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Score by collisions, patch by panic: defensive architecture for the post-90-day-disclosure era

After my last post on the death of the 90-day window (https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/05/the-90-day-disclosure-policy-is-dead/), the loudest critique I got was: 'Great complaint, what's the proposal?'
This is the proposal. It is an informal RFC on how we actually have to change engineering architecture when LLM-assisted bug hunting means the exploit lands before the patch. No magic vendor tools, just strict egress rules, ephemeral infrastructure (burning containers every 12 hours) and rootless runtime sandboxing. Curious to hear where you think this approach breaks down.

submitted by /u/unknownhad
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The compression of the exploit timeline: Why n-day gaps and 90-day embargoes are failing in practice.

The traditional vulnerability disclosure timeline relies on a fundamental assumption: exploit development and vulnerability discovery take time. Over the last 12 months the integration of LLMs into offensive tooling has demonstrably broken this assumption.
I recently published a technical write-up arguing that the 90-day disclosure window is effectively dead backed by three specific observations from recent incidents:

  1. Automated Diff Analysis (30-minute n-days) : The safety net between a patch release and an in-the-wild exploit is gone. Taking a recent React security patch (CVE-2026-23870), I used an LLM to analyze the diff, identify the vulnerable path, and write a working DoS PoC in roughly 30 minutes. The human reverse-engineering bottleneck has been bypassed.
  2. Vulnerability Convergence : I recently reported a critical P0 to a vendor and was told I was the 11th reporter in 6 weeks. LLM assisted scanners are causing independent researchers to converge on the same bugs simultaneously. An embargo no longer contains the vulnerability; it simply provides a head start to whichever threat actor also found it.
  3. The Linux Kernel (Copy Fail & Dirty Frag) : The recent kernel exploits highlight this perfectly. Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) went from an automated AI scan to a public PoC to nation state weaponization in days. Shortly after the embargo for Dirty Frag (CVE-2026-43284 / CVE-2026-43500) was broken in hours because an unrelated third party independently discovered the same bug class using similar tooling.

The defense cannot operate on monthly cycles when the offense is operating in hours. The focus needs to shift to real-time, PR-level AI scanning to match the pace.
can read the full technical breakdown and case studies on my blog:https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/05/the-90-day-disclosure-policy-is-dead/

I am curious if the researchers here are experiencing similar convergence rates or if you view this as a temporary anomaly while legacy codebases are scanned with new tools.

submitted by /u/unknownhad
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