retail focus |
| ventuuas | 1 | Professional Services |
| Others | 18 | Distributed diverse targeting |
Strategic Finding: While Qilin, The Gentlemen, and LockBit dominate ransomware attack volume, data exfiltration is fragmented across numerous smaller actors, including tanaka (6 posts), kazutlg (4 posts), and dozens of single-incident operators. This suggests a mature data brokerage ecosystem where extracted data is resold to specialized exfiltration actors.
Dark Web Data Marketplace Activity:
Implication: Organizations can no longer assume encrypted data is "lost forever" if backups are restored. Exfiltrated data will be monetized regardless of whether organizations pay ransoms. Data loss prevention becomes as critical as ransomware detection.
H1 2026 witnessed increasing overlap between geopolitically motivated hacktivism and financially motivated cybercrime, particularly among pro-Russian collectives targeting NATO-aligned European nations.
NoName057(16) - The Pro-Russian DDoS Coalition
Operational Evolution: NoName057(16) began as a purely activist collective claiming ideological motivation (anti-NATO, pro-Russia). By H1 2026, the group had evolved to include data exfiltration and monetization—suggesting either organizational evolution or infiltration by financially motivated threat actors.
Strategic Implication: European organizations cannot compartmentalize threat modeling. A geopolitically motivated attack that begins as a DDoS campaign can transition into ransomware deployment when exfiltration opportunities present themselves.
Prioritized Defensive Roadmap
Based on CRIL's H1 2026 regional data, European security leaders should prioritize defensive investments in the following sequence:
Phase 1: Critical Infrastructure Protection (30 days)
Phase 2: Data Protection (60 days)
Phase 3: Operational Resilience (90 days)
Phase 4: Threat Hunting and Detection (Ongoing)
If You're in Construction:
If You're in Professional Services:
If You're in Manufacturing:
If You're in BFSI:
If You're in Healthcare:
Europe and the UK face a mature, organized ransomware ecosystem dominated by five sophisticated threat actors who have developed deep understanding of regional economic vulnerabilities. The threat is not random or opportunistic—it is strategic, targeted, and evolved.
Key Takeaways:
For European security leaders, the path forward is to understand your regional threat actors, prioritize critical infrastructure protection, implement robust data protection measures, and establish resilient backup and recovery infrastructure. The threat is severe, but it is also understood and defensible. The question is not whether European organizations will face ransomware attacks in the remainder of 2026 and beyond—the data confirms they will. The question is whether they will be prepared.
The post Ransomware Threats in Europe H1 2026: A Deep Dive into Regional Attack Patterns and Dominant Threat Actors appeared first on Cyble.
Frontier AI is reshaping vulnerability discovery. Learn how our NOVA system found 14,000+ unknown vulnerabilities across the open-source software supply chain.
The post The Frontier AI Vulnerability Burst: Industrializing Autonomous Zero-Day Discovery in Open-Source Software appeared first on Unit 42.
Explore Unit 42's perspectives on AI's impact on cybersecurity, including key updates since the 2026 Incident Response Report.
The post AI, Automation and Attacks: Unpacking the Unit 42 2026 Global Incident Response Report appeared first on Unit 42.
Unit 42 explores The Gentlemen ransomware operations, revealing the affiliate model driving its rapid growth. Learn more here.
The post No Manners Here: The Ruthless Rise of The Gentlemen Ransomware appeared first on Unit 42.
A look inside the reverse-engineering journey of building the first RDP client outside of Windows to support WebAuthn redirection.
The post How We Added WebAuthn to a Browser-Based RDP Client appeared first on Unit 42.
Entrar