A 2017 UK assessment warned that police data on Microsoft Azure could face foreign access risks. The risks may still exist.

A Guardian investigation has surfaced a 2017 document signed off by then City of London police commissioner Ian Dyson, who also held the title of senior information risk owner for the entire country. That document reviewed 15 risks tied to moving police data onto Microsoft Azure. The files in question include criminal records, victim statements, internal emails, information from more than 40 UK police forces, and some material exceeding standard “official” classification, meaning it may sit at “secret” or “top secret” level.

The assessment was clear. It said Microsoft software had vulnerabilities that could eventually be exploited by cybercriminals and other attackers. It also pointed to a more specific and worrying risk: “US government insiders.”

“In doing so, officers accepted that “US government insiders” would be able to see the data, and that it could be “transmitted worldwide”, with “the extent of this … unknown”. According to five specialists who reviewed the Guardian’s findings, the risks identified in that document persist today. Almost every UK police force now depends on Microsoft Azure, and the UK government spends at least £1.9bn on Microsoft software each year.”” states The Guardian.

“There is a risk of compromise of sensitive data shared by, or taken from, Microsoft by the US government being released by US government insider attackers.” reads the document.

This wasn’t a general concern. It was a specific threat identified eight years ago by the official responsible for data-handling standards in British policing. Five experts who reviewed the same assessment for The Guardian said the risks are still relevant today.

The proposed protections were fairly simple: use Microsoft’s built-in encryption, keep servers updated and let individual police chiefs decide whether to use the service. But experts interviewed by The Guardian, including Microsoft engineers, said encryption does not prevent Microsoft employees from accessing the data. They also said it would not necessarily prevent the US government from obtaining it.

Which is exactly the geography problem Dave Michels, a researcher at Queen Mary University of London’s Cloud Legal Project, pointed to. Microsoft’s cloud infrastructure spans over 100 countries, and pieces of a single file can end up stored across several of them, Sweden to Ethiopia, for instance. Microsoft has started offering EU customers assurances that data stays within European borders, but Michels called the whole focus on data location somewhat beside the point, since the people who can access the data matter more than the servers holding it.

Legally, the situation becomes more complicated. Under the US CLOUD Act, American authorities can require US-based companies to provide data they control, even when that data is stored outside the United States. In some cases, companies can also be prevented from telling the customer about the request.

Microsoft, Amazon and Google have said they would challenge such requests when possible. But, as international law professor Douwe Korff pointed out:

“The risk is obvious, even though the providers of the cloud and the government both have an interest in talking it down” Douwe Korff, professor of international law told The Guardian.

Which brings us to the part that reads like a contradiction under pressure. Police officials told the Guardian the data stays in the UK and that Microsoft can’t share it without permission. Microsoft, meanwhile, told Police Scotland back in 2023 that data can leave the UK and that it cannot guarantee data sovereignty. Those two statements aren’t compatible, and nobody seems eager to reconcile them out loud.

Every single UK police force has now put its data, wholly or partly, on Microsoft’s cloud, despite all of this being on record since 2017. One former senior policing source summed up the current state of visibility pretty starkly:

“All the security guys I worked with when this policy came in expected a big breach by now, and we know it will take that to change the police’s position.” a source told The Guardian. “The truth is, however, the level of logging and information in the cloud systems would not necessarily tell us if there was a problem. We really don’t know if the data has been breached or not.”

That’s the key point. It’s not saying, “we checked and everything is fine,” or “there has been no incident.” It’s saying that the available logs and monitoring might not detect a breach even if one happened.

For anyone responsible for sensitive data in a large cloud environment, that’s an important warning. In a security assessment, saying “we would probably know if something went wrong” isn’t enough without evidence that the monitoring can actually detect it.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Microsoft Azure)

• In mid-2026, an emerging cybercriminal group known as ExfilSquad launched a high-profile extortion campaign targeting prominent UK organisations across the public sector, education, and law enforcement, as well as other firms worldwide.
• Unlike traditional ransomware groups, ExfilSquad does not deploy encryptors or destructive malware. Instead, they operate as a pure data extortion group, stealing data and threatening to publish it on their onion-based Data Leak Site (DLS) if a ransom is not paid.
• Several prominent UK entities have confirmed breaches linked to the group:
• UK Department for Education (DfE): Approximately 600,000 records stolen from its Help Portal containing parent and staff contact details (names, emails, phone numbers, job titles), plus around 7,000 records from the Turing Portal.
• Police National Legal Database (PNLD): Stole 1.9 GB of data (around 135,000 records) containing contact information for over 100,000 serving police officers, staff, and criminal justice professionals, alongside around 21,000 "Ask the Police" public inquiry records.
• Newcastle University: Approximately 440,000 records compromised containing applicant and student contact information, personally identifiable information (PII), and admissions database records caused by a technical configuration flaw connecting to an admissions system.
• Analysis of the details left on the data leak site revealed that ExfilSquad's primary attack vector involves exploiting misconfigurations in cloud portals, customer relationship management (CRM) platforms, internal case management systems, as well as Microsoft Power Pages data tables left publicly accessible without proper authentication.
• To force compliance and prove their claims are real, ExfilSquad uploaded multi-gigabyte torrent files for each victim to their TOR leak site. Resecurity noted that ExfilSquad assigns a distinct Torrent Tracker and initial Web Seed per victim.

Analyst Comment

While ExfilSquad is a new group, they appear to be already experienced at running these types of attacks, suggesting they have a history of cybercrime. Plus, ExfilSquad’s recent campaign highlights the growing trend of transitioning from file-encrypting ransomware to extortion driven entirely by cloud and SaaS misconfigurations. Organisations that have invested in defending against endpoint-based threats are often leaving critical business application interfaces exposed.

SaaS platforms continue to be primary targets of English-speaking cybercrime communities. In recent years,  customers of major SaaS providers, such as Salesloft, Salesforce, and Snowflake have all been extorted. Microsoft Power Pages portals, CRM databases, and customer support helpdesks frequently hold vast repositories of sensitive contact data and interaction histories. When internet-facing API endpoints or data table permissions are left unauthenticated or unpatched, cybercriminals can systematically scrape massive volumes of data without ever needing to drop a payload or escalate privileges internally.

ExfilSquad’s reliance on torrent distribution further amplifies reputational and operational damage. While gangs like LockBit, Clop, and Akira have previously utilised torrents, ExfilSquad’s operational twist of assigning unique Torrent Trackers and dedicated Web Seeds to individual victims ensures that leaked files distribute rapidly across P2P networks, making it extremely difficult to perform a takedown.

While ExfilSquad’s breaches have largely compromised contact directories and administrative support records, the real-world risks remain significant. Exposing work emails, names, and organisational structures for over 100,000 police officers and civil servants poses distinct social engineering, spear-phishing, and physical security concerns that impacted institutions will have to manage long after the breach occurs.

Defensive Takeaways

• Audit Microsoft Power Pages and Public SaaS Tables: Regularly review public data table permissions, web API settings, and unauthenticated browser views across Microsoft Power Pages, CRMs, and customer support portals to ensure backend data tables are not exposed to the public internet.
• Harden CRM and Case Management Integrations: Treat external-facing admissions portals, helpdesks, and case management systems as high-risk platforms. Implement strict access controls, conduct routine configuration audits, and enforce proper API token security.
• Deploy External Attack Surface Management (EASM): Utilise continuous external attack surface scanning to detect newly exposed web endpoints, misconfigured database connectors, and publicly exposed storage buckets before malicious actors locate them.
• Incorporate Pure Extortion into Incident Response Plans: Security teams must adapt incident response playbooks for data-theft-only scenarios. Organisations may seek to establish protocols for monitoring peer-to-peer (P2P) networks and managing public disclosures when stolen data is distributed via torrents.

Relevant Sources

1. https://www.computing.co.uk/news/2026/security/newcastle-university-data-breach-exfilsquad
2. https://www.thetimes.com/uk/crime/article/who-are-exfilsquad-hackers-cyberattacks-dtzhvvzgj
3. https://www.ncl.ac.uk/press/articles/latest/2026/07/statementonpotentialunauthoriseddataaccess/
4. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq6dmgrp21po
5. https://www.pnld.co.uk/article/?id=7ebf3c0e-598e-f111-8077-7ced8d3aa78f

Relevant CTI Sources

1. https://www.ransomware.live/group/ExfilSquad
2. https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/exfilsquad-targets-new-victims-shares-data-via-torrents
3. https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-exfilsquad/
4. https://www.sans.org/blog/hunting-saas-threats-insights-for589-course-cybercriminal-campaigns

• On 7 August 2026, the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) disclosed that between July 2021 and June 2023, the ACRO Criminal Records Office suffered three separate compromises involving its customer portal website (acro.police.uk).
• ACRO is a national police unit providing public services such as issuing Police Certificates, International Child Protection Certificates, and processing Subject Access Requests.
• In March 2023, ACRO was notified about an SQL injection attack that reportedly exposed 15 sets of credentials, the majority of which belonged to its employees.
• A subsequent forensic investigation uncovered long-term threat actor activity within the website's environment, spanning from 9 July 2021 to 22 June 2023.
• The website was built on the Kentico CMS and was running version 12.0.0 between September 2019 and March 2023. This version had multiple known vulnerabilities at the time of the incident, but suffered from ambiguity around who was accountable for patching led to missed hotfixes and updates.
• Between 15 and 16 February 2023, an unknown threat actor staged personal data for exfiltration, which included Police Certificate Applications, Subject Access Request (SAR) forms, and International Child Protection Certificate forms.
• Due to insufficient log retention, ACRO could not definitively determine if the data was successfully exfiltrated. A maximum of 10,920 data subjects had their data staged, but ACRO ultimately notified 84,048 data subjects on a precautionary basis in April 2023.
• Notably, on 23 February 2023, the ICO learned that ACRO's Trend Micro antivirus software detected and quarantined four attempts to install the well-known credential harvesting tool Mimikatz. However, because ACRO operated without a documented patching policy and lacked a structured process for analyzing security alerts, these warnings were never reviewed or acted upon.

What Happened

• New data published by the City of London Police in June 2026 reveals that courier fraud losses exceeded £21 million in 2025, with individuals aged over 70 being heavily targeted. The highest concentration of these offenses was recorded in London and the Home Counties.
• Cybercriminals and fraud syndicates are actively evolving their operational tactics, increasingly pivoting to messaging platforms like WhatsApp to contact their victims and remotely paying for third-party courier services to facilitate physical collections.
• UK law enforcement also highlighted a dangerous shift in 2025 toward high-value physical goods. Victims are being systematically manipulated into visiting multiple jewellers over an extended period to purchase gold and expensive jewellery, which they then hand directly to fraud couriers.

Recent operational crackdowns by UK Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) showcase the nationwide scale of these networks:

• North West ROCU Operations (July 2026): Police executed coordinated search warrants in Huddersfield and Manchester, arresting two men (aged 21 and 25) on suspicion of Conspiracy to Defraud and Money Laundering. In this specific series, the suspects impersonated bank fraud departments, convinced a victim her card was compromised, sent a courier to collect it, and immediately exploit the physical card to make numerous fraudulent transactions.
• North East ROCU (NEROCU) Sentencing (June 2026): A complex, cross-country courier fraud operation spanning March to May 2022 concluded with a prison sentence for a primary operative. The network targeted 14 separate victims, convincing them to hand over physical bank cards and PIN numbers under the guise of an internal "investigation" by their bank's fraud department. The group scammed a total of £56,000, which was then rapidly laundered through the high street purchase of smartphones, designer clothing, and luxury jewellery.

Analyst Comment

Courier fraud is effectively a hybrid cyber-physical social engineering campaign. While the final phase relies on a physical courier arriving at a victim’s doorstep, the initial approach relies heavily on psychological manipulation and email, message, or phone call-based deception.

This type of fraud is notable as it follows a structured cybercriminal playbook that bypasses detection systems and takes advantage of the vulnerable in society. The victim is instructed to bypass normal banking security controls by withdrawing cash, disclosing sensitive credentials (like PINs), or purchasing high-value physical commodities like gold or luxury jewellery. This makes it difficult to proactively detect and prevent.

The other concerning factor is the couriers themselves. According to reports, they can be an unwitting third-party courier service that is paid to go to the victim's home to collect the assets. Online services enable cybercriminals to organise these pickups remotely, lowering their risk of being caught.

The £21 million sizeable loss metric from 2025 shows how profitable this low-tech, high manipulation vector remains. The recent shift to targeting gold and luxury jewellery is a deliberate evasion tactic against traditional anti-money laundering (AML) and banking fraud detection algorithms. While banks have grown adept at flagging unusual rapid bank transfers, they cannot easily stop an account holder from physically withdrawing funds or using a card over several days at different brick-and-mortar luxury retailers. This tactic serves as a highly liquid physical laundering pipeline for these syndicates that remains a challenge to prevent.

Defensive Takeaways

• Implement Bank Transfer and Purchase Outlier Alerts: Financial institutions can focus on further behavioural monitoring for elderly demographics, looking specifically for sudden, consecutive high-value transactions at physical luxury retail or jewellery establishments and flag patterns on unusual activity for review.
• Public Awareness on Cross-Media Scams: Security awareness campaigns must make it clear that legitimate institutions, specifically the Police and Banking Fraud teams, will never send a courier to a residential address to collect cash, PIN numbers, bank cards, or purchased items.
• Vetting of Courier Logistics: Commercial courier services are increasingly being abused as infrastructure by these threat groups. Logistics firms must implement logging and analysis systems to detect unusual residential pickups booked via suspicious accounts and forged identities.

Relevant Sources

1. https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/news/city-of-london/news/2026/june/over-70s-targeted-as-courier-fraud-exceeds-21-million-in-2025-with-london-and-home-counties-hit-hardest/
2. https://www.rocu.police.uk/news/2026/july/two-suspected-fraudsters-arrested-after-cross-border-strikes/
3. https://www.rocu.police.uk/news/2026/june/a-courier-fraud-conman-has-been-jailed/